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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the socio-economic organization and change of the 
Ersari Tlirkmen, a little known people of Northern Afghanistan. They live in Afghan 
Turkistan, a region which is ethnically very mixed and where members of many 
different tribal and linguistic groups are in competition for scarce resources. 
Ersari ethnicity and tribal identity are constructed in terms of language, religion 
(Sunni Islam) and a patrilineal genealogy which links them with the founding 
TUrkmen ancestor. 
Fieldwork was carried out under difficult conditions for seventeen months in 
197 6/1977 before the Saur Revolution and the subsequent Soviet invasion. The 
study, therefore, offers an ethnographic account of a world that has vanished. 
The main purpose of the study is twofold: 
1) to provide a detailed ethnographic account of the Ersari TUrkmen of the 
Mingajik area; 
2) to present an analysis of the different ways watani (indigenous) and muhajirin 
(refugee) Ersari communities are dealing with social and economic changes 
brought about by an influx of several waves of TUrkmen refugees from Soviet 
Central Asia during and after the Russian Revolution; and by firmer integration 
of the area into the Afghan nation-state by the Central Government. 
Concentration of the analysis is on the basic social unit of Ersari social 
organization, the oba, a small lineage-based community of some 6-26 households 
whose members are linked by agnatic and affinal ties, multiplex relations of 
economic co-operation and ritual duties and obligations. The study tries to reveal 
X 
social and ideological processes in the lives of those small communities struggling to 
maintain authonomy within the encapsulating larger and more complex political and 
economic structures. 
The watani, characterized by a pastoral Weltanschauung and ideology, thus 
representing the traditional element of Ttirkmen society, are slow in changing from a 
nomadic or semi-nomadic subsistence economy to a mixed agropastoral, largely 
cash-oriented ecnomic existence. On the contrary, the refugees, due to their 
generally destitute state as newcomers to a foreign land, were forced to adapt a more 
diversified economy to safeguard economic viability. Today (1976) they represent 
the wealthy, politically influential and powerful segment of Ti.irkmen society. They 
are well integrated in the regional market economy and have largely undertaken a 
shift from subsistence economy to agropastoral production and trade and from tribal 
identities to social class. 
TRANSCRIPTION OF TURKMEN WORDS 
To date no standard system of transcription exists for the Ersari dialect. In 
Afghanistan traditionally the TUrkmen language is written in Arabic script, but the 
few literate individuals I came across, all used different spellings. Also the 
manuscripts I was shown were inconsistent in their usage of the Arabic alphabet. 
The Ttirkmen in the USSR use a more standardized adaptation of the Cyrillic 
alphabet. For details see Baskakov 1960, Dulling 1960 and Hanser 1978. Earlier 
this century an attempt was made at romanizing the TUrkmen language by using the 
so-called Unified TUrkish Latin Alphabet which also proved unsatisfactory and was 
subsequently abandoned. 
The TUrkmen language of Afghanistan is heavily influenced by Perisan and 
Uzbaki. Dulling correctly states: 
Where speakers of a Turkic dialect have long been in contact with a people to 
whom the idea of vowel harmony is completely foreign, the principle of vowel 
harmony tends to become more and more neglected. The result of this is that there 
is a tendency to neutralize vowels, making them neither hard nor soft, but to 
pronounce them centrally. Turkmen, and particularly its dialects spoken in Persia 
and Afghanistan (as indeed is only to be expected), is very prone to this. This 
explains the invariable suffixes of Persian Turkmen, and, indeed, the 
oversimplification on Standard Turkmen vowel harmonies in general (1960:3). 
For the purpose of this study, I shall transcribe TUrkmen glosses in the following 
rudimentary way. I am well aware of the shortcomings of this approach, but since no 
systematic phonemic analysis of Ersari TUrkmen was made while in the field, I am 
using this approach for want of a better solution. 
Afghan geographical names are rendered according to the transcription used on 
the 1: 100'000 map of Afghanistan published by the Ministry of Mines and Industries, 
Royal Government of Afghanistan 1960. 
xii 
Where a place name has an established English form, that is used instead of a 
transliterated form. 
Vowels 
a like 'father' 
a like 'a' in 'hat'- like German 'a' 
like in 'wit' 
+ like 'e' in 'father', 'brother' 
li like German 'li' 
u like 'oo' in soon 
e like 'e' in wet 
o like 'o' in 'short' 
o like German 'o' 
To lengthen a vowel'-' is placed above it (a,o,ii) 
Diphthongs 
ay like English 'high' 
ey like English 'grey' 
oy like English 'buoy' 
aw like English 'house' 
ow like English 'owe' 
Consonants 
Those consonants not specifically mentioned are roughly as in English. 
j like 'Jane' 
s like 'shadow' ('sh' in standard Persian and Dari) 
c like 'chip' ('ch' in standard Persian and Dari) 
x like German 'lachen' ('kh' in standard Persian and Dari) 
g like 'gh' in standard Persian and Dari 
q like Arabic, Persian, Dari qlif 
LES TURKMENES 
Entre l'Amou-Daria et Ia Mer Caspienne, 
Sur Ia Steppe souffle le vent des Turkmenes. 
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C'est un bouton de rose, c'est Ia noire prunelle des mes yeux noirs. 
La Montagne Noire, d'ou descend le Torrent des Turkmenes! 
Dieu les a distingues, ils vivent dans son ombre, 
Dans leurs steppes s'ebattent leurs chameaux males etfemelles, 
Des fluers multicolores s'epanouissent sur leurs plateaux verdoyants; 
Elle disparaft so us les basilics, Ia steppe des Turkmenes! 
Drapees d'hoffes rouges et vertes, leurs jeunes jees se promenent. 
U n parfum ambre remplit !'air de ses douces senteurs. 
Avec leurs Beys, leurs princes, leurs sages vieillards, maftres du pays, 
Elle dressent leurs campements bien peuples, les belles tribus des Turkmenes! 
lls sont les fils de braves. Leurs ancetres sont des heros. 
Koroghlou est leur frere. Ils sont enivres de vaillance. 
Si, par les monts et par les plaines, des chasseurs les traquent, 
lis ne peuvent les prendre vivants, ces tigres que sont les fils des Turkmenes! 
Si, unissant leurs coeurs, leurs ames et leurs pensees, 
!ls se rassemblaient taus, ils pourraient faire fondre !a terre et les roes. 
Sil 'on appretait leur repas pour un festin commun, 
Elle monterait aux nues, Iafortune des Turkmenes! 
Leur coeur s'exalte, quand ils partent, sur leurs chevaux. 
Les montagnes deviennent des rubis, quand ils Ies regardent de cote. 
Les eaux charrient du miel, quand ils s'elancent, tels unfleuve en crue. 
Quand il surgit, nul barrage ne peut Ie retenir, le torrent des Turkmenes! 
lis ne manquent pas de vigilance, ils ne se laissent pas humilier, au jour du combat. 
Niles maledictions, nile mauvais oeil ne peuvent les atteindre. 
Elles ne se fanent pas, elles ne palissent pas, separees de leurs rossignols, 
Mais elles continuent d'embaumer !'air, les roses des Turkmenes! 
Les groupes de combat sont des freres, les clans sont leurs bans amis. 
Le sort ne peut leur etre contraire, sous La lumiere du Dieu Juste . 
Si les braves partent a cheval, c'est en direction du combat. 
Elle va droit a l'ennemi, la route des Turkmenes! 
Plein d'ivresse, ils s'en vont. Nulle peine ne brale leur coeur. 
Rien ne peut leur barrer la route, ils brisent meme les roes ... 
Mes yeux ne peuvent regarder ailleurs, mon voeur est impatient. 
Moi, Makhtoumkouli , je suis la bouche par/ante des Turkmenes! 
Makhtumkuli Firaqi (18th century Tiirkmen poet) 
Translated by Louis Bazin and Pertev Boratav 
PLATE 1: GUESTS HAVING A REST AT A WEDDING 
PLATE 2: SPINNING AND SMOKING IN FRONT OF A YURT 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS: WHY THE TURKMEN OF AFGHANISTAN? 
Due to my sinological background, the ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity of 
Xinjiang (formerly Chinese or East Turkistan) held a special fascination for me. 
Especially the Uighurs, with their expressive language aptly described by Le Coq in 
his expedition report, captured my attention and stirred my curiosity to know more: 
Die Sprache ist ein schOnes, im Osten ziernlich reines tiirkisches Idiom mit 
wunderbaren Moglichkeiten der Ntiancierung des Ausdrucks. Wer sich mit ihr 
beschaftigt, muss jenem ostttirkischen Spruchwort beipflichten, welches besagt: 
'Arabisch ist Wissenschaft; Persisch ist Zucker; Hindi ist Salz; Turki ist Kunst' (Le 
Coq 1928:25). 
Unfortunately even with excellent relations with national and local Chinese 
authorities, in the 1970s, it was impossible to carry out substantive ethnographic 
fieldwork in Southern Xinjiang (south of the Takla Makan Desert along the southern 
branch of the Silk Road) where most of the pure Uighur communities are located. At 
the same time, the Ti.irkic areas of the USSR were also inaccessible to foreigners for 
field studies of longer duration. 
Since William Irons (1975) had done extensive fieldwork in Iran, and with his 
seminal work greatly contributed to our knowledge of the Yomut Tiirkmen of Iran, I 
decided to explore possibilities for research in Afghanistan. 
An initial survey of the available literature on Ttirkmen groups in Afghanistan 
revealed almost a terra incognita. Safe for more or less reliable, but antiquated 
reports of 19th century travellers, adventurers and military men (Bellew 1891; 
3 
Blocqueville 1860; Ferrier 1857; Grodekov 1880; Komarov 1886; O'Donovan 1879; 
Vambery 1865; Yate 1887, 1889, to name just a few) and various editions of the 
Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan, little mention was made of the 
various Tiirkmen tribes on Afghan territory. Other selections by Aslanov 1969; 
Bregel1959; Centlivres 1972; Dupaigne 1978; Schurmann 1962; Slobin 1976 are of 
value, in that fleeting mention on some aspects of the Tiirkmen of Afghanistan is 
made. 
In 1939 Jarring published a summary - still of merit today for comparative 
purposes - on the distribution of Tiirkic tribes in Afghanistan based on a careful and 
exhaustive survey and review of all available Russian and English sources. The only 
recent attempt at studying the Tiirkmen of Afghanistan in any detail, was made by 
Erhard Franz. Unfortunately, due to adverse circumstances, he had to abandon his 
field survey after a few months. Nevertheless, his preliminary raw material, still 
fraught with many errors, attempting to map the distribution of Tiirkmen groups in 
various northern provinces and some basic sketches on history and culture, were 
published in 1972. 
Since Franz was not allowed to visit the Province of Jowzjan, the main territory 
and stronghold of the Ersari Tiirkmen, I decided to concentrate my research efforts 
on a comprehensive ethnographic study of this Tiirkmen group and area. 
FIELD· WORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Equipped with a good portion of intellectual curiosity, idealism, enthusiasm and 
goodwill, I prepared myself for fieldwork in Afghanistan. In view of the sparse and 
erratic material available on the Ersari Tiirkmen of Afghanistan, I decided to leave 
for the field with no preconceived models and hypotheses to test. I wanted to get as 
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full a grasp as possible of the fabric of Ersari culture and society, which I hoped 
would gradually unfurl in front of me like a Tlirkmen carpet with all its exotic 
designs, patterns and colours. I had the ambition of trying to understand the 
workings of Ttirkmen society from the inside, the way they perceived it themselves, 
and keep an open mind to whatever interesting patterns and promising topics would 
emerge. 
My main objective was to gain insight into people's lives, their joys and 
sorrows, economic choices and strategies for survival, adaptation to the social and 
political environment in a broad, but unobtrusive and minimally disturbing way. I 
had in mind to observe, look, listen and smell, for after all I was going to work with 
real people, dealing with real lives and not some actors or maybe statuses of a given 
model. 
In fact Roger M. Keesing very ably spelled out what I had in mind: 'It may be 
precisely in explaining the phenomenological world of the familiar and immediate, 
the everyday and mundane, that we stand to gain the most crucial knowledge of how 
humans perceive, understand and act' (1974:63). 
Having gone through several, mostly American field research guides (Pelto 
1970; Wax 1960) on the state of the art, doubts started to crop up, as to whether these 
methods propagated would really work. It sounded all so one-sided, egotistical. 
What if the Ttirkmen were to reject all those time-honoured methods called 
structured interview, censuses, application of questionnaires and psychological tests, 
life histories and photographical sequences etc. etc.? Knowing what I already did 
about the Ttirkmen gave me the intuition that many of those methods would not 
work in a conservative, closed Muslim society strictly practising segregation of 
sexes, and that I probably would have to find my own way and make choices as 
things developed and rapport hopefully was established. 
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Abu-Lughod (1988), in her superb and sensitive analysis of honour and poetry 
in a Bedouin society, expresses exactly the nagging doubts and frustrations I felt 
before leaving and after arriving in the field: 
An honest account of the circumstances of fieldwork, not merely a perfunctory 
note stating the dates the anthropologist was in the host country, is, as Maybury-
Lewis points out in his introduction (1967), both essential for the evaluation of the 
facts and interpretations presented in an etlmographic report and sometimes 
embarrassing. Especially for young anthropologists, perhaps insecure about their 
professional competence, the cloak of secrecy shrouding the fieldwork experiences 
of successful predecessors inspires fantasies. It is easy to imagine, for example, 
that these great figures were not plagued by doubts about their abilities, the 
adequacy of the material they collected, or their hosts' feelings toward them. 
Rather, they must have begun with the ideas set forth in their final products, 
polished, crisp, and profound. But on a day when people are busy and you are 
alone in a desolate landscape, suffering from fever and being eaten alive by fleas 
or annoyed by a child poking fun at you, the question of whether THIS is the 
experience that carries such dignified labels as 'research' or the more scientistic 
'data collection' nags. And yet, the nature and quality of what anthropologists 
learn is profoundly affected by the unique shape of their fieldwork; this should be 
spelled out (1988:9-10). 
I do not want to unduly dwell on my field experience, but some salient features 
need to be presented and explained to set the parameters of what could possibly be 
done under the given circumstances in order to assess the material presented in the 
following chapters. 
Psychologically well prepared to brave the rigours and vagaries of the Afghan 
bureaucracy on whom I depended for an imposing array of permits and documents, I 
arrived in Kabul in August 1976.1 The reality proved extremely trying and nerve-
racking, in fact more so than I had anticipated. Out of 17 months in the field, nearly 
five were 'wasted' battling with red-tape at all levels of the bureaucracy and 
gendarmerie. I quickly learnt that 'I was only a woman'. It was a frustrating, but in 
some ways also a rewarding and illuminating experience, in that it provided me with 
insights regarding: 
a) the workings and interactions (or rather lack of) of the various government 
departments from the national to the village levels. 
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b) the status-games, rivalries between the administrative levels and the 
gendarmerie. This connection turned out to be very complicated. It absorbed 
all the diplomatic skills I could muster, since I often was the pawn in the firing 
line between the two groups. 
c) interactions of the various administrative levels (mostly Pashtuns) with the 
Ttirkmen ethnic minority in general. 
d) Janus-headed and often sycophantic attitudes of the local government 
administrators (all Pashtun) and the gendarmerie (mostly Pashtun) toward the 
well-connected, rich and influential Ttirkmen agropastoralists and their 
bakhshish-system. 
e) attitudes of the rich and influential provincial Pashtun elite towards the 
provincial and lower level bureaucrats and gendarmes, most of them also 
Pashtuns. 
f) attitudes and interactions between the rich Ttirkmen and the rich Pashtuns at the 
provincial and lower levels. 
g) interactions between the very traditional watani Ttirkmen agropastoralists from 
the desert-steppe villages and the more acculturated muhajirin Ttirkmen bays of 
the ethnically mixed villages.2 
Somewhere in this maze of dyadic relationships, of overt and covert, legal and 
illegal interactions, I had to find my own place and modus vivendi by manoeuvring 
past fragile male egos, ultranationalist chauvinism and, alas, racism. 
At times I felt like a tight-rope walker without a net for protection in case of a 
fall. It was frightening and challenging at the same time. Initially I met with 
suspicion on all fronts - on the side of the government, because as a lone woman I 
wanted to work with a 'rebellious, uneducated, backward minority' in a politically 
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sensitive border area. The Ti.irkmen initially saw in me some kind of a Government 
spy, since I came with the blessings of the authorities. 
Given the above mentioned constraints, it was in the hands of the government 
authorities when and where I was allowed to do field research; and I was entirely 
dependent on their mercy and goodwill. I further had to learn that a permit from the 
Central Government did not necessarily guarantee acceptance by the local 
bureaucrats and gendarmes. 
Then there was my status as a single woman in a rather fundamentalist Islamic 
society. How would I fit in? By whom would I be accepted at the local level? The 
following elaborations will shed some light, especially on this last point. 
The Central Government and the Swiss Honorary consul had decided that in the 
initial phase of my research, I should stay in the guest house of a very rich 
internationally working trader and entrepreneur. This very comfortable, western-
style guest house was part of a large skin-processing factory situated in a market 
town in the Province of Jowzjan. The premises were especially equipped to 
accommodate foreign (mainly European and Soviet) customers. It was an 
anomalous situation, in that I was attended by male servants, cooks and the director-
general and mingled with a motley assortment of unhappy male foreign customers. 
Not a single woman was in sight! I was treated very politely and courteously, but 
nobody seemed to understand what I actually wanted to do. In their view I was an 
oddity, an anomaly. I personally felt like a colonialist at the turn of the century with 
the great exception that I was not allowed to leave the walled compound without 
prior permission from the Director-General. There was no sneaking out, for the 
watchman had unequivocal instructions which no bakhshish would make him forget. 
This measure was apparently for my own safety. 
In spite of ever growing frustrations, I decided to wait and see, further study the 
situation and not antagonize any of the parties concerned. I used this stay for 
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brushing up my Dari and improving my knowledge of the Tilrkmen and Uzbek 
languages. Gradually I started to take up relations with the local schools and the 
district hospital staff. Living with the elites, I was limited in my social intercourse to 
the local elites. Later I was to find out that different levels of education and status 
allowed for different types of social interactions and determined my radius of action 
and interaction. After nearly 'l:fz months in this anomalous and prison-like condition, 
severe frustrations, depressions and a strong sense of wasted time came up. If I was 
to succeed with my research, I had to find a way out of this situation. 
A simple network analysis revealed that in order to get ahead, I had to associate 
with the top-segment of the local creme-de-la-creme, that is the Pashtuns, for as a 
foreigner, I automatically belonged to the elite. Preparing the second phase of my 
work, I confided in a local Pashtun doctor who was well-connected with the local 
authorities. Having studied in the USA, he was the only person who knew what 
anthropology was all about. Through his good offices, I was introduced to the local 
Pashtun deputy to the National Assembly in Kabul (Wakil), a rich and influential 
person in his own right, with a wife distantly related to the royal clan. Quite 
spontaneously the Wakil promised his help. To complicate the matter, this change of 
location needed another permission from the Central Government, which entailed for 
me another trip to Kabul. 
After more than a month in the capital, I was back at the residence of the W akil 
who, keeping his promise, had made arrangements for me to live in the compound 
(see Figure 7) of a rich, but very traditional Ti.irkmen agropastoralist in the chief 
place of the Woluswali (district) of Mingajik, a predominantly muhajirin Ti.irkmen 
village of mixed lineages. Although I was given the status of honoured guest, I had 
to submit to the strict rules of their own women. For them, a young, unmarried 
woman travelling alone on some strange research assignment (which they could not 
understand) was an anomaly. I was suspect and had a hard time persuading the 
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household-head and his agnates of my respectability. I was asked to behave 
'properly', but nobody ventured an interpretation of that term, and I did not dare to 
ask for fear of looking too ignorant of Ttirkic and Islamic matters and therefore 
undesirable. I was 'locked up' with the women in the female part of the compound 
and not allowed to leave without permission and a male guardian. I came to know 
the women and girls of four generations quite intimately, but found it difficult to 
accept total dependence on the male orders. Looking back at this time, I harbour 
memories of 'mud walls and blue skies'. Gradually I came to realize that 
respectability was not only interpreted in terms of behaviour in interpersonal 
interactions, but also in the relationships to the wider social world. From snippets of 
conversations and non-verbal communication, I was able to gather that in their 
conservative Weltanschauung where there is no place for female education, they 
assumed that I must have antagonized my family, especially my male agnatic kin, 
that maybe I even committed sexual offences, so that they had ostracized me for 
immoral and unethical behaviour. In Ttirkmen society no unmarried girl of 
marriageable age, whose good reputation and chastity were a must for a good match, 
was left to travel alone. In their reckoning and interpretation of morality, being 
female, travelling alone and having an inquisitive, educated mind, were negative 
attributes for any woman. They were positive attributes befitting a man in the public 
domain, but definitively negative in the women's domain. I had one other 'vice' in 
their reckoning, I was a kafir, an infidel. This apparently put my host in a difficult 
position. So the day came, when I was asked by the household-head to take Qur'anic 
lessons with the mullah of our compound, a proposition which I willingly accepted, 
if only to get out of my 'blue sky and mud wall' prison. Since I had to conform to the 
same standards of decency and propriety as the women of the household, which 
basically meant that I was restricted in where I could go, by whom I could be seen 
and with whom I could speak or interact, I gradually started feeling depressed and 
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lethargic. After four months in this situation, my morale was at its lowest, I started 
to show signs of withdrawal, my intellectual curiosity started to dry up. So I asked 
the local government chief and the police chief for a leave in Kabul, where I 
intended to reassess my situation, psychological strength and poor health. Just at the 
time of my departure for Kabul, luck was on my side, in that the rather stubborn and 
unyielding Subgovernor of Mingajik was replaced by a young and dynamic 
successor, a Pashtun from Kandahar. Although having not much understanding for 
the ethnic minorities of his country, he was sympathetic to my request to study and 
live in a pure watani Ttirkmen oba at the desert fringe. I knew by now that their 
women were much freer and not .locked up behind mud walled compounds, since 
they actively took part in pastoral activities, and all families belonged to the same 
lineage. Coming back from Kabul with new strength, enthusiasm, zest to work and 
the necessary government permit, I was finally able to move to Taghan, a cluster of 
agropastoral villages at the desert fringe all belonging to the same lineage. 
Experiences, ~bservations and data from Taghan form the core of this thesis. 
The third phase of my fieldwork took place under a lucky star. In Taghan my status 
was that of guest, gradually developing into that of an adoptive daughter. This latter 
position enabled me to enjoy the protection of kinsmen and at the same time did not 
jeopardize the status and role of my 'father' and his kinsmen. We had a clear and 
transparent situation. I was embedded into a network of kin ties which gave me 
respect, security and a sense of belonging. As days went on, I learned about 'our' 
culture, was initiated into 'our' genealogy, was socialized to the role of 'daughter of 
marriageable age'. A difficult factor remained my unmarried status, since I was 
considerably older than all the other unmarried girls. I finally told them that I was 
engaged to a poorer man who had to pay my bride-price by instalments.3 They felt 
pity for my plight, but accepted my answer without further questioning. The only 
problem this status entailed was the fact that it prevented me from asking questions 
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about sexuality. Girls in this category are supposed to be ignorant regarding this 
matter, and I neither had desire nor intention of damaging my reputation and that of 
my 'family'. Although I felt quite happy and comfortable in this situation, I was 
dependent, very dependent and never alone - no door to close behind me, no 
moment of privacy. Being the independent individualist I am, this was very hard to 
take. 
Was I not to conduct structured interviews, fill in questionnaires, collect 
quantifiable data etc.? How could I ever gather economic data in this situation? 
Was I a good TUrkmen daughter, but a hopeless academic failure? Should I be more 
aggressive, stubborn and insisting? On the other hand, how could I antagonize these 
kind and trusting people who had agreed to protect and care for me? For a time I 
was very much tom between my Western drive for achievement and my acquired 
TUrkmen identity. As we got closer, another problem started to bother me: my 
veracity. Just as I questioned them, they posed me myriads of questions about 
Switzerland, my clan, our animal wealth, our yurts, our wealth etc. They were 
illiterate peasants and herders, hardly acquainted with life outside the narrow 
confines of the Desert-Steppe Zone. I had no choice but to lie to them, express 'my 
European world and life' in 'their Ttirkmen idiom'. Was it acceptable, ethical to 
project my perceptions, situation in their cultural terms to protect my own reputation 
and meet my goals? I knew they would have judged me in their own terms. Was I 
too egotistical for the sake of reaching my academic goals? I was confused and 
plagued by feelings of guilt. After all, I expected them to be honest about their lives, 
economic activities, beliefs etc. The problems resolved itself quite naturally. When 
I was finally presented with a Ttirkmen dress appropriate for the status of 'unmarried 
daughter of marriageable age' by the senior woman of our lineage and allowed to sit 
with the men in the guest yurt, even attend the meetings of the tribal elders, I knew 
that rapport was fully established that I was accepted. At that time my nagging 
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suspicions and anxiety about dishonesty and veracity subsided and gave way to 
happiness. 
It needs to be emphasized that against all odds and prophecies by colleagues and 
bureaucrats, the illiterate, traditional watani Ttirkmen of Taghan with their strong 
kinship solidarity, largely pastoral ideology and outlook on life, were the most co-
operative and easy to work with. 
Maybe I was just lucky, in that I found in my 'father' a wise and exceptionally 
understanding man. He was a most generous informant and patient teacher on all 
aspects of Ttirkmen culture and society. As an informal leader of the region, he was 
well connected with leaders of other lineages and kept an open guest house which 
presented ample opportunity to talk to people (male and female) of all walks of life, 
of course with the necessary reservations and decorum befitting my status as 
'daughter' of a leader. After an initial period of getting acquainted with each other, I 
was even allowed to take photographs of all the women and adolescent girls of our 
oba and make photographic records of such intimate and private events as childbirth. 
Contrary to his openness and understanding, at the 'mud wall and blue sky 
compound' I was not allowed to take a single picture of an adolescent girl or a 
woman or use my taperecorder. Even note-taking had to be done after everybody 
had retired for sleep. My 'father' became a very eager research collaborator by 
inviting bards, venerated leaders and matrons from other lineages to our oba, in order 
to talk on topics he thought were of interest and merit. After I had become a skillful 
horsewoman, he took me to many villages of other lineages and once, to prove his 
independence, he took me to the forbidden areas of Khamiab and Qarqin on the 
banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus). 
On the technical side, participant observation, photographic records, informal 
interviews and jotting down of life-histories proved to be the tools of choice most 
acceptable to all parties concerned. With the aid of my 'father' and younger 'brother', 
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I managed to collect a fair amount of economic data, but unfortunately not in the 
kind of systematic way, I would have liked to. Other standard anthropological field 
research tools and methods were not suitable for application in this Islamic 
environment. 
During the course of my fieldwork and discussions with colleagues, I came to 
realize how sketchy the knowledge of the Ti.irkrnen has remained in Afghanistan and 
outside. For most people they are just skilled carpet-makers and producers of 
spectacular silver jewellery which has ended up in collections all over the world. 
Given this shortcoming and the rather rapid changes and firmer integration into a 
nation-state whose policy spells out integration and assimilation, I thought it 
important to write a thorough ethnographic record of Ti.irkmen culture and society, as 
I encountered them in 1976/1977. 
Several dislocations, after return from the field, caused loss and damage to a 
substantive part of my field notes and data, so the ethnographic record must remain 
incomplete. Some assumptions are subjective observations and personal feelings 
rather than quantifiable facts. Nevertheless, I think they are useful, in spite of their 
shortcomings. 
In the course of my stay with the muhajirin of Mingajik, it became obvious that 
there were considerable differences between the watani and muhajirin Ersari of 
Afghanistan, especially with regards to ideology, kinship ties, ritual practices, 
economic pursuits and strategies, political patterns as well as general attitudes 
toward social and economic change. 
In the following chapters I am trying to present aspects of Ti.irkrnen society the 
Ti.irkmen themselves found important and were eager to talk about. Whenever 
possible, I am comparing or elaborating on the differences between watani and 
muhajirin. 
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In the last chapter, in spite of a lack of quantifiable data (suited for 
generalizations), I am attempting to systematically present the differences of social 
and economic change and their causes and consequences by using the methods and 
model developed by Scarlett Epstein (1962) for her analysis of two South Indian 
villages. 
It was originally planned that after a period of six months of analysis and 
discussions with colleagues in Europe, I would go back to Afghanistan for a final 
period of field-work to fill in lacunae systematically and look at the situation afresh 
and with new theoretical insights. 
Alas, reality developed along different ways. In April 1978 Afghanistan was 
shaken by a bloody revolution which brought about many structural, political, 
economic and cultural changes. Ti.irkmen society, as described in this thesis, does 
not exist any longer, and many of the actors including my 'father' are no longer with 
us ... 
The Mingajik area remains closed for research by foreigners. 
THE POEMS OF MAKHTUMKULI 
The most accurate impression of Ti.irkmen life, thought and values can be gotten 
from the verses of the Ti.irkmen national poet, Makhtumkuli Firaqi, a native of the 
Goklen tribe. Born about 1730, he was a trained silversmith and poet. Still now, for 
the Ti.irkmen, the verses of their beloved and venerated poet rank next in importance 
to the Qur'an. 
His work consists of poems, songs, aphorisms and short pieces on philosophy of 
life, tribal ethics and the like. Parts of his verses, especially those concerned with 
moral teachings, honour and male bravery, piety and righteousness, female decorum, 
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were often used in Taghan to teach youngsters of both sexes the essence of 
Ttirkmenhood (Turkmencelik). Even now Makhtumkuli's verses are regularly recited 
by bards to the accompaniment of a dutar in the yurts and guest houses, and most 
Ttirkmen men know at least the more popular aphorisms by heart. 
Given the popularity, actuality and importance of his verses in Ttirkmen society 
of Mingajik and Taghan, I deem it necessary and useful to start each chapter with 
some appropriate verses. 
Unfortunately my original collection of several dozen poems recorded in their 
present-day Taghan version got lost in the course of several dislocations, so I had to 
make use of a small selection of poems, rather freely translated by Bazin and Boratav 
(1975). I left them in the French version in order to avoid further dilution of the 
essence by another translation into English. 
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NOTES 
1 Field-work in Afghanistan was carried out from August 1976 till December 1977. All dates and 
materials refer to this period. Political, cultural and structural changes brought about by the Saur-
Revolution of 1978 are not taken into consideration. This field-work was partly financed by a 
Fellowship from the Queensland Association of University Women. I wish to express my gratitude to 
the organization for their generous support. 
2 Whenever relating to Tiirkmen in Afghanistan, we have to distinguish between 'indigenous' groups 
(watani), that means, groups that were living in Afghanistan before the Russian take-over of Central 
Asia, and the refugees (muhajirin), mainly fleeing to Afghanistan during the Russian Revolution 
(1917) and just before or during the Stalinist purges. 
3 For an explanation of the term bride-price', see note 14, Chapter 4. 
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LEJEUNE HEROS ... 
Lejeune heros qui veut acquerir une renommee 
Doit d'abord posseder un cheval pur-sang. 
En accueillant ceu.x qui viennent a lui, 
Il doit etre bon et a.ffectueu.x. 
llfaut etre un brave pour supporter les tourments. 
Ilfaut un cheval pour franchir les defiles. 
Pour tenir table ouverte et distribuer le pain, 
lL faut avoir la generosite au coeur. 
Renonce done au.x vaines illusions! 
Les richesses sont pour toi totalement inutiles. 
Si ta destinee ne passe que par des votes licites, 
Il tefaut t'entretenir avec les sages. 
Si ton se voue a servir Dieu, 
A connaftre la voie du Prophete, 
A rejouir le coeur des derviches, 
alors, on doit posseder le bonheur. 
Makhtoumkouli est un mendiant. 
Le protecteur de tous, c'est Dieu. 
Qu'il soit un humble ou un riche, 
llfaut se mettre au service de l'hote qui arrive. 
Makhtumkuli Firaqi (18th century Ttirkmen poet) 
Translation by Louis Bazin and Pertev Boratav 
PLATE 3: IN THE DESERT-STEPPE 
PLATE 4: THE STEPPE OF AFGHAN TURKISTAN 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL SETTING 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORK! 
The area covered in this study (see Map 1) is situated between the Hindukush 
Mountains in the south and the Amu Darya (Oxus) river in the north, which marks 
the boundary between Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (Turkmenia, 
Uzbekistan and Tazhikistan) of the USSR. In more geographical terms, the area is 
located between 36°50' and 37°30' north latitude and 65°30'-66°30' east longitude. 
Politically it forms part of the Afghan Province of Jowzjan (surface 26'226kms2)2 
which is divided into six administrative districts called woluswali and six subdistricts 
called alakadari. In this study I am concerned with a part of the Woluswali of 
Mingajik (surface: approx. 952 kms2). For details on the organization of the Afghan 
Provincial government see the chapter on politics. 
Afghan Turkistan forms part of the arid zone of Eurasia which continues 
southwestward across Arabia and the whole of North Africa. The area studied (see 
Map 2) includes the Steppe Zone of Northern Afghanistan which extends for 
approximately 60 kms from the northern foothills of the Hindukush Mountains 
towards the Amu Darya at an altitude descending from 500 metres to approximately 
260 metres above sea-level. 
It is followed by the 40 kms wide Desert-Steppe Zone stretching towards the 
bank of the Amu Darya (Oxus). Along the river is a very narrow strip of irrigated 
land used for agriculture by several Tiirkmen communities. 
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In this study I define the term 'steppe' in accordance with Bobek (1968) and 
Kovda (1961:175-218) as a treeless flat region with a permanent thick cover of grass 
(see Plate 4). The various kinds of steppe plants are collected by the Ttirkmen as 
fodder for their animals, as fuel for their hearth and for magico-medical purposes. 
The desert-steppe is much drier with a very sparse thorny shrub vegetation. Sand 
dunes are a prominent feature of the northern part of the Desert-Steppe Zone in 
Afghanistan with dunes up to about 9 metres high. 
Kovda (1961) claims that these shifting sands with their dunes and sandhills 
encroaching on human settlements, are the result of centuries of destruction of the 
pasture vegetation of Central Asia by stockbreeders and nomads (see Plates 3 and 5). 
In Mingajik the process of sands shifting from the Desert-Steppe Zone towards the 
Steppe Zone can be observed easily. This shift is mainly due to a complete 
destruction of the shrub vegetation which took place during the first half of this 
century, when great numbers of refugees from Russian Central Asia passed through 
or settled in this area. The Ttirkmen are aware of their loss of arable land, but unable 
to do anything to counteract this process. 
The soils of Northern Afghanistan and of the depressions in the deserts of 
Turkmenia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are particularly highly saline. There are 
extensive areas where the toplayer of the soil has a salt content as high as 10-20 per 
cent (for a detailed analysis see Kovda 1961:178-180). There exist many salt lakes 
and areas of salt mud, also areas of lake salt deposits forming strata of a thickness of 
1/z to 1 metre. When the salt content exceeds 0.5 per cent, the fertility of the soil 
decreases considerably, and when the salt content raises above 1-2 per cent, the soil 
usually becomes barren and requires desalination. The salinity of the soil has always 
been an obstacle to irrigated farming in many locations of this area. The arid steppes 
of Northern Afghanistan are covered with light-coloured soil containing little humus 
and are frequently characterized by residual salinity. In these areas one often comes 
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across alkaline, clayey brown soils known as takyr. In summer their surface hardens 
and forms a solid crust underneath which the soil often retains an increased quantity 
of salts soluble in water. In winter these takyrs get wet and tum into a muddy, 
marshy bog. 
From the Hindukush several rivers flow towards the Amu Darya, but since they 
are diverted into a network of irrigation-canals for the Steppe Zone, they disappear in 
the desert before reaching the Amu River. For details see the section on irrigation, 
water resources and water management. In the Desert-Steppe Zone, the only sources 
of water are artesian wells. Many of them tum out to be brackish and their water not 
suitable for human consumption. It is also common that wells providing palatable 
water for a certain time, become brackish after a while, thus forcing their owners to 
dig new wells in another area. 
During the summer months, the water level of the wells is at approximately 15 
(in some cases up to 20) metres depth, whereas during the winter months, the water 
level may rise to about 5 metres, a fact which would make irrigation from wells 
possible, should the problems of desalination and drainage be dealt with properly. 
The climate 
The climate of the area concerned is extreme continental with great diurnal and 
seasonal changes and variations in temperature as the following table illustrates. 
History teaches us that the Turkistan Plains have periodically been hit by spells 
of drought which often have influenced the political destiny of the area. 3 
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TEMPERATURES FOR JOWZJAN PROVINCE (OCTOBER 1965-SEPTEMBER 1966) IN DEGREES 
CENTIGRADE 
1965 1966 
Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. 
Mean Max. 
Temperature 25 .3 19.1 12.5 15.2 14.8 16.0 23 .2 31.2 38.4 36.9 37.0 31.2 
Mean Min. 
Temperature 11 .8 6 .8 -0.1 3.0 5.5 6.6 10.8 14.5 21.2 22.1 20.7 15.8 
Mean Temp. 18.2 12.3 5.9 8.3 9.8 11.4 16.6 23.1 29.5 30.1 28.9 23.7 
Relative 
Humidity 44 61 69 61 71 66 59 33 32 36 29 24 
Source: The Kabul Times Annua/1967:87-90. 
The northern Steppe Zone of Afghanistan had not quite recovered from the 
severe drought of 1970/1971, when it was again plagued by unfavourable climatic 
conditions in 197 6, during the period of my field research. 
During July 1977, the hottest month of the year, I recorded peak temperatures of 
46 degrees celsius in Mingajik. In January 1977, the coldest month, temperatures 
dropped to minus 20 degrees celsius. The cold winter temperatures are exacerbated 
by a strong wind blowing from northeast to west. 
The people of Taghan (Mingajik Woluswali) and the adjacent villages 
distinguish three principal winds: 
a) The shama/-e-qiblah 
(lit. the wind coming from Mecca), which blows from west to east. It is a strong 
and regular wind starting about the first of Hamal (21 March) and continuing 
24 
until the end of Saur (21 May). For details regarding the Afghan calendar see 
appendix. 
b) During the summer months, a northerly hot wind sweeps over the Turkistan 
Plains and often brings about sandstorms which are feared by the people. A 
sandstorm is called taft- bad (hot wind) due to its burning quality. According 
to Kovda (1961 :184), the Russian peasants call these drought-bringing hot 
winds laden with fine dust sukhovei (dry winds). Kovda shows in a chart that 
over the last 50 years the number of days of sukhovei has steadily increased 
from 5.2 days in 1888-1897 to 84.1 in 1938-1947. Statements from senior 
informants in Mingajik, where there are no written records, show similar 
tendencies for the area. 
c) The strong east-west wind blowing during winter is partly responsible for the 
low temperatures. If no precipitation falls in the form of rain or snow, it causes 
sandstorms and makes the sand dunes shift in the direction of the arable lands of 
the St<a1pe Zone. The Ttirkmen and Uzbak:s inhabiting the area quite rightly call 
this region paka-u-postin = 'fan and furcoat', indicating that there are times 
when it is hot, and times when it is very cold in the same season, ·thus testifying 
to the extreme character of the climate. 
Precipitation 
There is irregular and minimal precipitation mainly in the form of rain, which 
falls during spring and winter. Annual rainfall is small, the means of the last 13 
years being only 202.6 mm. 
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MEAN MONTHLY RAINFALL FOR THE PROVINCE OF JOWZJAN IN Mll..LIMETRES: 
Month 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Total year 
Source: The Kabul Times Annua/1967 
Rainfall 
8.0 
54.5 
45.0 
24.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.3 
11.0 
14.8 
158.9 
This chart shows that the major rainfall occurs in winter and spring (November 
until April). It does snow on occasion, but very often the snowcover only lasts for a 
few days. In 1976, the first snow fell on 22 October, but only lasted for a few hours. 
As we shall see, these climatic conditions are a key indicator as far as pastoral 
and agricultural pursuits of the Ttirkmen are concerned, and most activities are 
geared around the annual rainfall periods as further chapters will demonstrate. 
There are no stables for sheep, goats and camels. During winter nights they are 
packed into corrals made of thorny shrubs which at the same time serve as firewood 
and fodder for the animals. When spring approaches, most of these corrals have 
been dismantled and their material used up. 
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THE IDSTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
a) The early history of the Tiirkmen 
Among Central Asian people, the past is always present in the form of history 
and oral epic literature. 
For the Ttirkmen communities I studied, the presence of history in everyday life 
has nearly become an obsession. Before making decisions on matters of concern to a 
lineage, the case is often compared to the deeds and achievements of real or fictitious 
ancestors and culture heroes; that is, historical precedents are sought in dealing with 
solutions to specific social and economic questions. As I shall demonstrate later, the 
past is also linked to the present by a wealth of oral literature that still has a distinct 
place in the male society of most of the Central Asian ethnic groups. 
In view of the importance of historical thought among Central Asian people, a 
brief discussion of the major historical events and trends seems necessary. I shall 
limit my elaborations to events and facts that are important for the understanding of 
the present-day situation, mainly among the Ttirkmen groups, since they constitute 
the subject matter of this study. This survey does not claim to be exhaustive. For 
detailed study of Central Asian history and ethnogenesis, I refer to the works of 
Abul-Ghazi (translated by Kononov 1958); Barthold (1922, 1927, 1956); Munis 
Agehi 1938; Tumanovich 1926 and Vambery 1885. I shall begin my historical 
explorations with the influx of waves of Ttirkic settlers into the southern areas of 
Central Asia in the 9th century AD. At that time, this region was populated by Iranic 
groups, who were sedentary agriculturalists making use of a fairly sophisticated 
irrigation-system. These migration movements resulted in a fusion of nomadic 
pastoralism with sedentary agriculture. In demographic terms this created a mixture 
of Ttirkic-speaking populations with Iranian groups. Soon the Ttirkic element 
became demographically, culturally and politically dominant. 
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By that time, nomads and farmers were living m close contact and had 
established mutual trade relations. In many cases a network of economic and 
political relations formed around a caravanserai! and its surrounding areas (for 
details see Hermann 1910; Shishkin 1943). 
I would say that the first 800 years of this era were the formative period in the 
evolution of most of the Central Asian peoples as we know them today. The term 
'Tlirkmen' is mentioned for the first time in the second half of the lOth century, 
namely in the works of the Arab geographer Maqdisi (Barthold 1928). Sarkisyanz 
(1961:214) mentions that the ancestor of all Ttirkmen was the oghuzic eponym 
Oghuz Khan. Around the 8th century AD, the Oghuz occupied the territory near 
Lake Issiq-kul, but due to pressure from the Karluqs, they gradually moved 
westwards and settled in the Syr-Darya (Jaxartes) region. From the history of the 
Seljuks we can learn that those Oghuz tribes which had converted to Islam, were 
now called 'Tlirkmen' and had become sedentary. Another descent group of the 
Oghuz, who lived near the Aral Sea until the 13th century, remained nomadic and 
became only marginally Islamic, as did most of the Central Asian nomads. 
Around 1200, according to historical sources, the term 'Ttirkmen' was now in 
general use instead of 'Oghuz'. Many of the Tlirkmen tribal segments had already 
adopted the names that are still in use (such as the Salors, who are supposed to be the 
oldest Ttirkmen tribe). At this point an inconsistency occurs in historical sources. 
The Salors are supposed to be the descendants of Tolui, a son of Genghis Khan. 
Salor-Oghur~ik-Khan is therefore supposed to be the father of all the northern 
Tlirkmen (Salor, Saryq, Ersari and Tekke). An analysis of the genealogies will be 
given in the chapter on kinship. 
During the 13th century AD, the Ttirkmen dominated the steppes of northern 
Turkistan. The Salors were the rulers of a mighty tribal confederation in the Balkhan 
area, east of the Caspian Sea. This is again a period of mixing with sedentary Iranian 
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groups. At the southern flank of their territory, many Ttirkmen groups were 
absorbed by sedentary Iranian agriculturalists. In the north, however, pockets of 
Iranian agriculturalists were integrated into nomadic or semi-nomadic Ttirkmen 
groups. 
Throughout the Mongol invasion, the Tlirkmen managed to survive as a stateless 
and archaic enclave in the middle of the territory of the Golden Horde. History 
shows that the Ttirkmen were the only people of Central Asia who were able to keep 
not only their genealogical hierarchy but also their tribal structure, until the final 
sedentarization movements were initiated by the Russians (Iranian and Afghan 
Governments to a certain degree) earlier this century. The history of the Tiirkmen 
has never been the history of an integrated Ttirkmen-nation, but a history of several 
non-unified Tiirkmen tribes (descent groups), which were constantly at war with 
each other and their neighbours of different ethnic origin, mainly because of 
pastures and water-sources. As a matter of fact, Ttirkmen history consists of ever 
changing relations between the various Ttirkmen descent groups and their strife for 
access to natural resources. Khivan reports (accordingly to Abul-Ghazi) on the 
Ttirkmen dating from the 16th century give the following areas as Ttirkmen territory: 
Tribe 
Ersari 
Salors 
Tekke, Yomut, Saryq 
Territory 
Balkhan mountains, Mangyshlaq Peninsula 
Mangyshlaq Peninsula 
Northern Khorassan, Atrek 
At the beginning of the 17th century, important internal migrations took place, 
which were often referred to by my senior informants in Afghanistan. At that time, 
the Ersari Tlirkmen - the group this study is concerned with - moved from the 
Mangyshlaq Peninsula and the Balkhan mountains to the south flank of the middle 
flow of the Amu Darya (Oxus) upon pressure from the Choudor Ttirkmen descent 
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group. In their new territory, most of the Ersari became sedentary agriculturalists. 
During the 18th and 19th centuries an ecological imbalance led to new shifts of 
population. Early in the 18th century Lake Sary-Kamysh dried up, which caused the 
Tiirkmen living around it to move south in search of new land and water. During the 
next hundred years, there was a constant shift of tribes southwards and westwards 
following water resources. 
A common tribal background did not prevent several Tiirkmen tribes (notably 
the Kara descent group of the Ersari) from organizing alamans (slave and booty 
raids) into Iran and northern Afghanistan and from catching and selling their fellow-
tribesmen into slavery or freeing them for a handsome ransom.4 Such behaviour 
brought the Tilrkmen a reputation as wild robbers and looters. This image of the 
fierce Tiirkmen generally prevails in the reports of the 19th cenrury travellers and 
adventurers. 
In spite of tribal diversity, raids and other separating factors, the Tiirkmen had 
and still have, as far as I could ascertain during my fieldwork, one unifying element 
(beside their language), namely their common oral traditions, their epic literature. 
Their most popular folk epic is called Kor Oghlu. It consists of a conglomeration of 
various motifs, influences and leftovers from the old Oghuz epic Korkut Ata. 
Versions of this epic tale are also known in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and other areas 
of Central Asia. As far as I could assess, Kor Oghlu is still very popular with the 
Tiirkmen people in Afghanistan and the USSR. In 1977 Radio Ashkhabad featured a 
special programme for traditional oral epics and folksongs. 
Among the Ersari Tiirkmen of Afghanistan, no life crisis event was celebrated 
without the presence of a bakhshi (bard, traditionally a shaman) reciting sections of 
Kor Oghlu or one of the other epics for the male guests. (In the Ersari Tiirkmen 
society of Afghanistan, reciting epic poetry is a male prerogative.) 
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Of all the Tlirkic people, only the Ti.irkmen - in spite of their very high rate of 
illiteracy - have, what we might call a national poet: Makhtumkuli Firaqi ( 1730-
1782). His poetry is as popular as the old epics and considered by all Ttirkmen tribes 
as a common cultural heritage. It gives the Ttirkmen a feeling and consciousness of 
cultural identity, since they have had no political identity. Although Makhtumkuli 
was strongly influenced by the classical Uzbek language (Chagatai) of the poet Ali 
Sher Nawai (1441-1501) , he chose to write in the Goklen Ttirkmen vernacular, 
which probably accounts for the popularity of his verses. In this context I would like 
to refer to his poem which opens this study. It might well be called the national song 
of the Ttirkmen, for it brilliantly illustrates the features, cultural values and symbols 
so dear to the Ttirkmen. Most of his verses stress supra-tribal values and have the 
potential of a strong unifying force. Makhtumkuli propagated Ttirkmen tribal unity 
at the highest level, that is at a national level. According to tradition, he died from 
grief about the internecine quarrels of the Ttirkmen and their failure to deal 
successfully with the Khivan and Persian politics of expansion. 
In spite of various troubles and differences with Persia and the Central Asian 
khanates, a large part of the Ttirkmen- mainly the nomadic ones- was able to keep 
their independence and did not fall under the rule of an organized state. 
The Ttirkmen of Khorezm, however, were brought under the rule of the Uzbeks 
in 1505 and were divided among various members of the Sultan llbars clan 
(descendants of Genghis Khan). Historical sources (Istoriya Narodov Uzbekistana 
1947: II) show, however, that the Ttirkmen avoided close contacts with the Uzbeks 
and kept their autonomy and individuality within the Khanate of Khiva. How was 
this possible? About one third of the population of the khanate was Ttirkmen, and 
they were not under the jurisdiction and authority of the Governor. Probably the 
Uzbeks were well aware that very often the balance of power between Khiva and 
Iran depended on exactly this third. 
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The reigns of Shah Abbas (1587-1629) and Nadir Shah (1736-1747) brought the 
Salor, Goklen, Yomut and Tekke Tiirkmen into the realm of Persian power. The 
Tiirkmen, however, kept good relations with the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, 
since both of them were economically important for the Tiirkmen as selling places 
for their slaves and booty from the alamans. 
As I mentioned above, there never existed a unity of all Ttirkmen tribal 
segments at the higher level, in other words, there never existed a Tilrkmen state. 
Never were all the Tiirkmen under one ruler, as was the case for the Uzbeks. Several 
important Tilrkmen became sort of temporary leaders in the struggles against Persian 
intrusion. They were not leaders of armies, but depended on tribal support. As a 
reward for their services, the Khan of Khiva offered these leaders and their followers 
land usually on the lower parts of the irrigation-canals, so that they were kept 
dependent on the water supply. 
Tribal cohesion and loyalty have always existed at the lower levels of the 
Ttirkmen segmentary lineage system. In fact Ttirkmen history is characterized by 
constant segregation, fission and fusion of larger with smaller segments, but there 
was practically no cohesion at the intra-tribal level. This might also explain the fact 
that slave raids were possible within Ttirkmen society. Only the Russian threat in the 
second half of the 19th century brought some of the larger tribal segments together. 
The various Tiirkic tribes of Central Asia had (and, as far as I could make out in 
Afghanistan and among the Uighurs of China, still have) a strong concern with 
genealogy. In most genealogies a fictive consanguineal unity of all congeners is 
expressed. Zhdanko (1950) even mentions a genealogy uniting the Tiirkmen, 
Uzbeks, Karakalpaks and Kazakhs. Such genealogies form an important part of the 
social life of the people of Central Asia. With the Tilrkmen of Afghanistan, the 
genealogies are still taught to boys at an early age. In the absence of a sense of 
common territory and united political leadership, they have only their consanguineal 
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bonds to unite them. These genealogical bonds - most of them fictitious (which, 
however, does not make them less important) - provide some kind of unifying 
foundation, perhaps even a rudimentary polity of some kind. Not much elaboration 
is needed to understand that these genealogies are not at all in agreement with each 
other. They are used to make a point of common interest to the individuals and 
groups drawing them up. Descent, whether real or fictitious, is a vital matter, the 
basis of the structure of Central Asian societies. Genealogies assert membership in a 
line, seniority in that line and rights inherent in that line. 
In order to understand fully the workings of the segmentary lineage system, it 
will be necessary to examine the Ti.irkmen landholding- and watersystem. The 
Ti.irkmen tribal groups considered their pastures to be communal property. The 
social unit was the aul (camp) consisting of few yurts, the inhabitants of which were · 
mostly consanguineal relatives. Foreigners and refugees were accepted as clients 
(gongsi, gelmisek). On the basis of membership in the same lineage, several auls 
often joined to form larger units of several hundred tents. In the case of the 
sedentary agriculturalists, such groups were guided by hereditary leaders, called 
begs. The independent nomadic groups, such as Yomut and Goklen, had no 
hereditary superiors. Their aqsaqa/s (greybeards = oldest, wisest men of the camp) 
were in power by virtue of age, courage, experience and personal reputation. 
Decisions were taken after the committee (majlis) of aqsaqals had discussed the 
matter in conference with other Ti.irkmen members of the group. The aqsaqals were, 
and in Afghanistan still are, the guardians of Ti.irkmen traditions and tribal law, 
which formed the basis of Ti.irkmen society until the earlier decades of this century. 
In Mingajik the aqsaqals are still quite powerful, although their responsibilities have 
taken a somewhat different direction. Now their task is to advise people how best 
and most efficiently to deal with the Afghan central bureaucracy, which, in many 
ways has superseded tribal law. I know, however, of several cases of homicide that 
PLATE 5: CARAVAN NEAR A WELL IN THE DESERT-STEPPE 
PLATE 6: IRRIGATED WHEAT FIELDS 
PLATE 7: SETTING UP A YURT 
PLATE 8: PART OF THE ERGHAY OBA 
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were never brought to the attention of the Central Government. They were litigated 
according to tribal law by the majlis of aqsaqals (cf. chapter on politics). 
When looking at land rights, we have to make a distinction between sedentary 
agriculturalists (comur) and nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists (corva). In fact 
the distinction between these two economic modes of production was more 
important (in Afghanistan until the influx of muhajirin from Russia) than the 
differences between the various Ttirkmen tribes. Nomads were supposed to be 
morally better, more trustworthy and honourable. Agriculturalists were often 
regarded as cowards. Since there was this stigma attached, the main reason for 
Ttirkmen to become sedentary agriculturalists was loss of their animals due to 
natural catastrophes, raids or detrimental credit arrangements. The agriculturalists 
had, however, to maintain good relations with the corva in order to avoid raids by 
them, and in some cases also to secure their protection against other tribes. 
Whenever the Ttirkmen took over land from oasis cultivators (mainly Persian) 
during raids, the land was considered communal property of the group ( = sanasiq). 
Restoration and upkeep of the rapidly deteriorating irrigation-schemes called for the 
pooled labour of the group. The irrigation-canals were divided according to 
genealogical privileges: the main canals belonged to the oldest lineages and their 
branches to the junior ones. In this respect, the irrigation-system of a Ttirkmen 
sanasiq network gives a graphic representation of their genealogy. Although the 
long feeder-canals were wasteful of water due to evaporation in the hot and arid 
climate, this collective water-system was popular until the beginning of this century, 
and, in a somewhat modified version, still exists in some areas in Afghanistan. It is 
noteworthy that nearly all the kolchoses of the early-Soviet period in Turkmenia 
were organized along sanasiq-holdings and lineage-lines. In certain ways this 
system also had politcal connotations. Quite a lot of water needed for the irrigation 
of the southern areas of Turkistan came from Persia. This problem forced several 
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groups of southern Ttirkmen into a loose form of cohesion to be militarily stronger to 
fight with the Persians for water. This need for water and consequently for tribal 
cohesion was recognized and used for political purposes by the Tekke Ttirkmen 
leader Nur Berdy. He managed to bring several Ttirkmen groups and lineages under 
his grip. 
A factor m Central Asian history, the importance of which tends to be 
underestimated, is the spread of Islamic learning. From the time of Islamization 
onwards, Islam was always strongest in the urban centres of Bukhara and Samarkand 
and among the agriculturalist groups. The Islamic establishment amassed great 
wealth and through it gained a powerful and influential economic position. Already 
in the 16th century the Islamic establishment was in control of important water- and 
landholdings. Barthold (1928: 177) claims that nomadic peoples, such as most of the 
Ttirkmen were strongly opposed to Islam and a written record (Abul-Ghazi) exists to 
substantiate his claim. Those nomads who did convert, settled down as farmers or in 
urban centres. As an example may serve the Oghuz Ttirkmen, who settled in the Syr 
Darya (Jaxartes) valley. As a general rule, all areas close to natural water sources or 
irrigation-systems were inhabited by Islamic agriculturalists, whereas the dry and 
desert areas became the domain of non-Islamic or marginally Islamic nomads. I 
tend to agree with Barthold, who claims that the political crises in Turkistan led to 
strengthening the role of religion. He attributes this firstly to the geographical 
position and secondly to the composition of the population: in times of crisis, it was 
easier to secure support from backward mountain- and steppe-dwellers than from 
among the urban and agricultural population. Steppe- and mountain-dwellers were 
considered fiercer and more prone to fight. Allusions to this theory can easily be 
found in the oral literature of Central Asia. 
It certainly is a myth to see the relations of exchange between nomads and 
sedentary populations in a kind of peaceful, pristine, idealist way. Very often they 
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clashed, mainly over land and water, and their trade and exchange-relations were 
severed and raiding ensued. Here again, Islam or religion as such, comes in. In the 
event of a nomadic victory, they did not have a trained bureaucracy to rule and 
govern, so they resorted to religion. An exception to this rule, probably, was 
Genghis Khan, who used the bureaucracy of the defeated sedentary populations for 
his own nomadic benefits and ends. To phrase it in other words: the patterns of rule 
among nomadic societies are unstable, with ever shifting loyalties and authorities. It 
is here that the religious hierarchy comes in as a stabilizing force. Even if the 
authority of nomads was in secular hands, the ecclesiastical authority acted as a 
shadow state (cf. Bukhara), always ready to step in, in case the secular authority 
showed weakness or should collapse. The authority of the religious establishment, 
however, was not of a lasting nature. Probably it failed because of the ever recurring 
political and economic crises, the attacks of not yet converted and unintegrated 
peoples and last but not least, religious factionalism. 
At the beginning of the 17th century Central Asia was divided into a number of 
smaller principalities and khanates constantly at war with each other. The centres of 
power, however, were now in Russia, Persia, China and later on in British India: in 
other words, the powers outside Central Asia decided on the fate of Central Asia. 
Due to discovery of shipping routes, overland trade from Europe to China and 
vice versa, by way of Central Asia, became insignificant. Gradually Russia 
established herself as the prime power in this part of the world. Russia began to 
restrict movement of peoples who formerly freely moved nomadically through lands 
now occupied by sedentary agriculturalists (Pankov 1927). Fights now took a 
different dimension: they were no longer fights for water, but fights for pasture. As 
an example might serve the Kazakh-Oirat wars, which were as much wars for control 
of the Central Asian pasture lands as for political control (Abul Ghazi 1958). I also 
believe that they were as much wars for control of trade with the agricultural areas, 
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that is, with Samarkand and Bukhara, through which most of the Central Asian trade 
was channelled. 
When in 1881 the Czarist armies finally conquered Gok Tapa, the last 
stronghold of the Tekke Ttirkmen, they realized that they could not radically change 
Ttirkmen society at once. Most of the Ttirkmen social organization was left 
untouched. The majlis of the aqsaqals was vested with police powers. The Russians 
successfully worked towards integrating Turkistan into the fold of the Russian 
Empire - much to the detriment of British India -by constructing administrative and 
military centres and by building a network of railways that served as supply 
mechanisms for the centres and as means of transport for the goods to be exported 
from the area. For the first time, all the Ttirkmen tribes were under one ruler (to a 
lesser degree also in Iran and Afghanistan) - a foreign one - no local leader had ever 
achieved this feat. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, political developments of the area took a 
new turn. All the previous larger and smaller uprisings against the Russians had 
been wars of independent societies. After the Russian conquest, the political 
movements lost their impetus and fervour and became local responses to injuries and 
damages -real or imagined - caused by the Russian Empire. The Ttirkmen took up 
their 'wars' with Russia about land, water and religion. But since war is the conflict 
of independent states, anned conflict in Central Asia was henceforward rebellion and 
no longer war. 
b) The recent history of the Ersari Turk men of Afghanistan 
The Ersari form the bulk of Ttirkmen groups in Afghanistan. They are one of 
the seven major Ttirkmen tribes sharing a contiguous territory in the southwestern 
part of the Soviet Union (Soviet Central Asia) and the adjoining border regions of 
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Iran and Afghanistan (Map 3). All the Ti.irkmen groups speak the same west TUrkish 
vernacular, with local dialectical variations. The Ersari language of Afghanistan is 
heavily saturated with Persian vocabulary and Uzbek elements. All the Tiirkmen 
groups share more or less the same cultural tradition and maintain, as explained in 
the previous section, an ideology of common descent from an apical ancestor. 
Before discussing the present situation of the Ersari of Afghanistan, let us 
briefly look back at some historical events of consequence to modern times. During 
the last two hundred years, Afghan Turkistan was the domain of ten petty, semi-
independent Uzbek Khanates at times dependent on Kabul or Bukhara, but 
constantly fighting with each other or in rebellion against their overlord. This led to 
a rapid decline of the urban population, agriculture, markets and trade. 
To this effect Ferrier wrote in his Caravan Journeys: 
The amount of rivalry and intrigue that exist amongst the petty Khans of Turkistan 
is perfectly incredible to anyone who has not been in the country; and instead of 
trying to decrease or modify either, they exert their intelligence to the utmost to 
complicate and carry out their paltry schemes. The certain consequence is a 
permanent state of warfare in which it is impossible for the people to attempt the 
development of the resources of the country, or to undertake any enterprises with 
the view to its future improvement. They (the Khans) recognize the suzerainty of 
the princes of Herat. Bokhara, or Khulm, only because they have not sufficient 
power to throw it off, or that occasionally it happens to be in their interest to 
acknowledge it (1857:204). 
At the same time, the constant raids of the Tlirkmen depopulated whole areas, 
thereby bringing agriculture and trade to a halt. 
From 1850-1855 Dost Mohammad Khan, the ruler of Kabul, in a series of 
military campaigns finally brought all the Uzbek Khanates of Afghan Turkistan 
under his rule. Meanwhile the Russians consolidated their power on the other side of 
the Ox us, and in 1869 the Emir of Bokhara became a Russian vassal. In 1873 Britain 
and Czarist Russia finally agreed on the Amu Darya and the Khanate of Khiva as the 
official border of Afghanistan. With the firm Russian grip on Khiva and the fall of 
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Merv in 1884, the last slave markets were closed and the TUrkmen brought under 
flrmer control. Amir Abdul Rahman abolished slavery in 1895, prohibiting it as a 
violation of the tenets of Islam. 
In an attempt to create a unified Afghan nation in the 1880s and 1890s, Amir 
Abdul Rahman shifted thousands of Ghilzai Pashtuns, his major rivals and enemies, 
as well as other rebellious elements from south and eastern Afghanistan, to the lands 
nonh of the Hindukush mountains, where their descendants still live today. By 
exiling large numbers of enemies, he had a double purpose in mind: firstly, to 
remove dissidents from areas where they could incite revolts amongst their own 
tribesmen; and secondly, to establish a force loyal to himself. He counted on the fact 
that the .Ghilzai Pashtun might be anti-Durrani while living in their own tribal 
territory, but once removed to the nonh, where they had to live among non-kinsmen 
such as TUrkmen and Uzbeks, they would be loyal, that is pro-Durrani Pashtun. His 
plan proved correct. With this clever strategy he managed to consolidate Pashtun 
rule in Afghan Tm::kistan and gained control over all ethnic groups. 
In Afghanistan the majority of the Ersari Tlirkmen live in the nonhero Provinces 
of Jowzjan, Fariab, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz and Baghlan (Map 4), with small 
communities also in Kabul and near Mari~ak in the Province of Badghis. (For 
elaborations on the distribution of the various Tlirkmen descent groups in 
Afghanistan see Franz 1972a, 1972b; Jarring 1939.) As far as the number of Ersaris 
is concerned, a wide variety of very contradictory figures are circulating. 5 Based on 
my own research and statements from several informants and government officials, I 
would put the estimate at 354,000 for 1977. About one third of this flgure are 
indigenous (watani) Tlirkmen and 2/3 emigres, refugees (muhajirin) from the Soviet 
Union.6 For a demographic summary of the area studied please refer to appendices 
10 and 11. 
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According to the G.A.T. 1979, the area of this study in 1886 belonged to the 
Aqcha administrative division of Turkistan which included: 
a) The plain country around the town of Aqcha, watered by four canals (of the 18) 
from the Band-i-Amir River: 
the Nahr-i-F atehabad with 
2 Uzbek villages and a total of 250 families 
2 Ersari Ttirkmen villages and 300 families 
the Nahr-i-Maghsum (official name). This is actually a very old, historical 
canal that was redug by order of Ishak Khan, and therefore often called Nahr-i-
Ishak Khan. On this canal there are: 
8 Uzbek villages with a total of 470 families 
3 Arab villages with a total of 130 families 
8 Ersari Ttirkmen villages with 505 families 
Taghan, the cluster of villages this study is concerned with, is situated on this 
canal. In the above statistics, Taghan is represented with 250 families (approx. 
1,250 inhabitants, male and female) for the year 1886. Compared with the 1977 
figures in Appendix 11, of 591 persons (only men), this indicates that the 
population of Taghan (all watani) has remained fairly stable over the last 100 
years. 
Nahr-i-Sayyidabad with: 
3 Uzbek villages with a total of 240 families 
2 Arab villages with a total of 120 families 
4 Ersari villages with a total of 340 families 
1 town (Aqcha) ethnically mixed 250 families 
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On the Nahr-i-Sailbur, there are no villages. It serves to carry off excess water 
after heavy spring rains. It is mentioned that the ends of the Sailbur and 
Sayyidabad canals form in spring an inundation between the villages of Chellik 
and Alamlik. This fact was confirmed by several of my senior informants. 
b) The riverine district of Khwaja Salor on the Oxus west of Kilif. 
c) The small district of Daulatabad on the Ab-i-Andkhui. 
The same report mentions that Aqcha, Shiberghan and Andkhui, the major 
towns of this region of Afghan Turkistan, were all in a state of decay, left with only a 
few inhabitants. In comparison to the size of the area, the population was very small, 
mainly due to constant feuds, devastating wars and extremely chaotic conditions 
prior to integration into the Afghan nation, and ergo a firmer rule. 
Another reason was the unhealthy climate caused by malarial swamps. A severe 
famine in 1872 and an outbreak of cholera contributed further to the depopulation 
mentioned in Maitland's report. During the second half of the 19th century, about 50 
per cent of the population of the whole of Afghan Turkistan were Uzbeks and 
Ttirkmen and the other half Persian-speaking Tajiks, Hazaras and Arabs. 
POPULATION OF AFGHAN TURKIST AN IN 1884 
Ethnic group 
Uzbeks 
Arabs 
Hazar as 
Tajiks 
Ttirkmens 
Baluch and Firozkuhi 
Afghans (Pashtuns) 
Sayyids and Khwajas 
Kipchaks 
Total 
Source: Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Turkistan, p.14. 
Number of families 
30,080 
16,070 
11,490 
10,740 
8,505 
3,730 
3,420 
1,610 
1,460 
87,105 
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ERSARI POPULATION OF AFGHAN TURKIST AN IN 1884 
District 
Hazdah N ahr area 
Khwaja Salar 
Shor Tapa 
Shibarghan 
Andkhui 
Daulatabad 
Total 
Number of families 
2,200 
1,000 
1,600 
900 
600 
370 
6,670 
Source: Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Turkistan, p.84 (Maitland's diary). 
Before the turn of the century, the Pashtun element in our study area was still 
insignificant and confined to a few villages in the vicinity of Mazar-i-Sharif. 
However the steady influx of Ghilzai Pashtun was encouraged by the Arnir for 
obvious reasons. The area could hold a much larger population than presently 
existed, after _those natural calamities. Should the area remain at peace and the 
Pashtun immigration continue, the Ttirkic-speaking population of Afghan Turkistan 
would soon be reduced to an ethnic minority. 
In spite of these assimilation trends, Afghan rule was apparently not too 
oppressive, as a statement by Maitland from 1886 demonstrates: 
We observed no sign of oppression or markedly unjust dealing on the part of the 
Afghan rulers toward the subject races. The administration was decidedly good 
for an Asiatic state ... In Turkistan both Uzbaks and Turkomans allowed they had 
no serious cause of complaint, though they naturally feel their inferior position. 
This feeling is shared by the majority of the Persian speaking population (G.A.T. 
1979:12). 
According to Hayit (1956) and Sarkisyanz (1961), many Ersaris left the 
Manghishlak Peninsula at the end of the 17th century and some of them gradually 
moved eastwards to the areas of the Amu Darya. Vambery notes that even then they 
were quite different from the other Ttirkmen groups: 
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The Ersari Turkomans, who only migrated hither from Manghyshlak 200 years 
ago, have retained very little of the national characteristics of the Turkomans. 
They may be styled only semi-nomads, the greater part cultivating the land, and 
the remainder, still exclusively pastoral, having lost with their savage character all 
the primitive virtues of their kindred tribe (1970[1885]:272). 
Apart from Vambery's value judgement, this statement might be valid for the 
Ersari groups in the USSR, but does certainly not stand proof for the Kara section of 
the Ersari tribe, for the Kara were nomadic in Afghanistan until the beginning of this 
century and their raiding only stopped when the region was firmly integrated into the 
Afghan nation. Some of the watani of Mingajik also stated that their ancestors 
arrived in this area in the second half of the 19th century mainly from the lower 
reaches of the Amu Darya, some as far away as Urgench. 
All migrations of refugees from Russian Central Asia between 1918 and 1935 
can be seen more or less directly in context with natural catastrophies and political 
events in Soviet Turkistan. A good description and analysis of these events can be 
found in Allworth (1967) and Hayit (1956). The first refugees, mainly 
agriculturalists, originally inhabiting land in the Amu Darya valley in areas close to 
the Afghan border, came during 1918/1919. Due to the proximity of their homeland, 
they were mostly able to bring their flocks and moveable property to Afghanistan. 
These first migrants, therefore, form the richer stratum of Ttirkmen and Uzbaks 
migrant society. Subsequent migrants, also from the Amu Valley, but from areas as 
far away as Khiva, came empty-handed. All migrant communities examined claim 
to have possessed arable land in their homeland and lived in settled villages, thus 
coming from communities with a predominantly agricultural background. My senior 
informant mentioned that the first wave of immigration was triggered by a severe 
famine in Soviet Turkistan and this is confirmed by written sources (Kovda 1961). 
A general pattern regarding their route of migration can be observed. Most 
refugees crossed the Afghan border near the town of Andkhui, a small town with half 
of its population being Uzbek and the other half Ttirkrnen. The greater part of the 
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Ti.irkmen population is of refugee-origin. Before the takeover of Afghan Turkistan 7 
by the Amir of Kabul, Andkhui was one of the most important Uzbek Khanates of 
the area, and also the last to fall into Afghan hands. Some refugees settled 
permanently in Andkhui, and they and their descendants form the nucleus of the 
present population of the town. Others stayed there several weeks, months or even 
years before migrating to other areas of Jowzjan or to adjacent provinces. The 
internal migrations generally took place within a network of kinship ties. Some 
aspects of these migrations will be dealt with in the chapter on kinship. 
The second wave of immigration (1923/1924) can be seen in context with the 
defeat of the Basmachi Revolution and the territorial division of Turkistan. People 
arriving during the 1925-1929 period mostly left their homeland for religious 
reasons. During those years prosecution of Moslims became stricter and practising 
of any faith became virtually impossible.s The last group of immigrants came in 
1935 shortly before the borders with Afghanistan became tightly closed. Their 
arrival probably is to be seen in relation to the collectivization of lands in Soviet 
Turkistan. Some older muhajirin reported that prior to their flight to Afghanistan, 
they had to fight the Bolsheviks on order of the Emir of Bukhara. By 1935, 94 per 
cent of all arable land was under Soviet control. 
It is common knowledge that watani Ersari were involved in the revolt against 
King Habibullah (Shah) who was murdered in 1919. My 'father' mentioned in this 
context that his kinsmen - still mostly nomadic at that time - received landgrants 
from the government of King Amanullah (Shah) 'for good behaviour', that is, for 
fighting on the right side. I agree with Franz (1972b: 197) that such land grants must 
be seen in context with sedentarization and integration movements, ergo better 
control of the still nomadic Ersari groups (especially the Kara descent group). 
Apparently also the first groups of refugees were given landgrants, generally smaller 
parcels than the watani. 9 As we shall see in the chapter on economics, quite a few of 
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the refugees managed to augment their agricultural landholdings by a variety of 
practices, since they did not have an initial aversion to becoming settled and tied to 
the land as did some of the Kara descent groups with a more pastoralist ideology and 
Weltanschauung. 
Nowadays many of the settled urban oriented TUrkmen (the muhajirin more so 
than the watani ) are trying to adopt the Uzbek life-style which is supposed to be 
chic, representing worldliness. This may take the form of adopting their style of 
dressing, their type of housing and interior-decoration, their music. Some even go as 
far as mixed marriages. In TUrkmen reckoning, the Uzbek life-style symbolizes 
refinement, carries a smack of the big cities of Bukhara and Samarkand. In fact the 
role of the Uzbeks as cultural brokers and middlemen is nothing new. Similarly I 
could observe in Kashgar and Khotan (Xinjiang, Chinese Turkistan) that Andizhani 
ways were especially desirable and worthy of imitation. Already Vambery mentions 
in his Travels in Central Asia that Kirghiz and Kipchak imitate and assimilate to 
Uzbek ways 'due to a certain prestige of breeding and bon ton of the Uzbeks longer 
established in Turkestan' (1970[1885]:432). 
Where are the Tlirkmen standing today? Most of the Tlirkmen in the desert-
fringe villages are still living in isolation ( 1977) with little physical and social 
mobility and hardly any access to the centres of power, or decent medical facilities 
for that matter. Few understand the importance of schooling, since the curricula are 
irrelevant to their mode of life. Prospects for jobs outside their traditional 
environment are bleak. Without basic education, very few find their way to institutes 
of higher learning or even the University of Kabul. Since literacy, education and 
partly also the right ethnic affiliation are pre-requisites for government and military 
careers, the Tlirkmen are heavily under-represented. As with all ethnic minorities 
having to integrate into a nation-state or assimilate to social and political ways whose 
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workings they do not understand, this is a long and tedious process, a road fraught 
with trial and error. 
48 
NOTES 
1 The quantitative infonnation of this section is taken from the map of Afghanistan 1:1000.000 
(Tiibinger Atlas der vorderen Orientes) and all other infonnation, if not otherwise stated, is from my 
own observations and inquiries made in the field. 
2 Getting reliable statistical material presents a serious problem in the case of Afghanistan. During 
the Daoud Era (1973-April 1978) various ministries have initiated censuses in certain areas for 
specific purposes. Figures, therefore, vary considerably from ministry to ministry. A peculiarity of 
Afghan census material is the fact, that figures never include women, girls and small boys. 
As example may serve the population figures for the Province of Jowzjan (Source: 1975 Gazetteer): 
a) according to the Ministry of Agriculture = 198,324 inhabitants 
b) according to the Ministry oflnterior = 211,133 inhabitants 
Also the figures for the Woluswali of Mingajik vary considerably: 
a) according to the Ministry of Agriculture = 12,771 inhabitants 
·b) according to the Ministry of Interior = 13,481 inhabitants 
c) author's own figures = 11,991 inhabitants 
For population density of major Tiirkmen districts and subdistricts as well as population figures for all 
the villages of Mingajik, see Appendices 10 and 11. 
3 Kovda (1961:184) mentions 38 major droughts on the Central Asian Plains in the period from 994 
AD to 1774, and 23 major droughts in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. For details 
see also I.E. Buchinsky 1975. 
4 For a description of Tiirkmen alamans (slaveraids) and their consequences see Charles Marvin: 
Merv, the Queen of the World and the Man-Stealing Turcomans with an Exposition of the Khorassan 
Question (London: W.H. Allen, 1881:177-200). 
5 See footnote 33, p.419 of Gregorian 1969 which reads: 
Most recent sources have estimated the number of Turkomans at 200,000. See Reysner, 
Afghanistan, p.266; E.I., 2d ed., I, 230-31; Wilber, Afghanistan, 1st ed., p.62; Humlum, 
pp.92-93; Fletcher, Afghanistan, p.l6. Soviet sources generally provide higher estimates. 
For example BSE (2d ed., III , 496) and Bochkharev (p.34) offer the figure 380,000, and 
Dvoriankov (p.37) estimates 400,000. 
Or Slobin 1976:12: 
Estimates of the number of Turkmens in Afghanistan vary as widely as those for the 
Uzbeks. Schurmann (1961:86) has collected the Russian guesses as follows: Aristov at 
50,000; Reisner at 200,000; Reiser at 4% of the population of Afghanistan; and Bochkarev 
at 380,000, or 3%. Schurmann himself gives 'a minimum Turkmen population in 
Afghanistan of 200,000 or more. The most recent Soviet figure, 400,000 (Aslanov 
1969:75), is probably as accurate as any'. 
6 The old-established, indigenous Tiirkmen in Afghanistan are called watani in Persian and 
oturumdar in Tiirkmeni. The tenn priire (muhajirin) if used by an indigenous Tiirkmen has a 
somewhat pejorative meaning. The priire are considered to be of inferior status, mainly because of 
their association with agriculture. As I shall demonstrate in the chapter on kinship, strict rules apply 
regarding intennarriage of watani with priire Tiirkmen. In the area of Mingajik most priire 
(muhajirin) are of different tribal segments. Politically only a very loose cohesion is noticeable 
between the two groups. Only in case of strife with other ethnic groups inhabiting the area, all 
Tiirkmen segments will unite and fight under the name of Ersari confederation. 
7 Afghan Turkistan consisted of the following Uzbek Khanates: Maimana, Sar-i-Pul, Sheberghan, 
Aqcha, Andkhui, Balkh, Gurziwan, Darzab, Kunduz and Badakhshan. They were all brought under 
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Afghan rule during the latter half of the 19th century. In 1878 Andkhui was still semi-independent. 
Amir Ali Sher Khan, the ruler of Afghanistan, had stationed a regiment of Afghan cavalry there to 
protect the khanate from the raids of the Tilrkmen. Marvin (1881:39) gives a brief account of the 
political situation and a general description of the khanate. 
8 Several refugee-informants admitted that although religious reasons were given, the real reasons for 
leaving Russian Turkistan was the liberation of the women by the communists. This caused a severe 
breakdown of the male-dominated family structure. It meant destruction of the strict segregation of 
male from female spaces. Massell in his illuminating analysis of the position of women in the early 
years of the communist take-over of Central Asia and their role as surrogate proletariat confirms the 
testimonies of my informants. 
9 The acreage indicated by Franz (1972a) footnote 12, could not be confirmed for the region of 
Mingaj i.k{faghan. 
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LES AGES DE L'HOMME 
Neufmois,j'ai dormi dans le ventre de rna mere 
Puis ce furent les jours ou, ouvrant les yeux, je vins au monde 
Je marchai a quatre partes, rna mere me porta 
A huit mois, vinrent les jours ou je commen~ai a rire. 
A un ans,je ne savais distinguer le bien du mal 
A deux ans, je connaissais bien mon pere et rna mere 
A trois ans, Dieu me delia la langue 
A quatre ans, vinrent les jours ouje commen~ai ajeter des cailloux. 
Ma cinquieme annee,je lapassai comme unprintemps et un ere 
A six ans,je courais en chantant 
A sept ans,je ne m'occupais encore pas desfilles 
A huit ans vinrent les jours ou mes dents de lait se mirent a tomber. 
A neuf ans,je saluai le Seigneur 
A dix ans, je suspendis a mon cou un verset du cor an 
A onze ans,je pris en mains l'ecritoire et le calame 
Ce furent les jours ou je comme~ai a lire eta comprendre. 
De mes douze ans,je passai a rna treizieme annee 
A quatorze ans, je commen~ai a subir les influences 
A quinze ans, les filles s'intoduisirent dans mes reves 
A seize ans, cefurent les jours ouje bouillonnais de folie. 
A vint ans,j'errais, comme enivre 
A vingt-cinq ans, je per~ais l'ennemi de fleches 
A trente ans, je montais a cheval et parcourais le pays 
A trente-cinq ans vinrent les jours ou j'essuyai des revers au combat. 
A quarante ans, rna coupe est deja pleine 
A cinquante ans,je prends le chapelet dans mes mains 
A soixante ans, je deviens le disciple d'un Guide spirituel 
Ce sont les jours ou j'atteins /'age du Prophete. 
A soixante-dix ans, des douleurs me descendent dans les genoux 
A quatre-vingts ans, un nuage de poussiere tombe devant mes yeux 
A quatre-vingt-dix ans, rna tete est desormais privee de raison 
Ce sont les jours ou je suis loin de tout entendement. 
Avant que tu atteignes cent ans, on te prendra ton arne 
On t'erendra sur ta couchefunebre, on taillera ton linceul 
Makhtoumkouli! Puisse lafoi t'accompagner 
Le jour ou ton arne sera separee de ton corps! 
Makhtumkuli Firaqi (18th century Ttirkmen poet) 
Translation by Louis Bazin and Pertev Boratav 
PLATE 9: BOY WEARING CAP AND 
WAISTCOAT ADORNED WITH 
AN ARRAY OF AMULETS 
PLATE 10: HAIRSTYLE OF GIRLS BEFORE REACHING PUBERTY 
PLATE 11: 
PORTRAIT OF A BRIDE 
BEYOND HER REPRODUCTIVE YEARS 
CHAPTER THREE 
DOMESTIC GROUPS AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT 
THE CONCEPT OF 0Y (HOUSEHOLD)1 
The smallest social and economic unit in Ttirkmen society is the uy. It 
comprises the physical structure of a tent (yurt) and the people living in it. In some 
instances a uy may contain more than one unit of reproduction e.g. in the case of a 
patrilocal extended or polygynous family. Members of a household usually occupy 
one yurt1 or more recently one tam (house)1. Depending on the phase of the 
developmental cycle a particular household is in, its members may occupy several 
tents or tams or a combination of both, but form one economic unit. As a rule, in a 
polygynous household, each wife has separate accommodation with her children. 
Only richer Ttirkmen can afford a guest tent or guest house, which, even if only a 
modest structure, is an important asset and prerequisite for the accumulation of 
prestige and status and for the promotion of harmony and stability between a given 
uy and larger sections in an elaborate segmentary lineage system. Never-ending 
hospitality and exchanges of food are seen as cohesive forces. We shall look at this 
phenomenon in the chapter on politics. 
The arrangement of space in a Ttirkmen yurt is more or less uniformly 
prescribed. The layout of the yurt is structured according to male and female spaces 
and occupations to be performed in certain sections. Generally the yurt is divided 
into four sections according to the four cardinal points, with the hearth as its focal 
point. The female working and sleeping place is to the left of the entrance which 
generally faces south. The men occupy the right half of the yurt. (For a detailed 
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discussion on spacing patterns of yurts in other Turkic societies and Mongolian 
dwellings, see Andrews 1973; Centlivres-Demont 1977; Frey 1983; Hamayon 1975; 
Humphrey 1979; Pritsak: 1954; Rank 1949 and R6na-Tas 1961.) It is interesting to 
note that these patterns are not applied to tams. 
It suffices here to stress that for most households, the yurt or the tam are an all-
purpose dwelling for living, working, sleeping, storage and sheltering of weak 
animals during the cold season. 
According to the Kara Ttirkmen of Taghan, an iiy is conceptualized as a cluster 
of people sharing an ocek, a hearth. 2 Although they might not all live in the same 
yurt, they form a reproductive and economic unit. Thus the concept goes beyond the 
idea of sharing shelter and common residence. 'Hearth' in this context also includes 
the tandyr, the round clayoven used for baking big, round loaves of bread, their 
staple food. In other words, it has the wider meaning of a group of people clustered 
together in sharing food from a common store of grain. Since bread is the staple in 
all the communities studied, this conception parallels that described by Irons, who 
states that the household among the Yomut of Iran is seen as a 'group of people who 
are united in the preparation of bread' (Irons 1969:8). 
As an economic unit the household claims ownership of the yurt or tam and its 
furnishings, all movable property, the herd and (whenever applicable) agricultural 
land. The ·ay is under the authority of a household head, usually the most senior 
male, who is also the defacto owner of all property belonging to the iiy as a corporate 
group. Ownership patterns may vary according to the phase a particular iiy is in at a 
given time. In an extended patrilocal household, individual married sons might own 
small herds or pieces of agricultural land, but these are looked at as part of the 
household's joint possessions. Pasture or rights to pasture and access to wells and 
other water sources are normally owned by several households together, or by one or 
more obas (camps, villages) related by agnatic ties. 
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The responsibility to represent the household in meetings of larger tribal 
segments rests in the hands of the household head, who with a few exceptions, as 
will be demonstrated later, is usually a male. The Ti.irkmen of Taghan consider the 
household to be the smallest unit in an elaborate hierarchical system of agnatic 
descent groups. Uylar are grouped into smaller named lineages (tire, oba)3 which in 
turn are merged into larger segments; these again form larger unions until the largest 
identifiable descent group, mostly in the realm of mythology, is reached. 
As we shall try to demonstrate in the chapter on kinship, accurate genealogical 
knowledge is a vital prerequisite to determining allegiance in disputes and marriage 
transactions and recently also in solving problems brought about by a firmer 
integration of Ti.irkmen politics into the framework of the Afghan Central 
Government. 
The uy appears to be the most important unit in the whole genealogical structure 
of the Ti.irkmen, since it is responsible for the reproduction and thus perpetuation of 
the system, producing over time new groups that will eventually form new lineages. 
It is also responsible for production and consumption. 
Livestock and agricultural land are the possession of a household. Pasture-land 
and wells or other water sources are often used by a cluster of households, an oba or 
several obalar, but access to them is invariably gained by virtue of being a member 
of a certain uy. 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE 
The regular -developmental cycle of a Ti.irkmen uy consists of fission of nuclear 
households from a patrilocal extended family. In other words, a married son may 
leave his father's household when his children have reached the age at which they 
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can be used as workers in the fields or can look after herds, thereby securing an 
adequate labour force necessary for the economic viability of the new uy. 
In order to facilitate a smooth transition from the father's patrilocal extended 
household to a new nuclear reproductive unit, the father has to provide his son firstly 
with a wife and secondly with an adequate number of animals and access to 
agricultural land. The first requirement- securing a bride -is a rather costly affair, 
since large amounts of bridewealth have to be paid in cash and kind. Generally 
agricultural land is not transferred as bridal payment and I know of no such 
transaction. Land is usually kept as a family group-holding passed down from father 
to sons. I was told that parcellization of landholdings makes irrigation difficult and 
the plots too small for effective cultivation. In spite of this danger, upon the death of 
the father, agricultural land is usually divided among brothers, a process which leads 
to micro-parcellization and economic non-viability. As a rule, sons are married off 
in order of seniority. This rule is only broken, if serious mental illness or a physical 
handicap prevent a man from getting married. Thus for each son a share of the 
paternal herd and income from other pursuits has to be appropriated for bridal 
payment; and later on, another share must be provided for fission from the paternal 
household and the establishment of a new uy. The complex matter of bridal 
payments will be dealt with in the chapter on marriage. 
Herds naturally vary over time. Separation and bridal payment are always 
subject to the economic conditions of a given paternal household. In Taghan the 
father normally gives about 50 animals to his son at the time of separation and access 
to the produce of commonly owned agricultural land equal to the amount of labour 
put in by the son and his iiy. As far as I could establish, there were no fixed rules 
regarding the size of the share, all decisions on this matter being at the discretion of 
the father. It should, however, be enough to guarantee the viability of the new 
nuclear household. The vagaries of the harsh climate, epidemics and loss of labour 
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(e.g. if a son is drafted into the Afghan army) make it difficult to anticipate or plan, 
when enough wealth can be accumulated to raise a bride-price and thus pave the way 
for a new household. Younger brothers often have to wait for many years until the 
necessary wealth can be accumulated. A further complicating factor among the 
Taghan section of the Kara Tlirkmen is the fact that their brides can only be taken 
'home' after the final payment has been made. In poorer households, the bride-price 
is paid in instalments (animals, money, grain etc), sometimes over a period of many 
years. It is therefore almost always necessary to enlist the support of richer agnates 
in securing payments, especially if the father of the groom-to-be is already of 
advanced age. This act of collaboration and the inflated bride-prices have led to 
relaxation of old tribal customs and adjustments to the new circumstances, as we 
shall see in the chapter on marriage. A further decisive factor in the readiness to 
change marriage patterns must be seen in the gradual impoverishment of most 
Taghan obalar, and a large proportion of muhajirin (refugees) who have no access to 
traditional ways of securing brides. My argument that animal wealth is decisive in 
the timing for the fission of a household is borne out also by Barth for the Basseri 
and Hudson for the Kazakhs. Hudson writes for the Kazakhs that 'When a son 
married or came of age he was given a share (enci) of his father's animals and 
established his own household. The age at which this occurred varied with the 
wealth and social position of the father, being earlier among the rich' (Hudson, 
1938:35; emphasis is mine). Barth mentions a similar procedure for the Basseri: 
'Greater wealth also generally leads to an earlier fragmentation of the household' 
(Barth 1968:421). 
My field data reveal that due to impoverishment, internal migration, ecological 
imbalance, several natural calamities and a higher male sex ratio, the average 
marriage age for a man is now between 26-30 years instead of 15-22 years about 40 
years ago. This higher age at first marriage in many cases also raises the marriage 
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age of girls. Although a girl might be engaged at the age of 12 or 13 years, she often 
reaches the age of 20 or more by the time the final bridal payment is made. This in 
turn shortens her reproductive cycle. This is an important fact for a society in which 
infant and maternal mortality are extremely high. This phenomenon often also 
creates a large age gap between spouses. Only rich herders and landowners can 
afford to pay the bride-price all at once, and thus have the monopoly over a 
considerable percentage of women in their reproductive years. Among the richer 
segment it is a matter of prestige to be able to 'buy' a bride for a son at an early age 
e.g. 16 or 17 years. Having the purchasing power to do so puts them in a very 
privileged position in a society in which various forms of wealth are an important 
ingredient to leadership status. Wealth and the ability to 'talk well' (oratory qualities) 
are prime requisites for any would-be-leader in a society which- in contrast to many 
other Central Asian societies - has no hereditary leadership and chiefly or princely 
lineages. 4 This important phenomenon will be dealt with in another chapter. 
With more men entering the wage labour force, cash plays a significant pan in 
bridal payments; in fact, it is gradually substituting for animal wealth. Families with 
daughters of a marriageable age are in a position to use the bridal payments for a 
daughter to secure a bride for a marriageable son or to facilitate fission of a nuclear 
household.s Ideally each nuclear family thus develops from an extended family and 
over time, in turn, becomes an extended family. In reality, however, conditions are 
often less ideal and many demographic, environmental and social variables might 
work against this 'ideal' development. 
The worst calamity to hit a man is to be without sons. 'A man without children 
is a bazar, a home without children is a mazar (grave)'. Variations of this and other 
proverbs stressing the importance of children (sons) are to be found among all the 
Central Asian Turks including the Uighur of Xinjiang. A son, especially the 
youngest son, takes a special position in his father's life. He is a source of labour, 
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comfort and an old age 'insurance' looking after the father in his old age. Daughters 
do not count, for they are to be married into another household and their labour is 
lost to their natal family. Obligations of economic, political and ritual assistance are 
extended in times of need beyond the father-son relation to include all close agnates. 
Should father and son be on bad terms, in a case of the father being involved in a 
quarrel of feud with another oba or tire (descent group), the son immediately has to 
take sides with his father's lineage. Agnatic descent is stronger than personal 
sentiments. The Ttirkmen of Taghan practise ultimogeniture: that is, the youngest 
son has to stay in his father's household until the death of his father. Only then may 
the father's estate be divided according to Qur'anic law or tribal customs. The 
youngest son usually inherits all property in animals that is left at his father's death. 
There exists a special term of endearment for the youngest son. His father often calls 
him korpii ogul, a term that implies closer emotional ties than with his other sons. 
Islam allows a man to have four wives at any given time, but only the rich can 
afford to maintain two or more households at the same time. The spectrum of 
marriageable women becomes smaller for a second marriage, and the bride-price 
proportionately higher, unless the second bride is a widow. 
As a last resort to secure continuation of his lineage, a man might resort to 
adoption, especially if he has a daughter who can be given in marriage to the adopted 
son. Adoption is a complicated process, which even now, with vanishing and 
weakening tribal cohesion, must be sanctioned by the whole lineage-grouping (e.g. 
in the case of Taghan, all the lineages making up the Taghan division have to be 
consulted). The importance of this act becomes clear when we are looking at the 
political status of the adopted son (ogellik). He has, so to speak, a double role to 
fulfill. Although economically he forfeits all the inheritance rights of his biological 
'Uy and inherits the property of his adopted father, according to tribal rules and 
regulations (deb, adat)6 politically he remains a member of his natal lineage. In 
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other words, in cases of conflict he owes allegiance to his agnatic tribal segment. In 
view of these political implications, only close kin, e.g. patrilateral nephews, are 
considered for adoption. Adoption thus is a lineage concern and not a concern of the 
two uylar involved in the transaction since the stability of the lineage system is at 
stake. If the ogellik marries the daughter of his adoptive father, which is nearly 
always the case, no bridewealth has to be paid. This is quite understandable, since 
the receiver and giver would be the same person, the adoptive father. The Tiirkmen, 
however, claim that no marriage transaction is valid without some kind of exchange, 
however small it may be. Therefore a token amount, usually consisting of a sheep 
and a don 7 is given to a close agnate to validate the transaction. The receiver in most 
cases is the bride's father's brother, who according to Islamic law would be the first 
possible guardian. 
These processes of household development can best be demonstrated by looking 
at a particular community. We shall present an. analysis of household developments 
in Taghan, the cluster of obalar forming the core of my field investigations. 
PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLD DEVELOPMENT IN TAGHAN 
We need to briefly recapitulate that Taghan consists of eight obalar, six of 
which are closely related watani81ineages, one is a muhajirin (refugee) lineage of the 
Ulutepe Tiirkmen not related to the others. The women, however, wear the typical 
Taghan bogmak, kulta,9 a sign that they are more or less assimilated to Taghan 
. customs; but there is no intermarriage between the groups. The last group is a 
lineage of former slaves (qui) 10 of one of the six watani lineages. They in turn do 
not intermarry with any of the other seven lineages, although they are completely 
assimilated to the Taghan way of life. The Taghan people, although not a 
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homogeneous group, nevertheless usefully enable us to examine the various 
possibilities of household development. These have been influenced by 
demographic changes, internal migrations, ecological imbalance due to an influx of 
refugees from Soviet Central Asia between 1919-1930, detrimental social customs 
such as bacabozlik/birishill and the consumption of opium - all factors ultimately 
leading to economic impoverishment of the Taghan area. We shall analyze the eight 
obalar as a unit and only distinguish between muhajirin, watani and qullar whenever 
the lucidity of the argument requires such a distinction. 
We have so far argued that most households follow the ideal developmental 
cycle, that is, nuclear households split off from patrilocal extended ones. As a 
consequence, the majority of domestic units should be either nuclear families headed 
by a relatively young head of household or patrilocal extended ones headed by an 
older patriarch. 
Using the example of Taghan, a community undergoing a great deal of 
movement and instability over the last 50 years, we shall analyze an irregular 
situation and discuss possible causes for these irregular developments, as well as 
mechanisms available to counteract irregularities. We shall then try to compare the 
situation in Taghan with the more stable conditions of the Yomut of Iran, described 
by Irons (1975). I have adopted the model stipulated by Irons, which looks at the 
interconnection of two variables: relation of dependent males to the household head, 
and their marital status. Adoption of this model will make my field data comparable 
with those presented by Irons. One might question why the women are more or less 
left out in this analysis. Until recently (1979 Census), it was quite common practice 
to leave women out of all vital statistics with the result that hardly any reliable 
statistics exist with regard to women in Afghanistan. Furthermore women are never 
represented in Ti.irkmen genealogies. My omission might be further justified by the 
fact that daughters upon marriage become members of other households and only 
60 
men are the stabilizing force in the developmental cycle of any given uy. The 
marriage of a daughter is insignificant to her agnatic lineage, whereas a son's 
wedding brings about the beginning of change, the first step to a new development. 
The replaceability of women brought forth by Irons is borne out by field data from 
Taghan. The high incidence of maternal death in Taghan accounts for a large 
turnover of marriageable women (wives). When inquiring about the death of 
someone's first wife and the hardship it might create, I was told: 'I will simply get 
another one, for women are only appendages of men'. This attitude regarding the 
replaceability of women is illustrated by many Tiirkmen proverbs such as 'If you 
have a son and the necessary wealth, you can always get a woman'. In other words, 
if you have a male, you can always secure a female. Whenever I asked my 
informants to recite genealogies, they did not mention any females. They found it 
hard to remember even the names of females more than two generations back, 
whereas the males were clearly and exactly recalled many generations back. Most 
often they would only remember that so and so had three wives, being unaware of 
name and tribal affiliation. We shall discuss this point further when looking at the 
female life cycle and the position of women. 
I also follow Irons' practice of grouping married men and widowers into one 
category, since their status within the household is similar. As mentioned earlier, 
most men, especially younger ones or older ones without male issue, usually marry 
again if their first wife dies. Whenever required, I shall draw comparative material 
from Carshangu, a settled Tlirkmen refugee village culturally more or less 
assimilated to Tajik and Uzbak practices. The inhabitants of this village are mostly 
rich agropastoralists, entrepreneurs and tradespeople. Their adjustment to Tajik 
practices is outwardly visible by their large housing compounds surrounded by high 
walls, and the total seclusion of their women. Polygyny is still practised among the 
rich entrepreneurs: in fact, it plays an important part in the status rivalries of the 
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villagers. In tum, this stratum of rich entrepreneurs plays an important role in the 
power structure of the area, as I shall demonstrate later. Carshangu, for reasons to be 
discussed in another chapter, has intermarried with people from other lineages and 
ethnic groups. Residence patterns of the villagers reveal that related lineages are all 
residing in certain sections of the village, muhajirin separate from watani. 
Table 1 shows the composition of each household in Taghan. Out of a total of 
89 households, 36 (40 per cent) are nuclear and 12 (13 per cent) are patrilocal 
extended. This would amount to a total of 48 (53 per cent) households being in 
phases of the regular developmental cycle. Compared with the Y omut, this figure is 
very low. Out of a total of 59 Yomut households surveyed by Irons 34 (58 per cent) 
were nuclear families and 14 (24 per cent) were patrilocal extended. This brings to 
48 (82 per cent) the number falling into phases of regular development. Also 
noteworthy is the difference in age at which nuclear households turn into patrilocal 
extended ones. In Taghan, the 11 men over the age of 50 in the nuclear family 
category have either married very late because of poverty or had only daughters 
before a son was born (which of course results in a vast age difference between the 
father and his eldest son). In some cases, the sons were engaged and the bridewealth 
paid in instalments over a long period of time. Irons, for his ·sample of 59 
households, reports seven cases which would fit the pattern of Taghan. The five 
simple polygynous households all came into existence because of total sterility of the 
first wife or because no male issue could be gotten. In one case where both wives 
could not get pregnant it must be assumed that the problem is with the husband.12 
Due to high female mortality, 30 per cent of all men presently married are living 
with their second or even third wife. This again indicates that women are 
replaceable. Polygyny in this case is a biological necessity and not a status symbol, 
since all five families live in rather poor economic conditions. One of the 
polygynous households consists of a brother with two wives, a brother with one wife, 
Phases of regular 
domestic cycle 
Age of Nuclear Patrilocal 
oldest male family extended 
in 
household 
60+ 4 9 
50-59 7 2 
40-49 15 1 
30-39 8 
20-29 2 
10-19 -
Total 36 12 
(40%) (13%) 
48 (53%) 
Total of 
individuals 142 81 
in each type 
Total population = 465 
TABLE 1: HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION OF TAGHAN 
Less frequent Unusual developmental cycle 
Simple Married man Widow + Unmarried Married Two or Unmarried 
polygynous +unmarried immature brothers man +un- more un- man +un-
patrilateral sons married married married 
nephew brothers brothers patrilateral 
nephew 
2 
3 1 2 2 
1 2 1 3 5 
1 2 4 2 2 
1 1 
3 -
5 3 3 4 10 11 2 
8 (9.5%) 33 (37%) 
23 22 16 12 54 96 5 
Unmarried 
brothers 
+ unmarried 
patrilateral 
nephew 
2 
2 
12 
Unmarried 
man +old 
mother 
1 
1 
2 
0\ 
N 
63 
1/ 
TABLE 2: HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION OF THE BAYS OF CARSHANGU 
Household number Number of wives Sons* Daughters* 
alive deal 
No. 1 4 1 5 4 
No. 2 3 1 6 4 
No. 3 3 
-
4 -
No. 4 1 
- 1 2 
No. 5 1 
- - 1 
No. 6 3 2 3 1 
No. 7 2 1 3 4 
No. 8 2 1 4 1 
No. 9 1 1 3 3 
No. 10 2 
- -
-
No. 11 1 2 1 1 
No. 12 2 - 1 3 
No. 13 2 
- 3 3 
No. 14 2 - 1 3 
No. 15 2 3 
- 3 
No. 16 1 2 2 1 
No. 17 2 2 2 -
No. 18 2 2 2 2 
No. 19 2 3 2 1 
No. 20 2 2 2 2 
No. 21 1 1 3 2 
No. 22 1 1 2 1 
No. 23 1 1 2 3 
No. 24 2 3 2 -
No. 25 1 1 1 1 
No. 26 1 1 3 2 
No. 27 1 1 2 1 
No. 28 1 2 2 2 
Number of 16 62 51 
polygenous 
households 57% 113 or 4.02 children 
per household (average) 
* 
** 
figures do not include stillbirths and deaths 
figures include husbands 
Total household numbers** 
14 
14 
8 
5 
3 
8 
10 
8 
7 
3 
4 
7 
9 
7 
6 
5 
5 
7 
6 
7 
7 
5 
7 
5 
4 
7 
5 
6 
189 Pax*** 
6.75 Pax 
(average) 
*** this average of 6. 75 persons per household does not include other relatives 
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and an unmarried brother. They form one economic unit, since on their own, none of 
them would be economically viable, not having enough labour to till their land and 
look after their herds. 
Table 2 illustrates the prevailing household composition in Carshangu, the 
settled village with a large percentage of rich entrepreneurs and traders. Here the 
situation is different. Out of a total of 28 households, 15 (57 per cent) are 
polygynous. Only household number 10 is entirely without issue, a fact warranting 
the taking of a second wife to secure a male heir to perpetuate the lineage. 
Household number 5 consists of a young man who only married two years ago, so 
there is hope for some male progeny. Households no. 1-4 are brothers, of whom 1 
and 2 and again 4 and 5 form single economic units. They are the sons of one of the 
richest agropastoralists and entrepreneurs of the whole of Afghan Turkistan. By 
virtue of his charisma, eloquence, religious manipulations and wealth - all attributes 
warranting leadership - he was the only man capable of uniting all the segments of 
the Ulutepe Tiirkmen. We shall use his example when discussing the political 
aspects of Tiirkmen society. 
A word needs to be said about the number of sons and daughters for each 
household listed in Table 2. The figures are exceedingly low since they do not 
include stillborn and deceased children. Women are usually quite unwilling to talk 
about dead offspring and often simply have forgotten them. Experience has shown 
that most women have an average of 6-7 dead children in the course of their 
reproductive years. Among the rich acculturated sector the age at flrst marriage is 
usually lower than in Taghan, since families are financially viable and have easy 
access to brides; even a high bride-price can be paid at once, and no lengthy period 
of engagement is needed. In most of the households listed in Table 2, the women 
devote a large part of their time to carpet-making, often assisted by poor relatives 
paid for their labour on a daily basis. Polygyny in those cases is an economic matter 
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more than a biological necessity. I would like to recall that the bride-price for a 
second and third wife - if a virgin bride - is considerably higher than for the first 
one; and as we shall see in the chapter on marriage, only certain groups of women 
are available for second and third marriages. In these circles having several wives 
this is a status symbol, like possession of the beloved and pampered buzkasi horses. 
It further testifies to the virility and economic standing of the owner. This argument 
will be further elaborated in the section on leadership. 
Irons mentions only two cases of polygyny for the Yomut of Iran. 
Let us now examine the unusual types of household development which 
structurally result from the premature death of the household head. Table 1 
illustrates that 33 households (37 per cent) fall into this category. In the ten cases of 
'married man with unmarried brothers', the oldest brother takes the responsibility of 
being the de facto household head, thus being responsible for securing bride·s for his 
brothers and giving the sisters in marriage, as well as looking after his mother 
(especially if she is old). The disposal of widows is a complicated matter that will be 
discussed in the next chapter. The high incidence of two or more married brothers in 
one household arises in all cases out of economic destitution (e.g. shortage of land, 
animals and labour). 
In the three cases of households headed by a female (widow), the oldest son is 
usually below the age of 19, which is supposed to be the age of maturity. This 
situation usually creates difficulties not only because of the rather low status of 
women, but also because of the strict segregation of male and female spaces, into a 
public and domestic sphere. Being a household head entails representing the 
· household in the public sphere of the baziir, toward the Central Government 
authorities etc. In this case a female household head needs the assistance of a male 
relative (usually the widow's husband's brother or some other close relative) as her 
representative in the public sphere. This guardian or representative is also 
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responsible for providing labour for tasks that cannot be performed by the widow 
and her children. The final say in all matters, however, is with the widow. 
Of our sample from Taghan one noteworthy exception is a widow with a 16-
year-old son and three grown up daughters. The family owns no agricultural land. 
The son is in charge of a small herd of goats and sheep. The widow has adjusted to 
her new status by making an assessment of skills, resources and labour available to 
her. Together with her three daughters she is knotting carpets 10-12 hours daily. 
These are then marketed by her deceased husband's brother at a nearby baziir. She 
has adjusted well to her new role and represents the richest household of the entire 
lineage-segment. 
The rest of the household types in Table 1 are to be classified as 'unusual'. The 
destitute situation again has its roots in the premature death of the household head, 
coupled with social and/or economic problems. A close look at the economic 
situation of most of these households reveals that they have neither a sufficient 
number of animals nor enough land to form a viable unit, but work as servants for 
the richer kinsmen. In 50 per cent of the cases, this economic non-viability results 
from loss of wealth because of excessive opium consumption, bacabozlik and other 
social problems. Three of the unmarried men in the age bracket 30-39 years are 
mentally retarded. In two cases (age bracket 40-49 years) the men originate from a 
former slave lineage and have no access to suitable women due to spatial separation 
of the group from other slave lineages, and economic non-viability. 
It is also revealing to look at household size (Table 3). In my Taghan data 73 
(82 per cent) uy consist of two to seven persons. Out of these the majority fall into 
the category of three or four persons per uy. I might add here that in Carshangu, the 
settled village described above, the households are generally larger, with an average 
of six to seven persons. The average Taghan family consists of 3,9 persons, 
compared with 5,5 persons for the Yomut of Iran. In Taghan patrilocal extended 
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TABLE 3: SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS OF TAGHAN 
Type of Number of persons per household 
household 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Nuclear 
families 6 9 12 4 2 1 2 
Patrilocal 
extended 2 1 2 3 3 1 
Simple 
polygynous 2 1 1 1 
Married man 
+unmarried 1 1 1 
patrilateral 
nephew 
Widow+ 
immature sons 1 2 
Unmarried 
brothers 1 2 1 
Married man 
+unmarried 1 3 2 1 2 1 
brothers 
Two or more 
unmarried 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 
brothers 
Unmarried 
man+ 
unmarried 1 1 
patrilateral 
nephew 
Unmarried 
brothers+ 
unmarried 1 1 
patrilateral 
nephew 
Unmarried 
man+ old 1 
mother 
Total 9 15 18 10 12 9 6 5 1 1 1 1 1 
73 households (82%) 
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families comprise a minimum of five and a maximum of 13 persons with an average 
of 7,3 persons. Irons mentions an average of 9.5 persons for the patrilocal extended 
households. What conclusions can be drawn from the situation presented? I should 
like to offer the following conclusions based on historical data and materials 
collected in the field. 
The influx of refugees from Soviet Central Asia earlier this century has led to 
substantive population movements and separation of lineages, which meant that 
suitable marriage partners were often unavailable. This population influx further led 
to overpopulation and ecological imbalance, a situation which the more versatile and 
less traditional muhajirin made use of by diversifying into new non-traditional 
economic pursuits and occupations. Various forms of patron-client relationships 
developed between the traditional watani and the more enterprising muhajirin. The 
dominance of the former has turned into the reverse over the last 30 years. The 
ecological imbalance (scarcity of water, pasture and agricultural land) coupled with 
bacabozlik, 13 other social problems, crime and several bad droughts over the last 
fifty years led to the impoverishment of a large segment of the population. This 
economic non-viability, the lack of suitable marriage partners and the long periods 
required for the accumulation of the bride-wealth raised the average marriage age 
considerably or made marriages virtually impossible for the poorest stratum of 
society. High infant mortality coupled with a lower female sex ratio and a high 
incidence of maternal death led to scarcity of marriageable women. A higher age of 
the females at the time of marriage also led to a shorter reproductive cycle. To adjust 
to the vagaries of demography, environment and poverty, the Ttirkmen of Taghan 
have relaxed their marriage rules to include marriage partners from other lineages, 
tribal segments and even other ethnic groups. We shall further pursue this argument 
in the section on marriage. I shall discuss later, how purity of Ttirkmen blood 
became a status symbol in a society that less than 100 years ago secured a substantial 
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income from slave-raiding. The following diagram sums up my argument presented 
above: 
LONG PERIOD IDGH 
OPIUM CONSUMPTION FORACCUM- FEMALE 
v ULATIONOF AND INFANT 
BACABOZLIK BRIDE MORTALITY 
IMPOVERISHMENT~ WEALTH NATURAL CALAMITIES + LOWER 
FEMALE v IDGHERAGE SEX RATIO ECOLOGICAL AT FIRST 
IMBALANCE MARRIAGE 
• + INFLUX OF REFUGEES COMPET-
ITIONFOR 
' 
AVAILABLE 
WOMEN 
INTERNAL MIGRATION 
' DISPERSION OF LINEAGES 
RESULTING IN NON-
AVAILABILITY OF 
SUITABLE MARRIAGE 
PARTNERS 
As far as I could learn from my senior informants, the demographic patterns 
around the tum of the century must have been quite different. There were many 
more polygynous households and a situation of general wealth prevailed in Taghan. 
Unfortunately no written statistics are extant, but reconstruction of patterns on the 
basis of information from my informants represent a picture quite similar to the one 
described by Irons for the Y omut of Iran. 
TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD TYPES ACCORDING TO TAGHAN LINEAGE SEGMENTS 
Household type Hallam sare Datxa Nurseid oahli Sogcbl Qullar Erghay 
Nuclear family 8 9 1 2 3 4 3 6 Regular phases of developmental cycle 
Patrilocal extended 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 0 48 (54%) 
Regular phases 10 14 2 3 4 5 4 6 
Simple polygynous 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Less frequent phases 
Married man + unmarried 8 (9%) 
patrilateral nephew 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Less frequent 4 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Widow+ immature sons 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 l Unn,.ol do.dnpmen<ol eyde Unmarried brothers 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Married man + unmarried brothers 1 4 3 0 1 0 0 1 Two or more unmarried brothers 5 2 0 1 0 0 2 1 
Unmarried man + I 33 (37%) 
~ 
unmarried 
patrilateral nephew 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unmarried brothers + 
unmarried 
patrilateral nephew 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Unmarried man 
+old mother 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
/ 
Unusual 
developmental 
cycle 10 9 3 2 2 0 5 2 
Total households 
per lineage 
segments 24 25 5 6 7 5 9 8 
TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD TYPES ACCORDING TO TAGHAN LINEAGE SEGMENTS (cont.) 
Household type Hanam Sare Dalxa N~id Illhl1 Sogcbl Qullar Erghay 
Regular(%) 41.6 56 40 50 57 100 44 75 
Less frequent(%) 16.6 8 0 17 14 0 0 0 
Unusual(%) 41.6 36 60 33 29 0 56 25 
'I 
.... 
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PATTERNS OF INHERITANCE 
'If at the time of separation you have to call on a mullah, your household is not 
in harmony'. 
This Tiirkmen proverb clearly illustrates the double nature of inheritance 
procedures and the innate problems they pose. Two sets of rules come to interact: 
the Islamic law code (shariat)1 4 and the Tlirkmen body of customs (adat, deb). 
Islamic law propagates equal shares for all males and half of a male share for 
females, whereas tribal customs are in favour of ultimogeniture and no shares for 
women. How are these two conflicting views reconciled? The proverb stipulates 
that Tlirkmen adat should have precedence and the shariat only resorted to in case of 
dispute and problems at the time of separation. Islamic law further stipulates that 
estates should only be divided after the death of the household head. The Tlirkmen, 
however, are in favour of sharing out part of the herd (inji) each time a son gets 
married and establishes a new household. According to Barth the custom of giving 
inji or 'anticipatory inheritance' as he calls it, is also in practice among the Basseri 
(Barth 1961:19). Agricultural land, however, is divided only after the death of the 
household head, if at all. The modus of division follows Islamic law, thereby serving 
as linking factor between shariat and deb. The value of this proverb is borne out by 
my field data and observations in Taghan. Generally the Tiirkmen of Taghan have a 
bad impression of the mullahs and the religious judges (qazi) , who are by no means 
beyond corruption. We shall examine this claim further in the section on feuding. In 
case mediation in a dispute about inheritance is needed, the Tlirkmen of Taghan call 
on the influential aqsaqallar to deal with the case according to adat, so as to 
preserve the harmony and peace of the domestic unit in question. The main 
objective of a smooth division of a given patrimony is to keep the 'blood ties intact' 
and to preserve harmony among members of a given lineage. Traditionalism and 
modern customs often clash, especially among the more assimilated and acculturated 
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richer segment of Ttirkmen society. Frequently modem and traditional sets of value 
are competing within the same family, often causing disharmony between the young 
and the old. 
The Tlirkmen are fully aware of their breaking of Qur'anic laws, but explain 
their behaviour in terms of collective interest of the family unit against the interests 
of individuals. 
We have seen that according to Islamic law women have a right to a share of the 
patrimony. In actual fact, however, they are left out when it comes to the division of 
property.15 How do the Ttirkmen account for this breach of law? The whole 
situation might best be illustrated by an example. I should like to repeat that 
ultimogeniture prevails. All but the youngest son receive part of the household herd 
during their father's lifetime. Upon death of the household head, the youngest son 
receives the residual estate. This practice, as we have seen, deviates from the Islamic 
norms. 
If a father is survived by one or two widows and several independent and 
dependent sons and daughters, the independent sons have no claims to any portion of 
the herd, since they have already received their shares of animal property. However, 
they do have a right to access to pasture and water and to their share of agricultural 
land, should it be divided, or to its usufruct in case no division of agricultural land 
takes place. After litigation of possible debts, the widows together are entitled to 1/8 
of the property, each dependent son to an equal share and each daughter to half the 
share of a son. A crisis might arise if the independent sons insist on receiving a 
further share. This might occur if the herds have increased considerably or if 
relations between the brothers have been strained. In such a case, individual greed 
and gains tend to overshadow the benefits for, and the harmony of, the group. Such 
demands further might lead to less co-operation among brothers and strained 
relations, but generally no change in residence patterns. According to Ttirkmen adat 
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daughters are supposed to give up their shares to their brothers. What happens if a 
daughter refuses to give up her share? Any refusal to do so would lead to severe 
problems - to cutting of all social relations by all close and often even more distant 
agnates: in other words, to virtual ostracism. The sister would forfeit all protection 
by agnatic lineage members, a risk no Ttirkmen woman is willing to take; for should 
her husband or any other affine maltreat her, she would have no one to tum to for 
protection. As we shall discuss in the section on marriage, she would also face the 
difficulty of being separated from her children should she ever become a widow. In 
other words, a sister exchanges her share of the patrimony for protection by her 
agnatic lineage members. The widow of a deceased household head also enters into 
an 'exchange agreement' with her sons. The only heirlooms a girl may have and 
which are her inalienable property comprise her dowry (slip): personal clothing, 
jewellery, furniture and trappings and trimmings for the aq uy.16 These goods are 
usually passed on to her daughters. Should she stem from a wealthy household, at 
the time of her marriage, her father might endow her with a few sheep or a camel, 
which over time might multiply into a considerable herd. She usually transfers these 
animals (mink) to her sons to start their future herd. It further is a custom among the 
people of Taghan to give an animal to boys at birth or at the time of circumcision. 
The richer the family and the higher its status, the larger the number of animals a boy 
might receive from his mother, from allies and. friends of his father. Although these 
animals are herded with the father's herd, they remain the property of the son; the 
father only keeps them in trust until the son gets married and separates from his 
father's household. Thus these animals constitute the basis for a future herd. The 
mother usually gives her mink to the youngest son, since she will stay with him until 
her death, provided that she is beyond her reproductive period at the death of her 
husband and therefore does not remarry. The animals given to her son, even if only a 
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few, are interpreted as 'payment for her upkeep'. Graphically the exchanges between 
sons and widowed mothers and brothers and sisters can be shown as follows: 
MOTHER Minit 
upkeep in old age SON 
SISTER - share of patrimony 
protection BROTHERS 
In the acculturated muhajirin villages17 Islamic law is followed; or at least 
shariat is the d~minant criteria should adat come into the picture. 
The reasons for this development appear to be: 
a) The reversion to Islam should be seen in the context of growing assimilation 
with non-Tlirkmen populations; this resulted in a change of values in regard to 
political and economic developments. A non-homogenous culture prevails. 
b) Acculturation and assimilation brought about an element of competition. In 
traditional Tlirkmen society brothers are not supposed to compete, but to co-
operate.18 The richer traders and agropastoralists are acting in their personal 
interest and no longer for the benefit of a kin group. They characteristically 
establish networks of connections that include not necessarily their lineage 
brothers, but outside elements that can be of use to further their personal 
political and economic interests. Thus personal gain often comes before lineage 
solidarity. 
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c) In their general reversion to Islam and their acculturated Weltanschauung, it is 
more proper- I suspect also more prestigious- to adhere to shariat than adat. 
This attitude comes to light in the elaborate festivities surrounding death. I shall 
argue in the next section that this practice is less of a religious than social 
importance. 
d) Since most of these assimilated muhajirin or mixed communities live in fairly 
close contact with the Afghan district bureaucracy, it seems more proper and 
natural to carry on transactions within the 'law'. In fact they often owe favours 
to the religious judge (qazi) who is only too willing to manipulate complaints 
against a proper renumeration.19 
The circumstances surrounding inheritance in the richest Ttirkmen family of the 
area will illustrate my argument. Upon the death of the household head, who was a 
strong and pious leader, his five sons and three daughters (from four different wives) 
could not come to terms about the division of the patrimony, which included 
thousands of jeribs (see Appendix 1) of agricultural land, vast sums of cash, antique 
jewellery, approximately 400 camels, 10.000 sheep and goats, 12 buzkasi horses, 
several tractors, lorries and other machinery. The oldest son was 62 at the death of 
his father and the youngest was 23. The youngest daughter was only 14. The two 
oldest sons, by then established leaders in their own right, had effectively 
consolidated their position in the lineage; each had also secured a network of allies 
among various sectors of society, including the Afghan bureaucracy at the district, 
provincial and even national level. Marrying off their daughters to other influential 
men and securing wives for their sons from the business sector further helped them 
to build a strong and influential position over a wide geographical area. They were 
in excellent standing with the religious and secular hierarchy and institutions. Their 
political and economic position was continuously strengthened by handing out alms 
to the poor, organizing Qur'an-readings, exchanging presents with influential figures 
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in government positions and keeping ceremonial exchanges flowing between lineage 
segments. Their connections thus included the private realm of kinship ties and the 
public realm of Islamic and government institutions. The dispute over their 
inheritance was brought before the Qazi, who had received a handsome reward well 
in advance. The two eldest sons were accorded the lion's share of cash, animal and 
landed property, and the younger sons, all married with families, received only one 
third, to be divided between the three. The second youngest son, who was well 
educated by Ttirkmen standards (he had even attended school in Kabul for two 
years), wanted to lodge a formal protest with the district magistrate. Only the 
council of tribal elders, also well paid by the older brothers, managed to deter him 
from doing so, by stating that such an act would be shaming family and lineage. The 
son, for some time was tom between disobeying the elders, a serious breach of adat, 
or getting his rightful share. In the end, the three disadvantaged brothers decided to 
follow adat and drop all charges against their powerful brothers, whom they could 
never have defeated anyway. This litigation led to estrangement of the brothers and 
to the formation of several lineage factions around some of the brothers. This 
splitting up into factions had rather severe repercussions and led to disputes when the 
two elder brothers, who shared a huge compound with their eight wives and 
innumerable children, got into a severe argument which nearly ended in a lineage 
feud. This case clearly demonstrates that adat, shariat and Afghan civil law are not 
always compatible. The kind of law applied in a particular case usually depends on 
the financial status of the contestants, and their position in the local power structure. 
Usually, however, the decision of the aqsaqallar is accepted after lengthy arguing in 
favour of lineage cohesion. Recently, however, the role and function of the 
aqsaqal/ar have undergone considerable change due to loss of cultural values and 
changes in orientation (Stucki 1978a). We shall further discuss this point in the 
section on politics. 
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Parcellization of land has led to a chain of interrelated problems. Due to 
constant splitting up of agricultural landholdings at each separation, individual plots 
became small and unprofitable. One can easily observe that a family which 
originally might have owned ten hectares of land, in the course of three generations 
could progressively divide the estate into parcels of a nonprofitable and non-viable 
size. As a consequence one may argue that Islamic law coupled with adat have 
contributed to the creation of unusual kinds of household development and non-
viable domestic units as described above. Viewed from an economic angle, this has 
led to a vicious circle of dependence. The small landholdings have led their owners 
to accumulation of debts under a very detrimental credit system (see chapter on 
economics). This process has, especially in L:arshangu, contributed to the creation of 
an exclusive landholding elite, and absentee landlordism, as well as dependence of a 
large number of debtors who entered into patron-client relationships with those 
landholders and entrepreneurs. 
During my time in Taghan, where there are no large landholders, 60 per cent of 
all households were in some kind of debt-relationship with inhabitants of other 
villages. Means and ways of getting out of this detrimental situation were often 
discussed by the lineage elders. They came to the conclusion that adat should be 
modified to the effect that agricultural land became indivisible and should be jointly 
tilled by the heirs and the results of usufruct divided according to labour input, in 
order to counteract parcellization. The Ttirkmen of Taghan have also realized, that a 
diversification of their economic activities is necessary to make ends meet. One can 
safely claim that the agropastoral households of Taghan are wealthier than the ones 
eking out a living solely off their herds. 
PLATE 13: INSIDE A YURT. A SUSPENDED 
FELTCRADLE IS VISIBLE IN THE 
BACKGROUND; THE HEARTH IS IN 
THE FOREGROUND 
PLATE 14: WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
ATTENDING A WEDDING 
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RELIGION, RITUAL AND THE DOMESTIC GROUP 
'The Ti.irkmen are bad Moslems, they are pagans, warts on the clean face of 
Afghanistan' (statement by a Pashtun landlord). 
The Ti.irkmen, like other ethnic groups of Afghanistan, have a predilection for 
hastily labelling 'good' or 'bad' the behaviour and acts of others, especially of other 
ethnic groups. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to put a 'good' or 'bad' label onto the 
Ttirkmen system of beliefs. I rather propose to discuss the ritual practices 
surrounding Ti.irkmen life. I shall attempt to delineate in what way their form of 
Islamic belief co-exists with their tribal values, such as honour, prestige and political 
status. In other words, I want to show how far Islam and extant pre-Islamic customs, 
as a system of ritual usage,20 permeate social, economic and political relations 
between individuals and groups. I shall limit my analysis to the local level, to show 
how many religious concepts and practices are closely embedded in the lineage 
structure. As we shall see, individuals and groups familiar with religious and ritual 
knowledge often wittingly or unwittingly use ritual to their own political and 
economic advantage. To bring out the full diversity of religious involvement, I shall 
distinguish between two different levels: 
a) orthodox Islamic prescriptions and their interpretation by the Ti.irkmen of 
Taghan;21 
b) the individual life cycle. 
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a) Islam and its interpretation by the Tiirkmen of Taghan 
Islam, like most canonical religions, has a 'big' and 'little' tradition (cf. 
Redfield). In this analysis we are mainly concerned with Islam at the grassroots, 
with the 'little' tradition. This form of Islam practised by illiterates has not much in 
common with the Islam of the scholars. It is a localized form of Islam mingled with 
a variety of pre-Islamic and tribal customs. In the course of this discussion, I shall 
examine, how many of their Islamic traditions are actually Islamic in an orthodox 
sense.22 The Tiirkmen of Taghan are Sunni Muslims following the Hanafite school 
of jurisprudence.23 
Islam provides its followers with rules and norms covering nearly every aspect 
of social and moral behaviour. Emphasis is on mutual co-operation and brotherhood, 
not on the individual and his development. Whoever follows Allah's instructions 
wanders on the right path. Most personal and interpersonal behaviour, success and 
failure, health and disease are at the will of 'God'. Mankind is at the mercy of 'God'. 
This view of humans being at the mercy of a divine force creates a fatalistic attitude 
towards life and work and does not encourage personal initiative. I often noticed a 
general unwillingness to look for tangible solutions in times of calamity. 'It is 
"God's" will, what can I do about it?' was the standard reply to my inquiries about 
why problems were tacitly and uncritically accepted and not dealt with. Invocations 
for 'God's' blessings accompany all important activities, be they of a personal, ritual 
or economic nature. Many activities surrounding the individual life cycle have their 
foundation in the Qur'an. Even generosity and hospitality are expressed in a 
religious idiom. Thus any act of importance has some symbolic basis in the Qur'an, 
the Hadith or in pre-Islamic beliefs (or in some combination of these). All these 
codified beliefs, however, can be modified without actually destroying the essence of 
Islam. Religious developments in the Soviet Central Asian Republics exemplify this 
phenomenon: Islamic ethics remain, although the ritual has been long disposed of. 24 
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The Islamic 'God' is compassionate and merciful. Knowledge of the existence 
of this all-forgiving, merciful and benevolent 'God' gives the believer a strong 
psychological and emotional support. This merciful 'God' is the basis of all beliefs, 
the creator of the universe and everything in it. Anything that is not explicable in 
simple relations of cause and effect is referred to Allah. Following 'God's' path, the 
right path of Islam, leads the believer to paradise (behesht, }annat); and following the 
wrong path leads to hell (duzakh). The mullahs25 spare no effort to describe the 
eternal delights26 awaiting the faithful in heaven and the excrutiating pains and 
tortures to be inflicted upon the sinful in hell. Small children at an early age are 
thoroughly familiarized with this dichotomy of heaven and hell, good and bad, right 
and wrong. All human behaviour and deeds are assessed in terms of sinful (guno) 
and meritorious (siiwiib). Guno is a multifaceted concept: there exist various 
categories of guno, the worst being violation of the five pillars of Islam, to be 
discussed below. 
There is sin (guno) related to family life (e.g. neglect of one's parents, animals, 
gambling and consumption of alcohol). The essence of guno, however, is rebellion 
against 'God' and his institutions that is, overstepping the boundaries set by Allah, the 
divine force. These are acts that will evoke retaliation by 'God'. Retaliation might 
take the form of death, sickness, misfortune etc. I found, however, that the sufferer 
punished by ill fate is more prone to attribute his bad luck to the evil eye, }inns, 27 
black magic or another person's envious notions. We shall come back to this 
concept, which has its roots in pre-Islamic beliefs. 
The bases of good Islamic behaviour are the five pillars of Islam, which consist 
of: 
1) shahadat or the profession of faith: acknowledgement that there is only one 
'God', and Mohammad his messenger 
2) salat (Arabic)- namaz (Persian) that is prayers to 'God' 
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Every Sunni Muslim is required to pray five times a day at prescribed times, 
after performing ritual ablutions. These prayer times divide the day into certain 
periods, which people use as denominators of time in the absence of timepieces. 
The day begins with a prayer just before sunrise (sobh) and ends with a prayer 
(kaftan) . The other prayers are due at midday (casht), midafternoon (digiir) and 
at dusk (ishtan) thus dividing the day into convenient periods. 
On Friday the devout Sunni Muslim is supposed to attend communal prayers 
at a mosque. In Taghan I have never seen any member of the community attend 
such prayers. In fact of the eight lineage groups described above, only two had 
a very simple mosque and a mullah. Prayers were not performed regularly. The 
head of the lineage, in whose household I lived, would only pray in the presence 
of guests or if otherwise compelled to keep his face. When I put him to task 
about his laxity in religious observances he shrugged his shoulders: 'Praying is 
a personal matter between man and Allah. 'God' is benevolent, merciful and 
forgiving'. This statement sums up the generally prevailing attitude among the 
Ttirkmen of Taghan. 
Among the assimilated and acculturated Ttirkmen groups, however, religious 
observance plays an important part. It forms part of their prestige and status 
system. They pray regularly and very ostentatiously. Each mohalla (village 
district) maintains its own mosque built and cared for by the inhabitants. Many 
older men who are beyond the economically productive years and aware of their 
approaching death pray more than five times a day to accumulate sdwiib. 
Generally with increasing age, men and women devote themselves more to 
religious practices, knowing that their time of final accounting for quno and 
sdwdb is approaching. The Ttirkmen of Taghan ridicule the religious zeal and 
fervour of their acculturated kinsmen, being well aware of their ulterior motives: 
'They do a good deal of commerce with their religion. They are good tradesmen 
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when it comes to their beliefs'. Religion, for them was not only to gain siiwiib 
but also to gain prestige and status. Many public Qur'an-reading sessions 
(khatem),28 ostentatious giving of charity, food-distributions for the poor 
(sadaqa) harbour an element of competition, conspicuous consumption, and 
politics. We shall follow this argument as we go along. 
Among the acculturated Ti.irkmen of Carshangu, children are usually 
instructed in Qur'anic matters at the age of nine years. Girls and boys are 
usually instructed together and only after the onset of puberty, segregation of the 
sexes takes places. Girls are then taught by an older woman knowledgeable in 
Qur'anic matters, or by a man falling into the mahram category.29 Boys are 
generally instructed by the mullah imam of the mosque. Among the watani 
obalar of Taghan, I found no woman who was fully conversant with the daily 
prayers. Little care was taken in teaching the children. During the month of 
Ramazan, a mullah or a member of a Sayyid (!shan) lineage was invited to 
instruct the boys in reciting the prayers and the most common Suras of the 
Qur'an (notably Sura number one, the Al-Fatiha). At the same time, these 
specialists were writing amulets to prevent dwellings, man and animals from 
being haunted by evil spirits - a custom not in accordance with orthodox 
Islamic practices. The oba people are well versed in matters pertaining to pre-
Islamic rituals, especially measures to prevent and cure infertility in human 
beings and animals. Sterility is considered to be a severe affliction. Pre-Islamic 
elements, especially remnants of A vestan cults and shamanism, are prominent 
among the female half of society. This apparently is partly a reflection of 
women's exclusion from the public domain, where orthodox Islamic practice is a 
matter of status and legitimacy; and partly a result of women's greater concern 
with matters of health. All important phases of the life cycle are marked by 
rituals which have little to do with Islam other than the odd invocation of 'God' 
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and some prayers. We shall pursue this argument in the analysis of the life 
cycle. 
3) zakat or the legal giving of alms is a purifying act 
A certain amount (in Afghanistan traditionally 'l:fz per cent) of a person's 
debtfree wealth (animals, produce of the land etc.) must be given to the poor. 
The Qur'an clearly prescribes the amount and to whom zakat has to be given. 
According to Qur'anic prescriptions, charity receivers include persons who have 
not enough property to stay economically viable, slaves, persons engaged in 
religious warfare and travellers (Hughes 1935:699-700). The preferential 
receivers are close kin fitting into these categories, in order to keep the wealth 
within the lineage group. The gradual breakdown of the traditional system, with 
the influx of refugees from Russian Central Asia, brought about a change in the 
receiving group. In view of these shifts and changes, allies had to be secured to 
guarantee peace and harmony within the lineages, and between them. Zakat 
was therefore very often dispensed to non-kinsmen, in order to secure their 
loyalty and allegiance. The giving of zakat thus became more of a political 
transaction and nearly lost its original, strictly religious purpose. Among the 
rich acculturated communities, the giving of alms is mostly accompanied by 
lavish festivities, as the bays (rich men) try to outdo each other in the name of 
religion.30 When I was trying to compute the right amount of zakat to be given 
by a rich individual, I found out that only a token amount had been given. The 
general mood of festivity and ritual acts covered the fact that among the richer 
segment avoiding of paying the proper amount was not unusual. Lavish 
banquets often accompanied by animal fights and other public entertainment 
diverted the attention of the public from the real purpose of the gathering. 
Lavish entertainment was a safe way of getting the name of a prestige and 
publicity-hungry bay into every spectator's mouth, thereby elevating his status. 
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At the same time this performance allowed him to accumulate siiwiib for his 
afterlife. 
4) sawm (Arabic), ruzah (Persian), the fast, constitutes the forth pillar of Islam 
During Ramazan, the 9th month of the lunar calendar, the devout Muslim has 
to observe the fast for a full month. No food or drink are to be consumed 
between sahari (dawn) and 'iftar (sunset). Since the Islamic calendar follows 
the lunar movements, Ramazan is 11 days earlier each year. The devout fasters 
encounter great hardship if the Ramazan occurs during summer. In Taghan 
nobody managed to observe a full month of fasting: most of them gave up after 
one week or ten days. 
With the richer bays in the acculturated villages the situation is entirely 
different. They turn the fast into a very important affair accompanied by 
readings of the whole Qur'an (khatem). For the rich, Ramazan does not bring 
about too much hardship, since they can afford to rest all day and let servants 
perform their work. 
The fast is concluded with Id-al-fitr or Id-i-Ramazan (Fitr-Bayram).31 This 
festival is celebrated by visiting and receiving kinsmen and friends and 
presenting them with sweetmeats, bread32 and other gifts. Everyone is dressed 
in new clothing. Generally it is a time for reaffirming the solidarity of smaller 
and larger kin groups. Men usually visit the elders of the various tribal 
segments, thereby affirming their status and leadership. Important bays, and in 
certain cases also government officials, are presented with an aladon or a red 
yaltk. 33 Similar exchanges are simultaneously taking place among women. For 
the women, festivals offer a welcome opportunity to receive visitors and to 
leave the confined spaces of yurt and tam for visits to kinsmen and friends. An 
exchange of information and gossip usually takes place on such occasions. The 
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social function is clearly much more important than the religious aspects of the 
occasion. 
5) the pilgrimage (hajj) 
An important event in the life cycle of each Muslim is the hajj, the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, the fulfilment of a man's worldly life. The traditional time 
for the pilgrimage to Mecca is the 12th month of the lunar calendar (Dhul'l 
Hijra). Hajjis are usually older men. They leave for the pilgrimage in the hope 
of dying in Mecca, the ultimate wish of any devout Muslim. Among the 
Ti.irkmen of Afghanistan men leaving for Mecca symbolically divorce their 
wives, thereby strengthening their hope of dying in the Holy Land. Should they 
return, a mullah is called in to remarry the couple. Returning from the 
pilgrimage, a man takes the title of hajji which puts him into a special category. 
He is now supposed to refrain from political competition and no longer strive 
for economic gains. Hajjis often act as mediators in severe disputes by virtue of 
their special status. 
There is no hajji among the obalar of Taghan. Carshangu, the acculturated 
community of rich merchants, however, has 16 hajjis, some of them rather 
young. A closer examination of their life histories reveals, that also the 
pilgrimage can be profitably used for economic and political purposes. Many of 
the younger hajjis admitted that their visit to Saudi Arabia served a double 
purpose - that is, to perform their religious duty as well as carrying out business 
transactions in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and in certain cases also in Iran. 
As an outward sign of their pilgrimage may be taken the proliferation of exotic 
goods34 gracing their guest houses. These exotic items naturally are admired by 
the visitors and consequently put their owner into a very prestigious position. 
The principal festival during the pilgrimage is Id-i-Qurban or Id-i-Kabir 
(Qurban Bayram), a festival commemorating Ibrahim's willingness to offer his 
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son Ishmael in sacrifice to 'God'.35 On this occasion a sheep is slaughtered 
ritually and equal parts of the meat are given to family, kin and the poor. 
The above discussion has revealed the dichotomy or rather polarity of Ttirkmen 
religion as manifest in the observance of the five pillars of Islam. The following 
diagram illustrates that piety (religious observance) has different purposes and 
consequences depending on the economic and consequently political status of a man. 
POOR 
PIETY 
POWER SAWAB 
STATUS religious 
observances 
TillS LIFE RICH AFTERLIFE 
Life of a poor man is entirely in the hands of 'God'. If he is unlucky or faces 
hardship, he considers it to be his qismat (destiny). He believes that no interventions 
by man are possible. His piety (dindiirlik) is therefore geared towards accumulating 
merit (siiwiib) for his afterlife: to put it simply, to secure a place in paradise. He will 
stick to the Islamic prescriptions as well as his economic status allows him to, in 
order to secure a smooth transition from this world to the next. His attitude is 
generally fatalistic and not geared towards achievements and change, since 
everything is in the hands of Allah. In case of sickness of man or animal, or other 
calamities, he will seek for a cause in the realm of the supernatural and perform 
rituals that have little to do with Islam but date back to the A vesta or have their 
origin in shamanism. This is especially true for all ritual activities surrounding the 
individual life cycle. 
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For the richer segment of Ttirkmen society careful, even exaggerated 
observance of religious practice has a double purpose. On one hand, their religious 
activities are geared towards their well-being after death; on the other hand, they are 
directed towards improvement of their status in this world. These rich men see no 
contradiction in this double aim. Religion, for them, is class-oriented. By 
performing all rituals prescribed and by following the path of a good Muslim (which 
poses no hardship if one is endowed with wealth and has access to servants and 
connections to the government hierarchy), one is able to amass sawab for the next 
life. At the same time, correct observances of religious practices and rituals provide 
access to power over people and goods in this life. 
The vast majority of Ttirkmen in Afghanistan are illiterate herdsmen and small-
scale agriculturalists or a combination of both, eking out a modest living in a difficult 
physical environment. In the eyes of the Ttirkmen, this trying environment harbours 
many dangers and people are constantly surrounded by fears: 
- fear of human and animal sickness and death; 
- fear of drought, crop failure and famine; 
- fear of infertility of women and livestock; 
- fear of supernatural forces. 
Women and children supposedly are especially prone to the evil eye, alabasti, 
jinns and a whole range of supernatural creatures constantly threatening to disrupt 
everyday activities. 
Means and ways have to be found to alleviate fears and dangers. In times of 
crisis the Ttirkmen revert to observance of taboos and other measures which have 
little in common with Islam except for the odd accompanying prayer or Qur'anic 
verse. In fact careful examination of some of these practices has revealed that they 
consist of a conglomeration of Persian and Ttirkic tribal customs, shamanistic 
elements, remnants of Zoroastrianism neatly coated with an Islamic gloss. 
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For the uneducated Ti.irkmen such practices - to be examined in the next section 
- go under the label of Islam. Given the history of the region, a melting pot of 
peoples, cultures and beliefs, this development does not come as a surprise. (Similar 
phenomena can also be observed among the Ti.irkmen of the USSR.) The name of 
'God' (Allah, K.hoda, Tangri) is always on their lips, but in most instances it is merely 
a habit, a name with which to conjure. The uninformed Ti.irkmen as well as the ill-
informed mullahs in the villages often have more faith in the magicaJ36 uses of the 
Qur'an than in its actual contents. In Taghan the mullahs, often barely literate, are 
not held in high esteem, and many jokes and stories circulate about their self-interest, 
greediness, avarice, and ignorance (cf. Shah 1967). Mullahs are mainly concerned 
with eschatological matters, such as reading the Qur'an at funerals. Their teachings 
concentrate on morality. They have little to offer in times of crisis, in times of 
misfortune. For them, success and failure are in the hands of 'God'. They are quick 
and strict in forbidding gambling, alcohol and music. 37 For this reason, they are 
usually kept away from happy celebrations such as weddings. Many mullahs are 
looked at with suspicion, since they are only too happy to inflict black magic upon 
people against a proper remuneration- a practice forbidden by Islamic prescriptions. 
Some mullahs are magico-medical practitioners, providing cures for physical 
ailments and affliction by evil spirits. 
In Taghan one mullah was renowned for preparing amulets (dogacik) against 
toothache and protection fromjinns. 
Death, the loss of a member of a household and lineage, is considered a point of 
crisis in the developmental cycle. The Ti.irkmen of Taghan interpret the pilgrimage 
as spiritual preparation for death, as an act facilitating a smooth transition from this 
world to the next. 
Richer Ti.irkmen also celebrate a rite called Paighambar Tui, a practice for 
which I found no foundation in the Qur'an or Hadith. It is celebrated when a man 
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reaches the age of 64. Supposedly the prophet Mohammad died at this age. During 
a Paighambar Tui, important men (usually older ones) assemble for a meal and 
Qur'an-reading at the house of the celebrant. On the whole it is a somber and solemn 
affair reminding the participants of death. 
Circumcision, marriage, pilgrimage and death are considered public matters; 
that is, they link the life of an individual to a larger group. On all such public 
occasions, the participation of a large number of kinsmen and friends is imperative, 
as is the sharing of hospitality and ceremonial gifts. 
Circumcision (siinniit)38 
Moslems all over the world strictly adhere to this practice, although no reference 
to it is made in the Qur'an (cf. ancient pan-Semitic custom that has spread to Central 
Asia with Islam). Among the Ttirkmen of Taghan, boys are usually circumcised at 
the age of 7-9 years. A siinniit is considered to be a public matter involving a larqe 
circle of kinsmen, affines and friends and is accompanied by a feast (tui). 39 For the 
tuis of the bays a variety of entertainment (buzkasi, wrestling, camel-fighting, 
dogfights) and music is provided for the guests. Close and also more distant agnates 
are expected to play host to guests from remote areas. The master of the tui-
household is obliged to provide each household accommodating guests with meat40 
and rice to feed the charges.41 Such co-operation serves to strengthen kin ties and is 
reciprocal. The closer the blood-ties, the more mandatory and important one's 
obligation to co-operate. In return for hospitality, entertainment and ceremonial gift, 
the guests are expected to donate money or animals to the boy to be circumcised. 
These contributions (meticulous records are kept of them) form the basis of his 
future herd, a first step towards independence from his paternal household. 
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b) The life cycle 
In the previous section I have shown that the household, for its viability, is 
dependent on co-operation of a circle of agnates and affines. In ritual terms, this 
sharing relationship is reinforced and sanctioned by regular exchanges of meat, bread 
and sweets, especially on important occasions surrounding the individual life cycle. 
At feasts of great importance, the circle of exchanges is drawn more widely to 
include a larger number of households, lineages and tribal sections. On such 
occasions the household head demonstrates his social and political standing and 
allegiances by visiting informal leaders and influential men of his tribal segment and 
of other segments whose support and services he might need in future. Since the 
representatives of the Central Government are gaining influence in the area, a visit to 
the Provincial Governor (Wali), the District Administrator (Wo/uswa/i) and Police 
Chief is often considered important. In this way, outsiders are brought into the circle 
of exchanges, thereby ritually treated as insiders. 
Formal Islam prescribes four public ritual sequences marking the individual life 
cycle. These performances can be grouped into two sections: 
(1) CIRCUMCISION 
(2) MARRIAGE 
~ ~ ~ 
PROCREATION I LIFE 
PRE-ISLAMIC PRACTICES 
DOMINANT 
HAPPY OCCASION 
~ 
(3) PILGRIMAGE 
(4)FUNERAL 
~ 
DEATH 
ISLAMIC PRACTICES 
DOMINANT 
SOMBER OCCASION 
~ 
PLATE 15: SELECTING THE DOWRY FOR A FUTURE BRIDE 
PLATE 16: TAG HAN WOMEN COVERING THEIR MOUTH WITH ONE HAND INSTEAD OF 
PRACTISING YA!MAK 
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Circumcision and marriage are geared towards the perpetuation of household 
and lineage, and are thus considered happy occasions. This air of celebration is 
apparent in the more secular phases of circumcision and marriage. Pilgrimage and 
funeral are somber occasions geared towards life after death. Amonq the Ttirkmen 
they tend to be more closely linked (than other life cycle rites) to orthodox Islamic 
practices. 
The actual circumcision ritual, however, takes place in the circle of the family in 
the presence of the tui wakil (usually and economically and politically important 
person), and the aqsaqallar of the lineage. Women, as a rule, are not present. The 
operation is performed by a barber (dalak).42 A mullah is often called in to recite 
verses from the Qur'an, but he generally plays a very low key role. 
The boy to be circumcised is placed on a new mattress and pillow especially 
prepared for this occasion by a senior woman of the uy, usually the boy's paternal 
aunt. The boy is dressed in a new white outfit with a red kerchief around his waist. 
Under the pillow are placed pieces of onion, garlic, pepper and a twig of wild rue 
(isfand, isparak) to prevent the evil eye from striking. At the same time, the whole 
litter is encircled with an alajayup (black and white twisted woolcord supposedly 
possessing magic powers) to mark it off-limits for evil spirits. The encircling of 
objects one wants to protect is a common feature in Ttirkmen ritual. 
The boy is encouraged by the elders to remain strong and not to cry. Each time 
he is about to sob, people present start piling money on his forehead. 
The sunniit in many of its aspects shows remnants of a pre-Islamic rite de 
passage. It may have been an initiation ritual into the world of adult men. When the 
prepuce43 is finally severed, the boy is showered with nokol (a kind of sugarcoated 
almonds) to celebrate the happy occasion. Whoever picks up these nokol is supposed 
to receive part of the strength emanating from the circumcised boy. The barber 
usually receives a small amount of money and an aladon for his services. 
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No outward sign marks the onset of the new phase of the boy's life cycle. As a 
matter of fact, most benefits of the tui go to his father (or to the household head, in 
case his father is not the household head), in that it raises his status, and indirectly 
also the status of the wholy uy. If the father or the household head manages to secure 
an influential tui wakil, he will thus initiate an important political and economic 
alliance, of importance far beyond the actual tui. For this reason it is crucial to select 
an important man for this role. 
Like other festivities, the sunniit-tui presents an occasion for exchange of gifts 
by various groups. Lineage elders and other politically and/or economically 
important personages usually receive an aladon, whereas less influential guests will 
get a yaltk filled with sweets and small pieces of bread (tui poi, serpoi). These are 
not only gifts of remembrance, but symbolically incorporate part of the magical spirit 
and influence with which each tui is surrounded and permeated. The sweets and the 
bread will be taken home and divided among people not having taken part in the tui, 
thereby letting them participate indirectly in the ritual aspects of the celebration. The 
recipient of the tui poi, mostly women and adolescent girls, will rub the bundle on 
her forehead (togab etiorlar) thereby letting the magical influence permeate her 
body. Thus the tui is important not only to the individual and his uy but also, as a 
means of safeguarding kin and friends. Perpetuating the lineage and fostering 
harmony and well-being among its sections are more important than the actual act of 
circumcision. 
Sharing of food44 is an important component of Tiirkmen celebrations. Seating 
arrangements usually spatially represent the kind and intensity of the relationships 
· among the participants. 
Women celebrate among themselves in a different section of the camp or walled 
compound, eating, singing, dancing and gossiping. They are limited to the female 
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spaces, and do not participate in any public entertainment, since public spaces are 
reserved for men. 
Thus the sii.nniit-tui consists of three major components: 
The least important component comprises the religious tenets upon which the 
ritual action is based. With the exception of the few prayers recited by a mullah 
during the severing of the prepuce, the celebration is completely devoid of any 
Islamic ritual. Once the feasting is in full swing, nobody wants to be reminded 
of Islamic prescriptions, and an air of entertainment and enjoyment prevails. 
The act of circumcision is done in strict privacy, usually after the guests have 
left. Islam enters into this component of strong pre-Islamic notions only in the 
form of short prayers. Even these prayers somehow sound more like magical 
incantations in this given context. 
The main component seems to be the feasting, merrymaking and entertainment 
of the guests, which serves to strengthen existing kinship ties and possibly form 
a new alliance through the tui wakil and his domestic group. For the father of 
the circumcised boy, a rise in status is the main purpose of the exercise. All 
these aspects are geared towards maintenance of the group and the individual 
only forms a link in achieving this goal. 
The female life cycle has no equivalent to a circumcision ritual. The first 
menstruation is usually marked by a change in hairstyle,45 but no ritual observance 
takes place. For women, however, the wedding ceremony is of great ritual 
significance, as is also the birth of her first child (cf. Liechti-Stucki 1990). Since the 
wedding ritual is of special importance, it will be dealt with in extenso in the chapter 
on kinship and marriage. 
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The pilwma~e ChqW 
Both pilgrimage and funeral are somber, austere occasions compared with the 
exuberant festivities at circumcisions and wedding feasts, although the boundaries 
between happiness and sadness are somewhat fluid. Marriage clebrations also 
harbour an element of sadness, especially from the point of view of the bride's 
mother, who loses an able carpetweaver and household-helper. 
On the other hand, when a hajji returns, he is feted and happiness prevails; but 
somehow happiness in this case is of a different, more ephemeral kind. Although the 
pilgrimage constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam, not many people have the 
financial means to undertake the tedious journey to Mecca. The pilgrimage is 
reserved to people with a certain economic standing, a class already well endowed 
with prestige and status, so that the hajj only consolidates their worldly status. 
The practices surrounding the pilgrimage fall into the realm of orthodox Islam. 
Devout Muslims believe that persons having made the pilgrimage are more or less 
guaranteed a place in paradise. It grants a smooth transfer of a social personality 
from this world to the next. 
No one single hajji is to be found among the eight obas of Taghan, people too 
poor to afford the journey. In contrast, many of the acculturated bays of Carshangu 
are hajjis; some of them so young that their motives have been questioned by many 
devout followers of Islam. The pilgrimage is supposed to mark the turning point in a 
person's life, his retirement from an active economic and polital career. A hajji is 
expected to spend the rest of his life away from the politcal arena in quiet 
contemplation and preparation for death. Younger men see in the pilgrimage just 
another opportunity to increase and expand their business transactions overseas and 
to bring back prestige items to adorn their guest houses - an effective way to attract 
admiring followers. 
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Incidentally I know of no Ttirkmen woman in the Mingaji area who has made 
the pilgrimage to Mecca. Since for women a journey to Mecca is only feasible in the 
company of a close male relative, expenses are enormous. 46 
Upon return from Saudi Arabia, a hajji is given a welcome feast by his kinsmen. 
It is a solemn affair consisting of a Qur'an-reading, feeding the poor and dispensing 
of alms. The hajji also distributes presents to his kinsmen and friends. Contrary to 
all other exchanges, such gifts are not reciprocal. They are personal gifts, a last 
remembrance before leaving this world, and not exchanges to enhance the status of 
his lineage. 
Death/mournin~ (jin6zahly6z) 
For the Ttirkmen death and practices surrounding it are events to be feared. 
Soon after the spirit has left the body, the women start wailing and lamenting the 
death of their kinsman. The corpse is washed by relatives and in certain places 
specialists,47 who are considered unclean. The big toes of the dead body are tied 
together, so that he may not harm living beings. Washing and shrouding take place 
immediately after death has been confirmed, and the corpse is usually buried within 
24 hours. Any water that has been in contact with the corpse is 'unclean' and harmful 
and needs to be disposed of properly to avert pollution. The same precautions are 
taken with amniotic fluid (Stucki 1978a). To prevent the demon of corpses from 
entering the dead body during the ritual washing, a senior member of the household 
has to recite the Kalimatu-l'shahada. According to Ttirkmen belief, the demon of 
corpses, like all destructive forces, approaches from the north. 48 
Cemeteries are considered to be sources of evil forces and are to be avoided. 
Gruesome stories circulate about people having been killed by fire-spitting monsters 
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and polyheaded snakes while passing a cemetery at night. TUrkmen people become 
irrational whenever the talk centres around cemeteries. 
According to Islamic beliefs, graves are supposed to command respect. I see in 
the Tlirkmen fear rather a Zoroastrian notion of impurity. A whole complex of 
purificatory and prophylactic measures derives from this notion of impurity. 
According to the A vesta, cemeteries are hunting grounds of all kinds of demons. 
The A vesta does not limit this notion of impurity solely to cemeteries, but extends it 
to everything associated with death, decay and destruction. This might partly 
account for the fear the Tlirkmen have of destroyed wells, old canals, ruins, all sites 
immediately linked with the presence of evil spirits. This notion is also expressed in 
the last part of the shamanistic ritual, when the shaman orders the demon to go to a 
ruin, a deserted house or to a dog. The spirit is supposed to leave his victim by way 
of his toes and head north.48 
Once the corpse is ritually washed, relatives and friends gather for a reciting of 
the first Sura of the Qur'an. This prayer for the repose of the soul may be recited by 
any senior male and no specialist is required, although economically affluent 
households will secure the help of one or several mullahs for the jinozah. The 
TUrkmen of Taghan take the prayer for the repose of the soul very seriously, for 
corpses harbour potential dangers for the living, should they not be properly dealt 
with. The transportation of the corpse to the cemetery is then virtually done on the 
run. 
Visitors attending a funeral are expected to bring a piece of cloth with them, its 
length depending on the economic status of the giver. This cloth is then transferred 
to the gravediggers as recompensation for their services. Nobody was able to explain 
the origin and meaning of this custom, which to my knowledge has no foundation in 
the Qur'an or the Hadith. 
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The richer stratum of Ttirkmen society also tends to tum the funeral of a close 
kinsman into a prestigious affair. The funeral of the richest bay of the area 
apparently attracted close to 100,000 guests, all of whom were fed, an act creating 
siiwiib for the deceased as well as for his kin. On such occasions, part of the 
deceased person's cash and animal wealth is divided among the poor. This 
generosity in tum enhances the prestige and standing of the descendants. Although 
this funeral took place six years ago, the descendants are still benefitting from its 
favourable effects on their standing in the community.49 
If death occurs in a household, the family carefully observes the rule that no fire 
is to be lit for three days, since it would desecrate the family hearth. Close agnatic 
relatives of another uy are obligated to provide food for the bereaved household. 
The yurt or tam in which the corpse was kept is then fumigated with smoke 
from wild rue (isfand, isparak), a plant supposedly possessing strong cleansing 
powers. This ritual is often referred to in the Avesta. On the 3rd, 7th and 40th day 
after death as ~ell as at the yearly anniversary, a memorial reading of the Qur'an has 
to be performed, and food and alms given to the poor. 
From the description of the life cycle events, it is quite obvious that although the 
Ttirkmen profess to be followers of Allah, a wealth of pre-Islamic ritual prevails. 
Pre-Islamic elements appear to be much stronger and more obvious than Islamic 
practices in all celebrations surrounding happy events such as circumcisions and 
weddings - events that are of importance for the perpetuation of uy and lineage. 
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NOTES 
1 Gy is the Ttirkmen tenn for 'house, tent, dwelling'. The Ttirkmen distinguish between qara uy (black 
tent) and aq uy (white tent). A bridal tent covered with a white cloth and an aq yup (white decorative 
band) is called aq uy. These decorations are usually removed after the birth of the first child. 
The tenn yurt which the European languages have adopted for this type of dwelling actually means 
'land, place, the spot on which the tent is set up; camp; a given territory; and in certain cases one's 
homeland'. 
Tam is a quadrangular one-room adobe house gradually replacing the uy. The concept uy implies that 
previously the domestic unit and residence unit must have been the same. Today people sharing the 
same hearth do not necessarily live in the same yurt, although they are part of one economic unit. 
2 In its wider meaning the tenn oeek denotes 'home', the descendants of a specific ancestor. In its 
symbolic meaning it represents the value of agnatic cohesion. The family hearth is of special 
importance for all ritual activities. Many curses, in one way or another, involve the 'hearth', e.g. 'may 
your hearth be flooded'- (meaning: may you all die!). A deserted tam is referred to as 'a hearth on 
which water has been poured'. A bride, for one month after the wedding ceremony, has to light the 
hearth of her mother-in-law's tent, thereby showing her ritual affiliation with the lineage of her 
husband. 
3 An oba is a descent as well as a residence group. Today the tenn is often used in the sense of 'small 
village'. Obalar: -tar denotes the plural in the Tiirkmen language. 
4 Vambery in his Travels in Central Asia notes: 'What suprised me most during my sojourn amongst 
this people, was my inability to discover any single man among them desirous of commanding, or any 
individual inclined to obey. The Turkoman himself is wont to say, "Biz bibash khalk bolamiz" (we 
are a people without a head), and we will not have one. We are all equal, with us everyone is king' 
(Vambery 1864:309-310). 
5 Oyerlashmaq that is setting up of a separate nuclear household, does by no means put an end to the 
close relationship between father and son. In Taghan, a newly independent son usually sets up his iiy, 
or nowadays mostly his tam next to his father's dwelling. Co-operation in social, economic and ritual 
activities is very close and extensive. In the initial stage of independence, the son's new home might 
lack certain tools, equipment etc., which he freely borrows from his father. They might also till their 
land together and jointly herd their flocks with the other obalar. Cases were brought to my attention 
where women of the father's household would also cook for the new nuclear household, although it 
constituted an economically independent unit. If the new bride is baking bread (remember the 
symbolic meaning of 'hearth' and 'tandyr') or cooking meat, she will always bring a token piece to her 
father-in-law's or husband's father's brother's household, should he live in the same oba; to 
symbolically acknowledge and strengthen the close ties. This sharing of food has disappeared in 
many Tiirkmen communities living in close contact with other ethnic groups. In Taghan, however, it 
is still the practice, and the laxity of the 'fringedwellers' (acculturated Tiirkmen) was often criticized 
by the aqsaqallar (tribal elders, lit. 'white beards'). The father-son tie is of prime importance and 
often illustrated in folklore and proverbs. Little boys in the early stages of socialization are made 
aware of the importance of this bond. A son may also freely use his father's guest house of guest yurt. 
In Tiirkmen society a guest house is a status symbol, a place where exchanges of food and ceremonial 
goods take place between kinsmen, friends and fiends. The importance of a well-equipped guest 
house will be dealt with in another chapter. Here it suffices to say that a guest house is a public space 
contrary to the yurt/tam of the family which belong to the private domain only accessible to close 
agnatic and affinal relatives of the mahram category. 
6 For the importance of deb (a word of Arabic origin edeb meaning 'morality') see Vambery, who 
writes: 'The inhabitants of the desert are ruled, often tyrannised over, by a mighty sovereign, invisible 
indeed to themselves, but whose presence is plainly discerned in the word 'DEB' - custom, usage. 
Among the Turkoman the 'deb' is obeyed; everything is practised or abominated according to its 
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injunctions' (VambCry 1864:310-311). Although VambCry wrote this statement in the middle of last 
century, for Taghan it is still very valid today. 
7 Don or a/adon (Dari: capan) is a kind of ceremonial coat with exceedingly long sleeves. It is 
usually made of striped silk or cotton. The stripe pattern and colour combination used to reveal its 
place of origin. Besides food and especially various kinds of bread, the aladon is the prime item used 
in ceremonial exchanges. 
8 When relating to the Ersari Tiirkmen of Afghanistan, we have to distinguish between 'indigenous' 
groups (Dari: watani; Tiirkmeni: oturumdar) that is, groups that were living in Afghanistan before the 
Russian takeover of Central Asia, and the 'refugees' (Dari: muhajirin; Ttirlcmeni: priirelar) mainly 
fleeing to Afghanistan just before or during the Stalinist purges. 
9 Elaborate female headdress, the shape and decorations of which vary from one tribal segment to 
another. All the decorations and colours have a strong symbolic value. The female headdress also 
reveals in which stage of her life cycle a woman is at a given time. 
10 qui = male slave; kyrniik = female slave; iq = free man; bikii = free woman. 
During the last century, the Kara Tiirkmen to which the Taghan division belongs, were fierce slave 
raiders. They would go on alaman (slave-raids) into Iran and sell the captured slaves in the markets 
of Bukhara and Merv. It was quite common for Tiirkmen men to marry captured slaves, but not give 
their own daughters to males of slave origin. This rule is still strictly followed today. These former 
intermarriages between iq and kyrniik account for some of the more Mediterranean looking Ttirkmen 
types. Those having more Mongoloid features are proud of their pure blood (as/ khun). Amir Abdul 
Rahman officially abolished slavery in 1895. For description of a slave-raid see Ferrier 1857:83-87). 
11 Bacabozlik (playing with boys); birishi (someone without a beard). The keeping of dancing boys 
has a long tradition among the Ttirlcmen. Boys are dressed up and groomed like women, but not 
castrated. According to my senior informants, until about 30 years ago, young boys were abducted 
from other tribal segments and trained in the arts of entertaining men. Upon reaching maturity 
(growing a beard), they were usually killed. Nowadays, however, they are kept as labourers of their 
sponsors. Only rich agropastoralists and entrepreneurs (bay) can afford this luxury, since in many 
instances bribes have to be paid to the government authorities. Furthermore the setting-up of a 
dancing boy, his costumes and jewellery are quite costly. Among the Tiirkmen of the Woluswali of 
Mingajik (Taghan is a part of it) the custom of keeping dancing boys is quite widespread and accounts 
for many quarrels and homicides. Although the practice is outlawed by Islamic as well as Afghan 
civil law, the remoteness of the area and the participation of some government officials in the 
dealings, are keeping it alive. Proverbs, folktales and songs about homosexuality are abundant: 'A 
woman for procreation, a boy for love' is a typical example. Stories about homosexuality and sexual 
deviance were an integral part of the repertoire of stories providing entertainment for men in the guest 
houses of the bays. During my field-work in Taghan, many fights between lineage groups erupted 
because of dancing boys. Two of the eight Tag han lineages lost their wealth because of dancing boys. 
Their impoverishment resulted from homicides involving dancing boys and subsequent bribes paid to 
the authorities to keep their agnates out of jail. A lineage is always corporately responsible for cases 
of deviance and their causes. The lack of emotional ties between the sexes led to the formation of 
strong emotional bonds and friendships between women. As far as I could ascertain, these 
relationships were devoid of lesbianism. It is interesting to note that the women of Taghan did not 
feel threatened by the competition from the dancing boys with whom their husbands spent a lot of 
time. I was, however, often questioned whether I had any knowledge of their husbands intending to 
take a second or third wife. This threat looms above women with or without male progeny, but is felt 
to be specially degrading for wives with male issue. Among the women of the acculturated groups, a 
fair incidence of depression and mental instability was noticeable. 
12 The Ttirkmen would never question male fertility. The defect is always attributed to the wife and 
explained in supernatural terms (magic, witchcraft). 
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13 The broken down data of irregular household developments according to lineage segments (Table 
4) tally with data on economic non-viability, social problems and other influencing factors known to 
me from individual life histories. 
14 For details see Hughes 1935:207-211; Lane 1908:105-107;Qur'an 4:10ff. 
15 This custom seems to be widespread among nomadic and seminomadic societies of Central and 
Western Asia (cf. Barth 1954:170; Glatzer 1977:149; Jettmar 1960:128; Shahrani 1979; Uberoi 
1971:403). 
16 During my time in Taghan, unfavourable climatic conditions led to drought and consequent 
economic difficulties. Many a husband tried to convince his wife to let him dispose of her jewellery 
and tent trappings. They fetch good prices at the bazar, especially if they are old. Women are 
sentimentally attached to these heirlooms often handed down from generation to generation. I know 
of several cases where a desperate husband sold the jewellery of his wife without her consent to save 
his family from starvation. In two cases this resulted in severe fighting between the husband and his 
wife's close agnates; the wife having exercised her right to agnatic protection and help. 
11 It should be remembered that many muhajirin claim to have left their homeland in Russian Central 
Asia for religious reasons during the Sovietization period. 
18 In traditional Ttirkmen society brothers are not supposed to compete. This rule also applies to 
games, e.g., brothers are not allowed to wrestle with each other in public performances and 
competitions, since such an activity could be interpreted symbolically as fighting. In 1976/1977 this 
rule was still strictly observed in Mingajik. 
19 The folklore of the area is rich in jokes and stories depicting the corrupt practices of mullahs and 
qazis. The following story might serve as an example: 
Two TUrkmen were quarrelling about access to a certain watersource. Since they could not come to 
terms, they decided to seek the advice of a qazi. The ftrst man went to see the qazi presenting him a 
valuable silk turban to put him in a benevolent frame of mind. The qazi happily accepted the present 
and advised the man to come back a week later. No sooner had the plaintiff left, the second man 
arrived at the qazi's house with a cow in tow. He presented the animal to the qazi with the request to 
take good care of his interests. The religious judge promised his assistance. When a week later the 
first man returned to inquire about the outcome of the case, the qazi informed him that things did not 
look very promising. Well, I have given you a valuable silk turban, so that you may take care of my 
interests'. The judge replied: 'My dearest friend and brother, unfortunately your turban was eaten by a 
cow'. 
20 I follow Barth (1961:147) in defming ritual as 'the symbolic aspects of acts in contexts vested with 
particular value'. 
21 The terms used by the Ttirkmen of Afghanistan are often at variance with the classical Arabic form 
and meaning. For comparison the following works are useful: Coulson 1964; Encyclopedia of Islam; 
Gaudefroy-Demombynes 1968; Hughes 1935. 
22 By 'orthodox' I mean practices that have their sanctions in the Qur'an, the Hadith (Traditions) and 
the Shari'at (codes of Islamic law). For further details see Smith 1959. 
23 For a detailed discussion see Hughes 1935:285-288. 
24 For a discussion on Islam in Soviet Central Asia consult Akiner 1983; Allworth 1967; Benningsen 
and Enders Wimbush 1985; Benningsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay 1967; Monteil 1982; Nove and 
Newth 1967; Wheeler 1966. 
25 A mullah is a person versed in reciting and expounding the Qur'an and the Hadith. In Afghanistan 
they usually wear a white turban and grow a beard. Their standard of Qur'anic learning greatly varies. 
Some of the village mullahs are barely literate. 
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26 The pleasures awaiting the faithful Muslim in paradise are often described as being of a sensuous 
and sexual nature. Could this be to compensate for the repressed sexuality in this world? 
27 Jinns are perceived to be malicious supernatural beings and spirits that may appear in the shape of 
animals. For detailed description and typology see Hughes 1935:133-138. 
28 Khatem = recitation of the whole Qur'an; sadaqa = almsgiving in the form of food, goods or 
money. 
29 Mahram (lit. : 'unlawful') relates to a near relative with whom it is unlawful to get married. For 
details see Hughes 1935:316-317. Women need not veil themselves or avoid being seen by a man 
falling into this category. Mullahs seem to be an exception, for in Taghan they had access to the 
female section of houses and yurts to perform Qur'an-readings for sick women. 
30 During my time in Mingajik, the Central Government had to approve any gathering attracting large 
crowds. Such conglomerations of a large number of people could easily end up in a tribal feud, 
especially if competitive sports or animal fights were involved. Permission was, however, always 
granted for activities and gatherings of a religious nature. 
31 For further explanations consult Hughes 1935: 194-196. 
32 Bread is now the staple food of all Tiirkmen group in Afghanistan. It is therefore treated with 
special reverence. The handling, making and storage of bread are surrounded by a series of rules and 
taboos. Several kinds of bread are prepared for different occasions and used in ritual exchanges to 
strengthen kinship ties and solidarity. The size of the shares to be exchanged varies according to the 
closeness or distance of agnatic kinship ties. Bread is also used in amulets against the evil eye and 
supernatural powers. It further plays an important part in fertility rituals to be explained in another 
section. 
33 Yalik, rumi5/. These kerchiefs have hardly any practical use. According to my informants, they 
are not only a gift, but symbolically incorporate part of the magical spirit each tui (celebration) is 
permeated with. The exchange of these kerchiefs is especially popular at circumcision feasts and 
weddings, e.g., life crisis events. 
34 About the importance of a well-equipped guest house or guest yurt, see chapter on politics. 
35 The Qur'an does not mention this connection. According to Sura 22:33-38 it is just an ordinary 
sacrifice. 
36 For a detailed discussion see Hughes 1935:221-222 under the entry lstikharah. 
37 The peril of music is seen in the disruption of the social equilibrium through loosening of public 
morals. From the Islamic point of view, the most negative aspect of music is undoubtedly its 
association with acts and activities that are offensive to Islamic morals. Loose sexual behaviour is 
linked to music through the medium of dance. A woman who dances in public, that is outside the 
privacy of the family circle is considered morally suspect. During dance performances, it is 
specifically the presence of outsiders that threatens good reputation. Another factor speaking against 
public performances of music and dance is a certain uneasiness, maybe even fear, about losing social 
status by associating oneself with musicians, representatives from the lowest stratum of society. As 
far as I could ascertain, the Qur'an takes no specific stand against music. The Hadith, on the other 
hand, contain many examples of overt or covert condemnation of musical performances and dance. 
For a discussion on music in Afghanistan see Slobin 1976. 
38 Siinnat-tuis (circumcision feasts) are usually taking place in autumn, winter or early spring - the 
cold seasons - so that infection of the wound is less likely to occur. Autumn is a time of plenty. 
Agricultural tasks have come to an end, and people have more cash and free time on hand. Until 
about thirty years ago, on the wedding night, the bridegroom had to climb onto the roof of the yurt to 
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expose his genitals to the bride through the smokehole. This act supposedly was to reassure her that 
she was marrying a fully circumcised Muslim (source: several aqsaqallar from Taghan). 
39 Among the Tiirkmen of Taghan, siinnat-tuis are preferentially held on hazar days to attract a large 
crowd, regardless of ethnic affiliation of participants. The larger the crowd, the greater the prestige of 
the host family and lineage. 
40 Meals based on meat are especially prestigious, since the host has to destroy part of his animal 
wealth to feed the invitees. The regular Tiirkmen diet contains very little meat. Levi-Strauss 
mentions in Les Structures E/ementaires de Ia Parente: 'meme dans notre societe Ia destruction de 
richesses est un moyen de prestige' (1958:68). Remy Dor (1975:128) gives similar examples for the 
Kirghiz of the Pamirs. 
41 Close agnates and lineage elders prepare lists of participants to be invited. Each list contains 20-30 
names usually from the same locality. I was infonned that on the occasion of the largest tuis 600-800 
lists were prepared containing names of guests from all over Afghanistan. In an effort to prevent 
indebtedness and impoverishment, the Central Government has now banned such 'wasteful' festivities. 
As soon as a group of guests arrives at the tui-house, the master of the house will direct them to the 
household in charge of their hospitality and well-being for the duration of the tui. It is imperative to 
carefully select a suitable host for each invitee, the criteria being equal social and political standing. 
Complaints from guests to the effect that they were not properly accommodated and cared for would 
instantaneously diminish the prestige going to the father (and lineage) of the circumcised boy. Such 
complaints would defeat the very purpose of the exercise. In order to secure a smooth running of 
organizational matters, a senior member of the lineage is assigned the duty of tui wakil (feast 
manager). Each person heading a list- always the most senior and important person of a given place 
- receives an aladon for his services. 
The following example will show the expenses incurred for the last big circumcision feast which took 
place in 1971. 600 Households were involved in taking care of guests, that is 600 lists were 
established. Each household received one goat or sheep, four ser kalan rice, two ser kalan coolcing 
oil, one don for the household head as a ceremonial gift and one don to be given to the person heading 
each list Totally this amounted to: 
600 sheep/goats at 1,400 Afs. (average) each 
2,400 ser-kalan rice at 250 Afs. each 
1 ,200 ser-kalan cooking oil at 800 Afs. each 
1,200 don at 700 Afs. each (medium quality) 
= 
= 
= 
= 
840,000 Afs. 
600,000 Afs. 
960,000 Afs. 
840,000 Afs. 
Total = 3,240,000 Afs. 
Rate of exchange (approx. 45 Afs. = 1 US$) = 72,000 US$ 
This amount does not include the prize-money for the buzkasi games and other kinds of 
entertainment. 
42 The barber renders a most versatile array of services and slciUs which he usually learns from his 
father: circumcision, blood-letting, tooth-extracting, cauterization (curative burning), cooking at 
weddings and funerals; cooking of khairat (food distributed in the name of 'God' by the bays to earn 
merit); town crying(= infonning people about weddings and funerals by going from home to home). 
Although most of these services are supposed to carry sawiib, in many communities barbers are 
believed to be unclean due to their association with dead substances (nail clippings, hair, prepuce etc.) 
often used for black magic. 
43 The severed prepuce is dried and supposed to have strong fertility-enhancing power. Closely 
related childless women may eat it in pulverized fonn to induce fertility. 
44 It is of interest to note that food for all public ritual activities is prepared by men of the same 
lineage or in some instances by a barber and not by the women of the household. 
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45 Before puberty, the head of a girl is shaved and only on either side of the head (temple), on the 
forehead and the neck a tuft of hair is left to grow. The bold head is covered by a cap (qalpak). At 
the onset of menstruation, the hair is left to grow, and when long enough, plaited in three braids on 
either side of the head. The headdress of a woman immediately reveals in which phase of her life 
cycle she is at a given time. For details see Liechti-Stucki 1990; Stucki 1978a. 
46 Illiteracy among the women is close to 100 per cent, but they are also 'illiterate' when it comes to 
Qur'anic knowledge, for at least a smattering of Arabic is a prerequisite. In Afghanistan, women have 
no access to mosques and communal prayers; at most they can make pilgrimages to local saints tombs 
(ziyarat). Wednesday is especially popular for such visits. Each saint has its own speciality, be it 
healing certain illnesses or inducing fertility. Fertility is a constant obsession with Tiirkmen women. 
The trees near a saint's tomb are usually covered with cradle-shaped pieces of cloth, each containing a 
crudely shaped doll to remind the saint of his duty to help securing progeny. Visits to shrines help 
women to vocalize their problems in the presence of the saint who understands the Tiirkmen language 
not only Arabic. They further have an opportunity to share their problems with other women who 
might have similar difficulties. Such visits are of immense psychological and therapeutic value and 
provide emotional relief in a society that lacks more direct institutional mechanisms for the expression 
and resolution of women's problems. Thus through the intervention of a saint, a woman seeks to 
control her reproductive power and emotional stability. Women's fear of barrenness is all prevailing, 
a fear which is justified in the light of a rather high rate of infertility and the definition of women's 
value and status in terms of the children they bear. For an excellent description of shrines and their 
functions in the life of women see Memissi 1977. 
47 Special care is taken of nail clippings and hair while grooming the corpse to prevent sorcerers from 
getting them. They must never be thrown into fire or water - the sacred elements of the Zoroastrians 
- but buried at a certain prescribed distance from water and fire. The A vesta provides detailed 
instructions in the Vendidad VII:4-5 on how to dispose of nail clippings and hair. These rules are 
more or less followed by the Tiirkmen of Taghan. 
48 The idea that north is the dwelling of all evil and negative forces is very prominent in the A vesta. 
Angro Maynush and the demons at his command are associated with north, with winter. Examples: 
Winter, created by DEV; winter which kills livestock ... which steals up like a beast of prey, which is 
terrible, full of danger and craft' (Vendidad XVII:27); or 'From the direction of north the many-times-
disastrous Angro-Maynush, the Dev of Devs approached' (Vendidad XIX:l). According to the 
Tiirkmen, this fear of evil influences coming from north prompts them to set up their yurts with door 
facing south. In less supernatural terms, this practice makes perfect sense considering that cold winds 
always blow from north. The conception of winter as a killer of animals and destroyer of vegetation 
is understandable, if one considers the extreme climatic conditions of the area, where the destiny of 
man, beast and crops depends so much on the vagaries of the climate. 
49 Elaborate and expensive funerals are forbidden by the new constitution; however, in remote areas 
of the country, where control is difficult, the law is at times violated. We also need to consider that 
Tiirkmen tribal customs (adat) differ from those of the legislators who are mainly Farsiwan and 
Pashtun. 
IE VOUDRAIS ... 
Avant toute chose, Dieu tout-puissant, 
Je voudrais que tu m'apportes ton aide. 
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Je voudrais unefemme etegante, belle comme une idole, 
Aux paupieres en amande, aux joues vermeilles comme des pommes. 
Queferai-je, si Dieu ne me l'accorde pas? 
Ou partirai-je, quittant mon pays? 
Je voudrais unefemme aux sourcils traces comme au calame, 
Et qui, assise ou debout, ait de /'allure. 
J e voudrais une femme qui fasse respecter, 
Et qui serve bien son mari, 
Unefemme qui ne reste pas les sourcilsfronces, 
Et dont le visage soit toujours souriant. 
Mes vingt ans sont maintenant derriere moi, 
Et je ne me suis pas amuse ici-bas! 
Je voudrais une femme aux paroles suaves, aux levres riantes, 
qui me pre sse sur son sein. 
Puisque moi, Firaqut,je suis venu en ce monde, 
donne-moi, Seigneur, une compagne intelligente et cultivee! 
Helas! Je suis tombe sur une sotte, qui ignore tout! 
Je voudrais unefemme qui pusse m'apprecier. 
Makhtumkuli Firaqi (18th century Tiirkmen poet) 
Translation by Louis Bazin and Pertev Boratav 
PLATE 17: 
BRIDE IN CEREMONIAL DRESS 
PLATE 18: BRIDE WEARING 
CUBA AND !ARMENIA 
CHAPTER FOUR 
KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE 
THE TURKMEN GENEALOGY AS A MODEL 
Patai (1971: 179) writes that 'pride in descent forms one of the most significant 
traits in the ethos of Middle Eastern peoples'. This is certainly the case with the Kara 
Tlirkmen of Taghan, where preoccupation with descent goes beyond mere pride. 
Their whole social structure is organized on agnatic descent principles traditionally 
regulating their social, economic and political life. This cohesion is reinforced by 
living in small settlements, which in the case of Taghan are composed of closely 
related kinspeople bound by blood and tradition to mutual assistance and co-
operation in economic, social and political matters. 
Ti.irkmen do not like to travel to areas where they are unable to secure the 
hospitality and shelter of a kinsman, however distant or even fictitious the link may 
be. Similarily, migration to other parts of Afghanistan usually takes place along 
kinship lines. 
The Tiirkmen kinship system is complex and would warrant a study in itself. 
Here I shall limit myself to a discussion of aspects that are relevant to the 
understanding of the present economic and political structure of Taghan. 
When asking a Tiirkmen about his ethnic identity, he will first of all identify 
himself as a Tii.rk as being of the Tii.rk Xalq in contrast to the Pathans who are the 
majority ethnic group in Afghanistan. This category of Tii.rk includes, in addition to 
the Tiirkmen, the Uzbaks, Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, Kazakhs, Uighurs and Tiirks of 
Turkey. The distinction between Tii.rk and non-Tii.rk is important insofar as marriage 
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rules and preferences are concerned. Preferably and customarily a Ttirkmen will 
give his daughter to a close kinsman; and if this is not possible, to a member of the 
same section or division. Recently, however, due to inflated bride-prices and 
demographic vagaries, the marrying of Uzbaks has become increasingly popular and 
acceptable. Giving a Ttirkmen girl in marriage to a non-Turk, especially a Pathan, is 
frowned upon. The only case of such a union brought to my attention led to 
ostracism of father and daughter ... 
The Ttirkmen as a whole may be considered as one big descent group consisting 
of various levels of progressively smaller and more closely related descent units. 
The 'national genealogy'! should be understood as a genealogical model, not 
necessarily corresponding to social and historical reality. It serves as a frame of 
reference to explain present social relationships. 
Descent groups are often at variance over the size, name and linkage of a certain 
group to their eponym. No unbroken genealogical chain of ancestors exists between 
the eponym at the top of the hierarchy and the lineage at the lowest level of a local 
group. The members of a given lineage are aware only of the fact that they are 
patrilineal descendants of a certain ancestor. The distant past is not important, and 
the actual linkages and relationships to the founding ancestor are not relevant. The 
main use of the written genealogies is their integrative character, in linking groups 
into a hierarchical descent system founded by a mythical ancestor. They are of little 
importance in everyday transactions. This sense of belonging to a group is of 
paramount importance, and manifests itself clearly each time two or more Ttirkmen, 
strangers to one another, meet. They set out to verify their affiliation to a certain 
descent group, and from this vantage point then establish some kin ties, however 
distant and tenuous the link might be. Inherent in this conception of common 
descent is a hierarchical model of affiliation, whereby a given individual claims at 
the same time membership in a series of more inclusive descent groups from lineage, 
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section, division to tribe. In other words, a member of the Erghay bir ata (lineage) is 
at the same time a member of the Taghan tire (section) of the Kara tayfa (division) of 
the Ersari halq (tribe).2 Thus knowledge of and a feeling for tribal cohesion, 
especially lineage cohesion at the lower level, is important. As far as the higher 
levels of segmentation are concerned, it is enough to know one's affiliation: how one 
is actually linked from the smallest to the most inclusive level is immaterial. Thus 
the lineage principle operates at two different levels: 
firstly, it defines membership in patrilineal descent groups whose members 
know their kinship links to one another and have binding claims of social 
obligations on one another. These lower levels of segmentation, particularly 
those of bir ata (lineage) and tire (section), form the operational base for the 
economic and political structure. 
Secondly, on a higher level it serves as a model to tie all Tiirkmen descent 
groups together into a 'national genealogy' which is at the fictitious, mythical 
level. Its main function is to create a feeling of belonging and cohesion, 
irrelevant of the actual everyday reality. 
Thus from the lowest level of reality we pass to a level of ambiguity- usually 
starting at the level of the 8th-10th generations back- on to a level of mythology. 
For our discussion of marriage, economy and politics, mainly the level of known 
or putatively known genealogical connections will be of importance. This level is in 
constant flux, since it needs to be adjusted to demographic and political realities and 
leaves considerable leeway for manipulations. It is not uncommon for wealthy 
domestic groups or influential bir ata groups to fuse with stronger lineages, and thus 
genealogically figure under their name. On the other hand, a powerful individual 
and his domestic group might form their own lineage and name it after the initiator 
of the effort. Such adjustments for social and/or economic reasons are done by 
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conscious manipulation, and mostly occur at the higher lineage or section levels, that 
is in the area of ambiguity. Adoption also offers possibilities for genealogical 
manipulations. While in the field, I witnessed such manipulations among the rich 
traders of L:arshangu. Konig (1962:63) reports that similar manipulations and 
additions of fictitious ancestors were also common among the Achal Tekke. 
Considerable diversity, if not confusion, reigns in the literature (Franz 1972a, 1972b; 
Irons 1975; Karpov 1929; Schurmann 1962; Tumanovich 1926; Vambery 1885) in 
the terminology used to designate the various levels of increasingly inclusive descent 
categories. The terms used by the Tlirkmen themselves are not consistent; usages 
largely depend on the practices of individual descent groups wanting to stress their 
connections with particular ancestors. 
For consistency's sake, I shall adopt the following terminology to refer to 
various sizes of descent groups from the most inclusive to the least inclusive: 
HALQ = TRffiE 
TAYFA = DIVISION 
TIRE = SECTION 
BIR ATA = LINEAGE 
Among the Ersari of Taghan, I was able to locate several incomplete handcopied 
versions of tribal genealogies, all of which represent in a more or less detailed form, 
the descent of all Tlirkmen from one mythical ancestor, Ogus Khan. According to 
those genealogies, the Ersari Tlirkmen are supposed to be the descendents of 
Ogur~ik, a great grandson of Ogus Khan. 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present a detailed historical analysis of 
those genealogies. What matters for our purposes is the fact that the Tlirkmen regard 
those written genealogies to be correct regardless of their ambiguities and 
discrepancies at the higher levels of segmentation. The distant past is only relevant 
for the creation of an idea and feeling of common descent. Omissions of 'irrelevant' 
ancestors and segments of a certain section or division are therefore conmon. As a 
consequence of such adjustments, written genealogies are always most detailed for 
the section which owns them. The following genealogy of the Ersari Ttirkmen was 
reconstructed from several incomplete manuscripts with the help of several Taghan 
elders (Figure 1). 
It depicts the way the Taghan see the subdivision of the Ersari tribe into four 
main tayfa, which in tum are subdivided into numerous tire, progressively closer to 
the actual local groups. It is noteworthy that the Kara division of which the Taghan 
are a tire, is listed in a more detailed manner. 
For their everyday transactions, the Taghan use a much simpler frame of 
reference, leaving out all the unnecessary ancestors. Figure 2 gives a representation 
of the genealogy used for everyday reckoning, especially when attempting to verify 
relationships between strangers. This matter is taken very seriously, even if for this 
purpose often rather far-fetched tenuous relationships have to be created. 
The Taghan tire is divided into two major groups called Ant and Stirebash. All 
the obas at the fringe of the desert-steppe, which formed the core of my research, 
supposedly belong to the Stirebash group. While the informants were quick to 
enumerate all the members of the Stirebash grouping, they were unable to give a 
comprehensive listing of the Ant. The little information obtained is too diffuse and 
incomplete to present a correct picture. I shall, therefore, not follow it further. It 
suffices here to mention that members of the Ant group are living close to the 
provincial capital and in the northeastern province of Qattaghan. Substantial 
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FIGURE 1: GENEALOGY OF THE ERSARI TURKMEN 
Source: Incomplete hand-copied version of Ogus Nama 
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geographical distance and non-mobility of both sides contributed to a loss of contact 
and a subsequent weakening of kin ties. 
The SUrebash group consisting of 11 closely related and intermarrying bir ata, 
in contrast, occupies a more or less contiguous territory, acts as a solidarity group, 
and shares ritual exchanges. Primary loyalty, however, is to one's closest agnates, as 
depicted in the following figure (Figure 3). For example, should the Erghaylar of 
group A have a dispute with the Dahiilar of group B, all the members of group A, by 
virtue of close agnatic ties are obliged to unite against group B, which in turn, 
constitutes a closely related unit. Loyalty, according to TUrkmen customs, is 
supposed to follow the closeness of blood ties. 
The bir ata A, B, C are supposedly descendants of three brothers. The first line 
of loyalty, by virtue of one's blood ties, includes descendants of one and the same 
brother. However, should one of the groups A, B, C have a dispute with D, all the 
descendants of A, B and C will unite against D who are more distantly related. In 
case a quarrel erupts between C and a member of the Ant group, then all the 
SUrebash will have to unite against the Ant. Thus the bir atas are the building blocks 
of society. They hold corporately rights to pastures, agricultural land and water: 
members derive legal, political, social and econcmic status through their membership 
in a bir ata. 
Since the lineage is the most important agnatic descent group, we shall examine 
its functions more closely. 
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DESCENT AND RESIDENCE 
The bir ata (lit.: bir =one I ata =father/of one father). 
It consists of close agnates tracing descent to a real common ancestor who lived 
5-7 generations ago and whose name or nickname became the name of the bir ata. 
All members of a bir ata, regardless of closeness of blood ties, call themselves 
qarndash (lit.: qarn =womb, stomach/stemming from the same womb/ relatives) and 
carry the name of the apical ancestor. In the case of the Erghay bir ata, the name is 
derived from their ancestor Khod~a Neas Erghay. In Taghan the size of a bir ata 
varies from 9-25 ii.ylar (domestic units) who may or may not form one residence 
group called oba. All members of a bir ata form a corporate group with common 
ownership of pasture, wells and in some instances also communally owned 
agricultural land. All members are bound by blood ties to close economic, social and 
political co-operation. 
In the Tagan area, the obas are usually situated on the site of the former winter 
camp. Pastoralism became less important with the influx of refugees. Many 
pastoralists got settled and placed more emphasis on agriculture as a means of 
livelihood. We shall analyse these changes in the chapter on economics. Most obas 
in Taghan are homogeneous, closely linked kin groups; however, some of them, as 
we shall see, have unrelated persons attached to them. Some of the larger obas, 
notably the Hanamlar and Qullar, separated into two groups, one of them living at 
the original site at the fringe of the desert-steppe, the other moving towards the 
irrigation canal into walled compounds surrounded by garden plots (xayat, hayat). 
Earlier this century, when pastoralism played a major part of the economy, the 
composition of an oba would change from season to season, usually being at its 
largest during the winter months. Although the obas are no longer herding units with 
a purely pastoral outlook, I observed a great deal of co-operation between domestic 
units in daily activities, especially tasks requiring a large labour force such as 
116 
harvesting, threshing and making of felts. All such assistance is provided on a 
reciprocal basis. 
The landholdings of an oba are usually in its immediate surroundings (although 
the rich bays of l:arshangu own land spread over a wide geographical area, thus 
requiring adequate means of transportation). 
Traditionally people of one oba were corporately liable and responsible in case 
of blood feuds and had to jointly raise the blood-money. Today blood feuding has 
ceased; but in case of a homicide or other serious crime involving the Central 
Government, the aqsaqallar will advise the culprit on how to present his case and 
will urge members to contribute in case compensation has to be paid or a member 
ransomed out of jail. Oba members, by virtue of their agnatic blood ties, and non-
agnatic residents, by virtue of their being granted residence (that is, protection), have 
a moral obligation to help fellow obalar economically in case of serious losses and 
in raising bride-prices. Mutual sharing of feasts, sunnat tuis and funeral expenses is 
expected. As my host often mentioned: 'My guest is the guest of the whole oba'. He 
would always invite some of the other oba residents to share a meal with a guest. 
Often they were requested to make a contribution in kind or labour towards the 
upkeep of important guests. 
DESCENT AND RESIDENCE: THE CASE OFT AGHAN 
Now that we are familiar with the structural principles of bir ata and oba, we 
shall examine a cluster of Taghan obas situated at the fringe of the desert-steppe. 
We shall look at their membership composition, descent and residence patterns. 
For administrative purposes the Aghan government has grouped the 14 obas ( cf. 
Figure 4) together and named the cluster Safarwali Awal. In order to see the 
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present situation in its historical context, we have to look back approximately 60 
years to the time of the great influx of refugees from Russian Central Asia. At that 
time the Erghay oba (my hosts) was situated approximately 5 kms to the north of its 
present location. Since the main means of livelihood at that time was pastoralism, 
the spring months and part of the summer were spent near the wells northwest of the 
present location. The site of the present permanent settlement was the original 
winter quarter. 
Before the migration of refugees from the Russian lands, the ecological balance 
was still guaranteed. The desert-fringe was densely covered with bushes and shrubs, 
preventing desertification and providing the Ttirkmen with an ample supply of fuel 
and fodder. 
The Sarelar were not yet at their present location, but lived in an area to the west 
of the Tshefshaklar, now belonging to the administrative cluster of Safarwali 
Dowom. Due to continuing blood feuding with the Hanamlar, who were their 
neighbours, the Afghan Government exiled the Sarelar to their present location 
(which, incidentally did not stop the feuding). Only several exchanges of brides 
brought an end to the disputes. 
At that time the Ttirkmen of Taghan were under the jurisdiction of the Afghan 
Subgovernor in Aqcha, but due to their location far from the centre and the poor 
infrastructure, they were looking after their own affairs unencumbered by 
Government control. 
Pasture land was in ample supply for all the obalar. In 1918, with the beginning 
of the refugee migrations from Russia which nearly tripled the original population,3 
an ever-growing ecological imbalance began. The first immigrants, mainly Uzbaks 
and Ttirkmen, were able to bring their flocks and belongings and were thus relatively 
well off. Later arrivals came empty-handed and became servants and clients of the 
then rather affluent population of Taghan. Rapid depletion of the jangal (bush and 
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shrub areas) for firewood and to gain new dryfanning land brought about steady 
desertification of the area. The existing canal system was expanded, putting a strain 
on a previously copious water supply. Fights between the competing ethnic groups 
for water and pasture brought about robbery and vanishing safety. The ecological 
imbalance heightened by several drought years became intolerable, a factor which 
precipitated the exodus of the richer Uzbak herders (mainly to Pul-i-Khurnri area) 
and of poorer Tiirkmen groups to larger market centres in search of work. The 
Tiirkmen, as a rule, migrated to areas where they had already established contacts 
with kinsmen, notably to places in the Qattaghan area of northeastern Afghanistan. 
During the 1970n 1 drought period further migrations took place for want of water. 
At present the picture as shown in Figure 4 emerges for the Taghan area: the 
Erghaylar, Dahalar and Sarelar obas near the desert-steppe fringe and the Hanamlar, 
Kellar amd Bokelar near the irrigation canal are all homogeneous: that is, composed 
of one bir ata belonging to the Taghan tire, and as we have seen, closely related in 
the agnatic line. The Sog-denlar and Karaja obas (both marked in red) are 
homogeneous, but not belonging to the Taghan tire. The Nurseidlar oba is not 
homogeneous. To the Kelek (Taghan) and the dominant Nurseidlar a few Mingajek 
(non-Taghan) families are attached. They sought exile here after a homicide made 
living among their own kinsmen impossible. Also the Hanam oba at the desert-
steppe fringe gave refuge to some families from another tire. The non-Taghan 
families live in a kind of patron-client relationship with the dominant Hanamlar. The 
two Qullar obas are inhabited by former slaves of the Erghay. 
All residents of the Erghay oba are descendants of two brothers. Households 1, 
2, 3 are the descendants of Tekke and live in the western part of the oba illustrated 
by Figures 5 and 6. The head of household number 2, as a result of his superior 
knowledge and better economic standing, is their informal leader in charge of the 
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guest house. Their part of the oba is set out in the traditional open pattern of a winter 
camp, with the exception that the yurts have been replaced by tams which are 
cheaper to construct and maintain. They have access to the two wells closest to their 
section of the oba. 
Household 1 consists of a widow with her own son and a son left by a deceased 
wife of her former husband and a second widow with two daughters. The two sons 
have married the two daughters and occupy the four tams marked with number 1. 
Household number 3 consists of two brothers. One of them has never married 
because of opium addiction and homosexuality. The other is a widower with a 
paraplegic daughter. A widowed sister without progeny decided to return to her 
biological household after the death of her husband. 
The other half of the oba is occupied by the descendants of Y omut. 
The head of household number 4 is their informal leader, and thanks to his 
status as aqsaqal, superior economic standing, excellent oratorial capability and 
connections with the Government, he is also the leader of the whole oba comprising 
both sections. His superior economic and social status is reflected in the elaborate 
two-storey tam situated in a walled compound and a big guest house in which all the 
important guests of the oba are entertained. 
Due to his status as aqsaqal hardly a day goes by without a visitor asking for 
advice in some matter, wanting economic assistance or other favours. Households 6, 
7, 9 separated about ten years ago from household 4 because of an argument over a 
bride-price to be raised for the bride of number 5. Number 6 is the de facto leader of 
the 'dissidents' and has a guest house in a bad state of disrepair. Due to their rather 
poor economic standing, all the 'dissidents' are largely dependent for their livelihood 
on the head of household number 4, leader of the group, who allocates them animals 
to herd and land to till. The household head of number 9 is an opium addict and his 
wife and two small sons are performing menial tasks for number 4 to pay for their 
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upkeep and livelihood. They also receive charity from the other oba households. 
Number 8 is at present working as a muzdur (labourer) for one of the rich bays in the 
Guppi oba and trying to save money to buy a wife. Whenever he comes back to the 
Erghay oba, he stays in the granary of household number 4 (marked with number 8 
on the map of the oba (Figure 6)). 
In spite of some tension within the section of the descendants of Y omut, the 
social and economic co-operation within the whole group and between all obalar is 
good. 
The herds of both groups are always communally herded in turns by one of the 
male members of the oba. 
Security is also a matter of oba concern. Especially in winter, when attacks 
from other obas not related by blood are frequent, each night two members of the 
oba are on watch duty. The informal head of the oba (number 4) draws up the roster. 
The watchmen are aided in their duty by a pack of fierce dogs to keep predators 
(mainly wolves) out of the animal corrals. The leader of the oba due to his superior 
status and economic assets, does not take up his watch duty, but instead sends his 
servant, who is the brother of the wife of number 9. Due to his opium addiction he is 
often not capable of performing his watchduties. To replace him, the leader pays one 
of his poorer kinsmen to take up watch-duties in his stead. 
The spatial arrangement of the Erghay oba follows the traditional spacing 
pattern of a nomadic camp with the leader's place in the middle. Although all yurts 
but three have been replaced by tams, the western section is following the traditional 
open camp pattern, whereas the eastern section, due to the economic and social 
superiority of their leader, is gradually developing into a compact walled compound. 
Most other Taghan obas, although ethnically homogeneous and mostly 
composed of one agnatic descent group, are no longer following the open camp 
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pattern, but have adopted life in walled compounds - mainly to save the expenses of 
yurts4 and also for safety reasons. 
The rich acculturated Ttirk.men of Carshangu also live in walled compounds 
consisting of one, two or more adobe/mud houses with a flat or dome-shaped roof 
(gumbiiz), a guest house and animal quarters. Their choice of dwelling is not 
primarily motivated by monetary consideration, but should be seen in the context of 
the ethnic configuration of the village. The core of the village is the Government 
administration building next to the market-place (baziir) . To the north and west of 
the market, clusters of ethnically more or less homogeneous residence groups sprawl 
along the irrigation canals. Due to a fairly rapid growth of the village, basically 
consisting of a number of previously unconnected obas of watani or muhajirin 
origin, the homogeneous cluster pattern has been destroyed in several areas; and 
unrelated groups now dwell adjacent to each other. Muhajirin and watani groups are 
mixed, and the settlement presents neither an ethnically nor genealogically 
homogeneous picture. The Ttirk.men community consists of members of various 
tayfa and tire not closely related. This in tum requires adequate safety measures and 
the protection of women and adolescent girls from non mahram kinsmen. 
Residence in an oba entirely composed of close kin, that is in most cases 
agnates, does not require safety measures against people inside the oba since all of 
them are bound to co-operation and assistance by virtue of their blood ties. 
The rich agropastoralists and traders live in well-defined walled compounds 
divided into a public and private area with clearly defined spaces for females, male 
agnates and affmes in the non-marrigeable category and for foreigners. Figure 7, 
which is quite self explanatory, illustrates this division. I shall come back to the 
importance of a well equipped guest house and spatious buzkasi horse stables for the 
prestige and status games of the rich. At this stage it is interesting to note that 
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spaces allocated to guests are nearly as large as the room for the widowed mother, 
three unmarried sisters and the wives and children of the two brothers owing the 
compound. Although the members of the female section are hard pressed for space, 
the two yurts are used as kitchen and food storage area. The widowed mother often 
voiced her desire to move into one of the yurts; but her oldest son (the master of the 
compound) was quick to reply that such a move would not be feasible: yurts these 
days were only for poor and backward people of the obas. 5 This closed settlement 
pattern is very hard on older muhajirin women, who in their younger days were used 
to spending the spring and summer months in the col (desert-steppe) with the flocks. 
Many older women lamented that they found life behind mudwalls very confining 
and restricting, infact, many of them used the term 'prison-like'. As a consequence of 
this isolation, I noticed a rather high incidence of depression, lethargy and 
psychological stress among women who have experienced camp life in their younger 
years. When I brought this factor to the attention of the men, they were quick to 
reply that Islam required seclusion of women. Among the richer segments of 
Ti.irkmen society, segregation of women has turned into a status symbol. That means 
that their traditional labour in the outside domain - herding, milking sheep and goats 
- has been replaced by wage labour employed for specific tasks. If, on occasion, 
women do milk cows, the animals are brought to cowsheds forming part of the 
female compound; thus no trespassing into public spaces is required. 
I often had the impression that changes in lifestyle and adjustment of a basically 
nomadic pastoral ideology to the requirements of a settled, more agriculture-based 
life-style were attributed to religion. Islam seemed to have become a convenient 
scapegoat for unresolved ideological conflicts and areas of ambiguity the Ti.irkmen 
themselves had not yet come to terms with. The nomadic past is not forgotten only 
repressed, for even among the rich and 'modem', tribal lore and the reciting of epics 
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glorifying heroes and famous tribal ancestors seem to be a major pastime and 
passion: somehow, a flight into the past. 
A transitory stage between the open and closed settlements is best described by 
presenting the case of Suleiman, an oba situated at the western desert-steppe fringe. 
Contrary to the bir ata membership of most of the Taghan obas, this settlement 
consists of clusters of several related sections (tire) of the Gtinesh tayfa (division) 
and a group of three gongsi6 households from the Kizil Ayak tire belonging to the 
Ulug Tepe tayfa. The following sketch (Figure 8) illustrates the residence pattern of 
Suleiman. The subsequent description shall shed some light on the peculiarities of 
this settlement. 
G Kawasaqal (tire), Gtinesh (tayfa) 
0 Suleiman (tire) Gtinesh (tayfa) 
0 Areqbater (tire) Gtinesh (tayfa) 
0 T~eker (tire) Glinesh (tayfa) 
0 Kizil Ayak (tire) Ulug Tepe (tayfa) 
A glimpse at the sketch reveals that the oba is divided into several clusters. 
Each cluster is formed by a group of close agnates, mostly brothers. With the 
exception of cluster 1, they all belong to fairly closely related sections of the Gtinesh 
division and exchange women in marriage. 
Cluster 1 consists of three households belonging to the Kizil Ayak tire who 
attached themselves to the Suleiman oba as gongsi several years ago because of a 
homicide. 
While living in exile among this only very distantly related group, they kept up 
their ties with their agnatic oba which is situated approximately 35 kms southwest of 
Suleiman. Although they were well treated by the Gtinesh majority of the oba, they 
could, as gongsi, not expect the same co-operation as living among close agnate 
::l 
0 
e 
:;1:! 
t-1 
QO 
rr:J-,---
' ' L_ : ryl I I 
' -,- --~ 5 I I f 
' I 1 I 01 LQ 4 
5 
I', , \.<. ,o : I I ITkl I I DO 0 
0 
I ' ' - -,- - - I I 0 I I 
( )-..__ ', ' : 1 DO I " I J 
' /~ "-,. ' •EE.J I I oo I 0 0 
', IITJ• I e 1r.rl I e 
....,_ I 0 I I ~ 1.------
' I I D & '~ I I • o I o 
I 7 l.l' I I ~0---l..=..:::::_l_ -
0 
• 
• 
~i \ § u>---L 1• 0 1 - _ - 1 I • \ ~ e I: i -- -l_ DO 
' ~ I I I ..... 
_ 0 /' / r-"4 , • 
---- / ' ~ ' ' ~ ....... 
----- 0 / ' / ' ' .. ' 6 I• ;-.-=--~-;CfJ /:0-.-/(', --- DO ---r-- ',, ' ' ' I , ' 
--- I 0 1 ' L-· 'DO ' 
" & I ' ' -~-- ~ 
• I " I I I , ,oo : 3 
I I " ---
1 : .9.9~-- " 
I • I I i " 
I ' oolool " I I ---~-- ....! '-
I I 7 '-
• 
KEY:-
• 
..... 
...... 
J I ~ 
I I 
0 
• [D Mosque 
--.., I 0 I 
I i4l 2 I t r-., I I 
I 
'--
I 
I 
I 
• I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-....I 
...... 
..... 
0 ....... 
..... 
....... 
....... 
....... 
....... 
........ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r--,-- -, 
I 10 I ~ walled compound with gumbaz 
N 
---'= l 
I 
I 
f 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 0 
I 
I 
I 
I I I I 
I I I 
:DO: 0 0: 
,------
10 I 0 1o o 1 I __ _} 
• freshwater well 
0 brackish well 
0 dried out well 
-N 00 
I 1 ~ walled housing compound with yurt 
·---, 
I I deserted or ruined compound L __ .J 
- _,.. track 
129 
would entail - that is, close social, economic and political assistance. This 
shortcoming became quite obvious in 1970, when the whole area was extremely 
droughtstricken. The Gtinesh people were committed to their own close agnates by 
virtue of their blood ties and nobody seemed to be caring about the Kizil Ayak 
gongsi who finally were forced to abandon their homes and return to their original 
settlement where they could expect assistance from their own agnatic kinsmen. 
Cluster 2 originally consisted of 5 domestic units of the Kawasaqal section. 
They arrived later in Suleiman than their closest kinsmen (cluster 7) which accounts 
for the physical distance of these related clusters. During the 1970/1971 drought 
period, three domestic units of cluster 2 lost all their herds and draft animals which 
constituted the base of their livelihood. Since their kinsmen of cluster 7 were equally 
hard-pressed for survival, no assistance could be expected. The three impoverished 
units thus left for Andkhui, a large settlement to the west of Suleiman predominantly 
populated by rich Kawasaqal agropastoralists and traders, where they were hoping to 
find employment as labourers with more fortunate section members. 
Clusters 4 and 3 experienced several misfortunes during the last ten years. 
Disease of family members depleted their labour-force - a vital criterion for 
economic survival as we shall see in the chapter on economics - and sickness of 
animals destroyed their herds. They attributed their misfortune to supernatural 
intervention. The custom exists among the Ttirkmen of that area to shift one's yurt or 
erect a new tam in another area of the present premises (camp or dwelling site) to 
'fool' the evil spirit supposedly living in the ground under the haunted dwelling. The 
site of the new tam is usually selected by the aqsaqa/s in consultation with a mullah. 
If this shift of abode is not improving the situation, the whole domestic unit will 
move to an entirely different location. In the case of cluster 4, they merely shifted 
their dwellings to the south and east of the original, now ruined compound(= cluster 
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3). During the time of hardship, they were assisted by close agnates living in the 
immediate neighbourhood. 
Cluster 5 was the poorest and most traditional segment of the T~eker section. A 
glimpse at the sketch reveals that they were/are still living in yurts, albeit surrounded 
by walls for protection. The larger part of the cluster left for the market centre of 
Aqcha during the drought years, where they were forced to make a living as servants 
and labourers of richer merchants. They previously had married Suleiman women 
from cluster 6 against the objection of their kinsmen of cluster 7, an act which 
created bad relations between the two clusters. When cluster 5 faced economic 
hardship, their agnates of cluster 7 did not come forth with the required assistance, 
pleading that they were also affected by the drought. 
Clusters 6 and 7 experienced bad luck in domestic and pastoral affairs and like 
cluster 4 shifted dwellings within their premises to avert other calamities. 
Cluster 8 is formed by four domestic units of the Areqbater section. They 
constitute the wealthiest segment of the whole oba and due to their superior 
economic and social standing provide the informal leadership for the whole oba. 
Their daughters are very much sought after by the other sections, but so far have only 
been given in marriage to members of the Suleiman tire with whom the Areqbater 
already had marriage exchanges before migrating from Russian Central Asia to 
Afghanistan. 
The general picture emerging from the description of these clusters reveals that 
genealogically closest related groups reside in clusters beside each other and are 
bound by blood to mutual co-operation. The flrst line of assistance is always one's 
closest agnates. In case they cannot provide help because of self-impoverishment-
the only acceptable reason for denying co-operation - help is traditionally sought 
from more distant kinsmen. 
131 
A third line of assistance are one's affines, but this is an uncertain choice. 
Affinal ties, unlike agnatic ones, do not carry an obligation of economic co-
operation. They merely stipulate avoidance of conflict, peaceful co-existence and 
mutual participation at rituals such as weddings and funerals. I know, however, of 
several cases where a wealthy brother came to the aid of his sister's impoverished 
household, especially if relations between that household and its close agnates were 
strained. Traditionally it is considered unacceptable for affmes to interfere in agnatic 
disputes. The matter is different in case of cousin marriages, where close agnatic 
and affinal obligations overlap. In such cases the responsibility as agnates is always 
decisive in the choice of action to be taken, and usually a solution is found to 
reafflrm ties and not to strain relationships (which would render all parties concerned 
vulnerable to outside attacks and interference). 
The Suleiman oba6a does not possess any agricultural land and is ·entirely 
dependent on pastoralism and its side products for its subsistence. Since it is situated 
away from irrigation canals, water for man and beast is gained from wells owned by 
individual residential clusters, as depicted in Figure 8 The desert-steppe to the west 
of Suleiman is col-i-khoda, land accessible to anybody for pastoral purposes. The 
lack of access to irrigated land is accounted for by its members by their late arrival as 
muhajirin from Russian Central Asia. I would tend, however, to accept the public 
opinion of the area labelling the Suleiman people as descendants of former slaves 7 
who adopted the names of their former masters, a practice apparently quite common 
among the Tiirkmen of Afghanistan. I have no direct proof of this statement since 
asking someone directly about slave origins is a sensitive and derogatory matter. 
·When probing them about genealogical matters, I would invariably receive 
contradictory statements and meet with a certain vagueness and unwillingness to 
talk, a factor which would reinforce my suspicion. Furthermore bir ata names such 
as 'itaqele' (lit. the wisdom of a dog) would point to slave origin. Neighbouring 
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obalar would often refer to the people of Suleiman as 'qullar' (slaves) when nobody 
of suspected slave-origin was present. 
As far as the architectural features of the oba are concerned, it is interesting to 
note that all compounds are walled, containing either a gumbiiz tam (adobe house 
with domeshaped roof), a yurt or both. If a compound is furnished with a tam and a 
yurt, the tent is invariably occupied by the most senior woman of the domestic unit. 
The tam structure is simple and of a stereotyped form. The prescribed spacing 
pattern of the yurt does not apply, as the following sketch illustrates: 
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Having analysed these three types of settlement patterns, let us revert to the analysis 
of the cluster of Taghan obas. 
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We have seen (Figure 3) that the majority of the Taghan obas are composed of 
one bir ata, and all bir atas described above are genealogically closely related The 
Sogdenlar and Karajalar (marked in red on Figure 4) are two muhajirin groups that 
arrived in 1920 from Russian Central Asia. They both are sections of the Ulug Tepe 
division and are thus only related to the Taghan at the mythological level of the 
'national genealogy'. Both groups arrived empty-handed and initially served as 
servants and labourers for the Taghan obas. Their women worked as skilled carpet 
weavers for the Taghan on a daily wage basis. According to the elder of the 
Sogdenlar, the initial years among the Taghan were extremely difficult, but for want 
of agnatic relatives in the area, they had no other choice, but to bear the harsh and 
humiliating treatment accorded by the Taghan. By way of hard labour, they 
gradually managed to accumulate small herds of sheep and a few camels which 
brought them a modest income and freedom from the domination by the Taghan. To 
date they do not own any agricultural land, but share in the ejora (land lease from the 
Government) of land with a group of Taghan obas. This form of land use will be 
described in the chapter on economics. Initially no marriage exchanges took place 
between the Taghan and the two refugee groups, but in recent years, mainly due to 
non-availability of brides, general impoverishment and better integration of the 
muhajirin, two marriages have taken place. The two refugee groups have adjusted to 
the Taghan way of life. As a visible sign of this process may serve the bogmak 
(elaborate headdress ) of their women. They have given up the traditional Karaja 
and Sogden female headdress and adopted the beaded Taghan kiUtii style (see Plates 
39 and 40). Only the different style of their children's clothing reminds an initiated 
observer of their muhajirin past. Both obas take part in ritual and economic 
exchanges with the Taghan. In fact the closeness and acceptance is aptly visible in 
the choice of a Karaja woman as wetnurse for the youngest son of the Erghay leader. 
Both groups are socially and economically fully accepted by the Taghan; politically, 
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however, they owe allegiance to the Ulug Tepe division. This became obvious 
during the last election campaign for seats in the Parliament in Kabul. Each Ersari 
section of the area nominated a candidate and active campaigning was taking place 
even in remote desert-fringe areas, such as Taghan. The Ulug Tepe candidate and 
his helpers reminded the Karajalar and Sogdenlar of their loyalty, although the two 
groups, for good neighbourly reasons, would have preferred to identify themselves 
with the Taghan section of the Kara division amongst whom they are living. 
To the Hanam oba is attached one family of Ulug Tepe muhajirin, the last 
survivors of a formerly larger group the majority of which migrated to other areas. 
During the 1970/1971 drought, the remaining families died of starvation, of which 
the ruined tams are a silent witness. The Hanamlar always had a reputation for 
accepting people who had committed illegal acts and for using them as cheap 
labourers and herdsmen. Attached to the Hanam oba is also one family of Harun 
gongsi (Kara division), two Nik~a (Kara division) and one Mingajik (Kara division). 
All of them took refuge in the Hanam oba earlier this century because of blood feuds 
or other criminal acts. They are completely assimilated, and since they share kin ties 
albeit distant ones, have inter-married and share the same rights as the Hanam. 
During my fieldwork there was talk of integrating them into the Hanam pedigree. 
Among the otherwise homogeneous Nurseidlar lives one Mingajik muhajirin 
family who attached themselves as gongsi soon after their arrival in Afghanistan. 
For all practical purposes they are integrated into the Nurseid oba and are full 
members of the Nurseid bir ata. 
The Oullar, former slaves of the Erghaylar and Tshefshaklar, became free at the 
beginning of this century, after slavery was officially abolished. After gaining their 
freedom, they first settled near the Sarelar oba at the fringe of the desert-steppe. 
During the reign of Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) land grants were offered to 
Ttirkmen pastoralists in an attempt to sedentarize them near the irrigation canals. 
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With the help of their former masters, the Qullar managed to get a few jerib of land 
near the irrigation canals and part of the original Qullar oba subsequently moved to a 
site near their land, which they later on lost to a creditor. Neither group of former 
slaves owns agricultural nor pastoral land and both depend on the col-i-khoda (free 
pasture areas) for their small herds. Their main income is derived from carpet-
making and service as labourers. Although there exists close co-operation between 
the qullar and their former masters and some of the other Taghan obas, no exchange 
of brides takes place between the former slaves and the free Ttirkmen. Being of 
slave origin carries a strong social stigma. Some impoverished free Ttirkmen might 
take a qui-wife, but never give their daughters to a descendant of a slave. I was time 
and again reminded that it was important to ' keep one's blood pure'. I shall further 
elaborate this claim in the section on the choice of marriage partners. 
Between the bir ata as the smallest and most relevant descent group and the 
Ersari tribe as the largest social unit, some larger and progressively more inclusive 
descent categories are recognized. Since their main importance lies in establishing 
political allegiance, we shall examine them more closely in the chapter on politics. 
They originally served to organize the tribe for political purposes and to mobilize 
larger groups in the case of regional disputes. Ever since the Afghan Government 
took firmer control over the Ttirkmen areas and tribal feuding came to a halt, the 
higher levels of segmentation have lost their former importance. As a consequence 
of this development, Ttirkmen youngsters today are hardly familiar with their bir 
ata's tribal affiliation beyond the section level. 
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THE ETHNIC CONFIGURATION OF MINGAJIK WOLUSWALI8 AND NEIGHBOURING AREAS 
I have so far looked at the descent structure and ethnic composition of one 
particular cluster of obas belonging to the Taghan tire and the settlement patterns of 
these obas. I will now attempt to put this cluster into the geographical context of the 
wider region and thereby try to account for some of the recent developments. 
From the point of view of the acculturated Ttirkmen traders and agropastoralists, 
the Taghan obas represent the traditional element of Ttirkmen society. They are 
often ridiculed by their more progressive 'cousins' for their adherence to and love of 
traditions and old epics, and their general unwillingness to adopt a 'modern' life 
(whatever that may mean). 
Figure 9 graphically illustrates the ethnic composition of the major villages of 
the area. The villages farthest away from the market centre (no.46) all belong to the 
Taghan tire (orange colour in blue frame). Nearly all these obas consist of a 
corporate property-holding agnatic descent group exchanging women in marriage, 
attending each other's feasts and ceremonies. Neighbouring obas are expected to 
extend help for economic activities requiring a labour force larger than the individual 
oba could muster. 
In spite of their mixed agropastoral economy, their outlook is pastoral, linked to 
their flocks. They do not seem to have developed a bond with their agricultural land, 
as many agricultural peoples have. Their view of life has remained pastoral, 
although the Taghan (notably the informal leader of the Erghay oba), are aware of 
the merits of economic diversification. This lack of a bond with their land might 
partly stem from the fact that only few of them own substantial irrigated 
landholdings. Given the vagaries of the climate, dry farming is a hazardous 
occupation. Although Taghan is only about 25 kms away from the market centre, 
astonishingly little mobility exists. Those depending on sotorkasi9 as a source of 
income might only visit the market centre once every month or even less frequently. 
N 
~~ 
O'""' 
>0 ~~ 
:;;~ 
otrl 
t""'_, ~~ >(":) c:(":l 
>0 
zZ 
o::l 
'J)o 
c::C:: 
::o::O 
::o> 0..., 20 
oz zo 0~ 
'J) 
26 
em 
1 
::f""WI 
•• L.:!.!_J 
27 
~ 
24 r-, 
I _ __ _ .J 
22 21 
lwiMI 
2 
~ 
19 
5 
4[}Y] 
3 [}YJ 
00 
16 15 14 ~oo em 
17 
~ 36 D .. .. .. .. 
~ D 18 35 37 38 CJ D 
34 
D 
33 
c=J 
32. 
D 
39 
D 
41 
40 c=J 
OJ 
42 
ITJ 43 D 31 D 
28 30 D . ' 
G 29D 
CJ 
12 
D 
47 
48 
lw:j 
IM I 51 
t:S 46 D 50 1 I-.-___.I 
44 ILJ 49 D 
D 
52 
D 
53 
D 
..... 
w 
-....1 
138 
FIGURE 9: ETHNIC CONFIGURATION OF MINGAJIK WOLUSWALI 
AND SURROUNDINGS (cont.) 
Explanations: W = Watani M = Muhajirin 
Predominant descent ~oups: 
Taghan (Tire) 
Kara (Tayfa) 
Gtinesh (Tayfa) 
OJ Bakaul I Begaul (Tayfa) 
[I] Ulug Tepe I Ulutepe (Tayfa) 
[a ~ PASliTUN (Non-Ti.irkic ethnic group) 
[E] ARAB (Non-Ti.irkic ethnic group) 
. 
D UZBAK (Ttirkic group) 
D ESHAN (Sacred Lineage) 
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FIGURE 9: ETHNIC CONFIGURATION OF MINGAJIK WOLUSWALI 
AND SURROUNDINGS (cont.) 
List of villa~es: 
1) Keleq 27) Taghan Areq 
2) Balja Abdul Rahman 28) Surkhi Khanabad 
3) J ui Shah Khan 29) Khanabad 
4) Jui Oruz 30) Ali eli 
5) Safarwali Dowom 31) Tshubbash 
6) Safarwali A'wal 32) Karaboyen I Qaraboyen 
7) Chellik - Kol 33) Erakly 
8) Chellik - Y oz Khan 34) Sultan Areq 
9) Chellik - Y aldash 35) Mingajik-i-Qulighajar 
10) Islam Tawarabof 36) Khali Jabeji 
11) Chellik- Aranji 37) Abbas 
12) Sheikh Razi 38) Khatab 
13) Mingajik Allaberan 39) Mingajik-i-F araree 
14) Harun -A'wal 40) Ain Qala 
15) Harun - Dowom 41) Bakaul 
16) Carshangu 42) Qelichabad 
17) Qazan Naraw 43) Khanaqa 
18) Keleq Areq 44) Baysh Kapa 
19) Islam Aq Maidan 45) Jeza 
20) Qorcangu Muhaji 46) Aqcha 
20) Qorcangu Muhajir 47) Jangal Areq 
21) Goyenli Muhajir 48) Dali Afghani and Dali Ttirkmanya 
22) Qoyeni Watani 49) Hayderabad 
23) QaraAdiq 50) Hindukush 
24) Alamlik-Kona (deserted) 51) Aranji 
25) Suleiman 52) Chakesh 
26) Lab-jar-i-Taghan 53) Chakesh-i -Sarband 
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To buy their daily necessities they usually visit a smaller bazar closer by (no.16), 
which is open for trading two days a week. This bazar-village is also the seat of the 
Government district Commissioner (woluswa[). Goods here are slightly more 
expensive than in the big market centre, but the costs for travel and time involved in 
the journey are less. Especially for women mobility is practically non-existent; and 
in this respect there is not much difference between the poorer obas of Taghan and 
the richer segment living closer to the market centre. The women of Taghan, with a 
few exceptions, have only visited surrounding obas of close relatives to attend feasts 
and participate in kOmiik. On the average their mobility extends to a radius of 
approximately 15 kms. Very few have visited the big market centre (no.46) for 
medical treatment; and only the wife of the Erghay leader, who prides himself as 
being 'progressive', was taken to Kabul to a hospital for specialized treatment. lO 
Even the rich bays seldom take their wives or daughters to larger hospitals. In this 
context it should be remembered that women are replaceable. 
To the south of the Taghan obas, along the irrigation canals, is a belt of 
territorially fairly contiguous Kara villages belonging to various tire (blue squares). 
They are, as the Ttirkmen genealogy illustrates, relatively distantly related to the 
Taghan obas. The spatial pattern of the contemporary villages lends support to 
Konig's thesis ( 1962) that obas and tires at an earlier stage owned contiguous 
territories, in spite of the change brought about by the sale of land and the granting of 
prime acreage to former Government servants of non-Ttirkmen origin in lieu of a 
pension. These Kara obas are more dependent on agriculture than livestock-
breeding for their livelihood, although nearly every household keeps a smallish herd 
of goats and sheep. Brides from these Kara obas are the second choice of those 
Taghan people unable to secure brides from their own bir ata or tire. 
The closer we get to the market centre ( 46), the less ethnically homogeneous the 
villages tum out to be. The reason for this diversity might partly be found in the 
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historical transformation of this area. At the beginning of last century, the north of 
Afghanistan consisted of ten U zbak Khanates - of which Aqcha was one - which 
were constantly competing for power (for historical details see Dupree 1973:417 and 
Gazetteer of Afghan Turkistan) . Around 1817 Murad Beg, the Khan of Kunduz, 
became the paramount Uzbak Khan of the north. He paid a minimal tribute to the 
Amir of Bukhara. Upon Murad Beg's death in 1846 the region was ravaged by tribal 
unrest; power finally went to the ruler of Tashqurghan (now Khulm). By 1849 all of 
the north, with the exception of Badakhshan, had accepted the authority of Kabul. In 
1859 Badakhshan also gave in; and in 1884, the Khan of Maimana, as the last ruler, 
submitted to the forces of Amir Abdul Rahman, the ruler of Kabul. At that time, the 
Amir faced insurrection from the rebellious Ghilzai Pushtun tribes in the southern 
and eastern parts of Afghanistan. In order to prevent a serious rebellion, he exiled 
large groups of Ghilzai to the north of the Hindukush, where their descendants now 
form a segment of rich agropastoralists and traders. The purpose of these forced 
migrations was to get his enemies and dissidents removed from areas where their 
tribe was a dangerous majority and where they might stir up revolts and insurgence 
against the court in Kabul. At the same time, Abdul Rahman managed to cordon off 
the northern frontier by creating a segment loyal to Kabul. He knew well enough 
that the Ghilzai Pushtun might be anti-Durrani (the ruling tribal group) as long as 
they lived in their own territory among fellow tribsemen; but once removed to a 
Ttirkic area, their loyalty would be to the Pushtuns regardless of tribal affiliation, 
rather than to U zbaks and Ttirkmen (for historical accounts and details see Dupree 
1973; Fletcher 1965; Fraser-Tytler 1967; Gregorian 1969). Amir Abdul Rahman 
certainly was right in his speculations, for the descendants of those exiled Pushtuns 
nowadays form a considerable Pushtun elite in all the major trading centres of the 
north. 
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Aqcha, the largest market centre of the area ( 46), seems to have been a focal 
point of ethnic mixing and co-existence long before the influx of refugees from 
Russia. Situated on an old caravan route to Bukhara, it suffered a decline with the 
closing of the border with Russia. However, it got a facelift in the late 1940s, when 
its old bazar surrounding the citadel dating back to the U zbak Khans, was destroyed 
to make room for a new, planned market-place closer to the road linking it with the 
provincial capital. Integrated into the long spacious main street of the bazar are 
several caravanserails, a government hospital, a bank, a government hotel and all the 
Government Administration buildings. In the 1960s the new paved road leading 
from the provincial capital to Kabul linked Aqcha with the national capital by way of 
a daily bus service. This improved infrastructure attracted many poor Uzbaks, 
Ti.irkmen and Arabs11 to Aqcha in search of work. Due to the gradual expansion of 
the new bazar, outlying villages were integrated and new, mostly ethnically mixed 
villages along the new road gradually came into existence. With the exception of the 
very central part of Aqcha, each ethnic group usually lives in a separate section of 
the village following the pattern previously described for Carshangu. In several 
Ti.irkmen villages (e.g. 16) with a muhajirin and watani population of the same tire, 
the two groups live in adjacent settlements. Trade seems to be dominated by 
Pushtuns, Uzbaks and some Ti.irkmen families who have always been active in the 
trade sector. 
In summer the villages of the Mingajik Woluswali were regularly visited by 
gypsylike bands of Jats and Jugis,12 both ethnic groups living in simple white cotton 
tents. The Jugis, whose women usually roamed around the villages begging for food 
and alms and offering their services as fortunetellers, claim to be of Arab origin. I 
had no means of ascertaining the grounds for this claim; however the Arabs of the 
region totally disassociate themselves from the Jugis. The Jats, on the other hand, 
seem to be of Indian origin. They engage in prostitution, sell bangles and strainers as 
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ambulant vendors in the baztirs and provide entertainment at weddings.13 The men 
of both groups usually work as casual labourers. No intermarriage between these 
gypsy-groups and other ethnic groups were reported. 
No open antagonism was visible between the different ethnic groups. Latent ill-
feelings, however, often flared up in conversations with Uzbaks and Ttirkmen 
regarding the presence of Pashtuns, who invariably receive favourable, preferential 
treatment from the bureaucrats, teachers and doctors, who to a large extent are also 
Pashtuns. There seemed to be little willingness on the part of the Pashtun 
agropastoralists or government personnel to understand the different cultural 
background of the Ttirkmen. The Pashtuns consider the Ttirkmen and Arabs to be 
inferior and thus treat them in a rather condescending manner. I shall pursue this 
point further in the chapter on politics. 
It seems that the creation of a new centrally located baztir, coupled with an 
improvement of the infrastructure, have attracted traders and labourers from other 
areas of the country - hence, the ethnically mixed settlements in the area. At the 
same time, these improvements also brought the region more firmly into the grip of 
the Afghan bureaucracy leading to a decline in the power of traditional Ttirkmen 
authority. These processes forced many Ttirkmen to adjust to a new way of life. The 
new circumstances generated antagonism between the literate traders and the 
illiterate Ttirkmen, whose system of operation in the social, economical and political 
fields is based on kinship and co-operation, and who harboured a strong distrust for 
non-kin ties which they consider ephemeral and passing. A Ttirkmen elite of traders 
and rich agropastoralists, however, was quick to learn that Government and market-
place were only controllable by power and money. Unlike kinship ties, ties created 
by wealth and connections are temporary and need constant renewal. For these new-
style Ttirkmen, kinship ties often interfere with relationships with outsiders, which 
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require flexibility and mobility. Many have exchanged the safety of the 'kin-based' 
inside world for a less safe, but flexible, profit-oriented outside world. 
The majority of the Ttirkmen, however, especially the desert-fringe dwellers of 
Taghan, live in the past, with horses, heroes and exchanges among kinsmen they can 
trust. 
THE CHOICE OF A SUIT ABLE SPOUSE 
Traditionally a marriage among the Ttirkmen of Taghan does not create a 
political alliance, but only a social relationship involving the bir ata of the two 
parties concerned. 
Marriage practices, bride-price14 and responsibilities vary according to whether 
it is a lineage-endogamous or lineage-exogamous union. In case of an exogamous 
union, as we shall see, the bride-price is usually higher and the ceremonial exchanges 
more numerous and elaborate. 
Among the richer segment, exogamous unions have become more popular in 
recent years. Reasons for this change are manifold, the most common being the 
creation of a business alliance. In this case kin ties remain secondary to monetary 
and status gains. Should the groom be physically handicapped or family problems 
hamper an endogamous union, a bride from a distant tribal segment will be looked 
for. 
The 'ideal' partner is perceived differently from the point of view of wife-givers 
and wife-takers. The parents of a marriageable girl prefer a young unmarried man of 
approximately the same age and economic status as their daughter, preferably a close 
agnate. A close agnatic relationship means security, knowledge of one's future in-
laws and basically a decent treatment of one's daughter by her new in-laws. There 
145 
are no unknown factors, no secrets, no uncertainties to be dealt with. In the case of 
an outsider, a man of another ethnic group, the lure of a higher bride-price may be 
tempting; but there is always a risk factor, since one does not know the character of 
the groom and the new affines-to-be and has to rely on the good judgement of a go-
between. 
Furthermore the Ti.irkmen do not like to let their women move to geographically 
distant locations, for physical distance inhibits proper checking into the well-being of 
one's daughter or sister. It further complicates speedy assistance or mediation in case 
problems should crop up with her new in-laws. In the case of a union between close 
agnates, this worry is unnecessary, since they usually live in the same or a nearby 
oba. 
From the point of view of the wife-taker, the preference depends on whether he 
is taking a first wife, is a widower remarrying, or is an already married man seeking 
a polygynous union. The criteria given here are for a first bride. For second unions, 
standards have to be lowered somewhat, since a much smaller range of partners is 
available to these categories of men. I shall look at this problem in a subsequent 
section. 
The 'ideal' bride is like a transport camel (guba), sturdily built, with big, strong 
legs, and clean. Plump, fat girls are preferred, since plumpness is often equated with 
good health, a pre-requisite for bearing a number of children. For this reason a girl 
from a family with a proven history of fertility is more desirable. Here again, close 
relatives are the safest bet, since one is familiar with the girl, her family and the 
reproductive histories of their women. A good character (yaxsi axloq) is further 
greatly valued; and skills as a carpet-maker are a must. Beauty somehow is of 
secondary importance, since women belong to the private domain. They are not 
prestige items such as buzkasi horses (cf. Stucki 1978a), but an economic asset. 
Younger brides are preferred to older ones, the ideal age being 15-20 years 
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irrespective of the age of the groom. The average Ttirkmen family - except the rich 
bays looking for a business alliance- will only consider an outsider if the groom-to-
be has some physical defect well-known to all close relatives, who therefore, are 
unwilling to give their daughters. In Taghan I came across several cases where 
unborn children were betrothed. In practice this usually happens in the following 
way: two male friends, usually kinsmen, both have a pregnant wife. They promise in 
the presence of several witnesses that if one of them gets a girl and the other a boy, 
the children should become husband and wife. Betrothal of small children is also 
quite common. The babies of two brothers, regardless whether the girl is older than 
the boy, will be engaged and married when they reach maturity. 
The only marriage proscriptions the Ttirkmen observe are set by Islam. 
According to the Qur'an (IV:23-28) the following categories of women related by 
way of consanguinity, close affinity or fosterage are forbidden as marriage partners: 
'You are forbidden to take in marriage your mothers, your daughters, your sisters, 
your paternal and maternal aunts, the daughters of your brothers and sisters, the 
mothers of your wives, your foster mothers, your foster sisters, your step-daughters 
who are in your charge, born of the wives with whom you have lain (it is no offence 
for you to marry your step-daughters if you have not consummated your marriage 
with their mothers) and the wives of your begotten sons. Henceforth you are also 
forbidden to take in marriage two sisters at one and the same time' (Qur'an IV:23). 
Diagram 1 sums up the prohibited degrees. 
There are also rules prohibiting certain marriages occurring at the same time, 
but not in succession. In the above diagram they are marked in black. Into this 
category fall marriages with the spouses of Egos's near collaterals e.g. siblings, 
siblings of ascendants. All Islamic legal schools 'prohibit contemporaneous 
marriages with two women so related to each other that, supposing either of them to 
be a male, a marriage between them would be illegal'(Hughes 1935:317). In other 
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DIAGRAM 1: PROHIBITED DEGREES OF MARRIAGE 
words, a married man cannot, while married, take in marriage any relative of his wife 
whom she could not herself marry if she were a man. 
Although among the TUrkmen marriage is not prescribed with any specific 
category of kin, certain preferences do exist for kinsmen, with close kin being 
preferred over more distant kin. 
My field data from Taghan, comprising all the extant marriages at the time of 
my research, show a rather high incidence of parallel cousin marriages (24 per cent) 
for the first marriage recorded (Table 5). Since I was not able to break down my 
data into numbers for second or more remote cousins, I included them in a category 
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labelled 'more distant agnatic kin'. My summary of all the marriages would confirm 
the statements of many informants that bir ata members are preferred: 54 per cent 
fall into this category. As a second choice was mentioned tire endogamy (in the 
above mentioned table figuring under 'other Taghan descent groups'). A third choice 
would be selection of a bride from the same tayfa: that is from another Kara descent 
group, in decreasing order of popularity. Only if no partner from within one's 
lineage, section, division or tribe is available would non-Ttirkmen be considered. As 
mentioned above, in the case of a first marriage, resorting to outsiders is practiced by 
the rich or the physically handicapped. It must be understood that there is no stigma 
attached for a Ttirkmen man to marry a woman from another Ttirkic group, but as a 
rule, Ttirkmen women are not given to other ethnic groups. This is less strictly 
applied to U zbaks, with whom the Ttirkmen feel a certain affinity due to a similar 
linguistic and cultural background. 
The three slave wives reported in Table 5 are spouses of an impoverished bir 
ata, whose members had gambled away their fortune by bacabozlik or lost it through 
opium addicition. No free man would have given his daughter to them, even if 
related by blood. The three non-Ttirkmen women reported are one Arab and two 
Uzbaks, all belonging to the poor stratum (since prices for non-Ttirkmen brides are 
considerably lower as I shall demonstrate). 
The obvious question presents itself: why is there such a high incidence of 
lineage and section endogamy, in the absence of any prescriptive marriage rules? 
In the social and economic context of Taghan, the following reasons come to 
mind: 
1) Since bir atas in most cases constitute local residence groups depending on an 
adequate labour force to maintain their economic viability, a bride, although 
physically moving to another domestic unit, is still a member of the oba and 
thus her labour potential not lost for the group. 
First marriages 
First cousins More distant 
agnatic kin 
FBD18 1 
FZD 3 26 33 
MBD 4 J24% 30% 
MZD 1 
Second marriages 
First cousins More distant 
agnatic kin 
FBD 1 
FZD 4% 5 
MBD 18% 
MZD 
TABLE S: RELATIONSHIPS OF WIVES TO HUSBANDS IN TAGHAN 
Other Taghan OtherKara Other Ersari Slaves 
descent groups descent groups descent groups 
25 12 8 3 
23% 11% 7% 3% 
Other Taghan OtherKara Other Ersari Slaves 
descent groups descent groups descent groups 
11 8 3 
39% 28% 11% 
--- --
Non-Ttirkmen 
3 
3% 
Non-Ttirkmen 
...... 
~ 
1.0 
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2) My informants never tired to stress that acquisition of a closely related bride 
minimizes friction with her mother-in-law, since both of them are familiar with 
each other's psychological make-up and character. 
3) A further consideration is the bride-price which is usually proportionate to the 
closeness of the relationship determined by blood, or previous marriage 
exchanges between the wife-givers and wife-takers. Bride-price contributions, 
especially among the poorer segment, are usually solicited from all lineage 
members residing in the same oba on a reciprocal basis. In case of an 
endogamous marriage, the payments accumulated as bride-price stay within the 
group. 
4) With the kinship system gradually losing its importance at the expense of a 
growing trend towards economic profit, affirmation and strengthening of blood 
ties among lineage members become increasingly more important. In a 
ethnically heterogeneous setting, the best way to counteract segmentary 
tendences of the bir ata structure is to exchange women. 
5) The Ttirkmen are aware of the dangers of physical distance. If a daughter or 
sister is married to an outsider, she might be moved to a distant village or in the 
worst case to another province. It would be extremely difficult for her to seek 
assistance from her agnates in case her affines should not treat her well. 
6) Marriage to someone from a different section or division harbours certain 
dangers. A go-between familiar with both parties is necessary to guarantee the 
union. In fact deception is not uncommon. I know of several cases where 
elderly women or handicapped girls were sold for enormous sums. Naturally 
such frauds entail endless quarrels which in the worst cases might end up in 
court. Generally, however, the conflict is resolved within the Tiirkmen legal 
system, since it constitutes a tremendous loss of face for the deceived party. 
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Ironically enough, the creation of alliances with different descent groups or 
other ethnic groups is the prerogative on one hand of the poor and handicapped who 
might have to select a bride from a lower stratum and on the other hand of the very 
rich who might have the mobility and power to select the daughter of a leader and 
thereby move into a higher social stratum. Such unions are usually made for 
economic and political gains. In the former case such a union is contracted out of 
sheer need and in the second case, it is made as a conscious choice for a better 
position or other gains. 
Among the richer segment of acculturated Ttirkmen, the acquisition of brides 
from other descent groups, muhajirin and watani, and from other ethnic groups, is 
quite common to enhance one's economic and political status. This trend started 
about 50 years ago when the richest and best-known bay and a leader and his sons 
married U zbak women of the largest business families to consolidate their economic 
transactions. They did not select foreigners for want of suitable endogamous 
partners, but made planned manipulations to increase economic gains. Among the 
bays the tendency to move away from kinsmen to outsiders in order to increase profit 
and mobility is steadily increasing. 
A census of the whole acculturated Ttirkmen area would yield different figures 
from the tradition-bound tires of Taghan (Table 5). I was not able to carry out a full 
census, but could only secure figures for some of the marriages with partners from 
other ethnic groups: 
2 men had Afghan (Pashtun) wives (daughters of rich landowners). 
25 men had U zbak wives (for this group I was not able to ascertain how many 
marriages were among the poor stratum and how many were among the rich). 
2 men had Arab wives (one poor, one rich). 
1 man had a Tatar wife (she is a medical doctor whom the man met when 
studying engineering in Moscow). 
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It must be emphasized that it is acceptable for men to marry foreigners. On the 
other hand, these same men would be rather reluctant to give their daughters in 
marriage to an outsider. I only know of one case where an impoverished Tlirkmen 
gave his daughter to a Pashtun for a large sum. This act was considered so shameful 
that it led to his being ostracized by his bir ata. The daughter is neither accepted by 
her Afghan in-laws nor by her own kin. 
Second marriages, on the contrary, usually tend to favour more distant relatives, 
with emphasis on the section and division levels (Table 5). We shall see in the next 
section that the choice depends on whether a widower seeks a new spouse or a 
married man a second or third wife. 
Priorities and women available vary according to age and standing of the man. 
Although my sample for second marriages is small, it nevertheless reveals the 
general trend. 
Traditionally men of pure Ttirkmen ancestry (iq) are supposed to marry only 
pure Ttirkmen women (bikii). On the other hand bikii girls should never be given to 
qui (slaves) and other ethnic groups. In Taghan, at least, this rule is fairly strictly 
adhered to. In other areas the first rule has been considerably relaxed, mainly due to 
non-availability of suitable bikii brides, economic hardship or for the enhancement of 
economic status. If outsiders have to be chosen, women of a Tlirkic group are 
preferable, since due to their linguistic and cultural background, they can easily 
adjust to the Tlirkmen way of life. 
Observations, inquiries from informants and government sources reveal a 
considerable shortage of women among the Taghan. As far as I could ascertain, the 
same pattern prevails among other Ttirkmen groups. Evidence to prove my 
statement is hard to come by, since women are not reported in local censuses and the 
1979 national census was incomplete due to political difficulties. Furthermore, the 
census results, as incomplete as they might be, are not available to me. Irons (1975) 
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mentions a similar trend among the Yomut, and Krader (1963) reports a shortage of 
women among the Ttirkmen of Russian Central Asia after the Czarist conquest. 
Unfortunately I had no access to Russian sources to examine the present situation in 
the Central Asian Republic of the USSR. My own household census for the Taghan 
area, although a rather small sample (see Table 6), nevertheless reveals the general 
trend. 
TABLE 6: SEX AND AGE COMPOSITION OF THE TAGHAN OBAS 
(Dec. 1977) 
Age group Male Female Total 
60+ 16 (67%) 8 (33%) 24 (100%) 
51-60 19 (54%) 16 (46%) 35 (100%) 
41-50 @<76%) @<24%) 52 (100%) 
31-40 rs (59%) I 40 (41%) 98 (100%) 
26-30 17 (57%) 13 (43%) 30 (100%) 
137 
107l 21-25 e9 (62%) 18 (38%) 47 (100%) 
15-20 33 (48%) 36 (52%) 69 (100%) 
0-14 50 (45%) 60 (55%) 110 (100%) 
Total 257 (55%) 208 (45%) 465 (100%) 
From this table a proportion of 55 per cent men to 45 per cent women emerges 
for the total population studied. However among certain age groups, the gap is much 
wider. What is responsible for the shortage of women in some age groups? Seen in 
the general context of Taghan, the following explanations seem valid: 
U nderreporting of females, especially in their reproductive years, seems to be 
common. The author, although familiar on a personal level with many uylar, found 
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it difficult to extract population figures from women in their reproductive years. 
Fathers and brothers were extremely reluctant to discuss their females with non-
kinsmen. For the uninitiated, the matter is further complicated by the fact that 
women must never be called by their names, but as daughters of X or wife of Y or 
mother of Z, which in some cases leads to confusion. 
The age group 0-14 shows a majority of females over males. This would 
confirm my argument that before reaching puberty, girls are usually free to move 
from the spaces allocated to women to the male spaces, and outsiders are therefore 
aware of their existence, which might prevent underreporting. During the early years 
of marriage, women are usually not yet tired and exhausted from innumerable 
pregnancies and more resistant, although malnutrition and a smaller food intake than 
for men was observed - factors which might account for the slight majority of 
females in the age group 15-20. After that age, a decline of females is visible, 
reaching its peak in the age group 41-50, the end of their reproductive phase. In this 
age group the h~gh incidence of maternal death during childbirth is recorded, mainly 
due to generally poor health, weakness, malnutrition and often difficult foetal 
position. Discussions with doctors at the provincial hospital revealed that difficult 
foetal positions are common among the Ti.irkmen and could partly be attributed to 
constant squatting and poor physical posture while producing carpets from an early 
age on. I have no basis for accepting or rejecting this theory; medical research alone 
could produce objective results. I have, however observed, that women generally 
consume less nourishing food, in fact utterly deficient in protein and vitamins. 
Inadequate clothing15 especially in winter and among the poor, low standards of 
hygiene and sanitation, coupled with constant pregnancies during their reproductive 
years, lead to a generally lower life expectancy. Health care facilities are 
insufficient, if not totally lacking. Even where medical care is available, Ttirkmen 
men are reluctant to take their women to a doctor - in most cases a man - or to a 
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health worker. This reluctance must partly be seen in the context of the Ttirkrnen 
'philosophy' that women are replaceable. 
TYPES OF MARRIAGE ARRANGEMENTS AND BRIDE-PRICES INVOLVED 
Young men seeking a flrst bride, widowers in search of a second wife, married 
men looking for a polygynous union are all in competition for a limited number of 
girls and women. It is, however, a competition regulated by rules, conventions and 
traditions, in which the given marital status of a man more or less decides the type of 
women available to him. The following Table 7 summarizes all the possible types of 
unions involving a bride-price. Each type is governed by certain restrictions as to 
availability of women and standards of bride-prices applicable. 
Prices are generally higher for exogamous brides e.g. very distant kinsmen of 
Ttirkrnen origin. Prices for brides of other ethnic groups are invariably cheaper. It 
can be taken from the table that a flrst marriage of an unmarried boy to a virgin girl 
is the standard union. It also sets the standard for bride-price calculations. All other 
units of bride-prices are additions to this standard quotation. Traditionally the bride-
price was paid in livestock at the rate of un olag (ten large animals, e.g.camels, 
horses, cows). However it could be and today mostly is converted into smaller 
animals and cash according to the standard exchange rate of 
one horse (female)l6 = 5 sheep (always ewes=dogre qoyen) 
one female camel = 10 sheep 
one cow = 5 sheep 
three goats = 2 sheep 
Cash prices are then calculated according to the market price of sheep at a given 
time. 
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TABLE 7: TYPES OF MARRIAGES AND BRIDE-PRICES 
Bride-price 
Type of marriage 
Lineage endogamous union Lineage exogamous union 
among Ti.irkmen 
Both partners 60,000- 100,000 Afs. Upper limit approximately 
unmarried (buydok) US$1,500- 2,500 120,000 Afs. (US$3,000) 
Traditionally 10 big 10-20 sheep 10- 20 sheep 
animals (un olag) if muhajirin a tuil.:ik 17 if muhajirin a tuil.f.k 
Widower + virgin bride 200,000 Afs. (US$5,000) Upper limit 250,000 Afs. 
(yurgan saran) (US$6,250) 
Traditionally 20 big 10- 20 sheep if 10- 20 sheep if 
animals muhajirin a tuil.f.k muhajirin a tuil.:ik 
Married man - virgin Close agnates do not give Upper limit 300,000 Afs. 
bride (heley U.Sta) brides for this type of union (US$7,500) 
Traditionally 30 big 10 - 20 sheep if 
animals muhajirin a tuil.:ik 
Widower - widow Price depends on age of Variable, age of bride 
(biwa) widow. If young, price for is decisive factor 
virgin bride applies, if older 
40,000 - 70,000 Afs. 
(US$1,000- 1,750) 
NO ANIMALS NO ANIMALS 
Married man - widow Prices vary according to age Age of partners is decisive 
of partners involved and factor 
closeness of blood ties 
NO ANIMALS NO ANIMALS 
Note: these figures are merely guidelines. The father of the bride may reduce the bride-
price to show his goodwill and generosity, especially if the bride is a close relative 
(FBD, FZD). Reductions are also common and expected if the bride has a handicap. 
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The kind of animals selected and the amount of cash to be paid are usually 
negotiated and fixed to suit the individual need of the father of the bride. In any 
case, only the best and healthiest animals are accepted for bridal transactions. 
Let me now analyse the types of marriages introduced in Table 7. 
a) Both partners previously unmarried (unmarried boy- virgin bride) 
As mentioned above, this is the regular union for · a first marriage. In Taghan 86 
per cent of all first marriages fall into this category (Table 8). 
Virgin brides, as a rule, are only given to previously unmarried men. Only 
families desperate for money would consider giving their virgin daughters to a 
widower or polygynist. The 25 per cent of virgin brides recorded for second 
marriages were either from poor distant kin (tire, tayfa or xalq levels) or non-
Ttirkmen. 
The standard price for this union was traditionally ten large animals in the case 
of close agnatic kin. Today the larger part of the bride-price is usually paid in cash. 
No animal component is paid in the case of a widow. 
The Ttirkmen of Taghan always ask for a higher price if a girl is given to a 
distant relative e.g. different tire and tayfa. This higher price is justified by the 
higher risk factor involved in this type of union. That is, the intentions of the new 
affines cannot be effectively supervised, since they usually live in a different oba; 
and help cannot be easily granted if maltreatment of the new bride should occur. 
Should one of the partners be afflicted with a physical handicap, depending on 
the seriousness of the impediment, up to 50 per cent of the original price may be 
added if the default is with the man and a similar reduction may be granted if the girl 
is handicapped. 
First marriages 
Virgin bride Widow 
95 2 
86% 2% 
----
Second marriages 
Virgin bride Widow 
7 9 
25% 32% 
TABLE 8: TYPES OF MARRIAGE ARRANGEMENTS 
Y iirgan siiriin Heley ilstii Sunk olisha 
3 0 6 
3% 0 5% 
Yiirgan siiriin Heley ilstii Sunk olisha 
6 3 1 
21% 11 4% 
Levirat 
3 
3% 
Levirat 
0 
0% 
Other 
1 
1% 
Other 
(elopement) 
2 
7% 
...... 
v. 
00 
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The wedding tui (celebration) is most elaborate for a previously unmarried 
couple, but as a rule, all tuis involving a virgin bride are celebrated by a big, public 
feast regardless of the marital status of the husband. 
b) Widower- virgin bride (yiirgan siiriin I iiy sinan) 
This combination is highly unlikely, since widowers are supposed to bring bad 
luck. Only very distant kinsmen or complete strangers will consider giving a girl to 
a widower's house in which 'the quilt has already been opened'. All the yurgan suriin 
marriages recorded in Taghan for first and second marriages, were with very 
distantly related women, usually ones afflicted with some physical defect; or with 
U zbaks, who are cheaper than Tiirkmen brides. The price largely depends on the age 
of the widower; as a rule 'the older the man, the more expensive the bride'. The lure 
of a high bride-price is the only incentive for giving a virgin girl to a widower. 
U zbak virgin brides used to be available for 30,000-40,000 Afs. and a tuiiik of 
30 ser (kalan) rice and 15 ser (kalan) cooking oil and 10-15 sheep for meat. Uzbaks 
have, however, come to realize the economic and political gains to be made by such 
a union. They gave their daughters a solid grounding in carpet-weaving, a skill 
supposedly responsible for the high bride-prices of the Ti.irkmen brides. Today 
(1977) Uzbak brides also have become dearer. 60,000-70,000 Afs. and a tuiiik is the 
going price for first marriages. Should the prospective groom be a widower or 
polygynist, the price will also proportionately increase. 
Poor Ti.irkmen thus are in search of a new market for brides, and Central Asian 
Arabs seem to be the upcoming trend. 
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c) Married men- virgin bride (heley iista) 
This is the most expensive of all possible unions, traditionally set at 30 large 
animals. Close agnatic kinsmen are utterly reluctant to give their daughters to an 
already married man, since such households hardly ever are harmonious and quarrels 
and rivalries between the co-wives and their children extensive. In all three cases of 
heley usta unions recorded in Taghan, the brides were either of slave origin or from 
impoverished, very distant kinsmen who could not resist the high bride-price. 
d) Widower - widow I married man - widow 
As the figures in Table 8 reveal, these are the most common ways of securing a 
bride for the second time. 
Bride-prices vary according to the age of the partners involved. A young widow 
in her reproductive years usually fetches a bride-price equivalent to the payment 
made for a virgin bride. The age difference between the spouses is often 
considerable in this kind of union. In contrast to elaborate marriage celebrations for 
a virgin bride, widows are married off quickly and without much ceremonial. Bride 
and groom are not represented by a wakil during the nikah (Islamic wedding 
ceremony), but are present themselves. Several other features regarding the position 
of widows in a second marriage will be dealt with under the heading 'leviratic 
marriages'. 
e) Sunk olisha (lit. 'exchanqe of bones') =exchange of women 
This type of union is popular among the poorer segment of Tiirkmen society 
since it does NOT involve any bride-price; only a token amount is exchanged to 
validate the transaction. No lengthy negotiations are necessary. The weddings 
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usually take place at an interval of 2-3 days. This kind of partner exchange (e.g. two 
men exchange sisters) is surrounded by a great deal of folklore telling about unhappy 
developments and ensuing fighting. Of the nine sunk olisha marriages (Table 8) 
brought to my attention in Taghan, six must be considered unhappy and ridden with 
complex problems related to childbearing, opium addiction or to homosexual 
activities of the male partners. 
In case the two women intended for exchange are not of equal value (e.g. should 
one of them be lame or have other physical defects) a so-called ustii put (extra 
money, additional money) has to be paid by the deficient party to strike an even 
balance. 
Although sunk olisha marriages are the subject of many quarrels, they seem to 
be on the increase, for the simple reason of circumventing the lengthy period of 
accumulating bridal payments. This option, however, is limited to a certain number 
of people, since it pre-supposes the availability of two women that can be exchanged. 
t) Leviratic marriaqes 
If a woman becomes a widow, her agnatic kinsmen have the right to claim her 
and to remarry her for another bride-price. This proposition is especially attractive if 
the widow is still in her childbearing years. At the same time it creates a problem if 
she is left with small children. Her children, according to Islamic law, belong to her 
husband's agnates. In case a widow is left with small children, she usually chooses 
to stay with her affines, who are the rightful owners and claimants of her progeny, in 
order not to loose her children. Often, in such cases, her agnates give up their right 
to claim her back; but should she still be at the prime of her fertile period, brothers 
often forget the well-being of their sister and her children, tempted by the lure of 
another bride-price, especially if they are hard pressed for money. Competition for 
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young widows is extremely keen, given the fact that virgin brides of close agnates 
are hardly available to widowers. 
Once a widow has reached the end of her reproductive cycle, her agnates are 
less keen to sell her again, since the price would considerably decrease with the 
vanishing of her fertility. In such a case she may either stay with the agnates of her 
deceased husband or return to her agnatic lineage, where her contribution to the 
labour-pool is always welcome. To prevent the separation of a mother from her 
children, the agnates of her deceased husband might consider a leviratic marriage. In 
order to please the agnates of the widow, they usually pay an extra sum of cash to 
make up for the loss of a second bride-price which could have been collected by her 
kinsmen. In some cases this iistii pul (extra money, additional money) or often also 
called otirma pul (the making her stay money) may reach the proportion of the bride-
price a widow might have fetched if remarried. The actual amount of iistii pul 
depends on the parties involved and is, as a rule, negotiable. 
Usually the widow is given to an unmarried agnate of her deceased husband, 
regardless of his age; and her children from the first marriage automatically become 
part of the new household. In very rare instances (1 only know of two instances) 
where the agnates of the deceased husband might find it difficult to raise and care for 
the children, they might give up their claim and leave the children with their mother. 
Such arrangements appear to be made, if the close agnates are impoverished and 
work as wage labourers and shepherds, and hence have no stable family conditions to 
care for a child. 
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g) Elopement (qiz qactirma) 
In case a boy and a girl know each other, but their uy or bir ata are against a 
union, they might try to elope: romantic inclinations are stronger than concern for 
lineage harmony and stability. 
The obas of Taghan, being surrounded by endless desert-steppes and guarded by 
a pack of fierce watch-dogs, present a difficult environment for a successful 
elopement attempt. It usually requires the connivance of some allies. 
Elopement is considered a last resort, since this kind of union is regarded as 
highly improper and as bringing 'shame' upon the family, bir ata and even tire 
involved. It must be remembered here that 'shame' is not a concept involving the two 
individuals committing a shameful act, but attaches to the group of which these 
individuals form part. Elopement usually leads to severe disputes between the bir 
atas concerned. In case of an elopement, relations between a daughter and her 
agnates are usually completely severed; that is, the daughter forfeits help from her 
lineage in case of difficulty. I know, however, of cases, where after many years of 
hostility, amicable relations between the two parties were finally restored. Should 
the couple be apprehended in the act of running away, traditional fathers are 
supposed to kill both partners for shaming the name of their lineage and for creating 
disharmony. Here again I would like to recall that a marriage is not a union between 
two people, but between two groups. 
Traditionally an eloping couple would seek refuge in the compound of a reputed 
aqsaqal and ask for help. It was then up to the aqsaqal to mediate between the 
parties concerned and to determine a suitable bride-price. With the influence and 
power of aqsaqals gradually waning, refuge is now often sought at the qazi's 
(religious judge) residence, who against a proper 'fee' often as much as 20,000 Afs. 
(US$500) will marry the couple. 
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Elopement, as with marriage to women from other ethnic groups, is mostly 
found at the extreme ends of the social ladder; but it tends to occur mostly amongst 
the poorer stratum, since girls of the richest segment are intimidated by their fathers 
and closely guarded by elderly women. Physically it is also much harder to escape 
the seclusion of a walled compound. 
I only know of one case of elopement among the richer segment. It was a rather 
unusual case, since both the boy and the girl were attending school in Kabul, thus 
becoming familiar with urban life. They had no desire to return to village life in the 
steppes of Turkistan, where there was no use and scope for their sophisticated 
education. When they got word that the parents of the girl wanted to take her out of 
school to marry her to a rich second cousin, they got secretly married in Kabul. 
Having thus spoiled a business marriage of convenience, the girl was ostracized from 
her family and ill-feelings still prevail between the bir atas of the couple. Needless 
to say that in case of elopement, neither a tui nor any marriage exchanges of gifts 
take place. Although elopement is outwardly frowned upon by most informants as 
creating disharmony and instability between two groups, secretly they admire the 
courage of the couple and consider it a minor act of heroism. 
Elopement is also used to secure a young widow in case the agnates of her 
deceased husband are unwilling to grant permission for remarriage. The two cases of 
elopement mentioned in Table 8 for second marriages fall into this category. 
FROM QIZ TO KELIN: THE DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF A MARRIAGE 
We have so far looked at the criteria for selecting a bride, and at the types of 
unions extant in Taghan. I shall now analyse the steps necessary to initiate and 
maintain a union. 
165 
All initiatives for a marriage have to come from the party of the prospective 
groom. Usually neither the groom nor the bride-to-be is consulted, although the 
young man might exercise some influence and might make his wishes known by way 
of his mother, with whom he usually has close and affectionate relationship. The 
relationship with his father, on the contrary, has all the attributes of a master -
servant bond. It would be unthinkable for a young man to go against the wish or 
decision of his father or other close senior agnates. As far as the bride is concerned, 
she has no say whatsoever. Women generally are believed to have inferior mental 
capacities, exercise poor judgement, show disinterest in lineage matters and therefore 
be incapable of making such profound decisions as choosing future allies. 
Regardless whether it is an endogamous or exogamous union, the initial 
negotiations are never directly initiated by the two parties concerned but by a go-
between. In most cases, this is a senior male of the oba, or a group of informal 
leaders. The larger the group and the more impressive its composition, the higher 
the prestige and esteem of the father of the groom. This status and prestige aspect is 
especially important in the case of an exogamous union, where both parties are not at 
all or only remotely known to each other. Exogamous marriage partners and their 
relatives need close scrutiny and investigation, since such an alliance harbours many 
risk factors. Not only the prospective bride, but also her bir ata and in cases of rich 
merchants, her whole tire come under close scrutiny. Cases of deceit are not 
uncommon and usually entail not only a loss of face, but also a display of the 
groom's lineage's incapacity and misjudgement. Only few cases are brought to the 
notice of the Afghan Government authorities for fear of being ridiculed. The duped 
bir ata usually asks for a refund of the bride-price and returns the bride. 
The ensuing description of the various stages in initiating a marriage are for 
families of median wealth and for an exogamous bride. Richer segments use their 
status to display their wealth by performing more rituals and exchanges of goods and 
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foods, especially if during the marriage negotiations period religious holidays such 
as Id-al-Fitr should occur. Among close agnates, ceremonies are usually simplified, 
since both parties know each other well; thus dwelling on ceremony is not necessary. 
Many of the items exchanged then only have token character. The same simplified 
pattern is followed in the case of poorer Ttirkmen unions. 
The procedures mentioned here are for a virgin bride with a previously 
unmarried man. As described in the previous section, no celebrations take place if a 
marriage between a widow and a widower takes place. In case of a cousin marriage, 
all parties concerned are aware of the physical condition, character and background 
of bride and groom. As a matter of fact, the marriage partners might know each 
other from childhood, especially if they grew up in the same or adjacent obas. 
If the bride is from a distantly related kin group or from another ethnic group, a 
senior woman from among the prospective groom's agnates will visit the family of 
the bride-to-be under some sort of pretext. The family, however, is well aware of the 
real motives of the visit. Should the visited party be interested in establishing an 
union, the girl will be presented in her most positive manner and possible physical 
deficiencies concealed.l8 Recall that desirable qualities of a prospective bride are a 
good character, plumpness (often equated with good health and physical strength) 
and proven skills in carpet-making. 
After her visit, the woman reports to the groom's father and to other senior 
males and females of the bir ata. Should her report be favourable, a party of wealthy 
senior men of status is then dispatched to the girl's father to ask officially for her 
hand in marriage. This step is called qudalik (marriage proposal). Although the 
acquisition of a bride is usually referred to as qiz satmak (sell a girl) or kelin olmak 
(buy a bride) by the respective parties, on the occasion of the qudalik, only 
euphemisms, such as 'Yo/ tiiziilamana geldik' (we came to renew the way) if kin ties 
already exist or 'Qarndash bolmana geldik' (we came to establish kin ties). These 
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expressions clearly illustrate that renewal of kin ties and establishment of an affinal 
relationship go beyond the union of two people (bride and groom). It is a lineage 
affair. On this occasion neither the name of the bride nor the name of the groom is 
mentioned. Since sons and daughters are traditionally married off in order of 
seniority, all parties concerned are familiar with the persons in question. A proposal 
may be accepted right away, or reflection-time may be asked for by the bride's father 
to discuss the matter with fellow kinsmen. Affines of bride and groom falling into 
the category of quda are usually consulted in such matters (cf. Diagram 2). This is 
especially the case, if the proposed union is endogamous. 
I I I I I I 
0 = 6 6 = 0 6=0 
L>r 
6=0 6= 0 0=6 
QUOA ~ KELINAKii GIOU DAYZA DAI QUDA QUDA 
I I I 
0 6 6=0 .... . 62 = 0 61 = 0 0 6 
QUDA QUDA GIOU EGO KELIN KELINAKA QUDA QUDA 
I 
I I 
6 =0 6=0 6 =0 6=0 6 =0 6 =0 
KELIN GIOU KELIN GIOU KELIN GIOU 
For a female ego the terminology remains the same, only the term 'KELINAKA' is replaced by 'YINGA'. 
DIAGRAM 2: ERSARI KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY RELATING TO AFFINES OF CO-SANGUINEAL 
ORIGIN 
If the girl's family is not at all interested, an exceedingly high brideprice will be 
asked for, a sum that is undoubtedly beyond the means of the inquiring party. Such a 
demand will usually set an end to any further steps and negotiations. It is not 
uncommon for a father of a prospective groom to make several trials until his 
proposal is finally accepted by some party.19 Once a proposal is accepted, the 
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brideprice is stated according to the norms and conventions mentioned above; 
acceptance of the conditions results in the patia (engagement). The length of the 
engagement-period entirely depends on the wealth of the bridegroom's uy and bir 
ata, that is on their ability to raise the requested bride-price in a shorter or longer 
period. Among the bays who can afford to pay the whole amount and all animals 
within a few days, the engagement-period usually lasts one month, leaving both 
parties enough time to prepare for the wedding. 
The family of the groom is responsible for the preparation of an aq uy (white 
tent), whereas the bride is supposed to provide the decorations and furnishings for it, 
along with her dowry. The choice of an appropriate trousseau is a delicate matter 
and rests in the hands of the senior women of her bir ata. They decide how many 
pieces of jewellery, felts, chests, salt bags and other kinds of antique or new storage 
bags (cuval, xurjin), clothing and household items are to be included in her 
trousseau. The list of items in the appendix only contains a bare minimum of 
objects. Among the richer segment, this will be augmented by large amounts of 
cuvals, torbas and antique jewellery. Too small a trousseau will put the bride's 
household into the category of stingy people and jeopardize good relations from the 
start. The women in charge of the selection often sit together for many days, sorting 
out the objects (see Plate 15) and requesting the men to bring additional items from 
the bazlir, to which women have no access. Women play the decisive role in this 
aspect of forming an alliance. The right choice, the right amount and herewith 
indirectly hannony and peace rest in their hands - a facet quite contrary to their 
otherwise repressed status and existence. The decisions made by the women in the 
'private' domain thus heavily influence events taking place in the 'public' domain. 
Among the rich a large and ostentatious trousseau is of prime importance in their 
status games. 
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The bride can only be fetched when the whole bride-price agreed upon has been 
paid in full. Among the poorer Ti.irkmen, it is customary to pay in instalments thus 
extending payment over a period of several months or years depending on the 
assistance the father of the groom is able to muster from his kinsmen. The delivery 
of the bridal payment is done by a group of senior males. They take a saddle-bag 
(xurjin), one side of which is filled with candies (or sugar-candy) and bread and the 
other side contains the cash portion neatly wrapped up in a red kerchief. No mention 
whatsoever is made of the actual purpose of the visit. The guests are feasted with 
palau and each of them receives a don (men's coat) from the bridal household. 
Before they leave, the saddle-bag is returned to the groom's party filled with sweets 
and bread. At that stage the leader of the groom's party fixes a date with the senior 
representatives of the bride's family to select the animals agreed upon as part of the 
bride-price. Only the healthiest and fattest female animals may be given: When 
everybody is ready for departure, a short prayer (du'a-i-xair) is said to wish the 
groom's party a safe journey home. The two parties are now united by kin ties, for 
the engagement is binding and cannot be dismissed easily. 
The next step in the marriage development is the quda dungur, a visit of the 
senior women of the groom's household to their counterparts in the girl's household. 
This visit is coupled with an elaborate exchange of gifts. On this occasion the 
members of the groom's family are visiting their new in-laws for the first time. All 
previous transactions were carried out by go-betweens. Usually all the wives of the 
groom's father, his sisters, aunts and also neighbours are selected for this visit, the 
function of which is to officially establish or renew kinship ties as the case may be. 
· In the case of an endogamous union, less importance is attached to this step, since 
the parties are already related and know each other well. I was able to witness the 
preparations for a quda dungur of an exogamous union. Material for 25 dresses, 20 
don, several dozen kerchiefs, one big amulet (tumar), four silver rings (yuzuk), 40 
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silver coins (keran), the trappings, trimmings and decorations of a female headdress 
consisting of caur and esge and innumerable silver ornaments ( capros; see Plate 18 ) 
were prepared. Since it was a very rich and prestigious household, the usual camel-
train of kajabas was replaced by a Russian lorry decorated with dozens of yards of 
Russian and Indian dress materials and Japanese brocades. The women and children 
all dressed up in layers upon layers of clothing and adorned with all their jewels, sat 
at the back of the lorry carrying two sacak (white tablecloths), each of them 
containing the cooked meat of a sheep, cut into 12 pieces and arranged in a certain 
ceremonial order. The bottom of the sacak (wrapped to a bundle) consisted of 
several layers of katlama (sweet, greasy bread) and various kinds of sweets. On top 
of this were arranged the 12 pieces of cooked meat topped with the tailfat (etyog) of 
the sheep. The second bundle had the same content with the exception that the base 
consisted of yoglepetir (a kind of greasy bread) instead of katlama. An expensive 
Japanese radio cum taperecorder with a selection of taped TUrkmen music-cassettes 
was to provide entertainment during the journey and at the bride's house. 
This visit marks the first get-together of the core of the new alliance: that is, the 
parents of the prospective bride and groom. It is the symbolic beginning of a new 
alliance or the renewal of already existing ties. 
At the home of the bride, the visitors are fed with seven kinds of dishes. Men 
and women are allocated to separate spaces. Many more exchanges of bread, meat, 
sweets, kerchief and don may take place after the quda dungur and before the bride 
is fmally brought to the groom's oba. The extent and nature of these exchanges 
depend on the economic situation of the groom's uy. The richer the uy the more 
numeruos and elaborate the exchanges. Among the poor usually only a token 
exchange of bread takes place. Should the engagement-period include religious 
festivals, special gift exchanges are expected. Although legislation came into effect 
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prohibiting lavish exchanges that usually leave the groom's domestic unit 
impoverished or in debt, it is not strictly enforced. 
When the brideprice is fully paid, the father of the bride visits the groom's 
family and is offered a meal of palau. It must be understood that among poorer 
people, considerable time might elapse between engagement and the last instalment 
of the bridal payment. I know of cases where the raising of the bride-price took 
more than five years. During the meal, the father of the groom will ask: 'olishiik 
soxadinge qacan berjiik'(when are you giving the time to pick up the bride?) or 
simply 'soxadinqe ber' (please give me the time). 
When selecting an appropriate date an auspicious day has to be chosen. 
According to the Tiirkmen of Taghan, all days containing the numbers four or seven 
are the most lucky ones for a harmonious, fertile union. Weddings do not take place 
during the second and eleventh months (safar oy and bosh oy) of the Islamic 
calendar. Not because it would be unlucky, but simply because of inconvenience, 
weddings do not take place during Ramazan (9th month of the Islamic calendar), the 
month of fasting. According to Tiirkmen folklore, people should never travel north 
on Fridays. Fridays, therefore are inauspicious for a bridal journey to her new home. 
Ten days before the announced wedding date, the toqus ceremony takes place. The 
relatives of the new bride must bring a set of nine items (toqus = nine) consisting of 
caur, esge,ZO finger-ring, a large piece of jewellery, a female dress (koyniik), a quilt, 
a don, a tentbag and an animal. The kind of animal selected depends again on the 
economic situation of the groom's family. In richer uys, normally a horse or camel-is 
given; whereas the poorer uys limit themselves to a sheep, a goat or a chicken. In 
exchange for these items, the yingii (bridal companion, attendant), normally the wife 
of the groom's father's brother (cf. Diagrams 2 and 3), brings along a silk don for 
each brother of the groom. The night before the bride is fetched, she officially bids 
farewell to her agnates at a celebration called qiz majlis (gathering of girls of 
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DIAGRAM 3: ERSARI AFFINAL KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY 
marriageable age). This is the last time she will be among them as qiz, for after the 
wedding ceremony she advances into a new phase of her life-cycle and becomes a 
kelin (bride, daughter-in-law). In case of a muhajirin family, the food for the qiz 
majlis is provided by the groom's family in the form of a tui/tk which forms part of 
the bride-price. In watani families the father of the bride pays for the expenses of 
food and gifts. The next morning the actual fetching of the bride takes place, ritual 
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details of which I will present in the next section. Festivities are now focussed on 
the house of the groom. 
The change of status of the bride is visible from the new headdress (bogmak == 
Tlirkmen language; xasaba == Dari) which will be placed onto her head the morning 
after the wedding ceremony, by the senior woman of the groom's bir ata in a 
ceremony called bos tui (hat feast) (for details see Stucki 1978a). The shape and 
ornaments of the bogmak vary from one tayfa to another. During the first two 
months of her married life, the kelin wears a cuba (see Plate 20) a kind of red cloth 
attached to her headdress to cover her face completely. In Taghan newly married 
women also wear a siirmenjii (see Plate 19) - a beaded veil which can be drawn 
whenever a man of the non-mahram category is to be avoided. The period following 
the wedding is a time when she must avoid all agnates senior to the groom. In 
determining the degree of avoidance, seniors have always precedence over juniors 
and males over females. A voidance rules are imposed on both bride and groom, but 
are obviously more stringent for the bride, since she is the one to move to a new 
surrounding demanding this special kind of behaviour. Usually at the beginning she 
also has to live in close contact with her parents-in-law, who are the ones to be 
avoided, since most probably at that stage, her husband would not yet have 
established an independent household. 
The period after the wedding is the most difficult and trying one for the new 
bride. After that she goes through various stages of her life-cycle, all of them 
outwardly visible from her headgear (for details cf. Liechti-Stucki 1990). During the 
first two months of her married life, the kelin has to cover her entire face with the 
cuba should her father-in-law be near. This total coverage calls for a constant 
companion to guide her, a task which is usually performed by a younger sister of her 
husband. The new bride usually develops an affectionate relationship with her 
husband's junior female agnates falling into the category of balduz (cf. Diagram 3 of 
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kinship terminology). The first contact a bride makes with her female affines is on 
the wedding day, when she is guided and chaperoned by a woman who falls into the 
category of yingii (cf. kinship terminology, Diagrams 2 and 4). During the avoidance 
period after her wedding day she will mainly be in touch with girls of her husband's 
uy, to whom she is in the relationship of yinga. As a rule she never gets as close to 
the wives (elti) of her husbands's older brothers. 
During the first month of her marriage, traditionally the bride also has to cover 
her face from her husband should a senior male or female be present, and similarly 
also from all members, male and female, senior to her husband. In Taghan this latter 
rule has become quite obsolete, whereas the acculturated Ttirkmen are still strictly 
adhering to it. In Taghan most brides are nowadays living in a tam or yurt with their 
husband where they can unveil and relax if no senior is present. For a young bride 
this is a very lonely time in an unfamiliar environment. To ease the loneliness and 
difficulties, junior female members regularly visit the bride and help her to adjust to 
her new environment. It is especially hard and trying in the case of exogamous 
marriages involving a member of another ethnic group not familiar with Ttirkrnen 
customs. After the initial two months the cuba is discarded21 and restrictions 
gradually eased. In the presence of seniors, especially her father-in-law, the kelin 
will now practice burunmak (burun=nose); that is, she lifts the cloth around her neck 
up to her nose and gathers the headcloth together on the sides to hide her face from 
the view of the person she is supposed to avoid. 
A new step of her life-cycle is reached when her first child is born. She then 
gives up burunmiik and practices yasmak, that is the lifting up of her neckcloth up to 
her chin. A modem form of this form of avoidance consists of covering one's mouth 
with one hand (cf. Plate 16). Yasmak not only entails covering one's chin and mouth, 
but also keeping silent in front of the person one tries to avoid. It is, however, a one-
sided affair. The persons to be avoided are free to talk to the kelin or to give her 
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orders. Should an answer be required, she will simply nod or use a junior sister of 
her husband as a spokeswoman. With ascending status in her life cycle, avoidance is 
gradually relaxed and only a token yasmak is practiced. The relaxation of avoidance 
rules is usually initiated by the wives of a husband's older brothers and older sisters, 
usually followed by older brothers. Gradually the relationship with a bride's mother-
in-law and father-in-law also becomes somewhat more relaxed, although among the 
acculturated Tiirkmen, this is the most persisting avoidance. Avoidance rules may 
be discarded earlier if the union is between close relatives; and may not take place at 
all, it the bride is from a different division or from another ethnic group. 
Among the Tiirkmen of Taghan, these periods of avoidance have been 
abbreviated to make use of the labour potential of the bride- e.g., carpet-making as 
soon as possible. Thus approxiamately ten days after the wedding ceremony, the 
fatherin-law invites the kelin and presents her with material for a dress to 'open her 
face' (yuzocterma). This is the first time her father-in-law sees her face. The older 
brothers of the groom and other close agnates follow the example of the father-in-
law and invite the bride, presenting her with a piece of cloth from which, in tum, she 
will give 500-1,000 Afs. (depending on the quality and value of the material). This 
ceremonial exchange officially ends the period of avoidance. 
The richer bays of tarshangu, on the other hand, are adhering to traditional 
customs, thereby stressing their ability to do without the labour-contribution of the 
new bride. 
Six months after her wedding, the bride for the first time visits her native 
household. The visit is usually called kaitarma or dorgun donma. She stays 10-15 
days, during which she visits all her kinsmen in her native oba. Generally the girls 
are more relaxed when they return as brides, since the time before engagement and 
marriage is a time of hard work for them. At the end of the visiting period, her 
mother will slaughter two sheep, prepare katlama (kind of bread) and wrap them in a 
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socik (tablecloth) in the same way as the bundle prepared for the quda dungur. A 
party of close female kin of the bride then accompany her back to her affines to 
renew ties with them. They usually stay overnight; the new affines feast them with 
palau and sorwa and present them with a set of prescribed gifts. It is important that 
the gift is slightly more valuable than the one presented to the mother-in-law by the 
bride's agnates. These exchanges must be carefully recorded, since future 
exchanges, which will take place on some religious holidays, must always be 
slightly larger than the goods received. It is quite obvious that these kinship-
reaffirming exchanges between agnates and affines leave a lot of leeway for 
ostentatious displays of wealth and prestige. 
After this visit, the bride's father as a rule sends a messenger to the groom's 
house inviting him for a meal. Up to this date, the bridegroom has been avoiding 
(kacmak=lit. running away, escaping) the bride's senior agnates, especially her father 
-who now presents his son-in-law with an aladon and asks him not 'to run away' any 
longer. The groom, if queried, usually explains his 'running away' as an expression 
of 'sarm' (modesty, bashfulness, shame). Before the father-in-law takes the initial 
step towards ending the avoidance-period, it is unthinkable for father-in-law and 
groom to be in the same room, or to come near each other at a distance that would 
require exchange of greetings. Once the father-in-law has given up avoidance, all 
other senior males follow his example. In case of a frrst cousin marriage, the father 
of the bride will do away with avoidance formalities within 10-20 days after the 
wedding. He would, however, be reluctant to propose such intimate social 
interaction with a total stranger. 
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THE WEDDING RITUAL 
Here I will discuss only those ritual aspects of a wedding ceremony that are of 
importance in strengthening existing kin ties or in establishing new alliances. The 
selection of marriage partners, preparations and exchanges leading to engagement, 
and the importance of the bride-price have already been analyzed in the previous 
section. 
The wedding ceremony, like the sunniit-tui, is a public affair used to renew and 
strengthen existing ties and to establish new relationships. This purpose is rendered 
explicit in the formulae used when asking for a girl in marriage, Proposals between 
strangers are initiated with 'qarnda.S bolmana geldik' (lit. we came to establish 
kinship ties). A proposal among kinsmen would be 'yo/ tiiziilamana geldik' (we came 
to renew the path). Here the emphasis is on renewal and strengthening of already 
existing ties, in most cases blood ties. The wedding procedures vary depending on 
whether the bride stems from the same lineage or from another section. The closer 
the already established kinship ties, the simpler the wedding ceremony. Bride-prices 
generally become higher with greater kinship distance. This discrepancy in the price 
is explained by the Tiirkmen in the following terms: 'We have to pay for the risk 
factor when securing an alliance with another section\ A clear difference is also 
visible in ritual performances. If the partners are from different sections, that is, no 
blood relationship exists, the preventive and pre-Islamic aspects are usually 
numerous and meticulously adhered to. 
The final choice of a wedding date is preceded by lengthy exchanges of food 
and goods, especially among the wealthy and economically strong sector, where this 
may take the form of ostentatious displays of wealth and conspicuous consumption 
of ceremonial foods. 
On the wedding day proper, the household of the groom dispatches a group of 
senior women and men to fetch the bride. The bridegroom is not part of this group 
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upon arrival at the bride's house, they are feasted with palau (rice dish with meat). 
The bride, in her best finery, is hidden and guarded by close agnatic kin. During the 
meal, no mention of the bride is made and an air of feasting and joking prevails. 
After the meal, the senior male of the bride-fetching party will say to the bride's 
father: 'ber koynek gufem ber ' (give me a dress and my meat). The father of the 
bride then replies: 'sii.nkem ol' (take my bones). This symbolic reference to the bride 
and the relationship her wedding initiates is significant. For her own uy she is 
'bones', a substance that does not perish. For her husband's lineage, however, she is 
'meat, flesh', a perishable substance. For the lineage of her husband it is a temporary 
relationship, for 'meat' is perishable, and exchangeable - replaceable, to refer to my 
previous argument. Upon her death, when she has fulfilled her obligation to produce 
sons for her husbands uy, her 'bones' are returned to her biological lineage, for whom 
she is permanent and not replaceable. A marriage creates a social alliance and not a 
political relationship between the parties concerned, since as a rule, it only involves 
shallow lineages, that is lineages whose household heads are united by a common 
father and grandfather. If the bride is given to a tribal section not related by blood, 
relations between the sections usually cease at her death, if no other marriage 
exchanges took place to reinforce the alliance. 
Once the request to have the bride fetched has been made, the father and other 
close agnatic kinsmen will go to the room or yurt where the bride is guarded22 by her 
friends and a group of senior women. A mock fight ensues between the intruding 
men and the women guardians of the bride. Finally the father chases his daughter 
out of her secluded place, by lightly striking her with the twig of a fruit tree, 
commonly a mulberry tree-twig.23 The bride is now placed on a piece of felt 
together with her yingii (bridal guardian, usually the bride's older brother's wife) and 
an old woman who has borne many healthy sons. 
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At this moment the cap of a healthy boy and the coat of the old woman are 
thrown onto the bride. The three females are then covered with a pardah, tuti, a 
kind of ritual curtain, behind which the bride will be living in her parents-in-law's 
tent or room. After the birth of her first child, this curtain will then be used to cover 
the cradle (besik, sallanjiik). It is clear from the context that all these activities are 
supposed to induce the fertility of the young bride. The bride and the yingii are then 
carried together in the felt to the bridal camel and helped into the kajaba24 by a 
group of senior agnates (male and female) who have a proven record of fertility. 
During the journey to the groom's compound, the yingii is responsible for protecting 
the bride. U susally the bridal cortege, consisting of a number of camels, horses and 
donkeys (nowadays sometimes also lorries), is escorted by close agnates riding on 
horseback on either side of the bridal camel to prevent barren women from crossing 
in front of the kajaba and thereby passing their infertility on to the bride. Before the 
kajaba leaves the bridal household a short du'a (blessing)25 is recited by a senior 
kinsman. This is the only act having any relation to Islam. Mullahs are usually kept 
away from happy celebrations, since they might not approve of games, gambling, 
music and dancing which usually form part of the entertainment. Before the bridal 
cortege leaves for the home of the groom, her paternal uncle locks two or three 
senior women of the bridegroom's party into a yurt or tam. They have to be 
ransomed by the father of the bridegroom, usually by paying a certain sum of money 
(kapituti). In exchange for this payment, the uncle will present the bride with a 
wooden chest and a dresslength of material. The trousseau of the bride is then 
loaded onto several camels (nowadays it may also be a lorry) for everyone to admire 
and scrutinize. The larger the number of items, the higher the prestige of the bride's 
natal ii.y. This public scrutiny of the trousseau is a vital part of the wedding 
ceremony, for it is supposed to demonstrate the generosity of the bride's ii.y towards 
its new allies. 
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At the time the bridal cortege, consisting of many animals and people, leaves the 
compound, the father or brother of the bride exercises his right (xaq) to throw a clod 
of soil (kiisiik) at the family of the bride. The ritual significance of this is not clear, 
but it might well be a mock fight to test the reliability of one's new allies. I was told 
that this custom used to provoke real fights between the two parties, fights that left 
wounded men on both sides, especially if stones were used. People killed in this 
manner did not have to be avenged by bloodfeuding. 
Upon arrival at the groom's compound, the bride is again led to a secluded 
place, guarded by the yingii and senior women of the groom's uy and is not seen by 
any guests. 
In the evening, the official Islamic wedding ceremony (nikah) takes place, in the 
presence of four aqsaqals, the kariadiir (village leader) and a mullah. The bride is 
represented by a wakil, who is to do the talking on her behalf. She sits behind a tuti 
together with the yingii. Islamic prescriptions require that bride and groom be 
consulted about their willingness to marry a certain person. However, I was 
informed by many brides that these consultations often do not take place, and I know 
of instances where this was true. It is the custom that during the nikah the yingii will 
prick the bride with needles or pinch her to make sure that she will consent. The 
actual nikah ceremony is a low key affair, with no guests present - quite analogous 
to the actual act of circumcision. While the nikah ceremony is taking place, the 
guests are feasted and entertained. The yingii has to be on guard, during the nikah, to 
ensure that nobody can get near the bride to perform sorcery or black magic to render 
her infertile.26 Strangers are excluded from the ceremony, since they are not known, 
and their presence constitutes a risk factor. Their intentions are not clear, for who 
knows whether they were sent by an enemy or a barren woman to perform black 
magic secretly. 
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In the meantime senior women of proven fertility have prepared the bridal litter. 
It is surrounded by an alajayii.p and pieces of garlic, onion, peppper and isfand (wild 
rue) have been placed under the pillows and blankets to protect the place from evil 
spirits. 
The bridegroom is dressed in tight boots and a turban cloth is wrapped around 
his loins. The bride is then to take off his boots and unwrap the turban cloth, 
activities fostering body contact and gradually leading to the consummation of the 
marriage. Before the bride tackles these obstacles, the groom symbolically induces 
her fertility by showering her with sugared almonds (kant sepior). Until quite 
recently the yingii had to witness the consummation and examine the piece of cloth 
for the required bloodstains testifying that the bride was a virgin. 27 
An important aspect of the wedding ceremony is the official display of the 
bride's trousseau. Household goods, jewellery, clothing and other items are closely 
scrutinized by the groom's relatives. Apparently a balanced selection has to include 
goods of certain categories. Too small a selection brings shame upon the bride's ii.y 
and lineage. 28 
On the day after the wedding ceremony, the bo! tui takes place among the close 
female kin of the bridegroom. Men are usually excluded. The bride is now wearing 
the big decorative, ceremonial hat, the outward sign of her change of status. She is 
now a married woman. This hat is also symbolically showing her affiliation with the 
ii.y of her husband, for size, colour and shape of those hats vary from one lineage to 
another.29 
After the bo! tui the bride takes on her duties which at the beginning primarily 
consist in lighting the hearth in her mother-in-law's yurt or tam. This act also shows 
that she is now part of her husband's ocek. For up to one month after the wedding 
she has to avoid certain categories of in-laws, notably her father-in-law and the older 
brothers of her husband. These practices have been analyzed in the previous section. 
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It is also her duty to visit all the households of her new oba to ceremonially greet all 
her new relatives. Only after each family has invited her for a meal and given her a 
token sum of money is she finally accepted as a full member of her husband's uy. 
Six months after her wedding, the bride pays a visit to her father's household. This 
first visit is accompanied by further visits and countervisits of both parties 
concerned, and by exchanges of clothing, sweets, bread and meat to acknowledge 
and strengthen the newly established relationship. On this occasion, avoidance 
taboos between bridegroom and father-in-law are alleviated by ceremonially 
exchanging a sheep and an aladon. This ritual exchange always has to be initiated 
by the senior person. 
This rather simplified description of the ritual aspects of the Tlirkmen wedding 
ceremony shows certain similarities with the circumcision tui in that it also takes 
place at three distinct levels: 
The actual Islamic marriage ceremony (nikah) is of secondary importance and 
only attended by a circle of insiders. 
Another level is devoted to ritual surrounding the main figures, in this case the 
bride and groom, and to ceremonial exchanges accompanying the various stages 
of the ceremony. Bride and groom do not actively participate in the festivities; 
the bride is kept in virtual seclusion. She emerges as the ritually more important 
character needing protection from evil influences set to destroy her fertility. In 
the spaces surrounding the bride, visitors are carefully scrutinized by senior 
women and an atmosphere of suspicion prevails. The groom, on the other hand, 
is free to mix with the guests. He has to face up to all kinds of tricks and 
mockery with strong sexual overtones. 
The most important component, as on the occasion of the circumcision tui, is the 
feasting, the entertainment of guests that have come to witness the renewal or 
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establishment of kinship ties. The important fact is not that two individuals get 
married, but the changes that this union brings about for the two lineages 
concerned. I would like to recall in this context that the elaborateness of the 
festivity and the exchanges depend on whether blood ties exist between the 
parties concerned or not. If the bride is a FBD, close blood ties already exist, 
that is, no risk factors need to be considered and celebrations can be kept 
simple. 
The major concern of bride and groom is the reproduction of uy and 
consequently lineage. In the case of the groom, it is a matter of social and economic 
importance, whereas for the bride, biological reproduction is stressed. 
Changes in the life cycle of bride and groom simultaneously mark important 
changes for the domestic groups of their respective lineages. In both sunniit-tui and 
wedding, the role of the community is important and ritualized. 
DISSOLUTION OF A MARRIAGE 
'Ikki niirsa yamon, wa heley guibermiik yamon wa yiir satmak yamon' (two 
things are despicable: to dismiss one's wife and to sell one's land). 
This proverb clearly illustrates the Ttirkmen attitude towards divorce. Although 
allowed by Islam (cf. Qur'an II: 226ff.), it is not condoned by Ttirkmen customs. 
This does not, of couse, mean that there are no shaky and unhappy marriages among 
the TUrkmen of Taghan. Couples usually stay together not to 'shame' their bir ata 
and tire. 
The granting of a divorce, like the arranging of a marriage, is not so much a 
matter of the two partners concerned, but of their lineages, which are trying to 
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safeguard stability and harmony and suppress disruptive forces. Happiness of a 
couple has not much room in this game. 
In case a divorce is unavoidable, it is discussed by the tribal elders, who usually 
first try to mediate between the disputing parties. Only in case of utter failure will 
the case be brought before the qazi, in which case the matter becomes public and 
more shameful. 
According to information received from the Qazi of Mingajik, four divorces 
took place during the last four years, two involving U zbaks and two with Ti.irkmen 
couples. In the first Ti.irkmen case, the reason for the dissolution was severe 
maltreatment of a wife and not caring for the family. In the second case, adultery on 
the part of the wife (who could not get any sexual satisfaction from her husband, who 
kept a homosexual dancing boy) was given as the cause. Normally in case of 
adultery, the duped husband would try to kill his wife and her lover. In this 
particular case, he did not make use of his 'customary right', since police 
investigations would have brought to light his own illicit relationship. 
Divorces usually lead to estrangement, if not hostility, between the two parties -
a very serious matter, if close agnates are involved. In case of a close agnatic 
marriage, both partners usually try harder to come to terms, since dissolution of an 
endogamous union might entail serious economic and political consequences. If 
strangers are involved, all ties are usually severed. Since an affinal alliance entails 
no political obligations, and only weak economic obligations, loss of face and sarm 
are the only problems involved. If the union has only lasted for a short time, part of 
the bride-price is usually returned, if the guilt assessed by the tribal elders of both 
parties concerned is mainly on the side of the bride. During my fieldwork in Taghan, 
the Afghan government introduced legislation enabling women to initiate a divorce, 
a privilege so far only granted to men. For Taghan this change had no consequences, 
since women were kept in the dark about such innovations. Even awareness of their 
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rights would not have put them in a position to really exercise them. Asking for a 
divorce entails a visit to the Qazi's office and to the District Magistrate. Women 
have neither the mobility nor a willing male to accompany them - for it is 
unthinkable for a woman to travel by herself. 
Since I lived in close contact with the women of Taghan, the topic of divorce 
was raised several times. Especially among the richer segment of Carshangu, 
women frequently expressed the desire to ask for a divorce. They were, however, 
unaware of the new legislation. With the new legislation in force and the traditional, 
tribal norms gradually declining and changing, I can foresee a much higher incidence 
of divorce in the near future. 
In some cases, where a divorce is not feasible (e.g. due to close endogamous 
ties), the tribal elders usually prescribe a period of separation to let the heated 
temperaments cool off. The woman usually returns to her father's or brother's 
domestic unit for an indefmite period, and often does not return to her husband (who 
in the meantime may have been on the lookout for another wife). Although in 
reality, this solution comes close to a divorce, it is socially much more acceptable. 
During my stay in Taghan, six cases of separation of spouses were brought to my 
attention. The reasons for separation ranged from laziness and incompatibility to 
adultery of husband and wife and to wife-beating and desertion. In all cases of 
separation reported, close agnatic unions were at stake - whereas the two divorces 
reported by the Qazi involved distant relatives belonging to a different tayfa. 
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NOTES 
1 Term borrowed from I.M. Lewis 1965:89. 
2 I am using the term 'tribe' as proposed by Barth (1961) in Nomads of South Persia. 
3 For demographic details see Gazetteer of Afghanistan Part II: Afghan Turkistan; Calcutta, Office of 
the Superintendent of Government Printing India, 1907. Especially introduction and entry on 'Hazdah 
Nahr pp.125-139'. 
4 The cost of a yurt, that is the wooden frame and felt covers, not including equipment, amount to 
approximately 10,000 to 14,000 Afs. (US$ 250 to 350), depending on the quality of the felts. 
5 Paradoxically enough, rich bays will, however, prepare an aq uy (white wedding yurt) with all the 
trappings, trimmings and furnishings for the wedding of their sons, who normally live in it until their 
first child is born. In this case it is considered a status symbol, since the acquisition of a white tent 
entails considerable expenses. 
6 Gong!i is used for individuals or minimal lineages residing away from their own agnates in 
residence groups dominated by another descent group than their own. A gong!i relationship often 
occurs when a household has to leave its native oba because of feuds or crimes. 
6a Public opinion labels the whole Suleiman oba (residence unit) as descendants of former slaves. 
The Suleiman oba, in turn, consists of the four tires called Suleiman, Kawasakal, Areqbater and 
Heker. The Suleiman tire (the most populous) was the ftrst to settle in this region and therefore gave 
the oba its name. The four tires are all muhajirin (refugees) from former Soviet Central Asia whose 
ancestors, upon abolition of slavery, adopted the tire-names of their former masters. Thus, the rule 
(spelled out on page 135) that free Ttirkmen may take wives of slave origin, but not give their 
daughters in marriage to former slaves, does not apply, since the four tires in question are of slave 
origin. All the tires of the Suleiman oba may freely intermarry. 
Since marriage alliances between the Areqbater and the Suleiman tires already existed before their 
exodus to Afghanistan, it is quite customary among all Ersari groups, to reinforce existing 
unions/alliances by contracting further marriages. 
7 See chapter 3, note 10. 
8 For administrative purposes, each province (wilayat) is divided into a number of woluswalis 
(districts) and alakadaris (subdistricts). 
9 Collection of steppe plants in the lol which are then sold as fuel or fodder at 100-120 Afs. 
(US$2.50-3.00) per camelload. 
10 While in the fteld, I took the eighteen-year-old son of the Erghay leader to Kabul, where we stayed 
at the home of European friends. He was completely taken aback by the 'wonders of Western 
civilization' such as flushing toilets, fridges, electricity and electric light switches. For two nights in a 
row he again and again flused the toilet and opened water taps, waiting for the moment the water 
would ftnally cease to flow. When I asked him about his impressions, he laconically answered: 'Well, 
at least I know now why we do not have any water in Taghan, why our wells are all drying up. These 
farangs (foreigners) with all their strange machines and gadgets must be diverting all our water to 
Kabul'. 
11 Not much is known about the Arabs of this region. As far as I could ascertain, they belong to 
several different descent groups. Some of them still speak a sort of Arabic dialect very heavily mixed 
with Dari and Tiirkic languages. 
12 For a specialized study of these marginal, itinerant groups see Aparna Rao: Les Gorbat 
d'Afghanistan: Aspects Economiques d'un Groupe Itinerant 'fat', Paris 1982. 
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13 Entertainers and musicians, especially if female, are held in very low esteem (cf. Slobin 1976). 
Music in the public sphere is invariably linked to sexual licentiousness. 
14 Although I am aware that the term 'bride-price' has been criticized and largely superseded in the 
anthropological literature, I am consciously using it as the most apt rendering of Tiirlcmen 
conceptualizations. The Tiirkmen themselves use the verb satmak (sell) and olmak (take in the sense 
of buy, since no specific term exists) in the context of giving or taking a girl in marriage. Women 
among themselves frequently talk about their bahoxsi (price) and pride themselves if it was highter 
than the sum paid for a relative or co-wife. 
15 While men are wearing quilted pants, coats and boots, women are often seen with their bare feet in 
a pair of cheap Russian rubber shoes or hard Tiirkmen-made leather shoes. 
16 For bride-price payments only female animals are used. 
17 The tuiHk usually consists of rice and a proportionate amount of cooking oil (Y. of amount of rice) 
and several sheep and goats for meat. These goods, to be given by the father of the groom, are used 
for the qiz majlis celebration at the girl's house. The practice of requesting a tuiHk is not common 
among watani Tilrkmen. 
18 I know of two instances where a prettier cousin had been substituted for the real potential bride. 
The inspecting woman was thus under the impression of scrutinizing the real candidate, who in fact 
was much older, far less attractive, skilled and desirable than the girl shown. 
19 Among the rich acculturated Tiirkmen, the third son of the richest bay encountered great 
difficulties in finding a wife for his oldest son. I was told that his proposition parties were all refused 
so far despite his family's wealth and status. None of the close agnates was willing to part with his 
daughter or cousin not even for a substantially augmented bride-price. I began to get interested in the 
case because of its controversial nature. Inquiries from various sources revealed that the son 
apparently had a bad character. The major handicap, however, seemed to be the three prospective 
mothers-in-law. The second wife, in particular, was very much feared. All her eleven children had 
died as infants. This woman is rumoured to engage, out of jealousy, in all sorts of witchcraft to pass 
her cilliii (infertility) on to a young bride. The father of the boy finally was able to secure a bride 
from a different tire, belonging to an impoverished and destitute family living in a remote area, and 
therefore not familiar with the situation of the groom-to-be's household. The bride further had a slight 
speech impediment and a limp. 
Rumours also had it that the bride actually belonged to a lineage of former slaves, a fact I was not able 
to verify due to the delicate nature of the topic. Should this be the case, which I strongly suspect, it 
would certainly account for the virtual ostracism of the boy's father by his two powerful elder 
brothers. 
This example also reveals the nascent trend that among the richer segment, monetary gains and 
considerations are outweighing kinship ties. Until earlier in this century, older brothers would have 
arranged for a poorer relative as a bride for the youngster in order to keep the 'problem' in the private 
realm. In fact the richer brothers have given their daughters to influential outsiders to gain support in 
a wider geographical area and to establish a network of allies outside the narrow realm of kin ties. 
20 Caur and esge are two different kinds of silkcloth used for the female headdress. For details see 
Plates . 
. 21 Until about 1950, the tuba was worn for a full year. 
22 The main reason for guarding the bride is to keep away barren women and people known for their 
involvement in black magic that could threaten her fertility. Barrenness, according to Tiirlcmen 
conception, is tranferable if done on auspicious days such as a wedding; cilliii or the fate of sterility 
can be gotten rid of by passing it on to another woman. This belief forms the basis of the fear that a 
childless woman might approach the bride with evil intentions. Barren women are treated like 
outcasts during any happy occasion. Many of these women are feared for their association with 
people well versed in black magic. 
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23 Note the symbolic association with fruits and fertility. Mulberry trees are favoured due to the 
abundance of fruit they produce each year. 
24 A kajaba consists of two box-like contraptions attached to either side of a camel. One box is 
reserved for the bride, the other for the yingii (bridal attendant). Both boxes are then covered with a 
white baldachin to ward off any evil spirits and to protect the bride from the evil eye. 
25 Du'a is a prayer used for supplications in contrast to salat or the liturgical form of prayer, cf. 
Qur'an Sura XIV:42. 
26 The most feared practices are: a) bolting of a lock at the moment of the wedding ceremony; b) 
knotting a comer of the bride's dress or knotting of her decorative hair-tassels. This notion of tying 
knots and bolting locks is widely known in the ethnography of Central Asian peoples. As a matter of 
fact this kind of sorcery is supposed to prevent the marriage from being consummated. Only ritual 
specialists such as shamans and mullahs are able to undo this kind of harm. My fieldnotes abound in 
cases involving such practices. 
27 The viriginity of a bride is of utmost importance. It must be recalled that women represent the 
honour of uy and lineage. Little attention is paid to medical defects and gynaecological problems 
which might have been caused by constant squatting while making carpets. According to my senior 
informants, up to about 40 years ago, non-virgin brides had to be killed on the spot by their father or 
closest male agnate, since only blood could restore the lost honour and exonerate her native ay. 
Nowadays usually severe disputes, quarrels and accusations occur. The bride is usually sent back to 
her paternal household and the bride-price is refunded. The situation is especially critical and 
precarious, if the bride had been married off to another tribal section. 
28 The women of the bride's natal household are in charge of this delicate task, which often takes days 
or weeks of discussions until a fmal selection has been made. A wrong selection considerably 
diminishes the good reputation of a household. In certain cases, too shabby a selection has led to 
feuding between the two parties concerned. 
29 The boJ tui is also surrounded by fertility magic and symbolism. The bride sits on a pillow on top 
of which the cap of a healthy boy and a handful of ossiq (knuckle bones of sheep) have been placed. 
These paraphernalia supposedly symbolize the wish of the bride to give birth to healthy boys. For 
details see Stucki 1978a 
RESSEMBLANCES 
La co/line, aupres du village, 
A l'air d'un cheval enselle. 
Les hommes sans valeur ressemblent 
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A des caracteres informes traces a l'encre doree. 
Ce monde est une mer sans fond: 
Ne t'y fie pas! On y fait naufrage. 
Ne sois pas orgueilleux! Ce monde ephemere 
Est comme un tour de garde qu'on prend pour un moment. 
Qui n'a pas defreres n'a pas de puissance. 
Qui n'a pas de .fils n'a pas de bonheur, 
Qui n'a pas de femme n'a pas de plaisir, 
Leur vie est comme le regret des jours heureux. 
Le bon ne peut jamais faire autant de mal que le me chant. 
Ceux qui sontfoncierement bons ne peuvent devenir mauvais. 
Nul bonheur ne vient des biens de ce monde. 
Unfits tient lieu de vraie richesse. 
Elle est comme quelqu'un qui couche avec un serpent, 
Elle est comme un bijou pendu au cou d'un chien, 
La femme de bien mariee a un homme vii. 
Elle res semble a une perle dont on meconnatt la valeur. 
C'est du sel et du poivre sur une blessure fratche, 
C'est un empoisonnement de tousles jours, 
Qu'une mauvaise epouse, pour un homme de bien. 
Elle est pour lui comme une interminable accusation. 
Makhtoumkouli! Je n'ai pu realiser mes voeux. 
Les gens sont gais, et moi,je suis sans joie. 
L'homme qui ne comprend pas le sens des mots 
Ressemble a un chien sans queue. 
Makhtumkuli Firaqi (18th century Ttirkmen poet) 
Translation by Louis Bazin and Pertev Boratav 
PLATE 25: WATERING ANIMALS DURING A SANDSTORM 
PLATE 26: SHEPHERD LEADING HIS FLOCK TO A WELL 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
FROM CORVA TO COMVR 1: THE CASE OF TAGHAN 
The influx of refugees from Russian Central Asia caused a severe strain on the 
elements of production (water, herds, pasture, arable land and labour) and brought 
about an ecological imbalance of the Taghan area, which in tum led to a re-
orientation from a predominantly pastoral to a mixed agropastoral economy. 
Availability of and access to productive resources determine to a large extent the 
choice a domestic unit will take in pursuing and keeping its viability. The 
anthropological literature demonstrates well enough that nomadic pastoralists in 
Central Asia have always attempted to sow wheat or barley in moist depressions to 
produce part of their foodgrain requirements. This was certainly the case for the 
Taghan area and is clearly documented by Konig (1962:41) for the Achal Tekke and 
by Irons (1975) for the Yomut of Iran. The pastoralists of Taghan were never totally 
isolated from the oasis-dwelling agriculturalists. They were always in economic 
contact, trading their pastoral surplus for grain and other commodities. 
Unlike other ethnic groups in Afghanistan (e.g. Pushtun nomads), Western Asia 
and Arabia, the corva of Taghan (and for that matter most Ti.irkmen groups) never 
undertook long-range seasonal migrations. They moved with their flocks within a 
confined pastoral territory, usually around a network of artesian wells. This form of 
'transhumance'2 must be seen in the context of the ecological conditions of the 
desert-steppes of Northwestern Afghanistan, basically an extension of the Kara Kum, 
characterized by a low yield of fodder, thus requiring a relatively large grazing 
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territory. On the other hand this kind of pasture can be used all year round, since the 
vegetation varies with the season. 
The main handicap is the lack of water. The only water sources available are 
artesian wells, arranged in a network all over the desert-steppe. Since most of these 
wells have an extremely high salt content, rendering water unfit for human 
consumption, only limited areas of pasture can be efficiently exploited. No written 
material exists, but according to my senior informants, the watani Ttirkmen of 
Taghan always lived near their freshwater wells in more or less permanent 
settlements. From here the flocks were driven to pastures at various distances from 
the home-base by members of the oba or by professional herdsmen, depending on 
the economic strength of a given oba. The master of a household nearly always 
stayed in the home-base, sending sons and their wives with the herds. Women 
always stayed with the flocks during the spring months (March-May) when the 
lambing took place and the milk supply was plentiful. The task of the women was to 
process the milk into various kinds of milk-products. Those left behind at the home-
base would occupy themselves with rudimentary dry-farming near lakes (kol) and 
humid depressions (kak). 
With the influx of refugees and the ensuing depletion of pasture, the Ttirkmen of 
Taghan moved closer to the desert-steppe fringe near the irrigation canals, where 
most of them are permanently living now. 
According to my oldest informants, agriculture was not seen as a main 
occupation, but rather a means of restoring herds depleted by climatic vagaries and 
other calamities. It was seen, if pursued as a full-time occupation, as a pursuit of the 
poor and destitute. Because of this attitude, few Taghan people took advantage of 
the landgrants offered by the Afghan government in the 1920s. The two Taghan 
obas now owning substantial plots of agricultural land acquired it because they were 
impoverished at that time, due to ransom payments to get some of their lineage 
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members out of jail. Many of the muhajirin from Russian Central Asia took 
advantage of the land-offers, since they had only worked as labourers for the then 
mostly affluent Taghan. Acquiring land brought a prospect of freedom. For them, 
pursuing agriculture as a full-time occupation had no stigma attached, since most of 
them, in their Central Asian homeland (mostly on the left bank of the Amu Darya), 
had been predominantly agriculturalists. They also had a far superior knowledge of 
agricultural techniques and technology, and thus did rather well in their pursuits. 
With amassed surplus capital gained from their agricultural work, they went into 
trading and marketing of qaraqul (Persian lamb) skins and carpets, the two major 
export items of Afghanistan, thereby linking Taghan and its surrounding areas to the 
national and international markets. Today most of the entrepreneurial activities are 
in the hands of the rich muhajirin who dominate the economic scene of Taghan. As 
we shall see, fortune turned against the Taghan, most of whom are nowadays nearly 
reduced to the status of clients of the rich muhajirin entrepreneurs. 
The influX; of refugees, closing of the borders with Russia and the better 
infrastructure and firmer supervision by the Afghan government brought about a 
change in the composition of the Taghan herds. Traditionally the Taghan raised 
sheep to meet their subsistence needs - that is meat, fat, milk dung and wool (recall 
that the furnishings and coverings of the yurt are nearly all made of wool). Only the 
large herd owners would sell their surplus wool for cash. 
Poorer people would apply their labour first, turn the wool into felts and carpets, 
for which they could get a higher price than for unprocessed wool. This constituted, 
as we shall see, the beginning of a very lucrative carpet market without which many 
families could not make ends meet. 
Traditionally large numbers of camels were raised for sale in the baziirs of 
Bukhara and Khiva as transport animals. With the cash earned from these 
transactions, grains, clothing and household commodities were purchased and the 
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surplus invested in silver coins and jewellery.3 A better infrastructure and the 
closing of the Russian border resulted in a decline of the caravan trade4 and in a 
lesser demand for transport camels. At that stage camels were replaced by Qaraqul 
sheep as sources of cash. Rich bays are making use of the cheap labour of their 
impoverished kinsmen to look after their big flocks, often consisting of 10,000-
15,000 animals. Such large flocks are herded, all year round, far away from villages 
and obas. Thus motor transport is a requirement to service the herdsmen and herds, 
especially during the winter months. Another requirement is a substantial amount of 
cash to buy extra fodder in case of bad winters, which are the crisis time for qaraqul 
breeders. It is not uncommon, during a bad winter, for herds to be reduced to 
approximately 40 per cent due to starvation. Since most of the entrepreneurs have 
diversified their economic activities to include trade and large-scale mechanized 
agriculture, they are able to cover their possible pastoral losses. 
For the average herdsman with a small herd, however, natural calamities may 
mean total ruin - especially if he does not own any agricultural land. With nothing 
left but the labour-force of his domestic unit, a household head and his able-bodied 
men might serve a richer kinsman as wage-labourers (muzdur) or sharecroppers; and 
the female members will take to carpet-making with wool received in various forms 
of credit arrangements. These will be analyzed in a later section of this chapter. 
Today Taghan presents a picture of mixed economy consisting of a pastoral, 
agricultural sector and a large sector of impoverished wage-labourers. In spite of a 
more or less settled life in tams, the Taghan Ti.irkmen retain a pastoral nomadic 
ideology. Folklore and symbolic elaborations centre around herds, horses and a 
desert-steppe environment. Although their material culture is basically geared 
around traditional items for the tent, such as felts and various kinds of bags and 
horsetrappings, the quality of these objects has greatly deteriorated. Carpets made 
mainly for cash returns are no longer woven carefully; and plant and mineral 
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dyestuffs have given way to imported glossy chemical dyes. Women in most 
families are spending long hours at the looms to supplement their family's income 
with carpets. They have no longer time to intricately embroider wedding costumes, 
ceremonial coats and children's clothing. Cheap Indian and Russian cotton fabrics 
have taken their place, for in Taghan as in Western capitalist societies, 'time is 
money'. 
THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF THE AGROPASTORAL ECONOMY OFT AGHAN 
In this section I shall examine the principal variables of the agropastoral 
economy of Taghan, and their interplay. 
a) Water resources and water management 
'Water is the mother of life and the beginning of all strife' 
Given the climatic conditions of the area and the scarcity of water, its prime 
resource, the meaning and importance of this proverb become clear. During my 
period of fieldwork, we experienced a severe drought. Water was extremely scarce; 
and suddenly loyalties, friendships, strife and quarrels were measured in terms of 
water, or centred around water in one way or another. Nearly 70 per cent of crimes, 
violations of tribal codes or offenses against the Afghan legal system were directly or 
indirectly related to water.s 
Access to water and water management, especially water for irrigation, 
constitute a serious problem for the agriculturalist and pastoralist alike and are 
therefore strictly regulated to minimize conflict. 
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The water resources, and the rules and regulations centred around them, are 
different for the two ecological zones dealt with in this study. 
The Desert-Steppe Zone C&iD 
This area is characterized by sandy soils, sparse rainfall and too remote a 
location to make use of the canal irrigation system. Parts of its soils, in years of 
plenty of rainfall, can be used for marginal dry-farming (lalmi). It is the pastoralist's 
domain par excellence, with a plantcover varying from season to season, thus 
making use of it possible virtually throughout the year. The pastoralists living in this 
zone rely on artesian wells (qui; kuduk) for their domestic and herd's water supply. 
The construction of a well requires the services of a specialist; it is a very 
labour-intensive process. In certain areas the water table is as low as 20m. In 
Taghan I witnessed the construction of a 15m. deep well which kept three labourers, 
working under the supervision of a specialist, employed for nearly three weeks. 
Once the excavation work is completed, the hole is usually fitted with a wooden 
frame and reinforced with bricks, depending on the condition of the soil. Water is 
usually drawn by attaching a leather bucket running over a pulley to a camel and 
driving the animal back and forth. 
The quantity and quality of the available water vary from season to season and 
from location to location. Water generally is at its best in winter, when the water-
level of the wells rises to about 5m. In Taghan the capacity of a well is usually 
sufficient to water a rama (500-600) of sheep/goats per day. The construction fee for 
a well varies according to its depth, but usually costs approximately 2,000 Afs. 
(US$50) - a substantial sum for the average domestic unit. Because of these high 
construction costs, wells are usually owned by a bir ata or a section of it. In the case 
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of the Erghay oba (Figures 5 and 6), section A owns one well, and section B three, 
one of which is not usable due to an ever increasing salt content. 
Wells further away from an oba may be owned by bir atas or rich individuals. 
According to Tlirkmen adat, any traveller passing a well is supposed to have access 
to its water. 
Rights to the water of a well may be sold at approximately 10,000 Afs. a year. 
In case the well is lineage-owned, all members of the lineage must be consulted 
regarding the transaction, and the profits shared. The upkeep of a well is also 
considered a lineage obligation. Close agnates living in another oba have free access 
to wells of their kinsmen by virtue of their kinship ties. Affinal ties do not 
automatically entail such privileges, but often free access is granted to demonstrate 
one's generosity and goodwill towards them. 
In the col surrounding Taghan, entrepreneurs have taken to digging wells for 
commercial purposes - that is, they are providing water to sham herdowners against a 
fee. This proved to be a lucrative business in 1970/1971, drought years when many 
wells in other areas dried up. Large pastoralists able to pay for water and pasture 
brought their flocks to the Taghan area and paid substantial fees for access to pasture 
and water. 
Ownership and access to wells create power and are constant sources of stress 
on kinship ties, agnatic and affinal. Kinship relations undergo a test of severe strain, 
especially in times of drought. Tribal rules and regulations in principle guarantee 
access to water for anyone. It depends, however, on the generosity and character of 
the well owner, whether he dispenses his water free or against payment. Here lies 
the point for conspicuous generosity and securing of followers and friends through 
an act of generosity. In times of need and scarcity of water, agnatic closeness and 
seniority are the operating principles; and these, at times, are in conflict with Islamic 
practices and the rules stipulated by the Afghan Government. 
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The Steppe Zone 
The land of this zone is mainly used for dry-farming (lalmi) . Rainfall is the 
main source of water. This is obviously a very insecure and unpredictable base for 
agriculture, since the success of the crop does not depend primarily on the skills of 
the agriculturalist, but on the timely arrival of the late autumn and early spring rains. 
Should they fail to arrive or come too early or too late, the fields dry up and the 
livelihood of many thousand people is threatened. 
A substantial part of the Steppe Zone of the Taghan area can be irrigated from a 
large network of canals and is therefore suitable for wet agriculture (tibi). This type 
of land use gives the agriculturalist a better chance of success and an element of 
security. 
Within the system of irrigation agriculture, depletion of the rather fertile loess 
soil is prevented by implementation of a rather simple crop-rotation system from gok 
ekin6 to aq ekin crops, a system that is also documented for the Achal Tekke in 
Turkmenia by Konig (1962). Details regarding crop rotation, and rentability of the 
various crops, will be given in a section on the yearly agricultural and pastoral cycle. 
I would like to present an analysis of the irrigation system, since it brings to the 
surface fundamental principles of Ttirkmen social system and values. 
b) Sources of irrigation-water and distribution mechanisms 
The Steppe Zone of Northern Afghanistan gets its water supply mainly from the 
Balkh River by way of an elaborate canal-system (probably very ancient) that was 
built or improved during the reign of Kin~ Amanullah (1919-1929) and which has 
hardly undergone any modernization since. Due to its archaic form, a lot of water 
oozes away; and the high temperatures and the dry climate cause considerable 
evaporation. The water-distribution system basically consists of 18 large canals 
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called nahr in Dari (Afghan Persian). They, in turn, are subdivided into a network of 
minor canals called jui (areq in the Ti.irkmen language). Neither the beds nor the 
walls of either kind of canal are reinforced in any way, and are thus prone to get 
silted or destroyed by the harsh climatic conditions. The courses of the juis are lined, 
at intervals, with villages. Those highest up near the canal heads generally are 
occupied by the Pathans; those next lower down by U zbaks or Arabs, while the 
furthest outlying villages with the most erratic water supply are inhabited by 
Tiirkmen muhajirin. Distribution from the nahr is effected by a multitude of small 
dams equipped with concrete gates. 
The amount of water each village is entitled to receive depends on the number 
of jerib (see appendix for conversion tables) of arable land and the type of farming 
pursued. Thus the entire irrigation system consists of hundreds of kilometers of 
canals of various sizes. Because so much water is lost through seepage and 
evaporation, an optimal water supply is not guaranteed. Obrucev (1888) mentions 
that in an analogous situation in Russian Turkestan only 1/3 of the canal-water could 
effectively be used for agii.cultural purposes .. From the point of view of technology, 
this canal-system certainly is a wasteful enterprise; but from the point of view of 
organization and upkeep, it is probably the best possible solution. 
The canal-system was created by groups or clusters of villages, whose residents 
received landgrants during the time of Amanullah, without government interference. 
Organization and maintenance of the canal-system require joint efforts calling for 
participation of thousands of people each year. This labour-supply is recruited from 
all landholders having access to canal-water and guaranteed by way of the traditional 
social organization. 
A village society, in joint effort with other such village societies, is perfectly 
capable of organizing and safeguarding its water supply, at least in minimal terms. 
Involvement of such a large labour-force obviously calls for some direction, 
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organization and chanelling of efforts to the right end. To pool the labour-force, 
direct the maintenance of the canal, initiate emergency-repairs in times of calamity 
and represent the views of the villagers at the annual water-distribution meeting for 
the 18 nahrs requires a formal leadership structure. Three separate officials serve for 
each nahr: 
1) The mirab 
The mirab (lit. 'ruler of the water') holds an elected office. He is elected by all 
the users of the nahr according to criteria of honesty, integrity and knowledge of 
Dari, since he has to liaise with the Afghan government authorities. His 
principal responsibility is the proper functioning of the water-distribution 
system. As might be obvious from the sketchy description of the canal-system, 
it leaves enough leeway for abuse, diversion of water before reaching its 
intended destination: all one needs is a bit of courage, the right timing and a 
spade to redirect the waterflow. Secret adjustments of the gates to the effect that 
one village gets more than its fair share are quite common: hence the high 
incidence of crime and irregularities with regard to water. Because of the vast 
area of the canal-network, the mirab usually has at least two assistants, 
sometimes also more, depending on the mileage of canals involved. The mirab, 
besides watching the smooth distribution of water, supervising the routine and 
emergency repair-work also represents and defends the interests of his nahr at 
the annual meeting of all the 18 mirabs where they decide how much water is 
supposed to go to each nahr. In order to get a fair deal for his nahr, he needs to 
be eloquent, trustworthy and above all well-versed in local politics, be it at the 
tribal level or at the local bureaucratic level of the Central Government. To 
fulfill these duties, he needs a network of allies who keep him posted on the 
latest developments, unrests, favoritism; thus he needs to be able to attract and 
coordinate support. 
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2) The piyade-mirab (assistant mirab) 
The piyade-mirab's job is to patrol along the canals, detect irregularities and 
report any damage, quarrels and problems to the mirab. He is responsible to the 
mirab, whereas the mirab is responsible to the waterusers-committee of the 
nahr. The piyade-mirab is constantly on the move along the canals either on 
foot or riding a donkey. 
3) The darak-ban 
The darak-ban is in charge of the water-division-dam. In many instances, since 
this is a spot for irregularities and trouble, he lives near the dam to remove 
physical obstacles such as trees and branches carried along by the river, or to 
prevent prospective water-thieves from adjusting certain dams and sluices in 
their favour. 
In a society where informal personal networks are more important and more 
efficient than formal organizations, this system harbours the danger of favouritism 
and transgression of limits, if a dyadic or group relationship requires or warrants it. 
It is, of course, a matter of secrecy, and if brought to light, has severe consequences, 
as do all disputes involving water. The remuneration of the mirab and his helpers is 
paid for by all the farmers benefitting from the canal-water for agricultural purposes. 
Each farmer pays according to the number of jerib of arable land he owns. Landless 
people have access to the jui for their drinking water free of charge. 
The rate and system of payment varies from nahr to nahr. In some instances the 
mirab receives a fixed salary. The average is about 50,000 Afs. (approx. US$1,250) 
per year and his helpers receive approximately 10,000 Afs. (US$250) per year each. 
The most common system of remuneration, however, is in kind, that is, in parts of 
the harvest of wheat and barley according to the number of peykal (1 peyka/=400 
jerib; for conversion table see appendix) 7 irrigated by the nahr. 
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It is quite obvious that the mirab occupies a position of prestige, power and 
influence in this rural society, since he is in charge of the most precious and most 
vital resource. He is constantly wooed by followers who hope to extract extra 
benefits from such a relationship. On the other hand he is dependent on their 
network of support for information - a vital asset that keeps him in office. 
In Ttirkmen society, as I observed it in Afghanistan, friendship and comradeship 
function as a network of reciprocal favours and obligations. It is more useful and 
important to have an effective web of informal connections, often, but not 
exclusively along kinship lines than to get entangled with the local level Afghan 
bureaucracy that is only pursuing its own selfish goals and not genuinely interested 
in doing anything for the area and its inhabitants. 
With the grip of the Central Government over remoter and ethnic minority areas 
gradually becoming firmer, adjustments to the local support- and power-network will 
become mandatory. It will become necessary to expand the network over a wider 
geographical area and to integrate the local bureaucracy into the system. At the time 
of my fieldwork, traces of this integration were developing and already quite visible. 
A closer look at the mirab-system reveals that the mirab, although earning a 
good salary according to local standards (most of them also own land and herds on 
the side), take full advantage of their prestigious position and secure favours against 
the proper payment in cash or kind, for help in a special deal or for allegiance, 
should the need for it arise. 
To function effectively in such a system, he does need a steady following of 
powerful allies who will back him up, should some irregularities be brought to light. 
It is thus vital for the mirab to secure the friendship and allegiance of the tribal 
power elite, namely the large landowners, rich agropastoralists and some of the 
influential senior tribal elders and Islamic leaders, who are not necessarily endowed 
with material wealth, but have the capability of mobilizing the masses against 
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someone (on religious grounds in the case of the latter or genealogical knowledge 
and adat in the case of the former). 
In a society that is only loosely integrated into a nation-state, the power of 
traditional access and ostracism must not be underestimated. Individuals without 
support of one kind or another stand little chance of survival, either economically 
and politically or socially, in a system in which everything revolves around 
interlacing dyadic and multigroup relationships. In recent years, due to increasing 
pressure from the Central Government, these relationships have even cut across 
ethnic boundaries. 
Water constitutes a very important factor in the power structure of the villagers 
and oba dwellers. At the same time it puts severe strain on kinship ties which 
stipulate co-operation in the agnatic line. It is obvious from the above description 
that the system leaves room for all kinds of abuses and machinations to create a 
network of power. However, despite the intricate politics of the mirab system, it 
functions well. enough to preserve the flow of water and the network of relations 
within and between groups. 
So far we have looked at different kinds of water sources. In the next section 
we shall examine what kind of criteria apply for the distribution of canal-water. 
c) The composition and functioning of the peykal-system 
The peykal is basically a surface measure. The area of a peykal can be 
continuous, but in some cases is interrupted by non-agricultural land, such as 
dwellings, roads or unproductive land, but it is also the unit of irrigation. In its 
primary meaning, it is a common measure north of the Hindukush Mountains, 
although its effective value varies from region to region. In brief, it basically refers 
to a unit of land that varies in size from area to area. 8 
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In Mingajik, however, it has a secondary, more recent meaning. It refers to a 
kind of co-operative land arrangement, where several, usually small or medium 
landowners combine their land for irrigation purposes to form a peykal. These co-
operation efforts must be seen as a direct result of a water shortage caused or at least 
aggravated by the following factors: 
Increase of small landholdings caused by the Islamic inheritance system which 
stipulates the division of paternal assets after the death of the household-head; 
Population pressure caused by an influx of refugees from Russian Central Asia; 
Change of climatic patterns of the area; 
More land available than water, which resulted in a gradual expansion of the 
canal system at the jui (areq) level, thus shortening the period, water is available 
for each plot. This measure was particularly disadvantageous to small 
landholders. 
Small and medium landholders who had neither the power nor the financial 
means to manipulate the system were most severely hit by the water shortages. 
Many of them got into detrimental credit arrangements and in the end had to pawn 
their land to get rid of their debts, and make a living as labourers or shepherds or 
look for odd jobs around urban centres. 
Theoretically membership in a peykal depends on the geographical location of a 
person's land; that is, peykals are formed of adjacent landholdings. In practice, 
however, other factors are important. Most members of a peykal are of the same 
ethnic group, sometimes of the same family or bir ata (lineage). The principle of 
kinship, all pervasive in Tlirkmen society, is also clearly operative here. Recently, 
however, as we have seen in the previous chapter, kinship ties have been 
manipulated to suit economic needs. 
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The peykal in many ways fits the criteria of a modem co-operative, since it is 
limited to production and not ownership of land. In other ways it is anchored in 
traditional lines of thought. There are no written rules and regulations pertaining to 
the rights and duties of individual members. Oral traditions, encompassing the 
importance of the seniority principle and the agnatic line, specify the role expectation 
of each member. 
The share of labour and resources to be contributed to its working are 
determined by the amount of land a person holds in the peykal. 
It must be stressed that the peykal is a voluntary organization. Its operation can 
be in the hands of the landowners or' sharecroppers or a combination of both. The 
most experienced member of each peykal is chosen as its cak-bosi, the head of the 
peykal. It is neither a position of power nor a remunerated office. 
Emphasis is on experience and not so much on the resources and connections of 
its holder. Unlike the position of the mirab, which harbours a lot of leeway for 
personal gain through clever manipulations and machinations of one kind or another, 
the cak-bosi has a honourary position without any official power attached. 
Duties of the cak-bosi 
Due to his experience he makes recommendations to the peykal-owners 
regarding the following issues: 
a) Choice of crops to be planted when and on which part of the peykal. 
b) Representation of the peykal at the village level, especially when discussions on 
water-usage are held. He also represents the peykal when the kariadar9 is 
chosen. This latter dimension of his job may give him indirect access to the 
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village power structure. Some cak-bosis are known to have used this position 
for personal gains. 
The term of office is not fixed and subject to the decision of all the peykal 
members. 
Water rotation-order 
In the village of Carshangu, consisting of 14 peykals and situated at the end of a 
canal, water for irrigation comes in a predetennined order. 
Under normal circumstances, each peykal gets water every seven days for 12 
hours. The seven-day span can be extended to 14 or 21 days according to the water 
conditions of the Balkh River. 
Within the peykal these 12 hours of water-flow are shared among the various 
owners according to the number of jerib belonging to each of them. 
The following example will illustrate the case: 
Landowner 1 120jerib 25.00 per cent of peykal receives 3.00 hrs. water 
Landowner2 60jerib 12.50 per cent of peykal receives 1.50 hrs. water 
Landowner3 240jerib 50.00 per cent of peykal receives 6.00 hrs. water 
Landowner4 15 jerib 3.12 per cent of peykal receives 0.37 hrs. water 
Landowner 5 30jerib 6.25 per cent of peykal receives 0.75 hrs. water 
Landowner 6 15 jerib 3.12 per cent of peykal receives 0.37 hrs. water 
This system is of greatest benefit to the small landholder, who otherwise would 
find it difficult to get enough irrigation-water for his land. However, it excludes 
those landholders who own a few jerib around their dwellings and are not in a 
peykal. Most of these 'waterless' landowners are poor peasants who do not have the 
means to pay for access to peykal-water. Recent changes, however, have made it 
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possible for them to secure a few minutes of irrigation-water, if they contribute an 
appropriate amount of labour while maintenance work on the canal is in progress. 
Each person is responsible for surveying the supply of water to his plot under 
the watchful eye of the cak-bosi, who also advises the arrival of the irrigation-water. 
Many landowners prefer to sleep near their plots on the day the water arrives to 
ensure that no irregularities take place. 
In a multiple-ownership-peyka/ the loss of water is enormous, due to an 
elaborate network of connecting canals within the peykal. This loss of water brought 
about a new, more economical development, that is collective farming efforts. The 
following salient features are noticeable: 
Each landholder in the peykal retains the title to his land, but the 480 jerib are 
treated as one big landholding and cultivated according to a crop-rotation 
system. The individual landholdings of the members are not taken into 
consideration in the cultivation process, that means the division of land for 
cultivation each year bears no relation to landtitles. 
Each member of the peykal-co-operative must provide labour in proportion to 
the number of jerib he actually owns - normally one labourer per 40 jerib. 
These men are then allotted tasks by the cak-bosi. 
Draft animals, seeds and other equipment are supplied in proportion to the 
effective landholding. 
The harvest is shared according to the same principles after deduction of taxes 
in kind payable to the mirab, the kariadar and other collective expenses. 
It must be emphasized again that this is a voluntary organization, but very few 
opt out, since securing irrigation-water constitutes a great problem. The main efforts 
and gains of the peyka/-co-operative system, therefore, are geared towards 
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irrigation. Thus the peykal as an irrigation unit can develop into a production unit, 
but in neither case is collective landownership involved. 
Most agricultural land nowadays is individually owned, whereas pasture-land in 
most instances is still in kin-group-ownership. This difference of ownership in many 
instances has an ideological background. Although the merits of agriculture are 
understood, the agropastoral watani Ti.irkmen of Taghan still have a strong prejudice 
against agriculture and the peasant philosophy surrounding it. 
As we have seen, the cak-bosi functions as adviser on organization and control 
of agricultural work. All important decisions with regard to the peykal, however, are 
made unanimously after consulting all members. 
Implementation is not too difficult, since specialized knowledge and experience 
in agricultural pursuits command a certain respect. This emphasis on knowledge is 
important, since some of the members of the peykal are of pastoralist background 
and not very familiar with the agricultural tradition and technology. Although not in 
a traditional position of power, the cak-bosi can manipulate people by way of his 
specialized knowledge. This latter fact is all the more important since the cak-bosi 
gets no monetary or other material remuneration for his services. His office is based 
on the confidence of the peykal members. He only stays in office as long as he can 
secure their confidence. 
Besides facilitating a more or less even distribution of water, the peykal co-
operative enables the water to be put to its most economical use. The co-operative is 
not organized along kinship lines, but in many ways functions in the same way. It is 
obvious that the peykal co-operative is of greatest benefit to farmers with small 
landholdings. It serves as a base for collective work and as a unit for collection of 
the graduated land-tax initiated by the government. In the Central Government's 
drive to promote rural development, especially in the agricultural sector, the peykal 
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co-operative serves as a base-unit for agricultural development and a dispenser of 
technological innovations. 
So far we have followed the organization and distribution of irrigation water 
from the nahr. The smaller irrigation canals, the juis are organized according to the 
same principles. Regardless of whether someone is a landowner or not, jui-water is 
accessible to everybody for domestic use. Villagers therefore tend to build their 
houses along the jui to secure a steady supply of drinking-water. A typical village 
consists of a row of walled housing compounds (see plate 36) situated on either side 
of the jui. The proximity of a compound to the jui is an indicator of the length of 
time a particular family has been living in a village. Newcomers, especially of 
different ethnic groups and therefore without the necessary network of connections, 
often find it difficult to conform with this pattern of residence. In some villages, all 
the space near the juis has been occupied by earlier settlers. 
Many of the rich landowners who have access to several hours of irrigation-
water each time their tum comes, often keep a water-reservoir called howz, which 
basically consists of a hole dug in the public section of their courtyard, often 
surrounded by trees. Mosques of hazar-sections may also keep a howz for public 
use. These howz are of a standard size and approximately two or three metres deep. 
Since neither their bottom nor their sidewalls are reinforced in any way, seepage and 
therefore loss of water is enormous. 
Furthermore these reservoirs attract myriads of insects and other parasites (the 
water is stagnant) which constitute real health hazards. Due to the cooling effect of 
the water and the shade provided by the surrounding trees, the howz and its 
surroundings are a favourite meeting ground for the male population. Since the 
water-supply to a howz derives from the share of irrigation-water of its owner, small 
landholders stand no chance of ever establishing a howz. Each time the water comes, 
normally at intervals of 7 or 15 days, the howz is refilled. Just before the arrival of 
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the new intake of water, the howz, although primarily intended for domestic 
consumption, is infested with worms and parasites. No attempts are made to clean 
the reservoir during low-water periods. To the majority of howz owners, the 
connection between consumption of infested water and intestinal parasites is not 
known. 
The water-level of the howz is reached by a flight of steps to prevent animals 
from drinking from the howz thereby making its water haram (unclean) according to 
Islamic doctrine. 
Access to howz and artesian well likewise should, in principle, not be refused to 
anyone. Refusal generally provokes severe reprimands not only from the Islamic 
leaders, but also from the council of elders and influential individuals. Breaches of 
the rule entail not only social, but also supernatural retributions and sanctions, such 
as pollution of the water and its owner by the evil eye. Furthermore irregularities 
and crimes involving water and horses, as I shall explain later, have a powerful 
social stigma attached. In a society where everyone is afraid of shame, loss of 
honour- it is always the honour of a group and not of an individual - such sanctions 
are quite effective. 
Possession of a howz, like possession of a few good freshwater-wells in the 
Desert-Steppe Zone, is also a matter of prestige. It gives the owner a constant 
opportunity to show generosity towards the less fortunate by granting them access to 
water. In certain extreme cases it may establish a relationship of dependence -
especially in the case of artesian wells - that could be favourably exploited by the 
well-owner, should the need arise e.g. for cheap labour. With regard to the howz, the 
decorative aspect is important as well for the status-power position of its owner. In 
an area where trees are extremely rare, it is considered to be a luxury of the first 
order to possess a garden with trees and flowers or a water-reservoir surrounded by 
trees.lO 
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In some cases a terrace is built around the reservoir and the location serves as a 
place to entertain male guests. It then has the same function as a guest house. 
Elaborate guest houses equipped with carpets and other trappings have a distinct 
place and function in the prestige cycle of Ttirkmen society. In the pastoralist sector 
of the population, this function is taken over by an ornate guest tent. 
Access to a surplus of water thus has a strong social function in the pastoral and 
agricultural sector of Ttirkmen society. A scarce resource serves not only economic 
purposes, but is highly instrumental in securing prestige and social status. 
To guarantee the social function of the howz, its location within the compound 
is important. It is always situated in the public space (that means the male section of 
the compound) so that it is accessible to all male visitors and at the same time non-
interference in the female section of the compound is safeguarded. 
In the Steppe Zone, unlike the Desert-Steppe Zone, artesian wells are not 
popular and their water is supposed 'to taste bad' (although generally well-water is 
cleaner and therefore healthier). In this case it is a matter of ideology; artesian wells 
being strongly connected to a nomadic-pastoralist existence, which most of the 
sedentary Ttirkmen, a great deal of them former nomadic-pastoralists of refugee 
origin, try to forget. In their view, the idea of a nomadic or seminomadic existence 
harbours an image of backwardness. It is an ambiguous imagery, since most of the 
folklore and the legends of the sedentary villagers retain strong characteristics of 
their nomadic past- in this case a matter of pride! 
The pastoralists, on the other hand, consider jui- or howz-water to be unhealthy 
and distinctly linked to a sedentary peasant existence. 
Most agriculturalists will only resort to wells in times of drought, but abandon 
them again, as soon as their usual canal-watersupply is restored. The presence in 
some villages of a more or less educated bureaucracy, mainly of Pashtun, Farsi wan 
and U zbek origin, made several villagers aware of the detrimental effects of jui -
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water on their health. As a general rule, only these bureaucrats and certain merchant 
segments of village society who enjoy greater mobility e.g. they have seen cities and 
other parts of the country, are regularly using well-water for their daily consumption. 
But even those more enlightened merchants keep their howz as a source of prestige 
and as a place of social interaction. 
HERD COMPOSITION AND PATTERNS OF HERD MOVEMENT 
A look at the world map reveals that most nomadic and semi-nomadic societies 
live in areas where the natural resources a given population is able to exploit with the 
technology at its disposal are insecure, meager and scarce, in other words, marginal. 
The pattern of herd composition and movement is largely dictated by this 
marginal environment e.g. its plantcover (with seasonal variations), its water-
resources, its soil-quality and its climatic conditions. Humans and herds live in a 
symbiotic relationship, that means they are mutually interdependent: humans 
provide care, shelter and in certain cases also fodder and water. The herds keep them 
supplied with milk, meat, hides, skin, wool, hair and dung which they can use for 
their subsistence needs or convert into commodities by way of a market-economy. 
However herds and humans together are parasitic on the environment, in as much as 
they do not replenish or improve the pastures. Dung, which might serve as fertilizer 
for pasture-land, is collected as fuel, especially in areas where there is no tree- or 
shrub-vegetation or where it has been destroyed by man. Figure 10, which is quite 
self-explanatory, gives a schematic summary of these ecological relationships - the 
variables being man, animals and environment. 
The amount of grazing and composition patterns of the herd determine the range 
of herd-movement. Climatic factors, water, water evaporation and soil-quality in 
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FIGURE 10: ECOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS 
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tum determine the amount of grass and other plant growth. Climatic conditions, on 
the other hand, also determine the length of the growing season of pasture 
vegetation. As we have seen, in the Mingajik area, water is a factor of prime 
importance. Scarcity of water limits the growth of the plant-cover and hence the size 
and density of herds and indirectly also of the population that subsists on them. 
Herd composition 
The pastoral activities of the Ttirkmen of the Mingajik area have undergone 
considerable changes since the end of the last century, with many herdsmen gaining 
access to agricultural land. 
Changes in herd composition were brought about by the decline of interregional 
caravan-trade, the influx of large numbers of refugees, which caused an imbalance of 
the herding environment, and the development of a better infrastructure in recent 
years. 
As mentioned above, the Tiirkmen were never totally isolated from the market 
centres, but depended on them for part of their household commodities, notably grain 
for their bread. Their herd composition, therefore, had not only to be adapted to the 
environment, but also geared towards products that could readily be exchanged in 
market centres. 
It needs to be stressed that the poorer stratum of Tiirkmen society, even at the 
end of last century, before official land grants were made by the Afghan 
Government, would periodically plant grain - wheat and barley - in depressions 
retaining water from the autumn or spring rainfalls. These plots were mostly situated 
near the winter campsites. 
According to my senior informant, camels constituted a large percentage of the 
total herd composition until the latter half of the 19th century, a fact which is also 
PLATE 27: CAMELHERDER 
PLATE 28: FETCHING A CAMELLOAD OF YANDOK 
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stressed by Konig (1962) for the Tekk:e Ttirkmen. In the case of Afghanistan a 
considerable demand for camels as beasts of burden existed. They were mostly used 
in the caravan trade and secondarily to work the water-wheels in the irrigated 
agricultural areas mainly in the hands of Uzbak farmers. Thus the breeding of 
camels was more geared towards export than for local use. The following story from 
my field-notes adequately illustrates the case: 
My grandfather, Yomud, owned a herd of more than one hundred camels and sixty 
fine horses and approximately 2,000 sheep. Once or twice a year he went to the 
famous bazars of Bukhara and Khiva to sell the animals to the comur. He brought 
back a lot of Kajare (Persian silver coins), Bukharan silver coins and silver 
jewellery. He had a good and free life and did not till any land. (informant: man 
51 years old). 
As is obvious from this quote, camels and other animals were traded for silver 
coins and women's jewellery. It is, however, interesting to note that these coins were 
not widely circulated as means of payment, but accumulated as treasures by the rich 
pastoralists. They were hoarded in jars under the yurt or in wooden chests. Such 
treasures constituted an integral part of the bridewealth to be given to the parents of a 
prospective bride. Stories about wealthy individuals possessing fantastic treasures 
are still widely circulating in the area, but are hard to verify. 
Reports of 19th century travellers and adventurers, although often grossly 
exaggerated, perpetuate such stories. The British adventurer Fraser (1825:264/65) 
writes: 
I heard of one individual, considered the wealthiest man among the tribes, who 
was reported to be possessed of seven or eight hundred camels, and two camels 
loads of treasures; one consisting of money, the other of women's clothes, jewels 
of gold and silver, rich furniture. 
Pastoral surplus was invested in treasures, thus providing the owner with a 
certain aura of prestige and status- a sign of affluence. 
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Camel's milk, which was available for nearly ten months a year, played only a 
secondary role and was consumed as cal (duacal), fermented sour milk. It was kept 
in large jars or leather containers and constituted an imponant source of protein. 
With the decline of camel herds, it is hardly available nowadays. Camel's wool was 
worked into a very fine cloth used for men's overcoats (cekmen). It was used locally 
and not for exchange in the baztirs. 
Table 9 gives a breakdown of the animal population of the most imponant 
ethnic groups of Central Asia. Although the figures are of an earlier date than those 
collected in 1977 by the author, they still reveal the general trend and help to 
reconstruct conditions in Mingajik for earlier times. 
TABLE 9: COMPARATIVE HERD COMPOSITION OF SELECT CENTRAL 
ASIAN AREAS IN PERCENT AGE OF TOTAL ANIMAL POPULATION 
Area Horses Camels Cows Sheep Goats Donkeys 
Kirghizia 11.4 1.0 17.0 55.0 13.6 few 
Kazakhstan 15.0 1.0 21.1 51.0 8.4 -
Uzbekistan 9.0 1.8 26.0 44.0 17.0 6.0 
Tadjikistan 3.5 1.0 22.0 42.0 22.0 3.5 
Turkmenia 3.8 6.3 12.8 + + 3.1 
Mingajik 
area 3.7 3.4 5.4 * * 4.6 
Animal total0 110 102 160 * * 138 
. +sheep and goats combined 74% 
* sheep and goats combined 82.4% (2,438 animals) 
0 total number of animals of any kind for the Mingajik area 
Sources: Figures for Kazakhstan are for 1925 (Voshchinin, 1929, p.47) 
Other Soviet Republics for 1929 (Vsia Sredniaia Aziia 1926) 
Mingajik area: author's field data (October 1977). 
Pigs 
1.8 
2.0 
few 
few 
few 
none 
-
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It becomes obvious, that with the exeception of Turkmenia, which has similar 
conditions to the Mingajik area, the Central Asian regions had a more diversified 
ecology better suited to herding a variety of animals, a fact which proved to be 
beneficial in times of calamity or scarcity of natural resources. 
Contrary to the camel, the sheep/goats were initially more geared towards 
meeting subsistence needs. They were the prime producers of wool, skins, meat, 
grease (fatty tail) and fuel (manure, peska[). The autumn wool was worked into felts 
for use as yurt~coverings and horse~covers. The finer spring wool was woven into all 
kinds of bags and sacks used as storage containers in the yurts. Large~scale 
manufacture of carpets for sale in the baztirs is a later development which began 
earlier this century, as we shall see in the section on household economy. 
Only poor corva without substantial herds of camels for sale, would resort to 
selling products from sheep and goats in exchange for household commodities. The 
nature and extent of such transactions depended largely on the size of the economic 
unit. 
Today, the Qaraqul sheep is the main earner of cash ~ directly by way of the 
qaraqul skins (Persian lamb skins) and indirectly by way of carpets made from its 
wool. Nowadays the camel takes very much a secondary position and is only of 
some importance for weak economic units, mostly without any agricultural lands. 
Tables 10 and 11 illustrate the fact that sheep/goats form the largest part of the 
total herds of the Taghan lineages. They constitute 82.7 per cent of the total herd 
composition of the Taghan lineages examined by the author. 
In terms of the national economy, qaraqul skins are one of the main earners of 
foreign currency (US$18 million in 1973).11 Prices for the skins fluctuate from year 
to year, since fashions in the Western world dictate the trends for favoured colours, 
and thereby also the price. Thus the international Qaraqul auctions in Leningrad and 
London greatly influence the economic fate of this area. 
TABLE 10: PERCENTAGE OF MAJOR ANIMALS IN TOTAL HERD COMPOSITION OF EACH LINEAGE 
N arne of lineage Horses Camels Cows Sheep/Goats 
% % % % 
Hanamlar 4.3 3.8 2.5 85.2 
Sarelar 3.1 1.9 8.7 81.1 
Datxalar 5.3 1.8 5.3 75.9 
Nurseidlar 5.0 2.9 3.6 87.6 
Diihalar 1.8 5.3 7.2 79.7 
Erghaylar 2.7 4.1 - 91.2 
Sogdenlar 4.2 4.2 17.0 63.8 
Qullar 5.5 8.3 4.8 69.8 
-
Donkeys 
% 
4.0 
5.0 
2.7 
1.4 
5.7 
1.8 
10.6 
11.1 
N 
...... 
00 
TABLE 11: HERD COMPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPAL TAGHAN LINEAGES OF THE MINGAJIK AREA 
Name of lineage W!M/S Horses Camels Cows Sheep/Goats Donkeys Economic units 
Hanamlar w 44 39 26 866 41 26 
Sarelar w 32 20 89 831 52 25 
Datxalar w 6 2 6 85 3 5 N 
....... 
\0 
Nurseidlar w 7 4 5 120 2 6 
Dab alar w 5 14 19 209 15 7 
Erghaylar w 6 9 - 197 4 8 
So~denlar M 2 2 8 30 5 5 
Qullar s 8 12 7 100 16 9 
Total 110 102 160 2,438 138 91 
W=Watani M =Muhajirin S = Former slaves 
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A secondary source of income provided by sheep is their wool. The better 
quality spring wool is mostly worked into carpets for sale in the baziirs and the 
coarser autumn wool is turned into thick felts used for yurt and tam. Further 
marketable products from sheep are guts and droppings. Most herdsmen have too 
small a herd to use it as a regular supplier of meat. Therefore meat is only consumed 
on special occasions. Good use is made of sheep and goat's milk. 
Goats are mainly kept as flockleaders in order to maintain a steady pace of the 
combined sheep/goat herds in their movements between wells. 
Sheep and goats are always herded together. Their different grazing habits 
make them an efficient team for exploiting the sparse pastures. Goats are mainly 
browsing and tend to act as flockleaders, whereas sheep are grazing in close clusters, 
thereby ruining the pasture in a short time, if they are not kept moving. For this 
reason they are herded together with fast moving goats led by several bucks (tekke, 
serkii). 
The rams ¥e herded separately and only brought together with the herd in early 
October, in time for the last annual rutting season, thereby preventing untimely 
lambing of the ewes during the winter months. 
Figures concerning the ration of rams to ewes vary somewhat from area to area. 
In Taghan usually one ram is kept for every 45-50 ewes. 
The optimal size of a mixed sheep/goat herd is 500 animals. At this size, a 
maximal number of animals can be herded by a minimum of personnel (three men). 
Similar findings are also reported by Glatzer (1977) for the Pushtun nomads of 
Gha.Ijistan and by Tapper (1972) for the Sar-e-Pul area of Afghanistan. The lower 
level is given by the Ttirkmen as 200 animals. If the number falls beyond that limit 
the 'herd cannot stay healthy'. Similar observations were made by Swidler for the 
Brahui: 
Our Brahui infonnants report that when a sheep flock falls below 250 animals, it 
becomes more difficult to herd and the animals fare less well than they do in larger 
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flocks. They express it in terms of a 'wasting away' effect which seems to occur in 
small flocks. When I queried Frederik Barth about this for the Basseri, he reported 
that they too report 'sheep are not happy in too small groups, they spread and 
wander and join larger herds, they will not move predictably, in a body' (1972:74). 
No Ttirkmen was able to explain this curious behaviour, but Tribe (1950:74) 
gives some evidence that the ingestive behaviour of sheep varies directly with flock 
size. The Ttirkmen of Taghan usually herd all sheep/goats of a bir ata in one flock. 
Should a bir ata not have enough animals to form a viable herd, they will join a flock 
of another lineage and take turns in herding them (gesekna). 
While in the field, it was often mentioned, that with a flock of 50-60 sheep, an 
economic unit would be viable without any other economic pursuits. It becomes 
obvious from the economic profile of Taghan (see appendix 5) that only very few 
units reach that ideal number. Most of them take on supplementary economic 
pursuits to diversify their income, the most prevalent being marginal agriculture, the 
sale of.yandok (bushes from the steppe used as fodder and fuel) and wage-labouring 
contracts. 
In the desert-steppe area of Taghan, nobody owned herds consisting of hundreds 
or thousands of sheep and goats. The rich bays of Carshangu, however, present a 
different picture. They invest some of their surplus into huge flocks of Qaraqul 
sheep which are kept under the surveillance of professional herdsmen. To invest in 
such large herds, the owner will need to possess a truck to regularly provide his 
herdsmen with stores, at times water and in winter often with supplementary fodder 
for the animals. Such large herds are usually tended far away from the owner's 
village. 
The Sogdenlar, Dahalar and Qullar (lineage of former slaves) are existing 
without any agricultural land. Table 11 reveals that their herds contain a large 
number of camels and donkeys. The reason for this phenomenon is the fact that their 
income largely depends on sotorkasi, collecting of bushes and shrubs in the desert-
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steppe, and transporting them by camel to the bazlir, where they are sold as firewood 
or fodder. In this case the donkeys are used as mounts for the caravaneers. 
Most economic units pursue this activity to a limited extent to secure a store of 
fodder and firewood for the winter months. It is, however, only for their own needs 
and not to generate a cash income. 
Let us now compare the livestock holdings of two different lineages: all 
economic units of the Erghaylar own some agricultural land, whereas the Qullar 
are all landless. Of all the Taghan lineages the Qullar own the largest number of 
camels (8.3 per cent) and the Erghaylar the largest number of sheep/goats (91.2 per 
cent). 
TABLE 12: THE ANIMAL WEALTH OF THE ERGHAYLAR 
Economic unit Horses Camels Goats/Sheep Donkeys People* 
M F 
1 2 20 53 1 5 2 
2 1 1 
3 2 5 1 3 1 
4 1 2 3 1 2 
5 2 3 1 
6 1 1 
7 1 3 40 1 2 5 
8 1 1 10 60 1 2 2 
9 3 2 2 
Total 6 9 77 118 4 20 16 
Note: * figure includes children of both sexes 
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Economic units 3, 7, 9 heavily rely on sotorkasi for their livelihood. Unit 7 also 
hires out its camels as beasts of burden on a daily basis. Unit 8, possessing only one 
camel, but a sizeable flock of sheep (the largest of the whole lineage) mainly uses his 
camel to accumulate a store of fodder and fuel for the winter months. Unit 6 consists 
of a bachelor who is not a resident of the oba , but works as muzdur for a rich 
Tilrkmen of another lineage. 
All economic units of the Erghay bir ata own some agricultural land, and 
together with the Hanarnlar and other Taghan lineages, a share in the ejora 
(communally rented land) from the Afghan Government. 
Most of the agricultural land was bought by the father of the present lineage-
head in the 1930s. At that time the lineage met severe financial difficulties, since an 
epidemic had killed a large part of their herds (fully nomadic at that time), and 
secondly because of heavy spending on dancing boys maintained by the deceased 
brother of the present lineage-head. This debauchery led to quarrels and the killing 
of two people. The rest of the lineage wealth was used to pay bribes to government 
officials in order to shorten the prison term of the brother. It must be recalled that 
the lineage acts as a corporate group and as such is responible for the behaviour of its 
members, and faces the consequences in case of misconduct. 
At the time of impoverishment, the Erghay lineage was seriously considering 
migration to the Qattaghan region (Northeastern Afghanistan) where a sizeable 
community of Kara Tilrkmen (Taghan lineages) had already settled after fleeing the 
USSR earlier this century. Migration of the Tilrkmen mainly takes place as chain 
migration, that is, through kinship networks. The idea of migrating to another region 
was finally abandoned on request of the senior women, especially the mother and 
elder sister of the present lineage-head. Their argument was, better to die 
impoverished on one's own pastoral lands than to take up a sedentary agricultural 
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existence in an unfamiliar and ethnically mixed surrounding, which entails living in 
walled compounds.12 
Economic unit 5 is the weakest and poorest of the whole chart. It can be taken 
from Table 12, that the only livestock owned are two sheep. The reason for this 
deplorable condition can be found in the opium addiction of the household-head. 
This habit makes him lethargic and sick for most of the time, thus unable to work 
and care for his family. He is heavily indebted in order to buy raw opium (goknar) 
to support his habit. This economic unit is mostly depending on charity from 
kinsmen. 
TABLE 13: THE ANIMAL WEALTH OF THE QULL~R 
(FORMER SLAVES OF THE ERGHAY AND TSEFSAK) 
Economic unit Horses Camels Goats/Sheep Donkeys Cows 
1 1 4 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 
4 2 2 10 1 4 4 
5 2 1 3 
6 1 2 10 1 
7 1 3 70 2 3 
8 1 2 
9 2 5 2 
Total 8 12 100 16 7 
Note: * figure includes children of both sexes 
People* 
M F 
3 2 
4 3 
5 2 
10 6 
4 2 
1 1 
3 4 
4 1 
1 1 
35 22 
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Compared with the Erghaylar the Qullar are economically worse off. The main 
difference lies in the fact that the Qullar own no agricultural land. Those economic 
units possessing camels and donkeys rely very heavily on sotorkasi as their means of 
livelihood, and the female members of these units engage in carpet-making on a full-
time basis. With the exception of economic unit 7, they do not own sheep to produce 
the wool needed for the carpets- they secure it from Ttirkmen or Uzbak bays, often 
in a chain of rather detrimental credit arrangements which tie them to their creditors 
for a lifetime. Full details of this credit-system will be given in the section on 
household economy. 
Many men of this lineage work as wage-labourers (muzdur) for rich muhaj irin 
Ttirkmen in the Aqcha/Carshangu region. 
It is interesting to note that the most affluent economic unit, number 7, is 
managed by a female household-head, a widow of 51. Her three sons, aged 18, 14 
and 10 fully engage in sotorkasi with their three camels, whereas her two daughters 
aged 17 and 7 weave carpets. Adding to the burden of this unit is the handicapped, 
seventy-year old sister-in-law of the present household-head. She was born without 
legs. In this harsh environment, it is extremely difficult to care for people who are 
not able to contribute to the economic viability of the unit. 
As can be taken from the above tables, cattle do not play an important part in the 
overall herd composition of the Mingajik lineages, mainly because of the 
unsuitability of the vegetation of the desert-steppe belt. Poor fodder conditions 
render a very low milk-yield. The economic units herding cattle mostly own a small 
patch of alfalfa near an irrigation canal or in a moist, depressed area. However, the 
percentage of cattle in the overall herd composition would be higher for the rich 
Tlirkmen bays, since they have access to suitable pasture. 
The high percentage of cattle for Turkmenia (Table 9) is due to the fact that 
cattle were kept in oases surrounding urban centres mainly inhabited by corva. 
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Grazing conditions in these areas were more suited to cattle-breeding. In Taghan, 
some economic units were also herding the cattle of rich Ti.irkmen bays on a seasonal 
basis. Contrary to shepherding-contracts, cattle-herding-arrangements rank very low 
in the pecking order of Ti.irkmen occupations. 
Remarkable is the high incidence of donkeys in the Taghan area. This high 
figure is an indicator of the general impoverishment of the Taghan lineages mainly 
due to overgrazing and bad economic management. With increasing economic 
decline, the number of horses gradually declined. In the difficult desert-steppe 
environment of Taghan, donkeys are better adapted than horses and cheap to keep, in 
fact often fending for themselves. In the whole area surveyed, there was only one 
buzkasi horse; 13 therefore, with the exception of one, all horses figuring in the above 
tables are mounts of inferior quality, often in a deplorable state, due to lack of 
fodder. Figures would be considerably different for the rich muhajirin areas of 
Aqcha and Carshangu which are inhabited by rich landowners. In this area, buzkasi 
horses, the ultimate prestige-item, are on the increase. The rich landowners are 
investing their surplus from large-scale agropastoralism in buzkasi-horses . They are 
expensive to keep, since they have to be fed on a diet of barley, eggs, alfalfa and 
grease, and bring no economic return (for details on the prestige aspect of buzkasi 
horses see chapter on politics). 
Table 9 reveals that in all areas of Soviet Central Asia, a small percentage of 
pigs is included in the data. The Central Asian Republics, although dominated by a 
Muslim population, contain small pockets of Armenian Christians and a sizeable 
number of atheist administrators of Slavonic stock, who do not disdain eating pork. 
In Afghanistan, however, in strict accordance with Islamic teachings and precepts, 
no pigs are raised. 
The most common uses of domestic animals kept by the Ti.irkmen of 
Afghanistan are presented in Table 15, which is quite self-explanatory. 
Name of lineage W/M/S 
Hanamlar w 
Sarelar w 
Datxalar w 
Nurseidlar w 
Dahalar w 
Erghaylar w 
Sogdenlar M 
Qullar s 
Average per 
economic unit 
W=Watani 
TABLE 14: NUMBER OF ANIMALS PER ECONOMIC UNIT 
Horses Camels Cows Sheep/Goats Donkeys 
1.6 1.5 1.0 33.3 1.5 
1.2 0.8 3.5 33.2 2.0 
1.2 0.4 1.2 17 0.6 
1.1 0.6 0.8 20 0.3 
0.7 2.0 2.7 29.8 2.1 
0.75 1.1 - 24.6 0.5 
0.4 0.4 1.6 6 1.0 
0.88 1.3 0.77 11.1 1.7 
0.98 1.01 1.44 21.9 1.21 
- -
M = Muhajirin S = Former slaves 
Economic units 
26 
25 
5 
6 
7 
8 
5 
9 
N 
N 
-.1 
Type Transport 
Sheep -
Goats 
-
Camels - children and 
women 
- grain and fuel 
Horses -men 
Donkeys -men of poor 
families 
-women and 
children 
-camp gear 
Catlle -plowing 
Dogs 
-
--
TABLE 15: USES OF MOST COMMON DOMESTIC ANIMALS 
Meat Milk and milk products Hides/wool Social function 
- religious sacrifice - fresh and sour milk -wool - bride-wealth 
-visitors - curd (qruJ) - qarakul skins - prestige if very large herd 
- celebrations - yoghurt, cheese -carpets 
- food (in rich -pouches 
households) -felts 
- medicinal purposes 
-visitors - cheese, fresh and sour milk, -water bags -
-food cunl - milk churns 
-rarely -fermented milk (diio tal) - wool for mens' coats, - bride-wealth 
leather for shoes, whips -prestige (if large herd) 
-boots - camel fights 
- - -
- high status and prestige, 
especially if fme 
buzlwsi horse 
- - - -
-seldom - sour and fresh milk, cheese, - hides for shoes - indicator of wealth (avail-
curds, etc. ability of good pasture) 
- - - - guarding of camps and 
herds, hunting, 
-dog fights 
--------
Occasions when sold 
- cash need for household 
purchases (sugar, 
clothing, grains, 
tobacco, 
- payment of taxes 
- same as above 
- need for cash (for 
taxes and fmes) 
- extremely dire need 
- impoverishment 
-
- large purchases 
-
N 
N 
00 
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Summing up we can say that sheep/goats generally form the mainstay of the 
herds of most of the Taghan lineages of the Desert-Steppe Zone. 
A high percentage of camels in the overall herd-composition generally indicates 
that probably no or very little agricultural land is owned to diversify economic 
activities. In such cases a high dependence on sotorkasi- on the desert-steppe freely 
accessible to anyone - is prominent. With the exception of the Daha, Sogden and 
Qul, all lineages own some irrigated agricultural land which allows diversification of 
economic activities, thereby creating more security and stability. In general terms, 
the decrease of camels is correlated with an increase of agricultural pursuits. 
The following Table 16 sums up the principal means of livelihood of the Taghan 
lineages examined. A detailed analysis of all possible variables will be presented in 
the section on household economy. 
TABLE 16: SUMMARY OF THE MAIN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE 
T AGHAN LINEAGES 
Name of lineage Landownership Pastoralism Carpets Sotorka.Si* 
Erghaylar Yes Yes Little Little 
Dahalar No Yes Much Much 
So~denlar No Little Little Much 
Qullar No Little Much Much 
Hanamlar Yes Yes Yes Little 
Sarelar Very little Yes Yes Little 
Note:* All lineages pursue sotorkaJi to accumulate stores for fodder and firewood for 
their own use in winter. In this table only sotorkaJi as a means of generating cash-
income is taken into account. 
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THE YEARLY AGROPASTORAL CYCLE OFTAGHAN 
The Tiirkrnen agropastoral year can be divided into three different, partly 
overlapping kinds of activities requiring different skills and a different labour-force. 
For a summary of all activities see Table 17. 
a) Agricultural activities 
In most areas of Afghanistan irrigated (abi) agriculture and dry-farming (lalmi) 
are practiced. In Taghan dry-farming is negligible, mainly due to climatic 
conditions. Since rainfall is often erratic in this arid region, labour would be wasted 
on dry land if no yields will come forth. In years of plentiful and timely rainfall or 
when spring flashfloods water a large portion of the lalmi fields surrounding the 
Taghan obas, a lot of acreage is put under cultivation. Normally, however, this land 
is used as grazing ground for sheep, goats and cattle. 
As far as the irrigation-agriculture is concerned, the Tiirkrnen of Taghan practise 
a simple three-year crop rotation. In the first year a given field is planted with aq 
ekin crops, that is winter wheat or barley. The following year the same field will 
contain a crop of gok ekin such as sesame, melons, lucerne, cotton or linseed. 
During the third year, the plot is left fallow. Generally the Taghan people do not use 
any artificial fertilizer because of its high cost. After a field has been harvested, the 
sheep and goats are left to graze on the stubble, thus providing some manure. 
Poor families with little acreage immediately sow a gok ekin crop once barley or 
winter wheat are harvested, thereby making more intensive use of their land 
resources. 
The bays can afford to leave their fields fallow every second year, but otherwise 
follow the traditional crop rotation from aq ekin to gok ekin. 
Agricultural Jadi Dalwa 
activities 22.12-20.01 21.01-19.02 
Wheat sowing sowing 
Barley 
Linseed/ 
flax 
Sesame 
Melons/ 
watennelon 
Cotton 
Alfalfa 
(lucerne) 
Fruits 
Mung bean 
Silk 
production 
-·----
TABLE 17: THE YEARLY AGROPASTORAL CYCLE OF TAGHAN 
Hut Hamal Sawr Jawza Sara tan AssOO Sunbula Mizan 
20.02-20.03 21.03-20.04 21.04-21.05 22.05-21.06 22.06-22.07 23.07-22.08 23.08-22.09 23.09-22.10 
harvest harvest sowing sowing 
harvest harvest 
sowing harvest 
sowing harvest 
sowing sowing harvest harvest 
ihi /almi 
sowing sowing harvest 
sowing harvest harvest harvest 
mulberries almonds nuts 
collected 
and dried 
sowing sowing harvest harvest 
eggs of sale of 
silk worms cocoons 
bought 
Aqrab 
23.10-21.11 
sowing 
sowing 
harvest 
pomegranates 
Qows 
22.11-21.1 2 
sowing 
sowing 
N 
w 
...... 
TABLE 17: THE YEARLY AGROPASTORAL CYCLE OF TAGHAN (cont.) 
Pastoral Jadi Dalwa Hut Hamal Sawr Jawza Sara tan Assad Sunbula Mizan 
activities 22.12-20.01 21.01-19.02 20.02-20.03 21.03-20.04 21.04-21.05 22.05-21.06 22.06-22.07 23.07-22.08 23.08-22.09 23.09-22.10 
Stock protection lambing sale of preparation collection collection breaking in 
raising of animals skins of milk ofyandok ofyandok of buzkasi 
in corrals shearing products for fuel and for fuel horses 
of camels shearing fockb- and fodder 
of sheep rams 
preparation sale of brought 
of milk preparation yandok together 
products of milk with ewes 
products 
horses and 
donkeys 
foal 
first 
shearing 
of sheep 
Domestic cleaning, cleaning, cleaning, carpet- carpet- carpet- felt- felt -making, 
activities carding+ carding -t carding+ making making making making 
spinning spinning spinning repair of 
of wool of wool of wool yurt felts 
making 
reed-
matting 
for yurts 
Aqrab 
23.10-21.11 
2nd sheep 
shearing 
cleaning 
wooden 
frames of 
yurts 
repair of 
tams 
(coating of 
roofs with 
adobe) 
Qows 
22.11 -21.12 
protection 
of animals 
in corrals, 
hunting of 
antelopes 
and hares 
for meat 
tv 
w 
tv 
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The richest agricultural entrepreneurs of the Mingajik area owning large tracts 
of land, technical know-how and machinery, no longer follow the traditional crop 
rotation. They select their annual types of crops according to the laws of the market, 
that is supply and demand of a given commodity. 
Many families own small, walled-in iibi fields (hayata) near the irrigation 
canals. In some cases these fields form part of the walled-in dwellings. In most 
cases these hayata contain small orchards of apricot and almond trees and a 
vegetable plot. 
After New Year (21 March) many fields are plowed with a simple wooden plow 
drawn by oxen or working horses. Since these archaic plows are not very efficient 
only shallow furrows can be made so that the same field often has to be plowed 
twice, for better results. A wooden board with spikes on which a man would stand to 
add weight serves as harrow and a similar board without spikes is used to smooth the 
surface after sowing the crop. 
Alfalfa, cotton and iibi melons are the first crops to be sown. These tasks are 
followed by harvesting the wheat and barley sown during the previous winter. Then 
it is time to plant lalmi melons and sesame. At the end of autumn the ground is 
prepared for winter wheat and barley. 
In the Taghan area, cotton is not a common crop, mainly for lack of sufficient 
water. During a vegetation period of approximately 180 days, cotton fields must be 
watered 4-6 times. Only bays with large fields and consequently a large share of 
water can afford this crop. Furthermore cotton planting and especially harvesting is 
extremely labour intensive. Only very few people in Taghan could muster the 
required labour pool. 
The whole agricultural year consists of a sequence of sowing, harvesting and 
preparing the soil. By the end of November all the agricultural tasks are complete. 
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The selection of crops that can be grown in Taghan is limited due to a restricted 
water supply. The most important crops are the staples winter wheat and barley. 
Melons and linseed can be grown with little water and are therefore second in the 
pecking order followed by lucerne in third place. 
This choice of crops is quite consistent with the figures I got from the 
government agriculturalist for the whole Woluswali of Mingajik of which the 
Taghan obas are a part. According to government statistics the following crops were 
planted in 1976: 
5,765 ha of winter wheat 
1,485 ha of barley 
1,190 ha of flax/linseed 
280 ha of alfalfa /lucerne 
230 ha of cotton 
185 ha of sesame 
176 ha of melons 
16 ha of grapes (mostly in hayata plots). 
Figure 11 shows the types of crops under cultivation in Tag han in 1977. A 
glimpse at the sketch reveals a predominance of yellow areas, that is fallow fields. 
All the /almi areas had not been under cultivation for many years due to lack of 
timely rainfall or flashfloods. Consequently the natural vegetation, mostly Ilak 
(Carex physodes), Kandym (Calligonum densum), Singren (Astralagus), Kumarcik 
(Agrophyllum latifolium) and spurge (Emphorbia cheirolepsis), was used as pasture 
or dry fodder for sheep and goats. 
The 200 jerib of irrigated land (see Figure 12) of the Erghaylar are jointly 
owned by the Erghay bir ata. Each member, according to his agnatic descent, owns 
a certain percentage of the land inherited from his ancestors. The largest share is 
owned by the informal leader of the group. This land was acquired in the early years 
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of this century when animal stock and cash reserves of the bir ata were depleted. As 
explained earlier, two brothers had to be ransomed out of jail because of a homicide. 
In 1977 one third of the land was kept fallow, one third was planted with barley 
and winter wheat, and the rest contained crops of melon and sesame. As far as the 
agricultural tasks were concerned, each shareholder would put in labour according to 
the size of his share. 
During the last thirty years, some of the Erghaylar also acquired or inherited 
personal plots of land (hayata) (on Figure 11 mentioned with names of owners) 
which are worked individually. Since 1976/1977 were very arid years and 
customarily small individual plots only have access to small shares of irrigation-
water, crops using little water, such as linseed, melons and alfalfa were planted. 
Only the informal leader, possessing the largest plot (ergo the largest share of water) 
was able to cultivate winter wheat on his individual field. 
The 600 jerib-irrigated land jointly owned by the Hanam bir ata are treated in a 
different way, that is according to the sanasiq system. Each fall the land is divided 
into new parcels and the individual parcels allocated to the individual shareholders 
by a kind of lottery. The plots are then individually tilled and harvested. As a rule, 
the 600 jerib must be cultivated with the same crop, since the water share is owned 
communally. It would be extremely difficult and wasteful only to irrigate certain 
parcels at certain times. (For a description of the sanasiq system in Turkmenia see 
Konig 1962:122 pp.) This land was acquired by one of the Hanam ancestors when 
the oba, like the Erghay, was forced to dispose of large amounts of animal wealth 
and other property, to keep some of their members out of jail. Due to inheritance 
· patterns, the land became more and more fragmented and nearly unprofitable to till 
and secure enough water. In order to counteract further fragmentation all 
descendents of a minimal lineage have now access to a plot which is no longer 
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divisible and needs to be managed in the manner described above. Incidentally, land 
in earlier time was only bought by impoverished pastoralists in times of crisis. 
The adjacent Hanam hayata fields are owned individually and tilled by each 
owner according to the current crop rotation system. In 1977 (see Figure 11) 60 per 
cent of the Hanam hayata were kept fallow due to lack of water. In more favourable 
years, usually only one third is kept fallow. The remaining 40 per cent were under 
gok ekin cultivation, which with the exception of the 15 per cent cotton, need less 
water than aq ekin crops. 
Since agricultural tasks often coincide with work in the pastoral sector, a fairly 
large labour-force is needed, especially in the case of domestic units with large 
landholdings and substantial herds. 
Obviously households with greater labour resources have a better chance of 
accumulating wealth and diversifying economic activities. Households with an 
insufficient labour-force can make use of labour-pooling to muster labour beyond the 
household level, especially for labour-intensive tasks such as harvesting, threshing or 
in the pastoral and domestic sectors shearing of sheep, constructing and repairing of 
tams or making felts. To accomplish such tasks, the co-operation of other agnatic 
households may be enlisted, which, by virtue of their kin ties are bound to co-
operate. Usually neighbouring obas are participating as well. This kind of labour-
pooling is called kOmiik (help) and is not limited to kinsmen. Anyone with time to 
spare or interested in establishing or renewing social ties with a given domestic unit 
may participate. No fmancial pay is involved, but participants receive a hot meal 
and tea. However, a komiik entails reciprocity. In other words, if household X sends 
people to participate in the komiik of domestic unit Y, X knows that it can count on 
receiving an equal number of labourers for an equal amount of time should it decide 
to organize a komiik. 
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As a rule, a komak only lasts one day; whoever needs help for a longer period 
will have to organize subsequent labour-pools. He can, however, not count on 
participation of the same people. This form of assistance-pooling is also known 
among other ethnic groups of Afghanistan, notably the Hazaras of Central 
Afghanistan (for details see Canfield 1973:74pp.) and the Pashtun of Western 
Afghanistan (see Glatzer 1977:83pp.). 
In the domestic, female arena, a komak is called umma. A typical occasion for 
arranging an umma is the making of felts in the fall. Usually many more women 
participate than are actually needed to do the job, for an umma provides a welcome 
opportunity for a social get-to-gether, meeting friends, discussing potential brides, 
exchanging news and gossip. The social dimensions are in fact more important than 
the economic aspects. 
In some cases widows or other poor people might participate in an umma. Since 
they will not claim reciprocity for want of any means of production, they receive, 
besides a hot meal and tea, some 30 Afs. per day for their services. 
Domestic units with large landholdings usually let one or more sharecroppers 
(dekhan) till part or all of their land. Various types of tenancy arrangements exist, 
but the following are the most common: 
Yarpi dekhancelik (Dari: nesbakari) 
Under this type of agreement, the landlord gives seeds, water and pays the land-
tax, whereas the tenant farmer provides labour, tools and draft animals. At the time 
of harvest, the crops are shared with one half going to the landlord and the other to 
the tenant farmer. Tenancy agreements are always for one year, but renewable for 
further periods after each harvest. 
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In the case of the Erghay bir ata, the informal leader employs one of his 
brothers and his brother-in-law - both owning very little land and no herds as 
sharecroppers. 
In the Mingajik area most sharecropping agreements are of the yarpi 
dekhancelik type. 
In other regions, however, the landowner provides seeds, tools, draft animals or 
agricultural machinery and pays the land-tax. The tenant only provides his labour. 
In this case the landlord receives 3/4 and the tenant 1/4 of the harvest. This system is 
mostly applied by bays possessing agricultural machinery. 
If supplementary labour is needed for a longer period than the traditional komak 
system would allow to muster, wage-labourers (muzdur) are employed for the 
required time. 
Depending on the skills of the wage-labourer and the nature of the tasks to be 
performed, he may earn 25-30 Afs. per day with full board and lodging. He is also 
entitled to a set of clothing per year consisting of the following pieces: 
2 sets of Ttirkmen pants and shirts (kuynii.k bolak) 
1 coat ( capan) 
1 pair of Ttirkmen boots (miiza) 
1 pair of Ttirkmen leather shoes 
1 heavy winter coat (cakman) 
In Taghan many muzdurs are impoverished agnatic or affmal (seldom) relatives. 
Should the muzdur be a relative, the obligation to care for his needs and well-being 
are obviously stronger than with a stranger. 
The various types of labour arrangements can be graphically summed up as 
follows: 
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Komiik 1 umma = reciprocal assistance 
LABOUR I FOOD 
LABOUR/FOOD 
per diem food 
Muzdur-contracts = wage labour contracts 
landlord 
LABOUR 
muzdur 
Unit B 
widow, poor kin or non-kin 
without own means of 
production 
CASH 
CLOTIDNG 
BOARD+ LODGING 
By the end of Aqrab most agricultural tasks are completed. Summing up we can 
say that seven months of the year are busy and labour-intensive and the remaining 
five months quiet and with extensive labour requirements. 
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Since agricultural pursuits in Taghan are completely dependent on water from 
irrigation-canals and timely rainfalls, the yields vary greatly from one year to 
another. 
Most informants asked were not able to come up with consistent figures as far as 
crop yields were concerned. I have, therefore, asked the government agriculturalist 
in charge of the Mingajik District to provide indicative figures for an average yield. 
1977 was a year with little water, thus yields would not have been as good as the 
following government figures provide: 
Yields per jerib (=0.195 hectares= 0.482 acres) 
winter wheat 196 kg or 14 ser-kalan 
barley 210 kg or 15 ser-kalan 
alfalfa 770 kg or 55 ser-kalan 
cotton 224 kg or 16 ser-kalan 
flax/linseed 63 kg or4.5 ser-kalan 
sesame 28 kg or 2 ser-kalan 
melons 2,100 kg or150 ser-kalan 
b) Pastoral activities 
In Taghan all animals are owned individually, but often herded in groups of 
several owners in order to compose a viable herd as described in the previous 
section. Most of the Taghan obas own the land around their dwellings or have leased 
pasture areas from the government. The steppes close to the desert-steppe fringe are 
open to all. 
The Taghan have never undertaken long range migrations with their animals as 
is the case for many of the Afghan nomads. As a rule, their herds are small. The 
pasture in a radius of about 15 kms provides sufficient fodder, and a network of wells 
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enough water all year round. The Ti.irkmen know the ecology of their environment 
very well and therefore make effective use of the plant cover of the different areas of 
the steppe (co/) at any given season. Making good use of their habitat thus enables 
them to use the same pastures all year round following a predetermined rotation 
pattern. 
Young boys of the herdowners (in the case of joint herds) are taking turns in 
looking after the herds in summer and fall. Around noon the flocks (sheep and 
goats) are driven to the wells, separated into groups according to ownership and 
watered. 
The herding pattern is entirely different for the large-scale pastoralists owning 
5,000-10,000 sheep and goats. Such large flocks are in the care of a team of 
professional herdsmen. They need huge grazing areas usually located far away from 
the homebase. I was informed that in a good year they shift their pasture area about 
four times. In the middle of October, the herd is divided into a number of smaller 
units (bolok) and driven closer to the homebase. This will facilitate the provisioning 
of the herding teams with edibles and at times with drinking water. It needs to be 
recalled that the herds are kept in the open all year. 
The rams are brought to the herds once a year in the middle of October. During 
the rest of the year, they are kept in pens in order to prevent untimely mating and 
consequently untimely lambing in winter. As a rule there are 18 rams per rama of 
ewes. Since the gestation period is five months, lambing begins in March when the 
pastures are in full bloom and the grass at its best. 
Contrary to many other sheep raising groups of Afghanistan, the Ti.irkmen of the 
Mingajik area mainly keep herds of Qaraqu/ sheep (Persian lamb). They are raised 
for the skin of the newborn lambs. Wool is only a secondary product. 
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In the herding cycle, the months from Hamal to Aqrab are the busiest. Work in 
the pastoral domain also coincides with tasks in the agricultural sector, so large 
labour pools and a meticulous time management are mandatory to succeed. 
The lambing season begins in the month of Hamal (March/April). A few days 
after birth, 80 per cent of the lambs are slaughtered; 20 per cent of female lambs are 
kept to make up for the sale of older ewes in summer, in order to keep up a constant 
overall size of the herd. This is an extremely labour-intensive period and many 
hands are required to milk the ewes, process the milk and the meat of the lambs as 
well as the skins. 
Traditionally a strict division of labour according to sexes was observed. Men 
were in charge of herding, protecting the flocks and slaughtering the lambs as well as 
salting the carcasses for air-drying. Men also protect the herds from wolves and 
other predators which are especially numerous during the lambing season. The 
agricultural sector is entirely in male hands. 
Women are in charge of milking the animals and processing the milk into a 
variety of more or less durable products such as curds, cheese, butter, yoghurt and 
qrut (a kind of dried cheese). 
In smaller, more traditional domestic units, women still stay with the flocks in 
the steppes from Hamal on for about three to four months. As I could gather from 
rather emotional accounts of senior women, this was a happy (probably often 
romanticized ) time with plenty of food and social interaction with neighbouring 
domestic units. 
In the course of economic and social change, the big agropastoralists with 
thousands of sheep herded far away from their homebase by professional shepherds 
are no longer letting their females join in the spring migrations. The tasks formerly 
performed by their own women and daughters are now carried out by hired male and 
female Afghan nomads with whom they share common pasture and wells in the 
245 
steppes. In fact a kind of symbiotic relationship has developed between the two 
ethnic groups. The Afghans provide services otherwise provided by Ttirkmen 
women and the Ttirkmen bays are acting as middlemen as far as the marketing of 
qaraqul skins is concerned; in other words they buy large numbers of skins from the 
Afghan nomads which they then sell with a considerable profit in the baztir of Kabul. 
Such transactions are possible due to the fact that the Ttirkmen bays have invested 
part of their surplus in Russian trucks and lorries which they do not only use for their 
own benefit but also for transporting goods of others against a fee. In many areas the 
truck has replaced the service of the camel. 
Well organized logistics are a pre-requisite for keeping big herds, since the 
dozens of shepherds and assistants have to be regularly supplied with food and water 
at their distant locations in the steppe. In severe winters supplementary fodder for 
the flocks has also to be carted to the pasture sites, which at this time are somewhat 
closer to the homebase. In fact logistic arrangements of this calibre would hardly be 
possible with camels and donkeys. 
In this context it is interesting to note that large-scale professional (as opposed 
to family-based) herding of Qaraqul sheep is a consequence of economic changes 
since the influx of refugees earlier this century, and of a closer integration of the 
Ttirkmen local economy into the national market economy of Afghanistan. 
The same phenomenon has also been observed for other Central Asian 
pastoralists. Konig (1962:41) mentions that substantive increases in animal holdings 
have their origin in the colonial situation: 
Charakteristisch fur die tschorva (Nomaden)-wirtschaft vor der Russischen 
Eroberung waren die Viehziichterwirtschaften mit einem maximalen Viehbestand 
bis zu 400-500 Schafen und 10-40 Kamelen. Die ausgesprochenen Bai-
wirtschaften mit Tausenden von Schafen ... umfassenden Herden entwickelten sich 
erst nach Anschluss des Landes an Russland, eine Erscheinung, die auch Markov 
bei den Viehziichtern der Choresmischen Oase feststellte. 
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Soon after the lambing season-work is completed, the first shearing of the sheep 
takes place. Smaller herdowners might call a karnak to muster enough labour, 
whereas the richer Ttirkrnen are hiring wage-labourers from among Arab (see 
Chapter 4, fn.ll) and Afghan communities to do the job. The supplementary 
labourers are paid a daily wage and provided food and lodging in a yurt. The chief 
herdsman and his helpers are supervising the shearing teams and watching that no 
wool is set aside for personal gains. Meanwhile at the homebase owners of camels 
are shearing them to sell the wool for good cash. 
The Ttirkrnen of Taghan are still observing strict labour division according to 
sexes. Agricultural work is considered men's work, since it implies moving outside 
the domestic spaces and entails dealings and transactions with outsiders and non-
kinsmen. Women do all the processing of animal products. Soon after the first 
shearing of the sheep, women start sorting, carding and spinning the spring wool, 
which is usually worked into carpets. As we shall see in a subsequent section, 
production of carpets plays a vital role in the domestic economy of most of the 
Taghan lineages. 
The coarser summer wool is worked into felts used for covering the yurts or as 
floorcoverings for the tams or horse-covers. Some surplus felts might be sold in the 
bazar for cash or traded for food grain. 
While the men are busy with the harvest of several crops, the women are 
carrying out repair- and cleaning work on the yurts. They are also in charge of 
harvesting and drying fruits and nuts from the walled garden and orchard plots 
(hayata). 
The raising of silkworms is not very popular in Taghan. Only few families 
would own sufficient mulberry-trees to guarantee a steady supply of leaves for the 
worms. No silk is processed in Taghan to date. There are, however, several villages 
in the Woluswali of Mingajik specializing in weaving and dying silkcloth for 
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women's headgear. Some also weave traditional silk ikats, once a prestige item of 
the rich and powerful. It is, however, a vanishing craft, as in other regions of Central 
Asia (notably the oasis towns of Chinese Central Asia, such as Khotan), since 
synthetic ikats from factories in Tashkent are flooding the markets. 
Before the onset of winter, the men repair the roof of the tams (men's domain, 
whereas the yurt is considered a female domain), waterproofing them with a new 
coat of adobe. 
During Assad and Sunbula (end of July till end of September) the collecting of 
steppe plants and bushes occupies a fair amount of male labour. Corrals for sheep 
and goats are built around the obas to protect the small herds from predators in 
winter. These steppe plants are used as fodder for the animals and fuel for the 
hearth. Collecting of yandok is hard work, since these bushes have to be brought by 
the camelload from far away places in the steppe. During the whole autumn, small 
children are busy collecting dry camel and sheep dung to serve as fuel. 
Pastoralists with more than fifty sheep and goats are also drying lucerne to use 
as supplementary fodder should a severe winter be indicated. Poorer households are 
collecting fuel and fodder in the steppes for sale in the market to supplement their 
income. 
Since the Mingajik area is devoid of forests, fuel, be it dried dung or dried 
steppe plants, always fetches a good price, thus providing a supplementary source of 
cash. A high percentage of households in Taghan avail themselves of this 
possibility. 
For the rich and powerful owning buzkasi horses, the prestige item par 
excellence, mid-September to mid-October is a busy time. The horses have to be put 
on a special diet of eggs and barley; contracts with a famous chapandaz (jockey) 
have to be made or renewed. Much time is spent on gradually breaking in the horses 
after their summer rest. The women are mobilized to prepare fine horse-blankets, 
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coverlets and other trimmings; bridles and harnesses (usually very precious 
heirlooms) have to be repaired and polished, in order to be ready for the buzkasi 
season. Since buzkasi horses and all the dealings and mythology surrounding them, 
play an important part in the status and power games of the rich watani and 
muhajirin alike, a special section will be devoted to this topic in the chapter on 
politics. 
Herdin~ contracts 
Among the Ti.irkmen, each herd (rama approx. 500-600 sheep) is cared for by 
three people. The herd may consist of animals belonging to one owner or be 
composed of animals of several owners. The herding staff may be recruited 
(especially in the latter case) from the domestic units of the owners or may consist of 
professional shepherds. 
Let us examine the situation of the professional herdsmen. The chief herdsman 
(cupon; Dari: copan) is assisted by a helper (colok) and a man in charge of watering 
the sheep (suci) . Under the supervision of the cupon, this troika is in charge of care 
and well-being of the flock. In case an animal is sick, the cupon has the authority to 
kill the sheep and divide the meat among his colleagues. In winter, when the plant-
cover is less dense and abundant, the rama is divided into several smaller units 
(bolok). New assistant herdsmen have to be recruited or, winter being a slack period 
as far as agropastoral activities are concerned, men of the owner-household(s) take 
turns in herding a bolok under the overall supervision of the chief shepherd. Each 
bolok is looked after by two persons, since predators are common and numerous in 
winter. 
A cupon is usually hired for a period of one year. Throughout Afghanistan 
various types of herding contracts exist. Among the Afghan nomads, herdsmen are 
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usually paid in sheep, that means a certain predetermined number of lambs are given 
as remuneration, usually 10 per cent of all the lambs born in a given season. In 
addition, clothing and flour are an integral part of the package. Accepting a herding 
contract may be seen as a transition period from the status of dependent youth living 
in his paternal household to that of a household-head. Since each cupon is a 
potential herd owner and future household head, his social ranking is equal to that of 
any other grown-up of similar age in the camp. They are, as Glatzer (1977:54) 
mentions, equal partners with their bosses, the herdowners, and consequently are 
accorded familiar treatment. In fact, herdsmen with outstanding knowledge in their 
domain may even influence the herdowners' decisions. Many young men not able to 
receive sufficient means to establish their own household and 'acquire' a bride from 
their own paternal domestic unit, usually resort to a herding contract. In that way, 
they can accumulate the economic base for their independence. 
The decisive factor in this context is the fact also mentioned by Konig (1962:89) 
for the Akhal Tekk:e Ttirkmen, that the herdsmen not only get paid in consumer 
goods which would keep them dependent, but in means of production, say animals. 
They afford him the possibility to reach independence. This marks the main 
difference between a tenancy and a service contract. Assuming a remuneration of 
20-25 lambs per year (good year), a frugally living cupon can accumulate the 
economic base for an individual household in about 4-6 years. Irons (1972:94pp) 
indicates similar possibilities for the Y omut of Iran to turn labour into 'capital'. This 
system is only valid for the chief herdsman of the Afghan nomads, since helpers and 
assistants are paid in cash. 
In Taghan the situation is quite different; nowadays cupon, colok and suci are 
paid in cash and not in animals. The chief herdsman receives about 10,000-12,000 
Afs. per year and the colok and suci some 7,000 Afs. each. Furthermore all types of 
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herding staff are supplied food and a thick felt coat (oilik, kiipiiniik) which at the 
same time serves as bedding. 
Statements of older informants indicate that earlier this century (probably before 
the influx of muhajirin and subsequent economic changes) remuneration for herding 
also contained an animal component. 
RITUALS SURROUNDING THE AGROPASTORAL CYCLE 
In contrast to the rich ritual observances surrounding the individual life cycle, 
few rituals are articulated with the agropastoral cycle. 
Remnants of pre-Islamic fertility cults are extant, but not linked in any yearly 
cyclical way. These relatively sporadic occurrences might be accounted for by the 
transition from a nomadic pastoral to a more sedentary agricultural pattern of life. 
On the other hand Barth (1961) notes an absence of ritual among the nomadic 
Basseri and concludes that the main ritual of the Basseri is to be seen in their spring 
migration. Tapper (1979), in his account of the Shahsavan of Azerbayjan, argues 
along similar lines. An analysis of the material from Taghan would not allow me to 
follow their argument, since the Ttirkrnen of Taghan never undertook long range 
migrations, but followed a pattern of short transhumant moves into the steppes. 
Furthermore, the Taghan are no longer nomadic pastoralists. 
At their present stage of development, human, animal and soil fertility seem to 
be the main indicators and elements of ritual behaviour surrounding the agropastoral 
year. Considering the difficult climatic conditions and ecological instability, this 
main theme centring around maintenance of fertility comes as no surprise. 
Nowruz, New Year, which falls on the 21st March, is one of the main festivals. 
Nowruz, marking the beginning of spring, the lambing season and the sprouting of 
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the winter crop obviously presents good reasons for celebration. At this time of the 
year, the pastures are at their best. Soon the scorching heat of the steppes starts 
drying up pasture, wells and irrigation-canals, thereby threatening the very existence 
of man, beast and crop. 
A noteworthy New Year's custom among many ethnic groups of Afghanistan 
including the Ti.irkmen of Taghan, is the preparation and exchange of semiliik, 14 a 
ritual food associated with inducing fertility, and assuring a rich harvest. It is a 
purely female ritual. As far as I could ascertain, this ritual bread was not known 
among pastoralists or descendants of pastoralists, but only to people in the 
agricultural sector. 
Wheat grain is washed in seven waters and left to sprout for seven days. The 
sprouts are then crushed and the pulp washed seven times in water and strained. The 
resulting liquid is the principal ingredient for the preparation of semiliik. Mixed with 
flour, sugar and raisins, it is formed into round balls which are then baked in the 
tandyr.15 The women of several closely related iiy usually pool their labour to 
prepare semiliik. As in all ritual surrounding fertility, old women with an established 
record of fertility, are in charge of the operation. The Ti.irkmen of Tag han attribute 
great fertility power to sprouting grain. I have often seen a barren woman rubbing a 
handful of sprouting wheat onto her abdomen to induce fertility. 
The finished semiliik are then distributed among kinsmen of closer and more 
distant sections, to induce fertility of their women, landed property and animals. 
Prosperity in Taghan is equalled to an abundant harvest, a large family and a healthy 
multiplying herd. 
Just as women are in charge of most ritual involving domestic, private fertility, 
senior men (yoshuli) are supposed to have special sacral power to enhance the 
fertility of agricultural fields. A Western observer might be tempted to explain this 
in terms of their more established knowledge of agricultural practices. A yoshuli 
PLATE 29: BASKET WITH SPROUTING WHEAT FOR SEMILAK 
PLATE 30: PREPARATION OF SEMILAK IN THE YURT 
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usually is in charge of plowing the first furrow and of planting the first seeds, after 
which he gives a patia (jateha) or blessing. 
Baba Dekhan (Grandfather farmer) is the pirl6 (patron saint) and protector of 
farmers. All ritual activities surrounding the agricultural cycle are dedicated to him. 
A special kind of diamond-shaped bread called boursek (or bogursak) is prepared for 
offerings to Baba Dekhan. 
He also is the central figure of the Khirman Tui (kind of thanksgiving feast) at 
which a ritual meal of shorwa (soup), boursek17 or palau is prepared for all the 
kinsmen and friends helping with the harvest of winter wheat and barley. Before the 
meal is eaten, it is dedicated to Baba Dekhan; and a yoshuli thanks him for having 
provided an abundant harvest. A token share of the harvested grain is then set aside 
for Baba Dekhan. 
Quite contrary to other pirs it is difficult to pin Baba Dekhan down and to 
establish his place in the hagiology. From what I could gather from my informants, 
he is a rather prosaic figure, a peasant among peasants. He is distinguished as 
supposedly the first farmer, who taught others the skills of tilling the soil. 
Allah, too, has a part in this mixture of Islamic and pre-Islamic ritual. When the 
harvested grain is divided among the sharecroppers and the landlords, the act of 
sacred purification of the harvest takes place. The Haq'ullah (Kauseng) (God's right: 
in other words, God's share) is set aside to thank him for protecting the crop. To me, 
this seems a secondary explanation of an older pre-Islamic phenomenon, which had 
to do with the ritual purification of the harvested grain to make it fit for human 
consumption. It must be remembered that to thresh the grain, animals (cows, horses, 
camels) are made to walk on the grain, an act which is considered to be highly 
polluting. 
The pile of grain set aside as haq'ullah is taken from all four sides of the main 
heap and then marked with a circle, a magic circle to protect it from hostile and 
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polluting supernatural forces. The act of taking a small amount of grain from the 
four sides (east, west, north, south) and putting it aside, effects the purification. In 
fact a closer examination of the A vesta, Vendidad VII, 52, 53 or VIII, 19 suggests 
that the supposedly Islamic ritual of haq'ullah might have its origin in Zoroastrian 
techniques of purification. 
We have seen in previous sections that various types of bread play an important 
part in Tiirkmen ritual and ritual exchanges. It is quite common among many 
farming people to surround bread, their staple, with special reverence, rules and 
ritual. In their belief, the grain grows as a consequence of a series of ritual 
applications and subsequently bread represents the sum total of magical properties. 
Among the Tlirkmen bread is therefore one of the common amulets against hostile 
supernatural forces (e.g. spirits and the evil eye).18 
Finally the harvest is sealed by a clump of clean, dried earth called barakar 
kdsdk, which marks the end of the purification rituai.19 
The pastoral cycle is even poorer in ritual observances. A significant yearly 
ritual event is the bringing together of the gaily painted and decorated rams with the 
flock of ewes at the end of October. During the rest of the year the rams are kept 
away from the ewes to prevent untimely lambing. The rams are well fed and 
protected with various kinds of amulets to safeguard their fertilizing power and to 
protect them from evil spirits. The day they are brought to the ewes, the cupon 
(shepherd) prepares a fire of dried wild rue plants (isfand, ddldrik) next to which he 
plants his shepherd's staff (cupon tayak) decorated with a white kerchief (yaltk). He 
then drives the united herd three times around the fire to fumigate the animals 
thereby freeing them from all evil spirits. At the same time an Eshan20 or a member 
of a sacred lineage recites the ayat of the patron of shepherds (Cupon Ata). Here 
again we have a purification ritual with distinct pre-Islamic features. 
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The bay now offers an abundant meal to his cupon and his helpers to thank them 
for the work they have performed during the year. The prosperity of a flock largely 
depends on a good cupon. His knowledge of pasture, climatic conditions and 
especially his honesty are vital for the bay and the well-being of the herds. A cupon 
can cause a herd to decrease rapidly by leaving sickness unchecked or by letting 
predators diminish the herds. A dishonest cupon may also dispose of part of the herd 
for his own benefit. In winter large packs of wolves threaten the flocks. To ward off 
this danger, the cupon not only relies on his gun, but also resorts to amulets attached 
near corrals to keep the wolves at bay. Wolves, however, are considered auspicious, 
if they attack a sick flock. The killing of one or two sick animals by a wolf is 
supposed to shake the others out of their lethargy and to restore them to health. 
Many proverbs and popular sayings attest to this phenomenon. 
Barth's definition of 'ritual as a symbolic aspect of actions in contexts vested 
with particular value' (Barth 1961) certainly is valid in this context of Taghan. In 
their agropastoral cycle, ritual occurs at points of crisis, at times of sickness, 
fertilization and calamity. 
As we have seen, the economic and social viability of the Tiirkmen uy depends 
on the fertility of its women, animals and land. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
the majority of ritual activities is concerned with inducing, maintaining fertility or 
with preventing evil spirits from tampering with various aspects of fertility. Fertility 
is, however, impossible without adequate water sources. For this reason, special 
attention is paid to the proper maintenance of water sources, be they wells or 
irrigation-canals. Water also has a specially allocated space in the yurt or the tam 
and precautions are taken to keep the watercontainers uncontaminated. Amulets are 
often kept near a well to prevent it from drying out and from getting contaminated by 
evil spirits. The vital importance of water becomes clear, if we consider the difficult 
arid environment in which a constant water supply can never be guaranteed. 
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Historical records and accounts by senior informants reveal that the area has 
been periodically stricken by severe droughts. A very severe drought in 1970/1971 
and a lesser one in 1976 brought many families to the verge of ruin. At that time 
neither pre-Islamic nor Islamic rituals and prayers for rain were of any use. Many 
families took to migrating to the northeastern part of Afghanistan. The ruined 
villages of Taghan and surroundings are silent witnesses of these migrations. 
DOMESTIC ECONOMY: PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION PATTERNS 
In Taghan the primary production unit is the household, which, in order to 
maintain its economic viability, assigns specific tasks to all members over the age of 
10. Boys are usually taking part in herding activities, whereas girls are initiated into 
the art of carpet-making by their older sisters, mothers or aunts. In poorer 
households witli a small labour-force, girls hardly able to walk are already put in 
charge of younger siblings and simple household chores. 
Each household, however, produces only part of what it consumes by applying 
the labour of its members to pastoral and/or agricultural or other economic activities. 
A strong dependence on the local hazar economy entails trading surplus agricultural 
and pastoral surplus for cash, household goods and clothing. Thus their economy 
has a direct subsistence and a cash surplus component. No family is able to cover all 
its needs through domestic production. Depending on the resources available, focus 
is either more on subsistence or exchange economy, but in both instances, families 
with a large labour-force are generally better off. A large labour-force provides a 
kind of security; pastoralism or agriculture are never able to guarantee in this 
hazardous physical environment entirely dependent on the clemency of weather and 
timely rainfall. 
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Glatzer (1977) mentions similar findings for the Pushtun nomads of Gharjistan. 
A household with an adequate labour-force and little or no productive resources can 
make a living by using its members as shepherds, tenant farmers (dekhans) or wage-
labourers (muzdur). As we shall see, a high percentage of families with an adequate 
number of able-bodied females are profitably engaged in producing carpets for the 
bazar trade, thereby securing a cash supply to purchase their commodities. Those uy 
claiming ownership of camels are either using them to transport loads for others 
against a fee or for doing sotorkasi (for details see below). Thus several possibilities 
exist for translating labour into capital. 
Figure 13, which is quite self explanatory, presents the functioning of the 
traditional Tiirkmen production unit with the major variables being labour-force, 
economic specialization, major products and production goals. 
As we shall see below, no clear cut lines exist between the various types of 
specializations. Most domestic units apply themselves to several occupations to 
make ends meet. A general pattern, however, emerges between families with titles 
to land and those without. As a matter of fact, families without land, small or no 
herds are usually seeking a variety of wage-labour contracts and rely heavily on 
carpet-making as their primary source of income. Families with a large labour-pool 
or with the means of recruiting outside labour are, as a rule, better off than those with 
a limited labour-force. 
Stockbreeding provides basic foods such as milk in various fresh and processed 
forms. In Taghan meat is not frequently consumed, since no economic unit owns a 
herd large enough to deplete it for consumption purposes. Households with a 
substantial cash income are usually able to buy some meat from itinerant butchers 
(qassab). I should like to recall that according to Tiirkmen recognition 50 sheep are 
necessary for a household to make a living entirely on the products of their flock (cf. 
Barth, Glatzer, Irons for similar figures for other ethnic groups). Not many 
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agropastoralists of Taghan reach this ideal number; most either have to supplement 
their income with agricultural and/or wage-labour activities. Animals are therefore 
only slaughtered by domestic units able to rely on other sources of income or for 
ceremonial and ritual occasions, such as weddings, circumcisions and other social 
events warranting a display of hospitality. Some households in Taghan enrich their 
diets by hunting antelopes, hares, ducks and a variety of birds. On rare occasions 
when the flashfloods reach Taghan during the spring months, fishing for subsistence 
and sale in the baztir becomes a welcome alternative. 
The wool (autumn wool) of the sheep is used to produce felt coverings for the 
yurts and the floor of tams and yurts. The finer spring wool is worked into carpets, 
horseblankets and a variety of sacks and bags for the yurts. Carpet production in 
Taghan is strictly for sale in the baztir.21 Nobody could afford to grace his guest 
house or tent with a sumptuous carpet. The simpler and less expensive and 
prestigious flatwoven kelims had to do. Well carpeted guest houses are the privilege 
of the rich bays who can afford to keep carpets out of circulation and miss out on 
cash income for the sake of increasing their prestige and status. We shall come back 
to the importance of a well-equipped guest house in the chapter on politics. 
The main source of pastoral cash income are the qaraqul skins which have no 
local use, but are sold to itinerant traders and eventually find their way to the 
international qaraqul auctions in Leningrad and London, thus linking the Ti.irkmen 
economy to the vagaries of the international market. Fashions and trends in remote 
lands unknown to the people of Taghan ultimately dictate the colour-predilection and 
price-structure of these highly treasured pelts for any given year. We shall devote 
the next section to the methods and circuits and cycles of trade from the local to the 
national levels. 
Dried excrement of camels, sheep and goats are used as fuel for the domestic 
hearth. People owning large herds will sell their surplus by the camelload to 
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supplement their cash-income. For a list of prices current at the time of fieldwork 
see appendix 6. 
In this arid environment devoid of any trees, wood is expensive and dried 
manure besides steppe plants and bushes (tekkan, yandok, khar) constitute the 
principal source of fuel. Only the bays with a substantial cash-income can afford to 
buy wood imported from other areas of Afghanistan. 
The main agricultural crops of the area are barley (arpa) and winter wheat 
(buxdoy) which are usually used to cover subsistence needs - bread being the staple-
food. Nobody in Taghan owns sufficient land to produce a large enough surplus to 
live entirely off the land. Agriculture is seen as complementary to pastoralism, 
carpet-making and other forms of wage-labour. Agriculture is a hazardous 
occupation in this harsh climatic surrounding. It is a gamble, since agricultural 
success depends on factors beyond human control such as timely rainfall and 
sufficient irrigation-water. Oil crops such as flax/linseed (cegr)and sesame (kunjit) 
are favourites since they need little water and are not labour-intensive. They further 
provide families with few animals with a supply of oils and fats for their palau 
(greasy rice dish) and at the same time also with kunjara (pressed remains of seeds) 
for animal supplementary winter fodder. 
With the exception of melons, no fruit or vegetables are grown and hardly 
anything of this category is consumed with the exception of onions and leek bought 
from a local market or traded from people with little garden plots (hayata) near the 
irrigation-canals. In fact, one family with a garden plot of about 3 jerib, no animals, 
no other landholdings, but a labour-force of five able-bodied men and three women 
is selling tomatoes, onions and grapes cultivated on their hayata, besides producing a 
large amount of carpets for sale. This type of local small-scale entrepreneurs making 
use of economic niches are becoming more numerous among the enterprising 
muhajirin. 
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Six of the Taghan obas have jointly leased land (ejora) from the Afghan 
government (cf. Figure 12) suitable as pastureland due to its location close to a 
depressed moist area. In late summer, after sufficient steppe plants (yandok, tekken) 
have been gathered for their own herds and for sale in the market, they sublet the 
whole area to individual buyers with large herds and insufficient pasture for a 
substantive fee. As we shall see in the analysis of one particular household budget, 
this kind of specialization brings in a considerable amount of cash without any 
labour-input for the larger shareholders of the ejora-lease. Smaller shareholders 
usually have to use their share of fodder for their own animals and as fuel for the 
wintermonth, thus leaving them with little or no surplus to sell for cash. 
The economy of the Taghan obas presents a very heterogeneous picture. Out of 
the 91 households (see economic profile, Appendix 5) only 27 (30 per cent) are able 
to make a living by combined agricultural and pastoral activities. Remains the vast 
majority with too small a herd, too little acreage or with nothing but their labour to 
sell. What economic strategy do they pursue to make ends meet? The composition, 
sex, age and size of their household play a vital part in the choice of their strategy. A 
household of a husband, wife and small children or a household consisting of 
unmarried men supporting an old mother cannot depend on their females to earning 
an income. Most of these individuals will work as muzdur (wage-labourer with 
permanent contract) for a richer kinsman or stranger against payment of 800-1,000 
Afs. per month and a set of clothing per year. Others might perform odd jobs 
(garibkiiri)for a daily wage of 25-30 Afs., take on a herding contract, collect steppe 
plants and sell them by the camelload (!otorka!i) in a hazar for 120-140 Afs. 
depending on the demand at any given time. A prerequisite for this kind of 
occupation is ownership of at least one camel. Considering the price of a camel 
which was 10,000-12,000 Afs. during 1977, this constitutes a substantial 
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investment. Many people eke out a living by performing a combination of menial 
jobs while keeping two or three sheep and one donkey as means of transportation. 
Somewhat better off are those households with females able to apply their 
labour to carpet-making. Since the larger part of these people do not produce the 
necessary wool for this kind of home-industry, they have to secure it at high interest 
rates and often detrimental credit arrangements from bays, hazar-merchants or other 
middlemen. In spite of its shortcomings, it still is an important source of income for 
a large percentage of Ttirkmen of Taghan and will be analyzed in a separate section 
below. 
Table 18 presents the economic activities pursued by the poorest economic 
units of Taghan: 
Activity Number of able-bodied members in household 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
M uzduri!Garibkari* 2 3 4 2 1 12 (44%) 
Muzduri/carpets 3 1 3 7 (26%) 
M uzduri/carpets/ 
sotorkaJi 2 2 1 5 (19%) 
S otorkaSi/garibkari 1 1 1 3 (11 %) 
N =91 27 = 30% ofN 27 (100%) 
Note:* includes tenant farmers on small holdings 
30 per cent of all the Taghan households fall into this category. The 12 households 
performing only menial jobs (muzduri/garibkari) do not have the means to buy a 
camel and diversify with sotorkasi. On the other hand they also do not have able-
bodied females in a position to produce carpets. This group represents the bottom of 
262 
the economic stratum and depends to some degree on alms from kinsmen. The 
smallest households all consist of unmarried brothers trying to accumulate 
bridewealth. The other three categories practise one or two other specializations and 
are thus able to diversify. 
Out of 27 of the poorest households eight (30 per cent) are doing sotorkasi 
combined with other activities as a means of livelihood. 
In fact sotorkasi is important for all pastoralists of Taghan; however most of 
them do it to cover their subsistence needs in fodder and fuel for the winter months. 
Only the poorer stratum uses this activity to make a living. 
The following Table 19 shows the amount of sotorkasi done in Taghan and the 
number of animals involved in the activity. (Figures include all economic units 
involved in the activity.) 
TABLE 19: AMOUNT OF SOTORKASI DONE IN TAGHAN AND NUMBER OF 
CAMELS INVOLVED 
Number of working Number of camels 
days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 day 4 3 1 
2 days 12 8 2 1 
3 days 1 1 1 
4days 1 2 
5 days 
6days 1 1 
7 days 1 1 3 1 1 
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Economic units with a small number of camels (poorest stratum) are numerous. 
Since this is a very strenuous and labour-intensive occupation, most households 
pursue it for two days per week and for the rest of the week engage in other 
activities. 
Of particular interest m this ecologically fragile environment are herding 
contracts for sheep and occasionally also for cattle. A rich bay will let a herdsman 
care for a rama of sheep, thereby separating his large herd into several parts, often 
herded in different geographical areas to minimize risks. Should one rama fall sick, 
his herd will not be totally destroyed, but only part of it. The remuneration of the 
herdsman is 10 Afs. per head per month. 
In addition the herder has the right to sell the dung and the milk should his 
contract cover the spring season. Contracts may be made for a whole year or part of 
it. The herdsman is in charge of the prosperity and good health of the entrusted herd 
and has to safeguard it from predators and thieves. Losses have to be reported to the 
owner. Should the herd consist of animals belonging to several owners, each animal 
will have the earmark/brand of its owner for easy recognition. 
In Taghan herding contracts for cattle are less common, mainly because the dry 
environment is not suited for bovines. Contrary to shepherding contracts, the 
herding of cattle is an occupation of little renown. Cattle contracts are usually for 
the months of Hut, Saur and Jauza and as a rule herds are of mixed ownership. The 
herdsman, besides a cash fee of 100 Afs. per head/month is entitled to sell cowdung. 
Should a cow die during the herding period, the only responsibility of the herdsman 
is to deliver its skin to the owner. Should a cow get lost for some reason or other, the 
herdsman has to inform the owner who will have to search for the animal. The 
herder can only be made liable if he fails to inform the righful owner. It is quite 
obvious from this description, that these rather slack rules leave enough leeway for 
manipulation and abuse. I know of several cases where a cow was reported dead 
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from disease, but in actual fact had ended up in the cooking pot of the herdsman and 
his kinsmen. 
Production of carpets 
Traditionally the Taghan produced no rugs for sale in the baziir, but only made 
the various bags, sacks and textile decorations required for the yurts. 21 
A girl at an early age would start producing these items, which traditionally 
were an integral part of her trousseau. Quality and careful execution of the 
traditional designs were important criteria for a favourable consideration and 
evaluation by her future mother-in-law. Until the early years of this century all 
colouring was done by vegetable and mineral dyes, a tedious and labour-intensive 
process. Today only a handful of old women are familiar with the process, since 
chemical dyestuffs from the markets have replaced the natural ones. Traditional, 
tribal designs are often abandoned for combinations of colours and patterns fetching 
the best price in the market. The carpet industry is dependent on foreign, export 
markets, which tend to be volatile and dependent on predilections and tastes of the 
foreign buyers. New colour combinations, sizes and styles are de rigueur, but often 
of dubious artistic and traditional value. With quick cash-returns in mind, quality 
has deteriorated and given way to quantity. This quick-return mentality has even 
affected the quality of traditional items for use in yurt and tam - once the pride and 
joy of every bride. 
As mentioned above, only very few households own sufficient sheep to produce 
carpets from their own wool. 
Table 20 illustrates that out of a total number of 91 households 68 (75 per cent) 
are to a greater or lesser degree dependent on carpet production for economic 
survival. 
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TABLE 20: THE SOURCE OF WOOL OR YARN 
Source ofraw material Number of households Percentage of total N = 68 
Own wool 10 15 
Own wool/cash bazar 5 7.3 47.3% 
Cash bazar 17 25 independent 
Own wool sutxor 1 1.4 
Sutxor (creditor) 30 44 52.7% 
Creditor baziir 2 3 dependent 
Credit relative 3 4.3 
Total 68 100 
Among the Taghan it is considered prestigious and a sign of economic success 
and status, if a household does not need to make carpets to secure a cash income; but 
only produces the traditional trappings and trimmings for yurt and tam. Out of the 
68 households only ten get enough wool from their own sheep. The others are 
dependent on outside sources for their raw material. In many households female 
labour is available, but not the necessary cash to secure the raw materials. These 
families depend on shopkeepers in the bazars, bays or other creditors for their wool 
or yarn. 
According to Islam, charging interest on loans of cash or goods is prohibited, 
but during my stay in the district of Mingajik, credit arrangements, often with 10 per 
cent interest per month were a common occurrence in many parts of Afghanistan. 
The Revolutionary government supposedly issued decrees abolishing these usurious 
money-lending practices. I was, however, unable to verify their application and 
PLATE 31: SORTING AUTUMN WOOL IN A TAM 
PLATE 32: WOMEN AT WORK; IN FOREGROUND GIRL CARDING WOOL 
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efficiency. In colloquial Ttirk:men these usurious money-lenders were called sutxor 
(lit. 'milk-drinkers'). 
Table 20 also indicates the source of wool or yarn of the sample of 68 domestic 
units depending on carpet-making. 
Those contained in the independent category ( 47.3 per cent) either have enough 
sheep to provide the necessary wool or spare cash from other economic pursuits. 
The remaining 52.7 per cent (dependent category) have to depend on various types 
of credit arrangements to procure the raw material. 
The following credit arrangements were in use in Taghan during 1976/1977: 
a) The yarim system 
In this arrangement the creditor provides the raw wool and the dyestuff; 
whereas the weaver provides her skills, time and labour. The preparation 
process is very labour-intensive and time-eonsurning, since the raw wool needs 
to be carded, spun and dyed before the actual knotting can begin. The profit 
resulting from the finished product is divided equally between the creditor and 
the maker. The price difference between the regular cash price of raw wool 
from the baztir and the amount calculated by the creditor for the same weight is 
indicative of the shortcoming of this arrangement. In 1976 the price for one ser 
of raw wool at the baztir was 1,100-1,200 Afs. depending on the quality. The 
creditor would charge 2,500 Afs. for the same amount. In fact the creditor 
makes a double profit, first on the wool and secondly from the finished product. 
b) In another type of credit arrangement, the creditor provides the undyed yarn 
and the chemical dyes. The maker provides skills, time and labour. The 
finished product is sold in the market with 2/3 of the profit going to the creditor 
and 1/3 to the maker. Here again a comparison of prices illustrates the case. In 
the baztir one ser of undyed yarn is sold for 1 ,700-1,800 Afs. The creditor 
(sutxor = Ttirkmen pronunciation of the Persian word sudxor = usurer) demands 
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3,000 Afs. for the same quantity; thus an equally detrimental system, although 
slightly more profitable since the yarn is ready for dying. The extra time and 
labour for carding and spinning are redundant. 
c) In a third type of credit arrangement, the creditor provides the already dyed 
yarn. Once the carpet is ready, the maker sells it in the baztir for the best 
possible price. From the proceeds the creditor claims the cost of the provided 
yarn; the rest goes to the maker. Here again, the creditor charges about double 
the current baztir rate of 1,900-2,000 Afs. for dyed yarn. 
d) People usually already heavily indebted will work as day-labourers (gunnukci) 
for 25 Afs. per day in winter and 20 Afs. per day in summer (rates 1977). The 
employer provides one frugal meal of tea and bread per day. Bays often engage 
many women in this type of arrangement, prac tically setting up a home-industry 
and producing dozens of carpets per year. Only the poorest women will enter 
this type of contract since it carries negative overtones (loss of freedom; having 
to move out of one's own compound etc.). 
Interesting comparative calculations can be made about the various systems, 
once the normal production costs of a carpet are known. To produce a carpet of 6 
square meters the following costs are involved: 
3 ser-kalan high quality wool for the pile 
at 1,200 Afs. 
6 ser-kalan yarn of lower quality for weft 
and warp at 260 Afs. 
dyestuffs 
raw material total 
labour costs: 2 women for 50 days at 30 Afs. each 
Total production costs (US$214) 
= 3,600 Afs. 
= 1,560 Afs. 
= 400 Afs. 
= 5,560 Afs. 
= 3,000 Afs. 
= 8,560 Afs. 
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Depending on the quality of the wool, the firmness of the weave, the design and 
other criteria, the carpet may be sold for 12,000-14,000 Afs. which would constitute 
a profit of 3,440 (US$86)-5,440 Afs. (US$136). This profit diminishes considerably 
if wool or yarn are procured by one of the above mentioned credit arrangements. 
In fact a credit arrangement entails more than the actual loan of wool or yarn or 
money'; it is a sort of silent (assumed) patron-client arrangement. The debtor can be 
called in for other services or small tasks; loyalty is expected. Not infrequently even 
the children of the debtor are used for services in the creditor's house, such as 
minding children, fetching water, carrying fuel and the like. It is an economic, social 
and political bond which lasts until the debtor can rid himself of the debt, which is 
often impossible under the prevailing conditions. 
Economic profiles of the Taghan obas 
The appended economic profile of the Taghan area (Appendix 5) yields the 
following results regarding economic activities, labour force, diversification and 
economic strategies employed by the different obas forming the cluster of Safarwali 
Aw'wal. It presents a very heterogeneous and varied picture: 
Hanamlar ( watani) 
All the households in this oba own some agricultural land, with the exception of 
the gongsi (households 11, 18, 19, 24) who by virtue of their attached status had no 
right to land. The gongsi-households, however, participate in the joint lease of land 
from the Afghan Government. 
The landholdings of individual economic units vary from 16-60 jerib, which 
under the given climatic and water conditions (end of irrigation-canal) and the 
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archaic farming methods do not yield enough to survive on agriculture alone. Most 
of the landholders in the 16-30 jerib bracket (the majority) with an adequate labour-
pool till the land themselves whereas those with more than 30 jerib and other 
economic pursuits or limited labour resources lease all or part of their land to a 
tenant farmer, who in the majority of cases is an impoverished relative. Only about 
seven households could make a living on pastoralism alone. Many of these same 
economic units are also among the larger landowners, thus form the richest segment 
of the Hanam oba. 
Gongsi household 18 (Nikca) consisting of two unmarried brothers with a herd 
of 123 sheep is entirely dependent on herding for its survival and is presently trying 
to collect bridewealth for the elder brother. Gongsi household 24 (Mingajik) also 
owns a substantive herd; as well as a labour force of six able-bodied persons. 
Thanks to this labour-pool it is able to diversify its activities to include carpet-
making and sotorkasi. The two other gongsi households (11, 19) are less well off 
and have no p~oductive assets. They either work as wage-labourers for wealthier 
relatives or/and their women produce carpets with wool from a creditor. 
This oba by virtue of its access to land, is quite well off as far as the Taghan 
area is concerned. Most households supplement their income derived from 
agricultural pursuits by raising larger or smaller herds of sheep and goats or by wage-
labour contracts of one kind or another. Nobody depends on alms and charity from 
wealthier relatives. 
Sarelar (watanD 
The 25 Sare economic units jointly own 83 jerib of irrigated land. Originally it 
was farmed individually, but due to the small size of the individual plots, it is now 
farmed communally to prevent loss of water. The yields are shared according to 
PLATE 33: MAKING FELT-RUGS 
PLATE 34: MAKING BREAD (TANDYR IN THE FOREGROUND) 
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landrights of each household. Compared with the Hanamlar there is less fluctuation 
in the size of the herds. On the average each household owns about 30 sheep/goats. 
The largest herdowner has 70 sheep/goats whereas his Hanam homologue owns 123 
animals. 
Among the Sarelar three units have no small animals, but secure their revenue 
from a combination of intensive carpet-production, sotorkasi and muzduri. The Sare 
oba presents a more homogeneous wealth-profile than the Hanamlar, who count 
more economic units at the upper economic level. The wealthiest Sare household is 
headed by a widow with a son and four daughters. The son is looking after the herd 
and the mother and daughters produce about 180 square meters of good quality 
carpets per year. All Sare units produce carpets to meet their cash needs. 
Datxalar (watani) 
This small oba is socially and economically linked to the Sarelar. They neither 
own land nor participate in a Government land lease. Only one economic unit has a 
herd large enough to make a living. All Datxa families rely on carpet-making for 
their livelihood. The wool is secured at favourable conditions from kinsmen living 
in other areas. Of special interest is economic unit no.50. Here also the men are 
engaged in carpet-production. Nobody does any muzduri. The two poorer families 
are engaged in sotorkasi besides carpet-weaving. On the whole, this small oba 
presents an economically very homogeneous picture. 
N urseidlar C watanD 
This is also a very small oba (six households) with no agricultural land or 
participation in a Government land-lease. Also here only one economic unit owns 
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enough small animals to make a living. All other units rely very heavily on carpet-
making in combination with sotorkasi and muzduri. Economic unit no.60 owns an 
oil-mill where sesame and linseed are processed against a fee. 
Dahalar (watani) 
They neither own land nor take part in a Government land-lease. They entirely 
depend on public land as pasture for their animals. They own the largest number of 
camels of all the Taghan obas and therefore engage actively in sotorkasi many of 
them seven days a week. Three domestic units own 60 sheep and produce carpets 
with their own wool. The two poorer units engage in muzduri. Since they neither 
own nor lease any agricultural land, they have to secure their food grains from the 
market, thereby using a large percentage of their considerable cash income. 
So~denlar (muhqiirin) 
This refugee oba owns no agricultural land, but takes part in a government lease 
together with the Erghaylar, Hanamlar and Qullar. Since the average size of their 
economic units is small and hardly any raw material is available, they do not produce 
many carpets. Only the informal leader of the cluster owns some animals; the others 
are sharecroppers, take on herding contracts for cattle or sheep. 
According to the lineage elder, before migrating to Afghanistan, they were 
settled on the shore of the Amu Darya, near the town of Burdalyk. They had 
specialized on irrigated agriculture and cattle-raising. Presently the informal leader 
is the largest cattle-breeder of the Taghan area. Since he has a good knowledge of 
agricultural techniques, he is often consulted by Taghan people of pastoral origin, 
but with considerable landholdings. This is the second but poorest of the Taghan 
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obas. According to the lineage-head, it is extremely hard to make ends meet without 
any supplementary agriculture. Most of the Sogdenlar are heavily indebted. 
Er~haylar Cwatani) 
Like the Hanamlar the Erghay oba jointly bought agricultural land (in times of 
distress) earlier this century. Furthermore the informal leader of the bir ata acquired 
personal land through the griou (grawi) system.22 He and his fellow obalar also own 
a considerable share of the joint Government lease (ej6ra) . Only two economic units 
own herds large enough to make a living. The informal leader and the other 
herdowner have poorer relatives farm their agricultural land in a yarimkar (50:50) 
tenancy agreement. Both of them derive a considerable income from selling yandok 
(steppe plants and bushes) to large agropastoralists from other areas of the Mingajik 
and neighbouring districts. Late in fall they let the herds of large-scale pastoralists 
graze on the ej6ra-land against a substantial fee (subletting-fee). All the ej6ra-
holders of Taghan practise this type of subletting with great success, especially in 
times of fodder shortage in other districts of Jowjan province, which for instance was 
the case in 1977. I shall discuss this possibility further in the analysis of two 
household-budgets in the next section. Some of the poorer relatives are working 
against a fee for the informal leader, others supplement their income derived from 
agriculture with carpet-making, sotorkasi or muzduri. 
The informal leader is in charge of overall guidance regarding lineage affairs. 
By virtue of his superior knowledge, generosity, religious piety (often all a big 
show), superior economic standing, open guest tam and excellent contacts with the 
Government, he has acquired the reputation of being a 'wise' man with a name. (An 
analysis regarding the importance of having a name is given in the chapter on 
politics.) By providing kinsmen and outsiders here and there with advice, good 
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counsel and credit, he has managed to secure himself a retinue of followers whom he 
can mobilize for all kinds of occasions and various types of favours and work. 
Although his philosophy of life is strongly traditional and pastoral, he is fully 
aware of the benefits of a diversified economy quoting the following story: 
Some time ago I had to borrow cash to get one of my brothers out of jail. Another 
brother wanted to get married and a bride-price had to be raised. Actually we 
could not afford it at that time since we lost many animals due to sickness; but he 
insisted, so I provided whatever had to be given, for he threatened to abduct the 
girl. A very shameful act, you know. Since we had already trouble with the 
Government, we could not afford more problems. Fortune turned against us, when 
another disease depleted our live-stock in fall. I became a beggar with little more 
than my two hands. We sold some jewellery of my wife to get us through winter 
and asked my creditor to wait. Since I had done him many favours before, he had 
no other choice. Then in spring, Allah be thanked and blessed, the flashfloods 
came. I had the 200 jerib of dry land surrounding our oba planted with sesame 
and linseed in a 50:50 arrangement with all my relatives and neighbours. 
Furthermore we caught a lot of fish and sold them in the baziir for good cash. I 
made a profit of 180,000 Afs. and was able to repay my debt of 100,000 Afs. and 
keep my word. My little camel, it is important to keep one's word. A man who is 
not keeping his word is na mard (lit. not a man, dishonest) according to our adat. 
So you see, had I not had this land, and God not sent the water, I would not be 
here. Land is a good thing, and a combination of animals and land is even better. 
Oullar (former slaves) 
Not surprisingly, this is the poorest oba of the whole Taghan cluster. Nobody 
owns any land, and most economic units engage in muzduri day-labouring and 
sotorkaJi if they own any camels. Those households with able-bodied women 
engage in carpet-making with wool or yams secured in some form of credit-
arrangement. Only their informal leader (no.88) has a viable herd of goats and 
sheep, as well as a labour-force large enough to afford diversification of economic 
activities. Being of slave origin, it is impossible for them to enter into marriage 
contracts and the ensuing relationships with the neighbouring obas. They have to get 
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brides from other slave lineages residing in different parts of Northwestern 
Afghanistan. 
Taghan, being situated at the fringe of the desert-steppe area, does not have any 
very rich agropastoralists. Lack of water and a rather distant location from the 
bigger market towns are other decisive factors. 
In contrast to tarshangu, for example, nobody owns a lorry, jeep or tractor. 
Many clever muhajirin have invested part of their agricultural and/or pastoral surplus 
in imported means of transportation as we shall see in the next section. These are not 
only used for their own entrepreneurial activities, but also hired out against cash 
payment. Old status symbols are giving way to new ones, personal and kin 
relationships are subject to manipulations or weakened for the sake of strategic 
economic and political alliances with outsiders, notably Government officials who 
can provide favours and services not available in a traditional kinship structure. 
MARKETS AND TRADE 
So far we have looked at economic production processes and consumption 
patterns. In Chapter Two, I have discussed the history of the region and 
demonstrated the influence of economic and political change on the development of 
urban markets and their network of rural satellites, as well as their role and functions 
in an essentially still agrarian society. A brief overview was devoted to the spatial 
arrangements of the urban baziirs and their developmental stages from the time of 
urban decline in the middle of the 19th century to a period of rapid growth and 
importance in the early 20th century. 
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Based on different variables such as periodicity, ethnic configuration, market 
sectors, structure, availability and range of goods and services, rural migrations and 
other criteria, the following typology evolved: 
large urban bazars with permanent shops and stalls and a regular urban 
clientele. Here handicrafts are not only traded, but also produced. These 
markets operate as commercial centres with control over a network of medium 
and smaller bazars in the surrounding areas. 
in the medium size bazars, mostly located in the main administrative town, the 
efflux of agropastoral produce to the urban centres and the connection of the 
rural hinterlands with the national economy take place. 
small periodical rural bazars basing their commercial activities on two hazar-
days a week, depend predominantly on rural customers. Mostly agricultural 
surplus products, limited in quantity, and daily necessity goods are sold. This 
limited choice of basic imported goods is furnished by urban merchants serving 
as middle-men between the urban market economy and the largely selfsufficient 
rural subsistence economy. 
After this brief overview of bazar types and economic spheres, let me now 
examine the choices and decisions the people of Taghan take in marketing their 
agricultural and/or pastoral surplus and procuring their necessities; and demonstrate, 
how Taghan, a predominantly preindustrial type of economy, fits into the national 
economy of Afghanistan. 
In analyzing the Taghan marketing system, I found the model-typology 
developed by Skinner (1964) for a study of markets in pre-industrial China quite 
useful and interesting. He demonstrates that there existed a hierarchy of ever more 
complex types of markets. The lowest he calls the 'minor' market catering for a 
small cluster of villages and endowed with the following characteristics: a small 
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'horizontal' volume of trade, that is, the goods traded originated and were consumed 
within the market area. Typical for this market type was the 'familiarity' which 
dominated trade relations. 
The next higher level he calls the 'standard' market, is attached to a bigger 
locality and frequented by a certain number of surrounding village clusters. Given 
the larger geographical area of activity, the volume of trade was proportionally 
larger, but with a few exceptions, still'horizontal'. This type of market was linked to 
other larger market areas and urban centres by an upward flow of goods and services. 
It did also receive some 'exotic goods', say imported luxury items and trinkets not 
indigenous to the area. 
Skinner's third type is called 'higher-level' markets. Here large-scale trading by 
using brokers, intermediary traders and agents was de rigeur. The impersonal 
element dominated trade-relations. 
Skinner is not alone in trying to set up a kind of 'evolutionary' typology. In fact 
any society may be placed on an evolutionary scale between two poles and therefore 
present an increasing degree of separation of its economic organization from its 
social structure and fabric. Several economic anthropologists have tried their hand at 
constructing analytical frameworks using this kind of 'evolutionary' frameworks. 
Bohannan and Dalton's three-stage classification of economies ('marketless 
economies'; 'economies with peripheral markets', 'market economies') comes to mind 
(1962). Also Sahlins (1965) tries his hand at this kind of continuum in his typology 
of different kinds of 'reciprocity' (from 'generalized' over 'balanced' to 'negative 
reciprocity'). 
On the basis of Skinner's insights, I have attempted to analyze the various 
economic spheres and flows applicable at different levels of the bazar typology. For 
easy reference and better understanding I have synthesized the flow of goods and 
services in the following flowchart (Figure 14) and shall now present an exposition 
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on the different levels of trade spheres, cycles and the agents involved in each kind 
of transaction. 
My point of departure are the moderately wealthy agropastoralist watani 
Ti.irkmen of Taghan described in the previous sections. The type of distribution 
outlet selected depends on the nature of the goods and their position in the local, 
regional and national economy. A further influencing variable is the fact whether a 
credit arrangement is involved in the production process. Let us first look at surplus 
products of the subsistence economy, produce which are more of a local and regional 
importance, such as sheep/goats on the hoof, agricultural products and 
yandok/calma. Most of the households examined sold their produce at the district 
bazar, ethnically dominated by Afghan and Uzbak traders. Here prices are a little 
better than at the smaller local bazars, and for certain products, especially yandok 
and calma (dried manure), the demand is very high given the large segment of urban 
buyers without their own animals. There is no market for dung in smaller bazars, 
since most people have their own animals. A visit to the district bazar, especially for 
the caravaneers with yandok (remember nobody owns any motorized means of 
transportation) entails an overnight stay in a caravanserai! of the bazar. Intensive 
questioning of informants has revealed, that although a higher level bazar is involved 
(on Skinner's scale somewhere between type two and three), social ties and personal 
relations are still very strong. People are in the habit of frequenting the same serail, 
because their fellow-clansmen from other villages as well as their friends are also 
there. Like in any market, the exchange of news and gossip, politics and 
entertainment figure as prominently as the actual economic purpose. People from 
. Taghan also tend to sell and buy from the same shopkeepers and traders, with the 
exception of live animals which are sold in a special animal market to the highest 
bidder. Only a very negligible percentage of informants stated that they shopped 
around for the best bargain or sold to the trader offering the highest price. Loyalty to 
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certain trade-partners seems to prevail over maximizing profits. At least in the 
Taghan case personal relations and social considerations seem to dominate actual 
economic considerations. These findings should be accepted with the necessary 
caution and do not allow for generalization, firstly because of the smallness of the 
sample and secondly the Taghan represent the very traditional segment of watani 
society. Further research would be needed to allow any substantive conclusions and 
generalization. 
Repeated observation at various levels of the baziir hierarchy and preliminary 
inquiries revealed that in the case of muhajirin sellers, relations would tum 
impersonal and eclectic - a prerequisite for unrestrained bargaining and haggling -
at a lower level of the baziir typology, thereby closely fitting the model developed by 
Skinner. 
A different trade cycle or sphere can be observed for wool and qaraqul skins, 
goods that are part of the interregionally important cash economy. Both products are 
bulky to transport. If no credit arrangements are involved, the Taghan watani will 
sell these products to a jelliib, a kind of itinerant trader or middleman, who either 
works independently or as agent for a big company, mostly located in Kabul. For 
convenience's sake he visits the Taghan area twice a year (spring and fall) with a 
truck and collects wool and skins against cash. The Taghan, although making use of 
a person belonging to the national capitalist sector, are somehow also personalizing 
this relationship. Most agropastoralists of Taghan sell to the same jelliib season after 
season regardless to which ethnic group he belongs. There is, understandably a 
certain preference for Tlirkmen or members of other Ti.irkic groups, mostly Uzbak. 
Here again, a relationship of trust and mutual understanding is of prime importance. 
The situation is different, if a credit arrangement is involved (dotted lines on the 
flowchart). Here the rich muhajirin Ti.irkmen bays play an important part in qaraqul 
and wool cycles. Poorer families (see economic profile) with few animals will offer 
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their skins to a bay for a cash advance. The same holds good for the various types of 
credit arrangements for wool and yarn for the carpet-production. In fact in a later 
development, which was gaining ground in 1976/1977 the bays, instead of paying the 
whole amount in cash, would provide a part of the advance to their debtors in market 
goods (e.g. oil, sugar, tea, salt, tobacco etc.) thereby making a double profit. They 
bought the goods at wholesale prices and passed them on at retail-prices plus profit. 
The Ttirkmen muhajirin bays do not sell the carpets received from their 
creditors in the district baztir, but directly in Kabul, where they have access to or 
own shares in international import and export companies. If one looks at this loan 
arrangement from the point of view of the debtor, it is considered a personal 
relationship, a connection of trust between two persons. As described earlier, loyalty 
is an integral part of these credit arrangements. 
The marketing of carpets deserves some special remarks, since it presents an 
oddity in the otherwise neat typology. Certain baztirs such as for example Aqcha 
(the choice of all carpet-makers ofTaghan not in a credit relationship) are famous for 
their carpet section. In the case of carpets, the relation with a seller is not 
personalized, no special, long-term or long-established trade-relations between 
individuals exist. Hard bargaining for the best possible price is the norm, even if it 
takes the whole day to achieve this goal. Here transactions are set to maximization 
of profit, which requires flexibility in the choice of a trading partner, and not a social 
relationship steeped in tradition hampering the process. Here the watani are living 
up to the image of their muhajirin 'brothers'. Why this change? We may recall that 
production of carpets for cash sale is of recent origin, an adjustment to a declining 
traditional economy. This might also be the reason for not falling under the 
traditional set of rules governing economic exchange. I do not have any evidence to 
allow for further substantiation of this claim. 
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Let us now turn to the purchasing cycles. The location of choice for the 
purchases of shoes, clothing and items which Skinner calls 'exotic' is the district 
market, which the wealthier Taghan household-heads visit about once a month or 
every second month depending on the yearly agropastoral cycle. Since Ti.irkmen 
women have no access to the baziirs, it being a public, male space, men are buying 
their clothing, shoes and ornaments. 
The smaller bazars play a more important role for the poorer stratum of society. 
Smaller markets are closer to home, so no animal transport is needed. As a rule the 
range is limited, the quality of goods inferior and the quantity smaller. These 
secondary baziirs (the first level in Skinner's typology) are pan of a rotation system 
described in the earlier part of this thesis. The better off watani will resort to these 
baziirs for smaller purchases (tobacco, matches, small quantities of sugar) if a sudden 
need arises or weather conditions prevent a journey to a district baziir. 
A word needs to be said about the large service sector. Since small markets do 
not offer much scope for employment as wage-labourers, people in search of work 
tend to flock to the bigger markets where jobs as porters, caravanserail-hands, horse-
grooms, teahouse-attendants or servants in richer households are available. Here 
again, the first choice would be with a kinsman even to the detriment of a smaller 
pay, but securely embedded in a social network. Also in this situation a Ti.irkmen 
will always prefer to work for another Ti.irkmen, the second choice being a 
representative of another Ti.irkic group and the last resort would be a Pashtun. 
Theoretically at each ascending level of integration, the social component plays 
a less important role, until reaching the national level, it becomes irrelevant. This 
then means that in more complex societies (or more assimilated societies) some 
processes must be at work which allow for economic and non-economic spheres to 
be brought into relation with one another, while still allowing some freedom for 
economic criteria of evaluation. With Ti.irkmen society gradually being 
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administratively and economically brought into the fold of a nation state by an ever 
increasing and greedy bureaucracy, maybe a larger, more inclusive view has to be 
adopted as Percy Cohen aptly puts it: 
in industrial society the integration of economy and society, in so far as there is 
integration, is achieved increasingly by bureaucratic administration; in non-
industrial societies it inheres far more in the nature of interpersonal relationships 
(Cohen 1967:115). 
We will leave the economic analysis at this point and have a closer look at the 
political aspects and structure of Ttirkmen society which are linked in many ways 
like in all segmentary lineage societies. In a last, conclusive chapter, I shall present a 
synthesis of social, political economic and religious factors that have shaped the 
different patterns of development in muhajirin and watani Ttirkmen society. In this 
final synthesis I shall draw on the models used by Epstein (1962) in her analysis of 
social change in southern India. 
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NOTES 
1 The Kara Tiirkmen of Taghan, like most other Tiirkmen groups, are divided into two distinct 
occupational categories: a) tomur who are predominantly agricultural with supplementary raising of 
sheep and goats; b) torva who are predominantly pastoral raising sheep and goats and oriented 
towards selling those animals and their products in local and regional markets. 
2 The term 'transhumance' was originally used to describe a spatially limited pattern of movement in 
mountainous areas, especially with reference to the Alpine areas of Europe. The extensive literature 
on the subject clearly shows that permanent villages occupied by all or part of their population all year 
round, form the nucleus of a transhumant society. Although pastoral activities are one of the interests 
of transhumant communities, agriculture virtually always remains the dominant interest. Thus 
pastoral movements are limited in scale and scope and mostly are undertaken only by a small segment 
of the population. Later on the term 'transhumance' began to be applied to groups that were not really 
transhumant and also to geographical areas outside the European Alps. Many nomadic groups that 
utilize altitudinal variations in pasture availability, have been called transhumant, although, as a 
matter of fact, their principal dependence on pastoralism would exclude them from fitting the 
definition. Despois (1949), Marcy (1929) and other French authors define transhumance as a seasonal 
alteration between two distinct pasture-areas, which are not necessarily at a different altitude. Other 
authors, however, consider vertical alterations a necessary factor of transhumance. In this thesis, the 
term is used in accordance with the definition of Despois and Marcy - that is, in the sense of 
horizontal nomadism. 
3 Possession of a large store of silver coins of various proveniences kept in jars buried in the yurt 
and/or a collection of exquisite traditional silver jewellery crafted by silversmiths of Merv and the 
former Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, provides prestige and status even in today's changing 
monetary economy of Taghan and surroundings. Jewellery also constitutes a stable (lasting in value), 
easily transportable and sellable capital-reserve. Stories - most of them legendary - about several 
refugee families of the Mingajek area allegedly possessing huge stores of such valuables, abound. 
Such stories were a popular topic with women. Allusions to people owning such legendary riches 
were also made at male gatherings where a musician (baxsi) would improvise songs about an 
important participant I gathered a whole collection of such stories, but was only able in one case to 
verify the actual existence of such treasures. 
4 The decline of the camel in Afghan Turkistan is in accordance with ftndings by Kijnig (1962) for the 
Tek.ke Tiirkmen of the USSR relating to the middle of last century. He gives figures of 20-40 per cent 
of the total herd composition for camels. According to Markov (1958) camel-breeding also 
constituted an important feature of the economy of the northern Tlirkmen inhabiting the Great 
Balkhan Steppe area. He argues that breeding of sheep on a large scale has to be seen as a later 
development, a fact which would support my findings for Taghan. Today, camels as a means of 
transportation are only used by women and children. For this pupose, a crate-like contraption called 
kajaba is attached to the right and left flank of the camel. In the case of a bridal kajaba, the litter is 
covered with a white baldachin. The division of riding-animals into groups fit for male and female 
use, is following the male/female dichotomy of spaces, objects, tent trappings etc., which constitute a 
salient feature of the Tiirkmen symbolic system. 
5 Figures were obtained by the qazi of Mingajik. I was allowed to attend his court on several 
occasions. 
6 Gok ekin (green plants) crops consist mainly of alfa alfa, melons, segr (linseed), kunjit (sesame) and 
a variety of vegetables. 
Aq ekin (white plants) crops consist, in the Tiirkmen areas of Afghanistan, of winter wheat and barley. 
7 Remuneration of a mirab: 
Total acerage involved: 14 peykal 
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From each peykal the mirab receives at harvest-time 20 ser (1 ser=14 kgs.) winter wheat and 20 ser 
barley. 
Quantity received In monetary terms 
14 x 20 ser winter wheat 
14 x 20 ser barley 
= 280 ser 
= 280 ser 
Total 560 ser 
Total revenue is 61 ,600 Afs. or US$1,540 
Rate of exchange: 40 Afs. = IUS$ (October 1977) 
8 The value of one peykal differs from area to area: 
in Mingajik = 480 jerbi 
in Fayzabad = 400 jerib 
in Sar-i-Pul = 360 jeirb 
in Taghan= 400 jerib. 
280 ser at 120 Afs. 
280 ser at 100 Afs. 
= 
= 
33,600 Afs. 
28,000 Afs. 
61,600 Afs. 
9 Kariadar or malik = village headman. Represents the village in all dealings with the Afghan 
Government, and brings decrees and messages from the Government to the attention of the villagers. 
He is also in charge of reporting births, deaths and marriages to the local government offices. 
10 Among the settled population of the Steppe Zone, especially the bays, possession of a howz ranks 
high in the pecking order of status symbols. 
11 Source: Allgemeine Statistik des Auslandes, Landerberichte: Afghanistan; Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 1976. 
12 The change to a sedentary existence in a walled compound, which severely restricts the movement 
of women, is hardest on the senior females who have experienced the relative freedom regarding 
segregation of male and female spaces in a nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral camp. I have 
investigated several households, which have undergone the transition from a semi-nomadic camp-
residence to living in walled compounds, and found a high incidence of mental disturbance, neurosis 
and apathy among the senior females. In connection with their living conditions, the term 'prison' was 
frequently used. 
13 Buzkasi (lit.: 'goat-snatching'; in the Tiirkrnen language ogloq), a horse-man game, in which the 
carcass of a goat- nowadays mostly a calf- has to be picked up by a rider and brought to a goal at a 
prescribed distance. While trying to achieve this, the rider is pursued by other riders, sometimes as 
many as several hundred, who try to snatch the carcass from him. It is a very wild and ferocious 
game often leading to severe injuries or even death. This game exists, with minor modifications and 
local adaptations, among all Central Asian Tiirkic groups, where the horse plays an important role. It 
is now the national game of Afghanistan. For a detailed account see Azoy 1982 and Balikci 1978. 
14 Also called sumaliak, sumulak, samanak (Dari). For details regarding Uzbak practices see 
Chagatay and Sjoberg (1955) and Shalinsky (1979). 
15 The preparation of this ritual food seems to vary from one ethnic group to another. Among the 
Uzbaks and Afghans it is generally cooked as a sweet gruel and not as a bread. 
16 According to my informants, most crafts and occupations used to have a pir. Many of them are 
Islamic saints. The veneration and invocation of pirs supposedly was very pronounced among the 
craft guilds of Central Asia. In our context it is interesting to note the blood-relationship attributed to 
Baba Dekhan. He is called baba which means grandfather. It is also used as a term of reverence. 
Government officials and other important people are sometimes called baba regardless of their actual 
age. 
17 For a linguistic explanation of b6ursek see Remy Dor 1975 chapter V, footnote 14. 
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18 In Taghan, bread is always placed, together with other things, under the pillow of a new mother, in 
the cradle of a newborn bay. Bread protects a little boy after circumcisions and a horseman during a 
buzkasi game. Pieces on nan (flat bread) are often sown into amulet containers (tumar). Jinns and 
other evil spirits never appear near places where bread dough is kept (e.g. near the tandyr). Bread and 
grain also play an important role in many magico-medical rituals of Taghan. 
19 At the time of harvest, from each peykal (for weights and measures see appendix) 12 ser-i-kalan 
winter wheat and 12 ser-i-kalan barley have to be set aside for the kariadar (official village-head) 
who is elected by the villagers and approved by the representatives of the Central Government. He 
serves as a liaison person between the villagers and the government authorities. A similar amount 
goes to the mirab (water-master) who is in charge of the just distribution of the canal-water. 
20 Eshanism is a late form of Central Asian Sufism. In Turkmenia as well as in Afghanistan, Eshans 
are often characterized as ignorant, fanatic, stubborn with a poor knowledge of Islamic doctrine and 
dwelling on obscurantism. Members of sacred lineages, called Ewlad, claim descent from the ftrst 
four caliphs (for details, see Demidov 1978). 
21 Until the end of the 19th century, carpets were made to meet the needs of the producing 
households. Moshkowa (1970) in her seminal study on Central Asian carpets mentions that already in 
early times some families were producing rugs for the Russian nobility and for merchants, but this 
was the exception. Carpet-making was a female occupation. Nowhere in Central Asia did men 
engage in carpet-making. They produced the raw materials, the tools and later on the marketing. 
However all the crafts intended for marketing and trade, such as embroidery and silk-weaving, were a 
male prerogative. Only with the setting-up of commercial carpet factories, did the men enter this 
female domain. 
22 The griou system is a kind of mortgage system which functions in the following way: X lends 
money toY. As security X receives a piece of land. Instead of collecting interest on the loan X may 
economically use the mortgaged land. In fact in many instances X lets Y work the land as tenant 
against part of the harvest. If the loan is not repaid within a fixed term (this varies from place to 
place, usually, however, 20 years), X will become the rightful owner of the land and Y forfeits all 
claims. 
286 
VOYEZ D'ABORD ... 
Si vous voulez juger de Ia noblesse d'un jeune guerrier, 
Voyez d'abord comment il siege et se comporte a /' assemblee! 
Si vous voulez vous lier d'amitie avec quelqu'un, 
Voyez d'abord s'il estfidele a sa parole! 
Aurez-vous a parcourir une route plus ou mains longue, 
Ou vous devrez peut-etre manier heroi'quement le sabre, 
Et voulez-vous, pour cela, choisir et acheter un pur-sang, 
Voyez d'abord son poitrail, sa croupe, son garrot! 
Si un dernier tombe entre les mains d'un misereux, 
Celui-ci, de joie, se promene, Ia poitrine decouverte, au vent d'hiver. 
Si vous avez jete votre devolu sur une fille ou une femme, 
Voyez d'abord son savoir-vivre, son acceuil, ses manieres! 
Si un vaillant guerrier est bien equipe en cheval et en armes, 
Jl accourt partout ou il y a de chauds combats. 
Quand un homme est genereux comme Khatem, et riche, de surcroit, 
Voyez comme les hates affluent chez lui, des quatre points cardinaux! 
0 Dieu! Tu as fait les uns immensement riches, 
Et, les autres, tu les fais soupirer apres un dernier. 
Bans et mechants, taus les hommes, sans exception, 
Voyez comme its passent et s'en vont, chacun a son tour! 
Sachez que Dieu est mecontent des riches qui ne paient pas l'Aumone du dixieme! 
Surtout,fuyez aussitot les lieux ou ils viennent s'installer! 
Quand survivent un incident, le brave l'attribue a la Divine Providence. 
Mais voyez comme, alors, le tache s'en prend a son compagnon! 
Le Iache court sans cesse,fuyant Ia mort. 
Quand on vient chez lui, il distille son venin. 
Le brave heros, lui re~oit ses hOtes a bras ouverts. 
Mais le Iache, voyez comme il sait s'esquiver! 
Les injustes oublient de penser a Dieu et de citer son nom. 
lls achetent les grains a vii prix et les revendent tres cher. 
Les usuriers impitoyables, en soutirant un or honnerement gagne, 
Voyez comme ilsfont des profits illicites! 
Satan, le M audit, empeche les gens d'accomplir leurs devoirs religieux. 
ll ne les detourne pas de /'illicite , il ne leur fait rien gagner honnetement. 
ll ne leur fait pas observer le jeane, ni faire leurs prieres. 
Voyez comme il se demene, ce diable de malediction! 
Lejeune heros s'adonne aux entretiens amicaux, aux chants en commun. 
Son coeur ne connait pas l'hiver, mais un printemps perpetuel. 
Dans le coeur de l'homme de bien, La rancune ne dure guere. 
Mais le mechant, voyez comme, chaquejour, ilfrappe quelqu'un de sa haine! 
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lls s'en vont et s'eloignent de leurs freres et de leurs proches, 
lls fraternisent avec des etrangers qui ne respectent rien, 
Makhtownkouli! lls s'allient a des gens impossibles! 
Oui! Voyez comme agissent ces Hodjas et ces Seyyfd! 
Makhtumkuli Firaqi (18th century Ttirkmen poet) 
Translation by Louis Bazin and Pertev Boratav 
PLATE 35: DISCUSSING TRIBAL 
POLITICS IN A GUEST TAM 
PLATE 36: WALLED COMPOUND WITH GARDEN PLOT AND TWO-STOREYED TAM 
CHAPTER SIX 
POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
FROM TRIBE TO NATION·ST ATE 
'What surprised me most during my sojourn amongst this people, was my inability 
to discover any single man among them desirous of commanding, or any 
individual inclined to obey. The Turkoman himself is wont to say "Biz bibash 
khalk bolamiz" (we are a people without a head) and we will not have one. We are 
all equal, with us everyone is king' (Vambery 1864:309-310). 
Some 140 years have elapsed since Vambery has written this passage, and in 
many ways it is still valid today. I am not going to give an analysis of the traditional 
acephalic political system, which is based on the descent principles of a segmentary 
lineage system, enabling units at various levels of segmentation to unite in case of 
feud and armed conflict. For a detailed description of this system, quite applicable to 
the Ersari situation until about 1930, see Irons 1975: chapter 3. I rather want to 
concentrate on the present situation and show the interaction of traditional patterns of 
leadership with the encapsulating (Bailey 1970: 146-147) national government 
authorities. In politics, descent still is the guiding principle and not residence. This 
could be clearly observed on two occasions in 1977. One occurred during a buzkasi 
game, when a dispute arose over the outcome of a particular game. As usual during 
these equestrian events, tension and emotions ran high, and the immense crowd 
started to take sides and align according to agnatic descent principles. Peaceful 
neighbours suddenly turned to bellicose foes. Only the ever present gendarmes and 
conscripts could prevent a heated battle between the two groups. 
The second example took place in the context of elections of a local 
representative for the Loya Jirga (National Assembly) in Kabul. This case also 
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clearly demonstrates that even today, at least in the Mingajik area, descent prevails 
over residence in political matters. During the election campaign, two Ttirkmen bays 
were competing for votes among their kin, followers and co-tribesmen. One 
candidate belonged to the Ulutepe, the other to the Kara section of the Ersari tribe. 
Both were scions of the two richest and most prominent and powerful bays of the 
region. The election campaigns took the form of traditional Ttirkmen prestige 
gatherings with gifts, conspicuous religious and ritual displays and generous 
hospitality. An impressive array of jeeps and lorries (the new type of status symbols) 
as well as the more traditional champion stallions gave the gatherings the air and 
ambiance of a tui. In fact, the campaign, the actual raison d'etre of the whole affair, 
was taking second place, since the families of the two candidates wanted to outdo 
each other in their bid for reputation and the status of most important bay of the 
region. It was a game of sympathy and antipathy that had little to do with elections, 
and neither of the candidates really seemed preoccupied with the outcome of the 
elections. As expected, the Kara lineages sided with the Kara candidate, and most of 
the Ulutepe (some abstained because of an unsettled dispute) supported their 
representative. 
The Sogdenlar Oba and the gongsi of the Hanamlar, both Ulutepe by descent, 
but living among the Taghan (Kara) for decades, voted for the Kara candidate, which 
according to tradition, was a serious breach of tribal convention. The bay of the 
Ulutepe promptly called the deviants to order, explaining in unequivocal terms to 
whom their loyalty was due. 
Until the early days of this century, when the area was not yet under firm 
control of the Central Government, and brigandage was frequent, tribal feuds were 
common, often requiring political alliances up to the higher levels of segmentation. 
I was told that the highest level leader of the Ersari was the Ilbeg, best characterized 
as a sort of temporary paramount chief. Each of the four Ersari sections (Kara, 
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Bakaul, Gi.inesh, Ulutepe) in tum had its own beg. According to my senior 
informants, the last beg of the Kara section was recruited from the Tshaketsh lineage 
during the time of King Amanullah (1919-1929). During that time, the Afghan 
Government supported the begs with gifts and landgrants to secure their loyalty and 
in a bid to settle the Kara Ti.irkmen and bring the area under firmer control and 
jurisdiction of the Central Government. 
Let us now examine the relationship of the Ti.irkmen with the district 
(woluswali) and National Government. The common Ti.irkmen has no direct relation 
with the National Government - this is the privilege of the most important bays. As 
far as the average Ti.irkmen is concerned, the district ( woluswali) and provincial 
(wilayat) levels of administration are the arenas for the implementation of policies 
and laws. Their representatives make up the Mingajik resident's everyday 
experience with the government. I will, therefore, not further elaborate on the higher 
levels of the Afghan Government structure (for a detailed account see Uberoi 1964), 
but concentrate on the micro-level, the way the average Ti.irkmen sees and 
experiences the state, and shed some light on the rather opaque relations between 
obas/villages and the lowest level of the state bureaucracy. 
Mingajik is a district (woluswali) of Jowzjan Province. As in all of Afghanistan, 
the administrative power and authority are shared by the District Governor (uluswal 
sahib) and the police commander (reinforced by a contingent of conscripts). With 
the exception of the occasional Farsiwan, the bureaucrats are all Pashtun from other 
parts of the country, mainly from the south, who neither speak the local language nor 
have any understanding for the Ti.irkmen customs and tribal idiosyncracies. Except 
for one Uzbek in a low ranking position, no Ti.irkic people were working in the 
Mingajik administration at the time of my research. Usually there is a regular 
rotation of officials, in order to prevent the establishment of private power bases and 
cliques, and apparently also to curb the rampant corruption. As a rule, government 
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officials do not visit the obas and remote areas, since the 'prevailing primitive and 
uncivilized conditions are beyond their status and dignity'. As I could learn, most 
Ttirkmen from the obas look at those officials with suspicion, fear, a certain 
helplessness and even contempt. Quite contrary to Switzerland, the Ttirkmen are 
afraid of the bureaucrats and not of the law (qanun) per se, mainly since existing 
laws are seldom correctly enforced; instead people encounter the arbitrariness, 
voracity and whims of an official greedy for bribes to line his own pockets. 
Since the government officials do not directly interact with the obas, there is the 
elected position of kariadar, a kind of middleman (Bailey 1970:167). In fact he is 
the structural link between his own people and the government. As we shall see in a 
special section, it is an ambiguous office with a rather dubious reputation. In fact the 
incumbent of this office is despised by many Ttirkmen for his connection with bribes 
and other solicited gifts and favours . He is seen by many as a traitor to the Ttirkmen 
cause for his being in connivance with greedy government officials constantly trying 
to generate bribes for their own pockets. Indeed with some of them, greed has 
become a real obsession. 
In defence of the bureaucrats one might add that the salaries and living 
conditions especially of the lower levels, are abominable, and they, in tum, have to 
pay their superiors for a transfer to a better place of service: in fact, it all amounts to 
a vicious circle. In order to get the smallest task or service accomplished, payments 
have to be made, and imagination seems boundless when it comes to collecting 
bribes. 
As a response to this awkward and detrimental situation, the Ttirkmen try to 
· avoid the government whenever possible and resort to their traditional avenues for 
dealing with disputes and crimes. Village and oba matters are kept closed to 
outsiders and government bureaucrats definitely belong to that category. Although 
the obas are encapsulated by the National Government, the government 
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representatives find it difficult to apply their power of jurisdiction to alien, 
unfamiliar and non-specific types of autonomy that residents use in order to screen 
themselves from alien power and interference. 
In the following sections we will examine the traditional Tlirkmen institutions 
and avenues that are used to deal with conflict and have a closer look at the office of 
kariadar. 
THE MASUXAT OF THE AQSAQALS (TRffiAL ELDERS): LAW AND ORDER BY CONSENSUS 
In the context of the above introductory remarks, let me briefly analyze the ideal 
situation (the way the Tlirkmen themselves idealize and perceive the past situation) 
and then look at the actual situation encountered in 1976/1977, the way it developed 
in the light of a stronger presence of the Afghan Government and the changing 
position of the big bays as self-styled, self-appointed leaders of the Tlirkmen 
hinterlands. 
The tribes have their Aksakals, but these are, in effect, merely ministers to each 
particular circle, standing to a certain degree, in a position of honourable 
distinction. They are liked and tolerated so long as they do not make their 
supremacy felt by unusual commands or extravagant pretensions (Vambery 
1864:310). 
When first talking to a Tlirkmen elder, he will tell you that nothing has actually 
changed since Vambery wrote this statement. Wishful thinking or simply the way 
older men really perceive reality? Perhaps both, for a large majority of the older 
illiterate people of the hinterlands do not understand (or maybe do not want to 
understand) that their region is part of Afghanistan, that is under the jurisdiction of 
the Afghan legal system. For most of them, their ignorance (unawareness) really 
does not matter, for in their everyday dealings they hardly have any contact with the 
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'Kabul Government' as they call the local bureaucrats. Theirs is a life of obas, 
villages, small rural baziirs, where life goes on according to their views, 
Weltanschauung and right and wrong are reckoned and judged according to adat 
(deb). It is also adat, tribal law, and conventions that guide the aqsaqals in their 
deliberations and judgements, in some cases assisted by Islamic law. In fact adat is 
the basis for exercising their honorary function. The Afghan civil code (qanun) is 
not their domain. 
Already the early travellers noted the importance of adat as a guiding and 
regulating principle, for Vambery writes: 
The inhabitants of the desert are ruled, often tyrannised over, by a mighty 
sovereign, invisible indeed to themselves, but whose presence is plainly discerned 
in the word 'Deb' - custom. usage. Among the Turkomans the 'Deb' is obeyed; 
everything is practised or abominated according to its injunctions (V ambery 
1864:311-312). 
What is an aqsaqal and what are his qualifications? The name literally means 
'white beard'; so age seems to be a criterion. Not necessarily, for younger men can 
also be called aqsaqal if the other qualifications are present. In fact, theoretically 
any grown-up man can be an aqsaqal. 
Aqsaqals normally are married men, heads of a household, whose general 
experience of life, wisdom (aql), character, and good judgement are accepted by 
society, and who are eloquent enough to present their political opinions at a meeting 
of elders (maslaxat, majlis). They should also be successful in their pastoral and/or 
agricultural endeavours and possess at least a median wealth. It must be emphasized 
again that being an aqsaqal is not an office, but an honorary title. 
An elder is really established, if he is called to mediate disputes and conflicts. 
There are no regularly scheduled meetings. The informal and loose organization of 
these irregular meetings is striking. There is neither a chairman nor a discussion-
leader. Participants sit in a circle to demonstrate equality. Participants in a 
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maslaxat, as a rule, are representatives of the domestic units which have something 
to do with the decisions to be taken or the case to be discussed. Most gatherings are 
informal, convened out of a situation of need in the guest house of an elder or a 
mosque. A meeting may also be convened on the initiative of an aqsaqal to solve a 
particular problem. (For an example of a particular case see Appendix 12.) The 
number of participants varies from one maslaxat to another. The convenor usually 
briefly states the problem, conveys his personal opinion, and then asks the others for 
their position. The modus operandi is to discuss the matter until no more 
contradictory statements are made to the proposal of a participant. Without any 
further repetition or confirmation, this last proposal is then accepted as decision of 
the maslaxat and binding for all participants. There are no votes or majority 
decisions, that is, all decisions are taken unanimously. Any participant can defeat a 
decision by contradiction or objection, which happens quite frequently. In such 
instances the representatives of divergent opinions usually visit each other and try in 
individual, informal and bilateral talks outside the maslaxat to convince and win over 
the holders of other standpoints. This negotiation is the task of the opinion leaders 
(in most cases important bay), the men most eloquently representing the opinion of 
their group. This may be a lengthy process of visits, discussions and counter-visits, 
until in the end consensus is reached. 
This type of tribal meeting is not unique to the Ttirkic peoples of Central Asia, 
but also quite common among the Pathans, as can be taken from the following 
description by Barth: 
The council among the Pathans is a meeting of men, called together by one or 
several of those present so as to arrive at a joint decision on a matter of common 
concern, and may thus refer to an ad hoc meeting or to an instituted tribunal ... The 
relationship between members of a council is one of equals, with no speaker or 
leader; the equality is emphasized by circular seating on the ground and the equal 
right to speak. The body does not finalize its decisions in a vote: discussion and 
negotiation continue until the decision is unopposed, and thereby unanimous and 
binding as an individual decision by each participant. A faction which will not 
accept a decision can only avoid commitment by leaving the circle in protest ... 
[the council] allows groups of men to arrive at joint decisions without 
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compromtzmg any participant's independence; it produces binding corporate 
decisions about concerted action without dissembling the structure of egalitarian 
balanced segments through the introduction of any one's right to give commands 
(Barth 1969:121pp.). 
The similarity to the Ttirkmen maslaxat is quite striking. 
My elaborations above represent the ideal type of a maslaxat which may take 
place at various levels of the segmentary lineage system. Nowadays, however, it 
takes mostly place, at least as I was able to ascertain and witness it, at the bir ata and 
tire levels. 
Most problems up for discussion in a meeting of elders have to do with animal 
thefts, trespassing on other persons' pastures, diversion of water or homicides in 
connection with bacabozlik. Theoretically all serious cases should be brought to the 
attention of the government administration. In actual fact, this is not always the case, 
especially in areas where villagers and government officials are not on the best of 
terms. In the eyes of the aqsaqals intertribal disputes are considered private 'family 
matters' that should not involve 'outsiders' such as government officials. I 
Many older Ttirkmen have ambiguous views of the government and its 
representatives, who are only too keen on asking for gifts (shirini) at any possible 
opportunity. In fact in recent years the function of the elders has changed and is still 
changing in the light of firmer integration into the fold of the Afghan state. During 
my stay in Taghan, smaller offences and common petty crimes were regularly settled 
by the aqsaqals without government interference. In the case of more complicated 
and visible problems such as homicides which could not be hidden easily from the 
watchful eyes of the bureaucracy, the elders tried to belabour and influence the 
culprit, in order to get away as favourably as possible -in other words as cheap as 
possible. The elder as judge in tribal matters has now developed into the role of 
'advisor on how to dupe the government'. During my time in Mingajik the relations 
between the villagers and the bureaucrats amounted to what one could call the 
'bakhshish connection': I give you a carpet or a sheep and you give me justice in 
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return! There was a constant wheeling and dealing which at times took bizarre 
proportions. In many ways the system is deficient and indicative of the unstable 
relationship between two unequal partners, a transitory stage to new developments 
that have not yet taken place ... Traditional ways and authority and national laws and 
power have not yet found a harmonious, symbiotic co-existence. 2 There is no 
understanding of mutual cultural ways and traditions, little or no tolerance. 
The poorer segment of Tlirkmen society (getting larger with every year) 
expressed a feeling of helplessness and resignation, of being left out of the 
community's decision-making processes. They felt that everything was decided by 
someone else - the bay by virtue of his economic power or the government. 
In contrast, people of the middle and upper levels of oba and village expressed a 
great deal of dissatisfaction with the gradual loss of lineage solidarity and growing 
individualism and the resulting loss of respect for the aqsaqals. 
THE BAY: THE GAME WITH THE NAME (NAM)- POLITICS BY REPUTATION 
In the previous section we have looked at the role of the informal traditional 
tribal elders (aqsaqals) and seen that their status and power are rapidly eroding. On 
the other hand, the Afghan bureaucracy is not a viable trustworthy alternative, 
especially in the traditional areas far away from the centres of administration and the 
bigger towns. The government does not provide a structure an individual can rely on 
if he is in trouble. 
The bay, a kind of self-styled, self-appointed leader, actually with a traditional, 
historical base and an ever changing coterie of followers and clients, is taking 
advantage of this power vacuum to redefine and redirect his own position along 
economic and social lines. 
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The term 'bay' is of TUrkic origin and is a multifaceted expression with a variety 
of meanings. Firstly, among the TUrkmen, it denotes a rich agropastoralist or trader, 
a powerful, politically influential person; but it may also be used informally as a term 
of respect, a kind of honorific (even for poorer people) when added to an ascribed 
name e.g. Rahmat Bay. 
The definition provided by Barfield for the Central Asian Arab bays of 
Afghanistan is fully applicable and correct also for our Ttirkmen situation: 
The bai is more than wealthy; he is the closest thing the Arabs have to a leader. 
He is much like a Kazakh bii (Krader 1963:209-213). The Arabs, who recognize 
no formal lines of authority among themselves, tum to the bais for help in 
resolving disputes. A bai has a social status rather than an institutional position. 
Wealth is only one criterion- the man must also be respected for his judgement 
and honesty, for the power of a bai rests on the willingness of people to defer to 
him (Barfield 1981:63). 
The bays, although linked to the urban centres (the most important even have 
associations with Kabul and foreign lands), have their roots and power-base in the 
rural areas, in the traditional kin-based Tlirkmen environment. 
The core of their entourage consists of their own agnates owing loyalty and 
allegiance because of common agnatic descent. To secure allegiance of a wider 
circle of collateral lineages and sections may prove more difficult and depend on 
character, reputation, ability to protect followers, successful mediation or arbitration 
in disputes (all bays are also aqsaqals) and generous hospitality. 
The Mingajik area, with a weak government control and about 60 per cent of 
poorer people in search of work as labourers, shepherds, horsegrooms, sharecroppers 
etc. presents an ideal setting for securing followers, supporters and clients, as we 
have seen in the chapter on economics. 
The area is inhabited by several immensely rich (also by European standards) 
bays who are controlling most of the means of production, that is agricultural land, 
water, pasture, livestock- and to a certain extent women, since all of them and their 
298 
sons are polygynists. Political authority is closely linked with economic power and 
wealth, that is control of resources. Whoever controls the means of production can 
buy compliance and allegiance. There is no power without wealth. Consequently 
there is also competition for followers and supporters. 
The size and composition of a following of a given bay is flexible and needs 
constant renewal and maintenance, since the followers are in a voluntary 
relationship and can freely move to the group of another bay. Centre of this cyclical 
development is the status and reputation (nam) as well as the importance of a given 
individual. Somebody is important because he enjoys an impeccable geographically 
far-reaching reputation. As a consequence, this attracts followers and clients - the 
better the reputation, the larger and more important the following. These supporters, 
followers (bringing in their own network of relationships) and clients provide 
favours (directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, legally or illegally) and labour, 
which will lead to economic and political success; and to close the cycle further 
contribute to the enhancement of the bay's reputation. 
It sounds simple, but the whole chain of enmeshed action is volatile and brittle, 
because of the competition between bays. Followers are easily won, but also very 
easily lost- and with them goes the reputation. 
In order to keep that cycle intact, the bay has to undertake certain activities to 
keep the followers interested. These may range from generous hospitality, special 
favours to lavish entertainment. There is a certain analogy to the Roman dictum 
'panem et circenses', but in our case it is not circus productions, but buzkasi, the 
Central Asian horseman-game par excellence, which forms the core of lavish 
entertainment with the purpose of making oneself a name. 
Let us now examine the spectrum of resources a bay has at his disposition to 
establish or enhance his reputation (his name), the ultimate source of political 
authority. 
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a) An architecturally impressive compound (multi-storey) with a well equipped 
guest house (Figure 7) 
The most important Ti.irkmen bays have a separate guest compound with 
verandah, flower garden, howz, lavatory, several bedrooms and as piece de 
resistance, a lavishly equipped reception room. Carpets, cushions, tapestries and all 
kinds of 'exotic' trinkets and gadgets from abroad (usually bought during the 
pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia) are part and parcel of an elegant, elaborate style. 
A generally accepted, conventionally predetermined seating order reveals the 
relative status of each guest. This seating order reveals exactly who is who in any 
given gathering. (For a detailed description of a guest house and the intricacies of 
such seating-arrangements see Azoy (1982:38-40.) 
Belonging to the compound (public sphere) are the stables where the finest 
buzkasi horses are ostentatiously tethered. The visitor's protocol invariably calls for 
an inspection of the champion stallions and precious heirloom silver harnesses and 
other embroidered horse-trappings and trimmings. 
No guest house would serve its purpose without sumptuous meals and lavish 
gifts carefully selected according to the status of an honoured guest. In this latter 
part of the entertainment and 'name-building' process, the women play an important 
part, as we shall see in a later section. 
b) Ostentatious display of religious ritual and piety 
As we have seen in a previous chapter, formal Islam as well as the individual 
life cycle and the agropastoral ritual cycle offer ample possibility for conspicuous 
display of piety and prayers. 
PLATE 37: GROOMING A PRIZED BUZKAil-HORSE 
PLATE38: ARURALBAZaR 
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This may take the form of lengthy Qur'an readings combined with public 
feedings and distribution of alms to the poor upon return from the Hajj; or an 
elaborate prayer-meeting in the mosque, in the presence of important guests. 
Distribution of meat and alms during orthodox Muslim festivals, such as Qurban 
Bayram offer further possibilities, to name just a few. Keeping a private mullah, 
who regularly accompanies his patron to ritual occasions is a favoured possibility. 
Apparently the richest and most famous bay of the Mingajik area (he is a legend by 
now) used to arrange huge religious gatherings and whole Qur'an readings whenever 
there were important disputes and feuds to settle. The hostile parties thus had to 
arrive in a conciliatory and forgiving spirit and matters could be discussed, arbitrated 
and settled in a placative spirit and without loss of face of either party. 
c) Lavish public festivities 
Circumcision and marriage ceremonies offer excellent opportunities for public 
display of hospitality and entertainment. A large circle of kin, friends and 
acquaintances from various ethnic groups and from all over Afghanistan may attend 
such feasts, which may last many days (the longer the better) and are usually 
crowned by buzkasi games with high cash-prize money and distribution of gifts. 
Since such huge gatherings involving thousands of people, require meticulous 
preparations and the involvement of many helpers, they are fraught with certain 
dangers (see Azoy 1982: chapter 3 for an excellent analysis of a buzkasi tui). If 
successful, they are, however, the quickest and most efficient and effective (but also 
most costly) way of establishing one's reputation over a wide area. Incidentally, 
even my first host, the immensely rich westernized owner of the skin-processing 
factory, who usually lived in Kabul or abroad, customarily offered buzkasi games 
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with high cash-prizes when he visited his native village, usually followed by a lavish 
meal for kith, kin and the government officials and alms distributions for the poor. 
Nowadays the bays have taken over many of the functions of the aqsaqals by 
virtue of their economic power and authority which even the government officials 
cannot ignore. They may have corrupt local government officials removed by 
bypassing the provincial level and directly activating their contacts at the national 
level. However, bays with this kind of extensive network of connections are rare. 
As far as I could find out, the aqsaqals usually deal with smaller problems 
involving neighbouring obas and closely related bir atas or lineages. 
The bays, also aqsaqals at the same time, were mediating disputes of a larger 
order involving clans or higher orders of segmentation or even other ethnic groups; 
however without any sanction powers. 
In spite of their economic wealth and consequent power and authority, they are 
considered primi inter pares who can try to bring about a settlement between two 
parties or arbitt:ate a case on behest of disputing parties. Their power derives from 
consent of a group of kin and followers and not from any coercive power. Should 
the contesting parties not accept the solution, there are always the government 
channels; but in spite of the government's claim to jurisdiction in all quarrels and 
disputes, most Ttirkmen prefer informal arbitration of their complaints by a 
reputable, well-known insider or a group of insiders, whom they can trust and who 
are familiar with the local Ttirkmen situation and customs, speak their language and 
make no demands for heavy bribes. 
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THE KARIADaR: MIDDLEMAN BETWEEN TRIBE AND NATION-STATE 
In the previous sections we have seen that the traditional Ti.irkmen political 
structure is undergoing changes which are being brought about by government 
attempts and measures to economically and politically firmly integrate this 
hinterland into the Afghan nation-state. 
To demonstrate this process we may use the analytical framework developed by 
F.G. Bailey for the relationship between the Indian bureaucratic state structure and 
the 'small-scale relatively undifferentiated tribal or village structures' of Orissa. In 
his analysis he states that 'almost without exceptions these structures exist within 
larger encapsulating structures', that is independent nation-states (Bailey 1970:144-
155). 
To bring the two groups together, usually a person knowledgeable of both 
systems holds the office of middleman or spokesman, which can, under certain 
conditions, as we shall see, amount to nothing more than simple messenger. In 
Bailey's definition 
Middlemen, in the situation of encapsulation, are roles which come into existence 
to bridge a gap in communications between the larger and the smaller structures. 
The role can take many forms .... The essence of the role is to keep a foot in both 
camps. His interest is to keep going a process of bargaining: either in what he 
does or in what he says, or both, he must persuade the two sides that this is a 
situation in which compromise can be made. He must convince them that they are 
not engaged in pure conflict, but that they have interests in common and that if 
they keep their eyes upon these interests, both can, to some degree, emerge from 
the contest as winners. In other words, he has to demonstrate that this is a non-
zero-sum game (Bailey 1970:67). 
The framework developed by Bailey differs in some points from the office of 
the kariadar, who has powerful informal rivals in the rich bays who might 
outrnanoeuvre him in important dealings with the government by virtue of their 
reputation, superior financial power and connections. 
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As a rule, the kariadar is elected by the tribal elders, the mullah imam and other 
important male members of a village or cluster of villages. His election has to be 
confirmed by the district governor (uluswal sahib). Normally this is just a matter of 
routine, since the government has other means and ways to get rid of an unwanted 
candidate than outright confrontation with the villagers by refusing their selection. It 
may, however, happen that the government appoints a kariadar without consulting 
the villagers. 
A potential candidate should have the following qualities, characteristics and 
prerequisites: 
have a good character 
enjoy an excellent reputation (nam) 
be literate 
have the ability to mobilize followers 
be eloquent in his dealings with the government 
have sons to assist him in his tasks 
enjoy a certain wealth (not absolute prerequisite, since he receives a salary 
payable in cash and kind). 
From the Tiirkmen's point of view, his task is to represent his village or group of 
obas vis-a-vis the government. In this, he is subject to directions from the villagers 
who elected him. In fact this political office does not entail any power or ruling 
function. 
In actual fact, it is a rather ambiguous position. After all, he is associated with 
the government, an alien system which spells out trouble and corruption. Quite a 
few kariadars are actually taking advantage of their position to intimidate 
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delinquents in order to extort bribes and solicit gifts, which are then shared with the 
government officials. For this reason, many Ttirkmen consider him to be a traitor. 
The villagers expect him to muster enough courage, wits and eloquence to 
successfully represent and push their interests with the government and to formulate 
petitions. No special political experience and wisdom (aql) - principal qualities of 
the aqsaqals - are needed, since the kariadar is not making policy or taking personal 
political decisions, but putting into operation the decisions jointly taken by the 
villagers and aqsaqals. 3 
From the government's point of view, he is requested to perform tasks which are 
harder to fulfill, since some of the measures are unpopular with the Ttirkmen. He is 
then, at times, torn between adat and the legal system of the Afghan state. 
Generally, as I could observe on several occasions, his loyalty is on the side of the 
delinquent or petitioner provided he came forth with the required 'gift'. 
His general tasks are as follows: 
to explain the government decrees and regulations to his villagers 
to report births, deaths and marriages to the government 
to organize village security patrols 
to establish lists of conscripts 
to report murderers and thieves and bring serious disputes and crimes to the 
attention of the government 
to facilitate government taxation 
to remind parents to send children to school (in places where there is a school). 
It is clear that most of these tasks are in the interest of the government and not 
popular with the Ttirkmen villagers. To inforce the rules, he has no power of 
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sanctions. In the Taghan area, some kariadars are the pawns of rich bays and 
function only as messengers. 
The village meetings usually take place in his guest house. During these 
meetings he has no special privileges, except if he happens, at the same time, to be 
an influential aqsaqal in his own right, which is the case with a few kariadtirs in the 
Mingajik area. 
It may happen that powerful bays simultaneously hold the office of kariadtir. 
Their power, however, derives from the status as bay and not from the office of 
kariadar; this is just a small appendage, which, if properly manipulated and made 
use of, offers further possibilities and avenues to increase business relations. 
It is not infrequent (I know of several cases) that the kariadtir by virtue of his 
office, some influential agnates and excellent contacts with some government 
officials, derives substantial personal financial benefits. In this case, he has to have 
the connivance and tacit agreement of influential persons in the government as well 
as in village circles; to put it in Bailey's words, 'He has to keep a foot in both camps'. 
WOMEN: THE HIDDEN POWER? 
In deed the Turcoman woman deserves respect, for nowhere in the East have I met 
their equals in exemplary virtue, devotion to their families, and indefatigable 
industry. 
Arminius Vambery (19th century) 
The reports by 18th and 19th century travellers and adventurers abound in facts 
and fiction about the situation, character, morals and manners of the women of 
Central Asian Ttirkic groups. Their assessments of Ttirkmen women range from 
very positive (see Vambery above) to outright rude, defamatory and derogatory. 
Typically enough, all those writers were men, with hardly any firsthand, personal 
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contact and access to the segregated, private female domain of the Ttirkmen yurt, 
tam oroba. 
The recent ethnographic literature on the Ttirkmen has sorely neglected the 
female aspects of society, probably for the obvious reason that the investigators were 
men. It is common knowledge that in sex-segregated societies, male researchers, as 
a rule, have far less access to women than female researchers generally have to men. 
This situation, incidentally is not limited to the Ttirkmen or other Ttirkic groups, 
as Cynthia Nelson correctly argues in a recent conference paper: 
I shall concentrate on the male image of the social worlds for the obvious reason 
that the ethnographic material on nomadic societies has been written almost 
exclusively by male anthropologists. Of the few descriptions and analytical accounts 
written by women (which tend to describe the sedentary situation), there is a 
suggestion that a great deal of what has been taken for granted about power and 
authority in nomadic society has been largely a reflection of 'patriarchal politics', to 
borrow Kate Millett's term4 (Nelson 1973:43). 
This is in no way surprising, for male anthropologists usually get their 
information from male informants projecting women's concerns and statuses in a 
kind of way males perceive them, and not the way women really see the matter. 
After this general digression, let us go back to Ttirkmen politics. If not 
otherwise stated, the conditions described relate to the watani of the Taghan area. If 
the argument warrants it, examples from the acculturated muhajirin villages will be 
used. 
So far we have examined the traditional Ttirkmen political system, the Afghan 
administrative system, the ways and extent to which the Mingajik area is 
encapsulated in the Afghan nation-state, and the type of middlemen and brokers 
these systems have brought forth to link the two political spheres - the macro 
dimensions. Let us now look at the micro level of domestic unit and oba and 
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examine, how women, in many indirect, overt and covert, subtle ways, influence the 
domains outside their private and domestic spheres. 
Traditionally spaces in Ttirkmen society are divided into a female, private, inner 
sphere with Ttirkmeni as the language of communication and a male, public, outer 
sphere where also some Dari is understood. This spatial division is clearly visible in 
the division of the yurt into a male and female section. Work and economic 
activities are divided according to the sexes and are largely complementary and 
equally valued. 
All agricultural work, herding of animals, collection of firewood (yandok), 
marketing of products and other activities taking place in the public domain, are the 
men's responsibility; in brief, the men represent the domestic unit to the outside, 
public world. 
Theoretically each sex could also perform most of the tasks of the other, but 
practically this is not done.5 Generally women's tasks in Taghan were more labour-
intensive and r~quired longer work-hours than men's activities. 
The women are unequivocally in charge of the household and its activities, such 
as childcare, preparation of food and the processing of animal products such as milk 
and wool (into carpets and felts) and all tasks belonging to the inner, private sphere, 
that is, only requiring contact with men belonging to the mahram and qaum 
categories. 6 
Women are an integral part of the economic unit. In the domestic sphere and 
regarding family economics, the women (especially the senior wife of the household) 
exercise considerable authority and autonomy. They enjoy a status similar to that of 
the Basseri women described by Barth as follows: 
With respect to the decisions in the domestic and familial domain, men and 
women are more nearly equal and the distribution of authority between spouses is 
a matter of individual adaptation. Thus decisions regarding the multitude of 
choices in the field of production and consumption ... and all matters of kinship, 
marriage, training of children and decisions that will greatly affect the family ... 
are all decisions shared by the spouses (Barth 1961:15-16). 
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Although now largely sedentary, the Taghan obas still resemble, in their 
composition and structure, a former nomadic winter camp. 
The situation regarding equivalence of work and status in domestic matters was 
quite different with the acculturated, rich muhajirin villages of Carshangu. They 
were less free, even in their domestic arrangements than their sisters in Taghan. 
Their situation rather resembled the conditions described by Talal Asad for the 
Kababish Arabs: 
In all households the ultimate responsibility of providing for dependents and the 
prerogative of making the final decisions about the management of the household 
resources rests with the male head (Asad 1970:37). 
Women and children do not need any money ... A man is responsible for buying 
all the requirements of his household - grain, tea, sugar, clothing, shoes. Women 
are irresponsible with money; they are just like children (ibid. :93). 
From these statements one would feel tempted to conclude that in this 
dichotomous conception of the two social worlds - yurt/tam for women and 
camp/oba/village for men- the women's sphere was restricted to domestic matters 
and excluded from any political activities. Although active politics take place in the 
public domain, women command a whole gamut of more or less subtle means of 
manipulating and influencing political decisions in the public sphere of men. 
Women, as I could observe, are well aware of the networks of contacts of their men 
and the subtleties and importance of political transactions. 
Let us now briefly examine the main avenues (only the most obvious ones) 
women can choose to influence the male, public domain: 
Hospitality 
In Ttirkmen society, hospitality is a delicate and essential matter through which 
important relationships can be made, maintained, reinforced or broken. It is the 
senior wife of the household who decides what kinds of foods, how many dishes 
or only tea and bread are to be served. There exists a strict unwritten 
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hospitality code for all levels of invitees: agnates, affines, government officials 
or strangers. Should one make a mistake, particularly be too stingy, a simple 
invitation taking place in the inner realm of male guest house or women's 
quarters will have serious repercussions in the outer, public sphere: that is, 
dishonour the name of the household-head (not of the woman who actually 
committed the error) or in serious cases, of the whole bir ata. For low level 
guests, tea with some bread and sugar (a rare and expensive commodity) and 
dried raisins are the norm. The higher ranks will get a whole array of 
sweetmeats, dried fruits and almonds and other delicacies as well as higher 
quality tea and plenty of sugar. The highest ranks, regardless of the time of the 
day, will invariably receive a palau (rice dish with meat and raisins) . Usually 
an animal will have to be slaughtered to provide the meat. Although the guests 
might be all men and not seen by the hostess, she decides what they will eat. 
The family reputation (nam) rests in her hands. 
In the case of a high ranking female guest, the senior woman of the household 
will make an appearance, attired in her best finery and jewellery. Incidentally 
the rank and social standing of a woman is determined by the status of her 
husband or guardian, in the case of an unmarried young lady. It is also that 
status which determines the seating order, and how many females of the host 
family are making an appearance. It is an elaborate and well-defined protocol, 
according to which wives of high ranking government officials automatically 
get the seat of honour. 
Selection of hospitality-~ifts 
Another aspect is the selection of the gift a guest receives at the time of 
departure. This may be a simple yaiik (kerchief) filled with sugarcoated 
almonds (nokol), a piece of cloth ranging from cheap cotton print to silk 
brocade or a small carpet for the highest ranks. 
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Special care was taken when the wives of high-ranking bureaucrats with their 
daughters were scheduled to visit. Feverish preparations and activities were 
taking their course several days before the scheduled visit. After such 'state 
events', I was usually dispatched to find out whether the event was a success, 
since as a foreigner, I had free access to public spaces, and in the company of 
my 'brother' could visit the baziir, the rumour kitchen, where especially 
unsuccessful events were quickly making the rounds. I know of several cases 
where the hostess abandoned her good judgement on purpose and gave free 
reign to her hatred of a kinsman by giving him an improper, shabby treatment, 
which then had immediate, or in one case, belated negative repercussions. In a 
society where much depends on an impeccable reputation, proper alliances and 
ceremonial exchanges with closer or more distant agnates, there is always a time 
to retaliate for an earlier mistake at a most propitious moment and that with 
malicious joy. 
Selection and preparation of a ~irl's dowry 
Another important area of female influence is the preparation and composition 
of a daughter's dowry. This is of crucial importance in case of an exogamous 
marriage. In charge of this important task are the senior women of the bride's 
domestic unit, and in the family of a rich and influential bay, all the senior 
women of the bir ata. Usually a special meeting is convened for this purpose, 
which may last several days, until the contents of the trousseau are fully selected 
and ready. Especially critical items are jewellery and clothing. Plate 15 
demonstrates how a little boy has to act as model for the jewellery selection and 
display. This, again, is an event immediately touching on the nam, reputation of 
a whole bir ata, although it takes place in the secrecy of the women's domain 
and is entirely in the hands of females. Here again, reputations are made or 
destroyed. 
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Gatherin ~ of information 
In the chapter on economics we have touched on the informal work-gatherings 
(komak, umma). As stated earlier, in most cases many more women are taking 
part than the actual task requires or warrants. This is not accidental. The 
women of Taghan have little geographical mobility. Such gatherings are a 
legitimate reason for visiting and gossiping - often as a therapeutical measure. 
Most important, however, is the exchange of news (each participating woman 
has a separate network of friends, family and acquaintances, thus covering a 
wide spatial area) on marrigeable girls, crimes, unpopular people, bacabozlik, 
business partners to avoid etc. Most of this information is then passed on to 
husbands, brothers and sons, who may use it to further their own plans and 
activities in the economic and political arena. In this matter, women, as I have 
witnessed, are not beyond exaggerations and even manipulation of news to fit 
their own perspectives on certain persons and events. There certainly is power 
in this activity especially for clever and manipulative women. 
The above mentioned activities are carried out by virtue of being a wife in a 
given household, in fulfillment of domestic duties. There are, however, also other 
avenues to leadership, e.g. by way of achieved status in the magico-medical field. 
Women with this kind of powers are feared, and at the same time respected. Since 
they are considered an anomaly, as far as regular female statuses are concerned, they 
have, to a certain degree, direct access to male, public spaces. I have argued in other 
papers (Stucki 1978a and Liechti-Stucki 1990) that certain stages in the female life 
cycle offer avenues for power in the public domain. 
In Carshangu, among the rich muhajirin bays, commercialization of pastoralism 
and diversification into large-scale, cash oriented agriculture (with tenant farmers 
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and sharecroppers) and national and international trade had a negative impact on the 
economic and subsequently political role and status of women. 
In the bay-households women are no longer needed with the herds in the spring-
camps to milk the ewes and process the milk. These tasks are now performed by 
hired labour, mostly Pashtun women. Until some years ago, even the women of the 
semi-nomadic Ttirkmen economic units would always be with the herds during the 
labour-intensive spring months, where division of labour took place along 
traditional, fairly symmetrical lines between the sexes. With the introduction of 
qaraqul sheep, production was increasingly geared towards a cash economy linked to 
external markets. Economic specialization resulted in a loss of social integration of 
women. With a steady diversification and shift of activities to the public spaces (e.g. 
trade, carpets for export etc.), women's and men's work was no longer equivalent and 
the roles no longer reversible. 
Sexual division of labour that in the past was only analytically divisible had now 
been separated in fact. Women's labour was no longer part of the close co-
operative public enterprise that traditionally gave nomadic women higher status 
than their sedentary sisters in Afghanistan ... 
as Barfield correctly wrote (Barfield 1981:124). 
Contrary to the homogeneous kin environment of an open-style oba (Figure 6), 
living in an ethnically heterogeneous environment of a village requires a walled 
compound to protect the modesty of one's women. Emulation of female patterns of 
seclusion may, in certain instances, even include veiling or at least some modified 
forms of it (Vinogradov 1974:103). The rich acculturated bays see it as a natural 
consequence of modern developments that women's lives are now largely restricted 
to the realm of household, family and kin group, while they lead public lives in the 
baziirs, teahouses and domains of political interaction. 
They now talk about their women (although considerably contributing to the 
household economy by making carpets for sale) as being 'weak, not intelligent and 
313 
unreliable'. The differention of spheres is now spelled out in another idiom, namely 
in the dichotomy 'nature' and 'culture' as Vinogradov notes very aptly: 
The inherent limitations in the character of women confine them to the sphere of 
'nature', whereas men are capable of operating in the sphere of 'culture'. These two 
worlds of 'nature' and 'culture' correlate with the private and public sectors of 
social life. A woman, therefore, is relegated to the 'natural' and private world of 
childrearing and general domesticity, while a man's life unfolds in the 'cultural' or 
public world of politics, trade and religion (Vinogradov 1974:193). 
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NOTES 
1 My informants claimed that only about 15 per cent of disputes were brought to the attention of the 
government. I had no possibility to verify this claim. It may be indicative, however, to know, that the 
uluswal sahib and the public prosecutor complained to me about lack of work. 
2 The following story of an old man illustrates the frustrations and insecurity the new system causes: 
Since time immemorial, for the Ttirkmen, the key to success were his herds, horses, a good 
family and kin. We lived well, thank be Allah, and had many sons. Now they 
(government bureaucrats) beat* us, because we do not understand what is written in the 
qanun (law code) which is written in a language we do not know. Most of us cannot read 
and write, you know that Time and again we are told: Such is the law! Everything is 
apparently written in that book. We have no means to verify, whether it is really written in 
that ominous book. At times I really doubt, whether such 'strange things' are really written 
there or whether they just want our money ... 
(*Application of physical force was not uncommon in Mingajik during the time of my research.) 
3 Of the 29 kariadars of Mingajik W oluswali, three were mullahs. In about 30 per cent of cases, the 
office has been in the same family for some 25-30 years. 
4 Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1970). 
5 One task the Ttirkmen would never perform is the grinding of foodgrain with a hand-mill 
(degirmen). Several sources attest to this; amongst them Vambery who relates that 
once, when I had, in the Atrek, obtained by begging a small sack of wheat, and was about 
to grind it in a handmill, the Turcomans around me burst into shouts of laughter. Shocked 
and surprised, I asked the reason of their scornful mirth, when one approached in a 
friendly manner and said: 'It is a shame for you to take in hand women's work' (Vambery 
quoted according to Marvin 1881:140). 
Asad similarly writes for the Kababish: 
In fact in the absence of women, when men are away with the main herds on a journey, 
many of these (female tasks) - but never the grinding of grain - may be performed by men 
(Asad 1970:44). 
6 A woman's social contact with men falls into three categories: 
a) mahram (lit. forbidden), that means not marriageable. With them women can be free and 
unrestrained; 
b) qaum (= all other recognized male kin and affines outside the forbidden degrees). Conversation 
with such men is possible, but relations are more restrained than those with men of the mahram 
category; 
c) basxa adam (in fact strangers), that means all men not belonging to the above two categories. 
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CRIAILLERIES 
Quiconque a deu:xfemmes 
Passera son temps, nuit et jour, en crialleries. 
Chacune d'elles fera cent mille caprices. 
ll tratnera ses jours, souffrant bien des tourments. 
S'il en aime une et qu'il neglige L'autre, 
ll sera decrie par les gens, et publiquement discredite, 
Son esprit sera hebete, il sera degoute de tous ses biens. 
S'il traite pas egalement ses deux compagnes, il sera sans honneur. 
Tantot, elles gazouillent comme des rossignols, 
Attirant les gens, qui veulent les voir. 
Tantot, elles frappent du poing Ia terre ou les cendres, 
Mais , si elles voient leur mari, elles restent sans mot dire . 
Si,fache, il ne vient pas aupres d'elles, 
S'il nejait pas de discours a Ia louange de chacune, 
Un tel marine sera plus considere comme un homme. 
Duex dames et leur mari, celajait trois femmes. 
Makhtoumkouli! Lefond des choses est un secret pour tous. 
Si vous vous mariez, veillez a epouser des femmes de valeur! 
Puisse le sort ne pas vous amener une mauvaise epouse! 
Vous seriez bien dequ, vous ne vous reconnattriez plus .... 
Makhtumk.uli Firaqi (18th century Ttirkmen poet) 
Translation by Louis Bazin and Pertev Boratav 
PLATE39: 
WOMAN WEARING THE 
BEADED TAGHAN HEADDRESS 
PLATE 40: 
TYPICALTAGHAN 
HEADDRESS (KiJLTA) 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
For reasons explained in the first chapter, I could neither freely select my 
research locations nor apply a systematic scientific sampling on a larger area. It is, 
therefore, difficult to generalize with any degree of accuracy beyond the boundaries 
of the small watani sample of Taghan and the limited qualitative information on the 
acculturated muhajirin villages. Nevertheless, I have been able to observe certain 
differences between the two groups, especially with regard to economic (as a 
trigger), political and social changes and values. Being fully aware of the limits of 
this approach, I will, nevertheless, attempt a more qualitative comparison, which, 
given the above mentioned limitations, will have to be of a preliminary and tentative 
nature pending further field research. 
For this purpose I find the methodology applied by Scarlett Epstein (1962) on 
two south Indian villages quite useful. Certain reservations are obvious, since we are 
dealing with two entirely different cultural environments (Islamic versus traditional 
Hindu caste-society). Epstein's emphasis is on the effect of economic opportunities 
on social institutions, and she attributed change to 'incompatibility' with given social 
structures. 
Arthus Lewis, in his preface to Epstein's book Economic Development and 
Social Change in South India, sums up her theoretical premises as follows: 
Whenever we study the effect of economic change on institutions, the basic 
answer seems always to be the same, namely, that the love of money is a powerful 
institutional solvent. What we need to know is just how powerful a solvent the 
love of money is. The answer seems to be that it dissolves what stands in its way, 
but nothing more ... Presumably a society as it changes, seeks to establish a new 
equilibrium between the economic and the non-economic values which its 
institutions embody. How much is changed depends partly on how much is 
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incompatible, and partly on how closely the interrelated various institutions are 
(Lewis in Epstein 1962:ix-x). 
In the previous chapters we have looked at the social, economic and political 
organization of the Ersari Ttirkmen and at certain changes brought about in recent 
years, especially after the influx of muhajirin. Here I shall try to analyze why certain 
changes occurred with the watani and not with the muhajirin, and vice versa. Let us 
begin with a brief summary of the two Ti.irkmen groups: 
The watani, mainly traditional pastoralists who due to government pressure 
accepted land grants earlier this century, are now more or less settled 
agropastoralists living at the fringe of the desert-steppe. Many of the poorer 
Taghan residents are still living in patron - client relations with watani or less 
frequently muhajirin bays. At the time of my field-work, the Taghan obas were 
gradually moving from a subsistence to a cash economy, linking them more 
firmly with the local and regional markets. As a consequence of 
impoverishment, a large percentage of families were relying on carpet-
production for economic viability. The Taghan obas still represent the 
traditional segment of Ersari Ti.irkmen society. 
The muhajirin, refugees from the USSR, arrived in Afghanistan during several 
waves of immigration earlier this century. The first groups, mainly from 
neighbouring areas along the Amu Darya, were able to bring their herds and 
were economically better off than the subsequent immigrants who arrived 
empty-handed and from areas further away. In their homeland, they had mainly 
been agropastoralists. Ethnically they are of the same stock as the watani, with 
the same lineage-system and similar cultural values. After their arrival in 
Afghanistan, many were clients of the watani bays, working as shepherds, 
sharecroppers or muzdur. Surplus cash was systematically invested in land, 
herds and small businesses. Out of sheer need, they practised economic 
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diversity right from the beginning and thus entered the cash economy. Today 
they are better integrated in the regional, even national cash sectors. They have 
a high percentage of very wealthy and well-connected bays, but also constitute a 
fair percentage of the local wage-labour force. 
Let us now examine the different lines and types of development and change the 
watani and muhajirin pursued, by following Epstein's methodology, which she 
describes as follows: 
In my comparison of economic and social change in Wangala (comparable to 
watani oba A.L.-S) and Dalena (rather like the muhajirin, but with certain 
demographic differences A.L.-S), I shall show that Wangala's social system has 
changed only slightly because irrigation strengthened the traditional [my 
emphasis] farming economy. I shall also argue that Dalena's social system 
changed radically, because the diversification of its economy changed economic 
roles and relations within the village. Wangala's persisting social system has 
incorporated many of the cultural changes now characteristic of the wider society, 
similarly, Dalena's changed system still shows the effects of traditional relations 
and values. The study of the two villages throws into relief the interplay of old 
and new values in the process of social change (Epstein 1962:10). 
For the sake of consistency and clarity, I shall distinguish between the same 
types of structural relations and aspects of culture as Epstein, in order to afford 
comparison of results. Let me thus, in accordance with Epstein, look at structural 
change in terms of economic, political, ritual and family roles and relations and 
discuss cultural change in terms of economic values. I accept her definition of 
values proposed by Hogbin as 'preferences regarding objects and actions in their 
social context' (Hogbin 1958:58). 
Many more categories could be identified and the system refined, but the 
incompleteness of my field-data, especially with regard to muhajirin, would only 
allow speculation. 
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a) Economic change 
As we have seen in the chapter on economics, with the closer integration into 
the nation-state, the Taghan watani obas have undergone subtle economic changes, 
but they did not interfere with kinship and good neighbourhood ties. The subsistence 
part of their economy is still quite considerable and only personal and natural 
calamities leading to impoverishment, will cause them to fully move into the cash 
economy (e.g. muzduri, carpet-making etc.). Marketing of their agropastoral 
products is still done through a network of trusted middlemen or in the neighbouring 
baziirs and serails belonging to kinsmen and friends. Personal relations in economic 
transactions are still valued and preferred to impersonal dealings. Their radius of 
operation is limited to the lower levels of the baziir hierarchy, that is to local and 
district markets. Only the richest watani bays have national or even international 
business interests, although their number is increasing. 
The patron-client system with all its economic and social implications is still in 
operation in many obas. The mobilization of the traditional labour-pools (komiik, 
umma) is popular, especially in the female sector, where it is also fulfilling the need 
for exchange of news, gossiping and entertainment, as the mobility of women is 
limited. On the whole, the situation of watani women has not changed much, and 
the traditional division of labour according to sexes is still practised. 
In Taghan, the gradual transition from subsistence to cash economy did not 
affect or change social structures. It is a slow process. With the muhajirin, it was a 
much more radical process involving also loss or redistribution of wealth. Changes 
in Taghan take the form of 'unilinear development' as Epstein aptly calls it. Epstein 
came to the conclusion that incompatibility with prevailing order provides the clue 
for change. This conclusion is also valid for the Tlirkmen of Taghan. 
The muhajirin are much more closely integrated into the regional and even 
national cash-economy, especially the upper stratum of rich bays. There is much 
320 
more diversification in their economic activities ranging from a well-connected rich 
segment of national and international traders, serail keepers, artisans and craftsmen. 
They have also branched out into new kinds of economic ventures such as 
transportation and marketing. They are firmly integrated into the bazar economy 
from the local to the national levels. Interesting enough, they invest surplus cash 
earned from their business ventures into traditional means of production, such as 
qaraqul sheep-herds and agricultural land. Their radius of operation is much wider 
than that of the watani, often spanning the whole country. 
Their market relations have adopted a much more impersonal, profit-oriented 
character. Profit is the driving force and not maintenance of local social bonds. 
Flexibility and relations with outsiders (people of other ethnic groups, government 
bureaucrats and even foreigners) are becoming more and more prominent. 
Individuals often act in self-interest, unconscious of the social relations which 
traditionally affect and determine social behaviour. Hereditary economic relations 
and labour-pools, such as komiik and umma, which have also important social 
functions, are abandoned for the sake of hired, easily disposable and exchangeable 
wage-labourers. Selection of the cheapest labour source according to the law of 
supply and demand is superseding kin relationship and responsibility towards 
impoverished kinsmen. 
As we have seen, economic change among the muhajirin has brought about 
considerable deterioration of the position of women. Women are confined to walled 
compounds, with stricter rules of segregation and diminished mobility, since the 
muhajirin villages are usually no longer homogeneous lineage settlements. Being 
able to keep one's woman idle, 'invisible', has become a status symbol of the rich 
bays. Among the poorer groups, women, although quite invisible and confined to 
private spaces, play an important economic role in the family economic unit by 
making carpets for sale. The poorest muhajirin men often seek employment in town 
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as wage-labourers. This is also the most traditional segment, which, if it were 
possible, they would actually prefer to work for richer clansmen. 
b) Political change 
In this field, the difference between watani and muhajirin is not as wide and 
visible as in other sectors. It is more subtle and invisible. 
Closer economic integration of the watani has not necessarily brought about an 
awareness of wider political issues. They do see a need for some political changes, 
but not at the cost of giving up adat and lineage solidarity. 
As we have seen in the chapter on politics, they are very traditionally minded, 
seeking historical precedents and trying to keep their bays in check. In the light of 
ever increasing government interference and control, they are trying to define a new 
role for the aqsaqals. Watani as well as muhajirin try to circumvent government 
authorities for lack of trust. 
When I was leaving Taghan, new lineage alliances and a redefinition of the 
functions of the aqsaqals were in status nascendi. Probably persistence of a 
relatively stable traditional economic structure was responsbile for the persistence of 
traditional political structures. On the other hand, it could also be a sign of 
helplessness, resignation and lethargy in the face of an ever more powerful and 
demanding central administration. 
Among the muhajirin, as far as I could ascertain from observation and second 
hand information, the power of the lineage elders is eroding faster. The bays are 
manipulating political affairs and relations because of their economic power. 
Increased economic mobility created by economic diversification led to 
redistribution of wealth, which in tum became incompatible with political leadership 
based on an acephalic lineage system. The aqsaqals had little power, no sanctioning 
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devices to oppose the quest of the bays seeking political expression and alliance by 
virtue of their economic status and extensive relations all over the country. An 
increased range of economic relations, naturally entailed an increased range of 
political relations. 
It was, however, visisble that even among the muhajirin bays there seemed to 
exist a cleavage between the innovators and the more conservative ones. 
c) Ritual change 
With the watani, traditional ritual exchanges to strengthen lineage solidarity are 
still very prevalent and not alienated from their original purpose. Life cycle and 
agropastoral rituals are performed in their traditional form. Also the Islamic festivals 
are regularly observed and celebrated in their local variations. With the watani, 
ritual still is an intra-lineage affair. 
With the more status-conscious muhajirin, ritual has taken on political and 
status dimensions, as we have seen in the previous chapters. Life cycle rituals may 
take the form of ostentatious displays of wealth and status, having little to do with 
the original purpose of the activity. New 'rituals' are being created in the dealings 
with the government bureaucrats, in fact economic success is being 'ritualised'. 
Among the watani, ritual status is also a determinant of social status, but with the 
muhajirin economic success rather than ritual roles is the ultimate criterion of social 
status; for the newly acquired economic status can easily be translated into ritual 
status by clever political manipulations and influence. In this domain, the end 
justifies the means. 
Prestige and status, among the rich muhajirin bays, are no longer only an intra-
lineage, but also an extra-lineage and multi-group affair. 
323 
d) Familial change 
Contrary to Epstein's reportings from India, where the conversion from 
subsistence to cash economy led to a breakdown of the joint family unit, this is not 
the case with the Ersari Ttirkmen, either watani or muhajirin. 
Especially among the watani, lineage unity, solidarity and lineage endogamy are 
intact. Extended families going through the normal developmental cycle are the 
norm. Among the richest segments of muhajirin society, certain signs of erosion of 
lineage solidarity are visible, especially with regard to the choice of marriage 
partners for their children. Sons with a certain degree of education and schooling 
may no longer be willing to blindly accept the will of their fathers and elders until 
separation from their natal extended family. The father-son relationship will 
certainly undergo changes in the years to come. 
With the economic interests prevailing over social cohesion, also the relations 
between brothers will undergo some change. In future, with an ever increasing 
economic orientation among the richer segment of muhajirin society, the breakdown 
of joint family units may become an important issue. 
In contrast to India, the position of women in Afghanistan is different for 
religious reasons. In a strictly Islamic society, neither muhajirin nor watani 
Tiirkmen women are taking part in the public economic spheres of bazar and 
teahouse. Their contribution to the family economy - very important among the 
poorer groups- takes place in the private sphere of family compound or yurt. In this 
respect, the situation is not comparable with Epstein's Hindu villages. 
e) Change in economic values 
For most of the Taghan watani, pastoralism or agropastoralism occupies the 
dominant place in their system of economic values. For them it is more than just a 
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means of making a living, it is a way of life. Although in their Weltanschauung, 
pastoralism and its attibutes are still being idealised, in actual fact they all recognize 
the value of owning some agricultural land. 
Even the poor landless watani prefer to work as shepherds or tenant farmers for 
a closer or more distant kinsman than in the anonymity of a factory outside a 
network of kin ties. In many ways the Taghan obas still represent a closely 
integrated society in which economic, political and ritual relations are concentrated 
within the boundaries of a natal oba and neighbouring obas, that is, among close 
kinsmen. 
Once relations include outsiders, that is a move from personal to gradually more 
impersonal connections, dependence on kinsmen decreases. Taghan has managed to 
keep its social system more or less intact by keeping foreigners, non-lineage people 
out or integrating them as gongsi. As we have seen, all Taghan obas are very 
homogeneous, of the same bir ata (Figure 4) or lineage. 
The muhajirin situation is somewhat different. Traditionally in their homelands 
in the USSR, they also attached great value to pastoralism and mainly 
agropastoralism. This Weltanschauuing is still quite predominant with the first 
group of refugees able to flee with their herds. Compared with the later arrivals, 
their outlook is still much more traditional. 
Later arrivals had to perform whatever tasks were available to earn a living. 
Making money and after some financial successes, increasing it was their first 
priority. But even now, the ultimate aim of the Ttirkmen factory workers is to buy 
some land and a few animals. They are quite aware of the instability of the wider 
. economy of the region of which they are a part; and in my view this causes a certain 
resistance to changes in economic values. 
Even the richest bays engaged in national annd international trade, even when 
residing in Kabul or overseas, will invest a part of their revenue in agricultural land 
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and qaraqul herds in their native villages. They are well aware that income from 
non-agropastoral sources depends on the constant expansion of the regional and 
national Afghan economies, factors ultimately beyond their own control. 
I agree with Epstein and other theoreticians, and my data certainly bear it out 
'that resistance to change in economic values appears to be a time lag between 
change in the economic environment and in economic values held by individuals in 
society' (Epstein 1962:328). 
AUSOMMET 
Au sommet des hautes montagnes, 
Les nuages jouent avec les torrents. 
Pour le jeune brave, tout est banquet et jete, 
Pouvu qu'il soit avec les gens de sa tribu. 
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Ceux qui savaient bien parler sont devenus sourds-muets. 
L'or et l'argent se sont mues en rouille. 
Comment le moustique a-t-il pu egaler, 
Dans Ia lutte, Iaforce des elephants? 
Les veaux s'en vont vers les Paturages, 
Guides par les plus beaux taureaux. 
Un vrai pur-sang se reconnaft 
M erne so us de vieilles couvertures dechirees. 
Les serviteurs de Dieu se hatent vers lui. 
Le mechant trouvera le chdtiment des ses mefaits. 
Makhtoumkouli compense ses defauts 
Par des propos pleins d'efficacite. 
Makhtumkuli Firaqi (18th century Tlirkmen poet) 
Translation by Louis Bazin and Pertev Boratav 
PLATE 41: SUNSET IN THE STEPPE 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: WEIGHTS AND MEASURES USED IN AFGHANISTAN TODAY 
Historical sources present a bewildering picture of the variety of weights and 
measures in use in Afghan lands. 
In the past, as today, there was a close connection between weights and surface 
measures. Not only did the value of the various weights and measures vary from 
place to place, but in many cases, they also varied with the article to be weighed. 
MEASURES OF WEIGHT 
Afghanistan weight Metric equivalent 
1 nakhud* 0,19 grarnmes 
1 mesqal = 24 nakhud 4,6 gramrnes 
1 khurd = 24 mesqal 110,4 grarnrnes 
1 pao = 4 khurd 442 grammes 
1 cherak = 4 pao 1,766 kilos 
1 ser = 4 cherak = 16 pao** 7,066 kilos 
1 man = 8 ser-e-Kabul 56,528 kilos 
1 bokhar = 32 ser-e-Kabul 226,112 kilos 
1 kharwar = 80 ser-e-Kabul 565,300 kilos 
* weight of one chick-pea (nakhud) 
** 1 Kabul ser or small ser. In the Northern provinces, the ser-e-Mazar or ser-e-
kalan (big ser) which is 14,122 kilos in use. 
If not otherwise stated, weights mentioned in this study are indicated in ser-e-Mazar 
(big ser). 
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LINEAR MEASURES AND SURFACE MEASURES 
Afghan measure Metric equivalent 
1 gaz-e-chak 1,066 metres (Kabul gaz) 
1 gaz-e-jerib 0,736 metres 
1 jerib (44,2 metres) 0,195 ha (or 0,482 acres) 
1 peykal = 400 jerib 78 ha 
5,2jerib 1 ha 
REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 
In Taghan a different measure called hada is often used with regard to land. In 
Taghan one hada consists of 15 jerib, that means approximately 2,925 ha. The value 
of the hada varies from village to village. There may be as many as 40 jerib to a 
hada. 
In Taghan certain commodities, notably grain, are measured by the ghanar or 
cuval-i-sotor which is kind of large saddlebag for camels. In the case of grain, 
ghanar contains about 40 ser-i-Mazar when full. 
Another form of weighing and measuring agricultural produce is a pair of long 
pack-sacks called ghab. 
It is mostly used to transport calma (dried camel dung) or peskal (dried sheep 
manure). 
Prices for such waste products are always quoted per ghab. 
Values of some animals in equivalent of sheep (Taghan December 1977) 
3 goats have the value of 2 sheep 
1 mare has the value of 5 sheep 
1 cow has the value of 5 sheep 
1 female camel has the value of 10 sheep 
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APPENDIX 2: SOME COMMENTS ON THE 12· YEARLY ANIMAL CYCLE 
Generally the Ttirkmen do know their own age and that of their closer relatives 
and friends. Age reckoning is done in terms of a cycle of 12 animal years, which 
undoubtedly has a Chinese origin. For a detailed discussion of the subject see Turan 
1941. 
Each year has an association with one particular animal. According to the 
Ttirkmen way of thinking and to Ttirkmen traditions, the weather and specific events, 
mainly bad ones, occurring during that year, are supposed to be linked to the 
character of that particular animal. 
The animal year in which a person is born is always remembered. By 
comparing the animal year of someone's birth with the current animal year, it is 
possible to determine a person's age, which in any case, must be one of several 
possible ages, each 12 years apart. 
The following may serve as an example: My research in Taghan started in the 
year of the fish. Anybody born in the year of the dog would be either 6, 18, 30, 42, 
54, 66 or 78 years old. 
Given these facts, it is quite easy to detennine which age-possibility to select. 
The full cycle is called a muje. A period of 3 muje (36 years) is referred to as a 
hengam. 
A hengam is approximately the period over which the Islamic lunar months 
make a cycle in terms of the solar year, so if a particular date in the Islamic calendar 
falls in a particular solar year on the spring equinox, it will fall close to the spring 
equinox one hengam later. 
It should be noted that all ages change on the same day, namely on New Year's 
Day. In other words, that a person's age by Ttirkmen reckoning may differ during a 
part of the year from his real age according to Western reckoning. 
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1st year sican (mouse) 
2nd year segir (cow) 
3rd year bars (leopard) 
4th year taus han (rabbit) 
5th year baleq (fish) 
6th year yilan (snake) 
7th year yilki (mare) 
8th year goyen (sheep) 
9th year bijin (monkey) 
lOth year towuk (chicken) 
11th year it (dog) 
12th year dung us (pig) 
A word needs to be said about converting Ttirkmen ages to ours. In this context 
one has to remember that their New Year's Day falls on March 21, and that a child is 
considered to be one year old at birth, and two after it has seen one New Year's Day. 
In practice this amounts to the fact that a baby born shortly before New Year is 
considered to be two years old after New Year's Day, although in reality it is only a 
few weeks old. 
Reckoning of Ttirkmen ages by sheer appearance is not always easy. Most 
individuals under the age of 20 generally look younger than their actual age would 
suggest. However, once they reach the age of 40, or 35 for women, they appear 
older than their actual age. One could thus say that the Ttirkmen population matures 
later and ages faster once they have reached maturity. This statement is especially 
true for the female half of society. 
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THE AFGHAN SOLAR CALENDAR 
No. of month Name in Dari Zodiac sign Duration No. of days 
1st month HAMAL Aries 21.03.-20.04. 31 
2nd month SOUR Taurus 21.04.-21.05. 31 
3rd month JOUZA Gemini 22.05.-21.06. 32 
4th month SARA TAN Cancer 22.06.-22.07. 31 
5th month ASAD Leo 23.07.-22.08. 31 
6th month SUNBULA Virgo 23.08.-22.09. 31 
7th month MIZAN Libra 23.09.-22.10. 30 
8th month AQRAB Scorpio 23.10.-21.11. 30 
9th month QOWS Sagittarius 22.11.-21.12. 30 
lOth month JADI Capricorn 22.12.-20.01. 29 
11th month DALWA Aquarius 21.01.-19.02. 30 
12th month HOOT Pisces 20.02.-20.03. 30 
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APPENDIX 3: DOWRY OF A GIRL FROM A FAMILY OF MEDIAN WEALTH 
1) Clothing 
benatdonlbrenjiik (ceremonial velvet coat adorned with various kinds of silver 
ornaments - cf. Plate 18) 
don (regular coat) 
koynekle!tan (long dress with long matching underpaats) 
2) Personal grooming 
bogca (embroidered storage bundle for comb and mirror) 
aina (mirror) 
one ceriik of soap 
shana (comb) 
3) Household goods 
sanduq and qolf (carved wooden storage chest with lock) 
tutilpardah (embroidered room or tent~dividing curtain) 
kuduk set (waterpitcher, soap dish and basin to wash hands of guests and for 
Islamic ablutions) 
kecii (felt rug for yurt or tam) 
tabak (serving~tray) 
2 cimcii (spoons) 
2 kiisii (teacups) 
2 cainiik (small teapots) 
liaf (quilt, bedding) 
3 yas#k (pillows/cushions) 
4) Jewellery 
100 capros (disc~shaped silver beads) 
100 yaprak (leaf-shaped silver beads) 
50 yakkalik (square-shaped silver beads) 
4) Jewellery (cont.) 
1 eserga (nose-ring made of gold) 
1 eserga tartxe (nose-ring chain) 
10 kangrou (silver bells) 
333 
100 keranqolfle (old silver coins usually of Bukharan or Iranian origin) 
1 pair biliilik (bracelets) 
1 sanjalik (silver ornament for the top of the female headdress consisting of 
stylized rams horns on top of pins linked to carnelians) 
5 yuzuk (finger rings) 
1 kiiltii (beaded band for the front part of the female headdress. This is the most 
typical and identifying part of the headdress worn by some of the Kara 
Ttirkmen tayfas) 
1 manglaylik (headdress-ornament consisting of rectangular plaques joined 
together with silver rings and a fringe of silver yaprak. Two hooks on either 
end are for attaching it to the headdress) 
1 set kumus sacmonjuk (silver ornaments for fastening at braids) 
1 siirmenjii (beaded veil for headdress) 
ornamented silk caur 
orange silk esge 
redyasmak 
1 set qulogxalka (earrings) 
silk scarves for draping over 
headdress and around neck 
Rich families will of course add many more pieces of silver jewellery to the 
dowry. For details on motives, symbolism, materials and techniques of Ttirkmen 
silver jewellery see Andrews 1971; Dupaigne 1978; Firouz 1978; Prokot 1980 and 
Rudolph 1985. 
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APPENDIX 4: MAINTENANCE OF THE IRRIGATION-CANALS- THE COSTS 
The Agcha canal (nahr) is the last one of the eleven canals stemming from the 
Balkh River and serves the village of the Steppe Zone and the fringe of the Desert-
Steppe Zone. 
Since it is the last canal of the system, it receives the smallest amount of water. 
The Woluswali of Mingajik has 25 juis for the maintenance of which the users 
are responsible. The maintenance of the canals is fairly costly and the following 
example based on data from the 'Balkh Irrigation Project Report' will illustrate the 
case: 
Figures in workdays per year 
a) Routine repair-work: 
(25-30 days) (1,000- 1,200 men) 
(work to be carried out once or twice a year) 
b) Temporary repair-work due to calamities etc.: 
10 days x 2,400 men 
Total man/days of labour: 
minimum year: 
maximum year: 
25,000 man/days x 1 
24,000 man/days x 2 
36,000 man/days x 2 
24,000 man/days x 6 
= 25,000 - 36,000 man/days/year 
= 24,000 man/days/year 
= 25,000 man/days 
= 48,000 man/days 
73,000 man/days 
= 72,000 man/days 
= 144,000 man/days 
216,000 man/days 
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Figures in monetary terms (average daily wage= 45 Afs.) 
minimum year: 
maximum year: 
73,000 man/days@ 45 Afs. = 3,285,000 Afs. 
(approx. US$ 82, 125) 
216,000 man/days@ 45 Afs.= 9,720,000 Afs. 
(approx. US$ 243,000) 
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TAGHAN OBAS 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows DOnkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep ~ wool for 
persons* carpets 
no. 1 Hanam 4 1 
no. 2 Hanam 3 2 4 3m2 credit bay 
no. 3 Hanam 14 2 17 1 2 12m2 credit bay 
no. 4 Hanam 6 1 1 12m2 credit bay 
no. 5 Hanam 7 2 57 3 1 12m2 credit bay 
no. 6 Hanam 3 50 1 12m2 credit bay 
no. 7 Hanam 3 2 1 3 
no. 8 Hanam 3 1 12 6 4 2 
no. 9 Hanam 5 1 10 2 1 3m2 credit bay 
no. 10 Hanam 4 9m2 credit bay 
no. 11 Ulugtepe 4 9m2 credit bay 
gongsi 
no. 12 Hanam 10 4 100 3 6 2 12m2 cash bazdr 
------ ---
Other 
sources 
of income 
muzduri 
sotorkaSi 
7 days/w 
muzdwi 
sotorkaSi 
7 days/w 
jelli:ibi 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
garibkiiri 
sotorkaJi 
3 days/w 
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
25 
23 
35 
24 
35 
25 
21 
25 
30 
16 
no 
50 
Guest 
house 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
w 
w 
0\ 
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TAGHAN OBAS (cont.) 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows Donkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep }XOOuced wool for 
persons* carpelS 
no. 13 Hanam 7 4 74 2 6 
no. 14 Hanam 4 1 4 1 2 6m2 credit bay 
no. 15 Hanam 5 4 91 2 2 6m2 credit bay 
no. 16 Hanam 7 3 102 5 12 2 12m2 own wool 
no. 17 Hanam 3 2 14 1 2 3m2 credit bay 
no. 18 Nik~a 2 123 3 
gongsi 
no. 19 Nik~a 4 6 3m2 credit bay 
gongsi 
no. 20 Hanam 5 4 89 8 4 9m2 own wool 
no. 21 Hanam 4 3 1 1 3m2 credit bay 
--------··-- --···-
Olher 
sources 
of income 
sotorkaJi 
4 days/w 
sotorkaJi 
4 days/w 
muzduri 
sotorkaJi 
1 day 
sotorkaJi 
3 days/w 
sotorkaJi 
2 days/w 
muzduri 
daughters 
carpets for 
others 
sotorkaJi 
7 days/w 
sotorkasi 
6 days/w 
----
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
32 
28 
45 
30 
30 
-
-
60 
15 
Guest 
house 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 2 
no 
v.> 
v.> 
-.I 
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TAGHAN OBAS (cont. ) 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows Donkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep JYOdoced wool for 
persons* carpelS 
no. 22 Hanam 4 1 13 1 1 12m2 credit bay 
no. 23 Hanam 5 3 7 1 1 1 12m2 credit bay 
no. 24 Mingajilc 6 5 97 2 2 4 6m2 credit bay 
gongsi 
no. 25 Sarelar 9 1 15 1 5 3 15m2 credit baziir 
no. 26 Sarelar 2 1 20 2 
no. 27 Sarelar 8 70 1 4 3 15m2 cash baziir 
no. 28 Sarelar 2 50 1 4 2 3m2 own wool 
no. 29 Sarelar 3 1 30 1 2 3 9m2 own wool+ 
cash baziir 
no. 30 Sarelar 3 3 40 3 3 18m2 own wool+ 
cash baziir 
Other 
sources 
of income 
sotorkaJi 
2 days/w 
sotorkaJi 
1 day/w 
sotorkaJi 
4 days/w 
sotorkaJi 
2 days/w 
cow herding 
contract 
sotorkaJi 
2 days/w 
sotorkaJi 
2 days/w 
sale of enger 
from ejolfl 
sale of enger 
from ejolfl 
------
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
39 
12 
-
share 
83 
jerib 
Guest 
house 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
VJ 
VJ 
00 
APPENDIX S: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TAGHAN OBAS (cont.) 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows Donkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep prodoced wool for 
persons* carpets 
no. 31 Sarelar 8 1 1 2 1 12m2 cash bazar 
no. 32 Sarelar 4 2 30 2 2 
no. 33 Sarelar 3 40 2 2m2 cash bazar 
no. 34 Sarelar 2 20 
no. 35 Sarelar 5 3 60 2 10 3 18m2 own wool+ 
cash bazar 
no. 36 Sarelar 6 3 60 4 1 6m2 own wool+ 
cash bazar 
no. 37 Sarelar 3 1 1 2 4 9m2 yarn 
cash bazar 
no. 38 Sarelar 5 1 45 1 2 2 9m2 yam 
cash bazar 
no. 39 Sarelar 5 2 40 1 7 2 9m2 cash bazar 
Other 
sources 
of income 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
sale of fruit, 
vegetables 
sotorkaSi 
4 days/w 
sale of 
alfalfa 
muzdwi 
sotorkaSi 
3 days/w 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
among 
all 
Sarelar 
Guest 
house 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
w 
w 
\0 
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TAGHAN OBAS (cont.) 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows Donkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep JXOducro wool for 
persons* carpets 
no.40 Sarelar 2 1 5 
no.41 Sarelar 6 50 1 6 1 180m2 cash baziir 
no. 42 Sarelar 7 1 20 2 5 5 
no.43 Sarelar 3 4 30 1 7 2 9m2 cash baziir 
no.44 Sarelar 5 1 60 3 10 4 6m2 yarn 
cash baziir 
no.45 Sarelar 7 3 50 1 8 3 18m2 yarn 
cash baziir 
no.46 Sarelar 3 1 25 8 4 15m2 cash baziir 
no. 47 Sarelar 3 1 50 
no.48 Sarelar 3 1 20 
no. 49 Sarelar 2 9m2 credit bay 
no. 50 Datxa 4 1 10 2 2 36m2 credit relative 
- ---- --------
Other 
sources 
of income 
muzduri 
sotorkaSi 
1 day/w 
seamstress 
shepherding 
contntct 
peshkal 
sotorkaSi 
1 day/w 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
jellabi 
herding 
contract 
muzduri 
muzduri 
men also 
carpet-making 
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
Guest 
house 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
w 
.j:>. 
0 
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TAGHAN OBAS (cont.) 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows Donkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep JlUdoced wool for 
persons* carpets 
no. 51 Datxa 5 1 60 4 1 9m2 own wool+ 
cash baziir 
no. 52 Datxa 4 2 5 1 24m2 credit bay 
no. 53 Datxa 5 1 10 12m2 yam from 
relative 
no. 54 Datxa 6 1 1 1 9m2 yam from 
relative 
no. 55 Nw-seid 5 50 1 6m2 own wool 
no. 56 Nw-seid 2 1 
no. 57 Nw-seid 2 1 30 2 6m2 own wool 
no. 58 Nw-seid 2 2m2 credit bay 
no. 59 Nw-seid 6 3 10 1 12m2 credit bay 
no.60 Nw-seid 9 2 30 2 4 1 9m2 own wool 
no.61 DahaJ.ar 3 1 60 4 6 6 18m2 own wool 
-
Other 
sources 
of income 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
engerfrom 
ej6KJ 
sotorkaSi 
2days/w 
muzduri 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
muzduri 
sotorkaSi 
2days/w 
oil mill 
sotorkaSi 
7 days/w 
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
Guest 
house 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
w 
""" ...... 
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TAGHAN OBAS (cont.) 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows Donkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep prodln'.d wool for 
persons* carpets 
no. 62 Dahalar 5 1 60 4 6 4 18m2 own wool 
no. 63 Dahalar 6 1 60 4 6 4 helps 
no. 62 + 
shares 
profit 
no.64 Dahalar 4 1 25 2 1 1 12m2 cash hazar 
no.65 Dahalar 8 1 6m2 credit bay 
no.66 Dahalar 4 4 12m2 credit bay 
no. 67 Dahalar 3 
no.68 Sogdenlar 5 1 30 2 8 4 30m2 yarn 
cash hazar 
no.69 Sogdenlar 2 4m2 credit bay 
no. 70 Sogdenlar 3 1 1 
no. 71 Sogdenlar 2 4m2 credit bay 
Other 
sources 
of income 
sotorkaSi 
7 days/w 
sotorkaSi 
7 days/w 
sotorkaSi 
7 days/w 
henling 
sharecropping 
muzduri 
muzduri 
henling 
sotorkaSi 
2days/w 
sharecropping 
sharecropping 
muzduri 
herding, 
smithing 
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
Guest 
house 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
w 
~ 
tv 
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TAGHAN OBAS (cont.) 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows Donkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep prodoced wool for 
persons* carpets 
no. 72 Sog<knlar 4 2m2 credit bay 
no. 73 Erghaylar 5 2 73 1 
no. 74 Erghaylar 2 7m2 credit bay 
no. 75 Erghaylar 3 5 2 
no. 76 Erghaylar 2 1 7 6m2 own wool+ 
credit bay 
no. 77 Erghaylar 3 2 2m2 credit bay 
no. 78 Erghaylar I 1 
no. 79 Erghaylar 6 1 40 3 1 9m2 wool 
cash baziir 
no. 80 Erghaylar 4 1 70 1 1 4.5m2 own wool 
no. 81 Erghaylar 4 3 7m2 credit bay 
no. 82 Qullar 4 1 4 1 
Other 
sources 
of income 
herding 
sharecropping 
selling of 
enger 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
hunting 
muzduri 
muzduri 
transport 
work with 
own camels 
sells yandok 
sotorkaSi 
6days/w 
muzduri 
muzduri 
sharecropping 
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
60 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
30 
20 
Guest 
house 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
(.;.) 
-"'" (.;.) 
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TAGHAN OBAS (cont.) 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows Donkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep prodoced wool for 
persons* carpets 
no. 83 Qullar 3 1 1 
no. 84 Qullar 5 1 
no. 85 Qullar 10 2 11 2 4 4 18m2 yam 
credit bay 
no. 86 Qullar 6 2 1 3 6m2 yam 
credit bay 
no. 87 Qullar 2 1 10 2 1 9m2 cash bazar 
no. 88 Qullar 6 1 70 3 3 2 12m2 cash bazar 
no. 89 Qullar 5 1 2 
Other 
sources 
of income 
sotorkasi 
1 day/w 
muzduri 
muzduri 
garibkiiri 
sotorka.Si 
2 days/w 
sotorka.Si 
2 days/w 
muzduri 
sotorka.Si 
1 day/w 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
sotorka.Si 
2 days/w 
muzduri 
garibkiiri 
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
Guest 
house 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
w 
""-
""-
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC PROFILE 01<' THE TAGHAN OBAS (cont.) 
Domestic Tire No. of Horses Goats and Camels Cows Donkeys Carpets Source of 
unit productive sheep }XlX1wxl wool for 
persons* carpets 
no. 90 Qullar 2 5 2 2 16m2 credit bauir 
together 
with 
others 
no. 91 Qullar 1 
* Number of household members above age of ten years engaging in economic activities. 
Other 
sources 
of income 
sotorkaSi 
2 days/w 
muzduri 
muzduri 
Agri-
cultural 
land 
(jerib) 
Guest 
house 
no 
no 
w 
""" 
VI 
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APPENDIX 6: PRICES OF COMMODITIES IN T AGHAN (DECEMBER 1977) 
(in ser-i-kalan = 14,122kg) 
Foodstuffs and household items 
1 ser clarified butter 
1 ser sesame or linseed oil 
1 ser rice 
1 ser wheat 
1 ser barley 
1 pao tea (Chinese top quality) 
1 pao tea (low quality) 
1 ser salt 
1 pao sugar 
1 pao kerosene 
1 pao nasuar 
1 pao tobacco 
1 large box of matches 
1 pao mutton 
1 pao goat meat 
1 pao beef 
Farm produce 
1 ser autumn wool (for felts) 
1 ser spring wool (for carpets) 
1 ser undyed wool yarn 
1 ser dyed wool yarn 
1 mesqal dyestuff for carpet wool 
1 bundle/sheaf of lucerne (alfalfa) 
1 camel-load of dried sheep dung 
Exchange rate: 44 Afs.= US$1 
1,600 Afs . 
800 Afs. 
250 Afs. 
115 Afs. 
110 Afs. 
95 Afs. 
35 Afs. 
28 Afs. 
18 Afs. 
9 Afs. 
30 Afs. 
52 Afs. 
36 Afs. 
25 Afs. 
25 Afs. 
20 Afs. 
700-800 Afs. 
1,100-1,200 Afs. 
1,700-1,800 Afs. 
1,900-2,000 Afs. 
56 Afs. 
6-8 Afs. 
100-120 Afs. 
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1 camel-load of dried camel dung 
1 camel-load ofyandok (fuel/fodder) 
1 camel-load chopped straw 
Animals 
1 chicken 
1 camel 
1 working horse 
1 riding horse 
1 cow 
1 ram 
1 qaraqul sheep (ewe) 
1 goat 
60-70 Afs. 
100-130 Afs. 
200-300 Afs. 
80-100 Afs. 
10,000-12,000 Afs. 
2,500 Afs. 
6,000-12,000 Afs. 
4,000-6,000 Afs. 
2,500 Afs. 
3,000 Afs. 
800-1,500 Afs. 
In bad years with a shortage of fodder/water, prices of animals are considerably 
lower. 
Machinery 
1 tractor (made in USSR) 
1 lorry (made in USSR) 
* without Afghan Government import taxes. 
465,000 Afs.* 
250,000 Afs. * 
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EXPLANATION TO APPENDICES 7, 8 AND 9 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL INCOME AND EXPENSE PATTERNS 
The income a Ttirkmen economic unit derives from agriculture and/or livestock 
and supplementary activities fluctuates greatly from one year to another depending 
on the climatic, water and market conditions. 
It also depends whether in a given year bridal payments or substantive 
ceremonial expenses (e.g. circumcision) have to be borne. 
In order to show the possible range of fluctuations, I am presenting the incomes 
of two families for good and bad years. Both units own land and livestock and take 
part in a joint government land-lease. One family is also engaged in carpet-making. 
These two economic units correspond with households nos. 73 and 80 of the 
economic profile of the Taghan obas presented in Appendix 5. 
It must be mentioned that the Ttirkmen in general are among the wealthier 
ethnic groups of Afghanistan. According to government sources, the per capita 
income for the year 1977 was 5,544 Afs. (US$ 139).* 
The above national income figures are estimates of the Ministry of Planning 
Affairs, Central Statistics Office. There is no National Accounting System presently 
(1978) in Afghanistan. 
* Source: Statistical Information of Afghanistan 1977-78. 
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APPENDIX 7: ESTIMATED ANNUAL EXPENSES OF THE RICHEST ERGHA Y 
AGROPASTORALIST HOUSEHOLD (1977) 
Figures are for an average year without any special festivities and celebrations. 
Number of household members: five persons and one servant (muzdur). 
On average two visitors are received and fed each day. 
Item Amount Cost per unit Total 
Food items 
Rice 52 ser 250 Afs. 13,000 Afs. 
Tea 30pao 80 Afs. 2,400 Afs. 
Sugar 180pao 20 Afs. 3,600 Afs. 
Leeks, onions 12 ser 100 Afs. 1,200 Afs. 
Dried tomato powder 6 ser 45 Afs. 270 Afs. 
(pomoder) 
Salt 3 ser 28 Afs. 84 Afs. 
Pepper (red, black) 1pao 2,880 Afs. 
Meat (from own herd) 10 animals 800 Afs. (av.) 8,000 Afs. 
Meat (from butcher) 5 ser 600 Afs. 3,000 Afs. 
(US$783) 34,434 Afs. 
Household items 
Dyes for carpet wool 6 mesqal 56 Afs. 336 Afs. 
Crockery, other utensils 2,000 Afs. 
Matches 12 packs 36 Afs. 432 Afs. 
Kerosene for lamps 208pao 19 Afs. 3,952 Afs. 
(US$153) 6,720 Afs. 
Clothing 
For family member 15,000 Afs. 
For servant (muzdur) 2,500 Afs. 
(US$398) 17,500 Afs. 
Entertainment 
Tobacco for waterpipe 52pao 60 Afs. 3,120 Afs. 
Nasuar 12pao 40 Afs. 480 Afs. 
Teahouse and restaurant 1,000 Afs. 
Opium for servant (addict) 240mesqal 50 Afs. 12,000 Afs. 
(US$377) 16,600 Afs. 
350 
APPENDIX 7: ESTIMATED ANNUAL EXPENSES OF THE RICHEST ERGHA Y 
AGROPASTORALIST HOUSEHOLD (1977) (cont.) 
Item Amount Cost per unit Total 
Miscellaneous 
Transportation 360 Afs. 
Ammunition for shotgun 500 Afs. 
Medical expenses 1,000 Afs. 
(US$42) 1,860 Afs. 
Agropastoral activities 
Barley 80ser 100 Afs. 8,000 Afs. 
Dried lucerne 10,000 Afs. 
Eggs for buzkasi horse 2,000 Afs. 
Graduated land-tax 2,440 Afs. 
Rent for Government 6,000 Afs. 
land-lease 
Fee for mirab and kariadiir 2,000 Afs. 
"Gifts" for government 4,500 Afs. 
officials 
(US$794) 34,940 Afs. 
Total expenses (US$2,547) 112,054 Afs. 
Exchange rate: 44 Ms. = US$1 
1 ser = 14,122 kg. 
Note: no precise budgeting and accounting is done. Figures are compiled on the basis 
of statements by several household members and from my own observations. 
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APPENDIX 8: ESTIMATED ANNUAL INCOME OF THE RICHEST ERGHA Y 
AGROPASTORALIST HOUSEHOLD (1977) 
Type of income Amount in good year Amount in bad year 
Cash income 
Sale of wool for felts 4,000 Afs. 2,400 Afs. 
Sale of qarakul skins 40,000 Afs. 10,000 Afs. 
Sale of yandok 50,000 Afs. 70,000 Afs. 
Sale of fodder (enger) 8,000 Afs. 32,000 Afs. 
Sale of dried sheep dung 4,000 Afs. 4,000 Afs. 
Sale of dried camel dung 3,000 Afs. 
Sale of sheep 7,500 Afs. 
Sale of goats 7,500 Afs. 
Total cash income 109,000 Afs. 133,400 Afs. 
Subsistence income 
Melons 15,000 Afs. 1,000 Afs. 
Wheat 9,000 Afs. 1,870 Afs. 
Barley 3,000 Afs. 1,500 Afs. 
Sesame (oil) 15,000 Afs. 3,000 Afs. 
Meat 10,000 Afs. 8,000 Afs. 
Total subsistence income 52,000 Afs. 15,370 Afs. 
Total income 161,800 Afs. 148,770 Afs. 
(US$3,677) (US$3,381) 
Per capita income 26,966 Afs. 24,795 Afs. 
(six persons) (US$612) (US$563) 
Exchange rate: 44 Ms. = US$1 
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APPENDIX 9: ESTIMATED ANNUAL INCOME OF A TAGHAN FAMILY OF 
MEDIAN WEALTH (1977) 
Type of income 
Cash income 
Sale of wool for felts 
Sale of qaraqul skins 
Sale of carpets 
Sale of yandok 
Sale of sheep 
Sale of goats 
Total cash income 
Subsistence income 
Wheat 
Barley 
Sesame/flax 
Meat 
Wool for felts 
Total subsistence income 
Total income 
Per capita income 
(four persons)* 
Amount in good year 
4,800 Afs. 
40,000 Afs. 
11,000 Afs. 
2,000 Afs. 
57,800 Afs. 
5,000 Afs. 
900 Afs. 
2,000 Afs. 
1,600 Afs. 
1,200 Afs. 
10,700 Afs. 
68,500 Afs. 
(US$1,557) 
13,700 Afs. 
(US$311) 
Exchange rate: 44 Afs. = US$1 
Amount in bad year 
1,800 Afs. 
10,000 Afs. 
7,000 Afs. 
10,500 Afs. 
2,000 Afs. 
31,300 Afs. 
1,000 Afs. 
800 Afs. 
600 Afs. 
350 Afs. 
-
2,750 Afs. 
34,050 Afs. 
(US$774) 
8,513 Afs. 
(US$193) 
* in a bad year the household consists of four persons. In a good year the household 
also employs a servant (muzdur). 
APPENDIX 10: POPULATION DENSITY OF MAIN TURKMEN DISTRICTS/SUBDISTRICTS OF 
JOWZJAN PROVINCE 
District (D) Surface/km2 Population ace. Population ace. Persons per km2 Number of villages 
Subdistrict (S)) Ministry of Ministry of 
Agriculture Interior 
Mordian (S) 829 10,590 11,610 12.77 14.00 20 
Faizabad 829 10,650 10,109 12.84 12.19 25 
Khanaga(S) 1019 13,004 12,609 12.76 12.37 32 
MINGAJIK (D) 952 12,771 13,481 13.41 14.16 28 
Aqcha(D) 75 8,380 11,669 111.73 155.58 18 
Khamiab (S) 1008 3,500 3,325 3.47 3.29 3 
Karkin (D) 1230 5,330 6,207 4.33 5.04 6 
Total 5942 64,225 69,010 10.80 11.60 132 
-
Note: Figures do not include women and girls 
w 
Ul 
w 
APPENDIX 11: POPULATION OF THE WOLUSWALI OF MINGAJIK 
Village Population ace. Population ace. Population Major ethnic groups Muhajirin (M) 
Ministry of Ministry of author's figures Watani (W) 
Agriculture Interior 
Chaharcbangu 950 1,073 915 Tiirkrnen, few Uzbeks mostly M 
Harun-i-A'wal 360 395 413 Tlirkmen mostly W 
Harun-i-Dowom 370 359 368 Tlirkmen mostly W 
Mingajke-i-
Allaberan 550 547 498 Tlirkmen mostly W 
Sheikh Razi 450 438 458 Tlirkmen w 
w 
~ 
Dali Turkmanya 1120 572 782 TUrk men w 
Dali Afghani 160 271 132 Pashtun M 
Safar Wali-i-A'wal 520 295 466 Tiirkrnen Taghan w 
Safar Wali-i-
Dow om 160 99 125 Tiirkrnen Taghan w 
BaljaAbdul 
Rahman 450 437 311 Tiirkrnen Taghan w 
Jui-e-Oruz 320 293 257 Tiirkrnen Taghan w 
Jui-i-Shah Khan 310 336 272 Tiirkmen Taghan w 
-- --- -
APPENDIX 11: POPULATION OF THE WOLUSWALI OF MINGAJIK (cont.) 
Village Population ace. Population ace. Population Major ethnic groups 
Ministry of Ministry of author's figures 
Agriculture Interior 
Qorchango-i-
Muhajir 1,024 1,156 978 Ttirkmen 
Qorchango-i 
Watani 318 333 319 Tlirlcmen 
Qoyenli-i-Watani 417 474 410 Tlirlcmen 
Qoyenli-i-
Muhajir 448 491 440 TUrlcmen 
QaraAdiq 291 296 270 Ttirkmen 
Qizil Ayak 
Odekar Suleyman 581 574 350 Tlirlcmen 
Alamlik-i-Kona 182 200 deserted Ttirkmen/Uzbek 
Khali Jfibeji 160 169 128 Tlirlcmen/few Uzbek 
Qarya-i-Abbas 500 531 470 Uzbek:/few Ttirkmen 
Khatab 280 277 195 Uzbek:/Ttirlcmen 
Mingajek-i-
Qulighajar 360 452 433 TUrlcmen 
----
Muhajirin (M) 
Watani (W) 
all M 
all W 
aUW 
all M 
aiiM 
W, Suleyman = 
M 
partly M 
M 
M 
M, W 
M 
Vl 
V\ 
V\ 
APPENDIX 11: POPULATION OF THE WOLUSWALI OF MINGAJIK (cont.) 
Village Population ace. Population ace. Population Major ethnic groups 
Minisll)' of Minisll)' of author's figures 
Agriculture Interior 
Mingajek-i-
Fararee 380 420 322 Ttirkmen 
QazanNaraw - 754 720 Tiirkmen 
Eraghly 450 480 487 Ttirkmen 
Islam Aq Maidan 820 868 569 Ttirkmen 
Sultan Aregh 560 640 691 Arab 
QazanKeleq 280 251 212 Ttirkmen 
Total 12,771 13,481 11,991 
--- - --------
Note: Figures do not include women and girls 
Muhajirin (M) 
Watani (W) 
w 
w 
M 
W,M 
W, M 
w 
VI 
0\ 
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APPENDIX 12: EXAMPLE OF A LITIGATION 
The following story may serve as a case in point on how crimes were dealt with. 
One evening in the autumn of 1977, Aga Murad, the brother of my 'father', came 
to our yurt in a very excited state of mind. He related that his son, Beg Murad, who 
was working as a shepherd for a bay in Jui Balja, was gravely wounded in a fight 
with three shepherds of another bay. Apparently Beg Murad, trying to prevent the 
sheep of the others from grazing on his master's pasture, was hitting one of the 
shepherds with his stick. The others, in retaliation, started to attack Beg Murad with 
an axe. People collecting firewood nearby apparently witnessed the brawl. (Most 
people do not want to be called as witnesses, since they are afraid of the 
unpredictability and arbitrariness of the government officials.) 
The same evening, the employer of Beg Nazar came to see my 'father', who was 
the responsible lineage elder and at the same time a bay. Since there were third-
party witnesses, the case could not be concealed from the government and settled 
according to adat, which would have been a simple matter. At the same time, my 
presence would not make the case easier. Surely the government wanted to show me 
its efficiency and competence in such matters. 
In a small maslaxat some six elders were deliberating in our guest tam how to 
'sell' the case to the government without having to pay too much. A story was put 
together, according to which the three shepherds a priori had the intention of killing 
Beg Murad to steal his sheep. Then a delegation of elders together with the kariadiir 
proceeded to the seat of the government to inform the police commander. The next 
day, the master of Beg Murad and the master of the three shepherds came to further 
discuss a settlement with the elders of all parties concerned. They were eager to 
quickly settle the matter between themselves. While the deliberations were in full 
swing, three soldiers arrived to arrest the employer of the three shepherds and 
together with the kariadiir of his oba ( a rather doubtful character) they rode to the 
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seat of the government. The police commander accused the bay of homicide, as he 
must have instructed and incited his shepherds to kill Beg Murad. Everybody 
present, of course knew, that the story was not true, and that the commander had to 
put on an impressively threatening show to extort a high bribe. It was now a matter 
of playing the shirini-game and haggle over payments. Casually the police 
commander mentioned that the district governor was not in town, in other words, the 
matter could be settled solely with him, if the price was right. After this cue, the 
party was dismissed. On the way home, I overheard them saying that the case would 
cost at least between 30,000 to 40,000 Afs. (US$ 665-890). Trying to leave the 
government out of the settlement would not have been cheaper either, because the 
event was wimessed by outsiders who could easily report to the government out of 
personal grudges against one or the other party. In such a case, the government 'fees' 
would have been even higher, because the parties had failed to inform the 
government and thus violated the law. 
As far as tl}e real damages were concerned, the master of Beg Murad and Beg 
Murad himself received satisfaction from the culprits in the form of three sheep and 
500Afs. cash for medical fees. Everyone concerned shared a meal in our guest 
tam,.said the usual prayer (du'a-i-xair) and the case was closed. 
Some ten days later I heard that the government collected 40,000 Afs. ( 10,000 
Afs. each for the police commander, the district governor, the public prosecutor and 
the qazi) in settlement of the case. 
It remains to be said that the bay of the three shepherds paid the sum to the 
government, keeping the shepherds in a debt-relationship - that is - making 
deductions from their pay until the full amount is paid back. 
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